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1
Introduction
Susan N. Houseman
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Economic and trade liberalization in developing countries, coupled
with technological advances that have greatly lowered trade and communication costs, have fueled an explosion in the volume of international
trade since the 1990s. Trade liberalization and technological advances
also have enabled a tremendous expansion in the types of international
transactions, including trade in services and intangibles and the development of complex global supply chains. The accompanying expansion
of multinational companies has blurred the boundaries of national economies, and the production of manufactured goods and some services
increasingly has shifted to emerging economies. While international
trade in goods and services has long been expanding, the speed and
scope of recent changes have given rise to the term “globalization.”
Among the most pressing policy questions in the United States and
other advanced economies are those concerning the impact of globalization: Has globalization fostered productivity growth and well-being
in advanced economies? Or have the forces of globalization weakened
key national industries, resulted in widespread worker dislocation and
wage stagnation, and worsened inequality? Understanding the impacts
of globalization is critical to fashioning appropriate policies in a rapidly
changing world. But understanding its impacts requires good data, and
national statistical systems were not designed to measure many of the
transactions occurring in today’s global economy.
The chapters in this volume and its companion, Measuring Globalization: Factoryless Manufacturing, Global Supply Chains, and Trade
in Intangibles and Data, identify biases and gaps in national statistics,
examine the magnitude of the problems they pose, and propose solutions to address signiﬁcant biases and ﬁll key data gaps. The chapters
originally were presented as papers at a research conference in 2013
funded by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and their authors include

1
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researchers from academic institutions and statistics agencies in the
United States and other countries.
Shifts in the location of production and associated trade patterns
have been driven to a large degree by lower prices in emerging economies. The research in this volume focuses on biases in price indexes
that may arise from the growth of globalization, building on work presented at an earlier Sloan-funded conference in 2009.1 Price indexes
likely fail to capture price drops that consumers and businesses enjoy
when they shift purchases to lower-cost foreign suppliers—a general problem termed “sourcing substitution bias” that results in an
understatement of real import growth and an overstatement of real
gross domestic product (GDP) and multifactor productivity growth.
Another source of bias arises from the fact that the use of imports in
the economy is not tracked. Errors in the allocation of imports to industries and ﬁnal consumption, which is required in the construction of key
industry statistics, may have become more important as the volume and
uses of imports in the United States and other advanced economies have
grown. Such errors can lead to biases in input price indexes and associated biases in measures of real output and productivity growth. The
decline of transportation costs also may have imparted a bias to price
indexes for imports, particularly low-cost imported products.
Another source of bias to price indexes may arise when price
changes associated with a new product or model are not observed.
To avoid such biases for domestic product prices, the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics has used hedonic indexes to adjust prices for changes
in product attributes, particularly for products experiencing rapid
technological advances. With the growing volume of imports in technologically advanced product lines, the fact that hedonic indexes have
not been used for imported products may be imparting a signiﬁcant
bias to import price indexes in certain product segments. At the same
time, adjusting prices of domestically produced products for quality
improvements has meant that price deﬂators in certain industries—in
particular computers and semiconductors—are rapidly falling, and, correspondingly, their real value-added is rapidly increasing. As a result,
relatively small industries (in nominal terms) drive measures of real
GDP and productivity for aggregate manufacturing. One consequence
of the use of hedonic indexes has been widespread misinterpretation of
real output and productivity growth measures in U.S. manufacturing.
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In addition to examining the theoretical nature of price-index biases
that have been exacerbated by the growth of globalization, the chapters
in this volume estimate the magnitude of various biases to price indexes
and to real output and productivity growth in the United States and
other countries. The ﬁndings point to a number of signiﬁcant concerns,
and the authors propose concrete solutions to address the biases, which
include changes in the way some price indexes are constructed and the
introduction of a new price survey.
The second conference volume extends the analysis to several other
measurement issues arising from the growth of globalization. The fragmentation of production has given rise to so-called factoryless goods
producers (FGPs): ﬁrms that design and market products but outsource
the manufacturing of their products, often overseas. Several chapters
consider the implications of a proposal to reclassify U.S. FGPs in the
manufacturing sector. The growth of global supply chains often renders traditional international trade statistics misleading. Other chapters
review new data on trade in value-added, which are designed to more
accurately depict the volume of international trade and the stages of
production performed in each country. Chapters in the second volume
also examine the classiﬁcation of output of multinational corporations
in national statistics and, with the advent of the Internet, the explosion
of international trade in data.

BIASES TO PRICE INDEXES: THEORY
In “Sourcing Substitution Bias and Related Price Index Biases,”
Alice Nakamura, Erwin Diewert, John Greenlees, Leonard Nakamura,
and Marshall Reinsdorf provide a thorough examination of biases to
price indexes, with a special emphasis on biases resulting from the
growth of international trade. A set of price index biases Nakamura et
al. collectively label “sourcing substitution biases” arise from the methodology the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and statistical agencies in
other countries use in constructing price indexes. In particular, the BLS
collects periodic price quotes for very speciﬁc products (e.g., a 10.75ounce can of Campbell’s soup) sold by a speciﬁc retail outlet in the
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case of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), sold by a producer in the case
of the Producer Price Index (PPI), or purchased by an importer in the
case of the Import Price Index (MPI). The price changes reﬂected in
the CPI, PPI, MPI, and other price indexes are essentially computed as
weighted averages of the price changes of product-seller (or purchaser)
observations (e.g., the price change of a 10.75-ounce can of Campbell’s
soup sold at the Walmart outlet in Kalamazoo, Michigan) as collected
in BLS surveys.
As Nakamura et al. explain, this methodology implicitly assumes
that the “law of one price” always holds: any observed difference in
prices between apparently similar products is assumed to be the result
of differences in product quality. Yet, the law of one price is routinely
violated. Sourcing substitution bias arises when buyers shift from a highcost supplier to a low-cost supplier of a good or service. Because price
indexes are generally derived as weighted averages of price changes of
speciﬁc products within the surveyed establishments, price drops that
purchasers enjoy when shifting from a high- to a low-cost supplier are
not captured. The rapid growth of low-priced big-box retailers such as
Walmart and the decline of high-priced small retail stores raised concerns in the past that growth of the CPI was systematically overstated
(see, for example, Reinsdorf [1993] and Diewert [1998]). So-called
outlet substitution bias is one type of sourcing substitution bias.
The dramatic growth of emerging economies, most notably China,
since 2000 and associated shifts in the location of production have raised
concerns about other types of sourcing substitution biases. The growing
share of U.S. imports coming from emerging economies reﬂects a shift
in production away from high-cost suppliers in the United States and
other advanced economies to low-cost suppliers in emerging economies. The cost savings enjoyed by consumers or businesses from these
shifts to low-cost overseas suppliers is not captured in the import price
index, resulting in an upward bias in this index. In addition, as emphasized in several chapters in this volume (Alterman; Fukao and Arai;
Houseman, Bartik, and Sturgeon; and Nakamura et al.), the import price
index is used to construct industry input price indexes, which in turn are
used to compute the growth of industry real value-added. Upward bias
to the import and input price indexes from shifts in sourcing from either
high-cost domestic or foreign suppliers to low-cost foreign suppliers
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results in an upward bias to aggregate and industry real GDP growth
and certain productivity measures. Nakamura et al. point out that price
index biases arising from shifts in sourcing cannot be addressed simply
by altering the formula used to construct the price indexes; the price
drop associated with the shift to a low-cost supplier is not measured
under current procedures, and no amount of reweighting of observed
prices will ﬁx the problem.
A closely related problem for price indexes arises from the introduction of new products or models, as is discussed in chapters by
Nakamura et al., Brian Kovak and Ryan Michaels, and Mina Kim and
Marshall Reinsdorf. In order to compute a price change for a speciﬁc
product sold or purchased by a speciﬁc establishment, it must be in the
sample for two periods. When new products or models are introduced
into price samples, typically it is assumed that the price change for the
new item is the same as that for closely related ongoing products—a
procedure called “linking in.” Often, however, price changes coincide with model changes. For example, a company may embed a price
increase into a new model; to some degree the higher price of the new
model may reﬂect higher product quality and to some degree a pure
price increase. Because new models are likely to be subject to the linking procedure when they are added to price samples, the price increase
in this example is missed, a problem called “product substitution bias”
(Nakamura and Steinsson 2012).
Conversely, Kim and Reinsdorf point out that, particularly for products undergoing rapid technical improvements, the linking in procedure
may result in a substantial overstatement of price index growth. Unlike
in other BLS price indexes, hedonic methods to adjust for changes in
product attributes, and thereby avoid linking in, are not used in the
construction of import and export price indexes. Consequently, these
indexes are especially subject to this type of bias.
Similarly, when businesses and consumers shift purchases to a
lower-cost foreign product, the product typically is not identical to the
one for which it is substituted. Indeed, the import price index, which
is based on a survey of importers, treats country of origin as a product
characteristic. This practice virtually assures that if an importer shifts its
purchases of particular products, say, from Japan to China in response
to lower Chinese prices, the Chinese products will be linked into the
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sample and the price drop for importers missed, no matter how close in
speciﬁcation the Chinese and Japanese products.
The common justiﬁcation for the assumption that the law of one
price always holds, which underlies current price index methodology, is
that arbitrage eliminates any price differences. Building on earlier work
in which they ﬁnd large, systematic, and persistent cross-country price
differences among semiconductor wafers with identical product speciﬁcations (Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels 2013), Kovak and Michaels argue
that trading frictions may interfere with arbitrage. In “Assessing Price
Indexes for Markets with Trading Frictions: A Quantitative Illustration,” they develop a theoretical model describing the price dynamics
of incumbent and new suppliers when buyers face high short-term costs
in switching suppliers. Their theory is motivated by the stylized facts of
semiconductor wafer production in which it is prohibitively expensive
for wafer design ﬁrms to switch contract manufacturers for a speciﬁc
design because of high manufacturing setup costs. In the short term,
the incumbent supplier gouges ﬁrms that cannot switch. Over time, the
prices of old and new suppliers converge. Importantly, their model can
explain changes in relative prices when no change in the characteristics
of the product or service provided by the suppliers has occurred.
Several chapters examine potential sources of bias to price indexes
that are unrelated to sourcing substitution or to the introduction of new
models or products. Benjamin Bridgman examines transportation costs
for imported and exported goods and their implications for price indexes.
Usually, the lower a good’s price, the larger the share of its total price
made up by transportation or speciﬁc trade costs. Most notably, with
transportation costs generally falling over time, the price indexes of
lower-priced goods from emerging economies like China will rise more
slowly than those for higher-priced products from advanced economies,
all else being the same. Falling transportation costs, therefore, will tend
to result in an overstatement in the growth in real (quantity of) imports
from emerging economies relative to advanced economies. The size of
trade costs is particularly high in ﬁnal goods prices, but Bridgman notes
that as trade costs fall, this source of bias will become less important.
As discussed in chapters by Jon Samuels, Thomas Howells, Matthew
Russell, and Erich Strassner and by Kyoji Fukao and Sonoe Arai, a
different type of bias to the input price index may arise from the fact
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that statistics agencies generally do not track the destination of imports
in the economy. Instead, agencies must make assumptions about how
imported goods and services are allocated between ﬁnal demand and
intermediate uses in industries. Typically, statistics agencies assume an
industry’s use of an imported item is proportional to its overall use of
the input in the economy—the so-called import comparability or import
proportionality assumption. For instance, if an industry accounts for
10 percent of the use of a particular product, then it is assumed that
it uses 10 percent of the imports of that product. Input price deﬂators
are constructed for each industry as a weighted average of domestic
and import prices. If the allocation of imported and domestic inputs to
an industry is incorrect and if price trends of imported and domestic
inputs differ, industry input price indexes could be signiﬁcantly biased.
Because input price indexes are used to compute an industry’s real
value-added and certain productivity growth measures, these statistics
could be biased as well. As Fukao and Arai note, however, if one industry is using relatively more of an imported input, another industry will
be using relatively less. As a result, the biases across industries will
tend to cancel each other out and so have little effect on the accuracy of
aggregate GDP or productivity measures.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTS OF
PRICE BIASES
The work in this volume signiﬁcantly extends empirical research
presented at the 2009 conference on the magnitude of biases to U.S.
price index, real output, and multifactor productivity growth measures
arising from the shift in sourcing to lower-priced foreign manufactured
goods. In order to estimate these biases, researchers must make assumptions about the quality-adjusted price gaps for goods in advanced and
emerging economies when shifts in sourcing occur. Reinsdorf and
Yuskavage (2014) utilized apparent inconsistencies between, on the one
hand, the Consumer Price Index—which the authors point out should
be less prone to sourcing substitution bias—and, on the other hand, the
Producer and Import Price Indexes to estimate the bias to the Import
Price Index for manufactured goods. They ﬁnd evidence of substantial
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upward biases to import price indexes in durable goods and selected
nondurable goods. Although the implication of these biases for aggregate real GDP growth is modest, Reinsdorf and Yuskavage estimate that
aggregate multifactor productivity growth was overstated by about 10
percent between 1997 and 2007.
Other prior research used case study evidence along with microdata on import prices to assess price differences between manufactured
goods produced in emerging economies, in intermediate countries, and
in the United States and other advanced economies. Under various
assumptions about the price gap, Houseman et al. (2011) estimate that
between 1997 and 2007, real value-added in U.S. manufacturing was
overstated by 0.2 to 0.5 percentage points and multifactor productivity
by 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points. Although the bias to real value-added
growth was a relatively small share of measured growth in the computer
and electronic products industry, it may have accounted for somewhere
between a ﬁfth and a half of the growth in the rest of manufacturing.
In this volume, authors use a variety of other evidence on price
declines associated with the shift in sourcing to low-cost foreign suppliers in order to estimate biases to price indexes and to real output
and productivity growth in the United States and other countries. The
Japanese government collects unique data on the prices of products sold
in Japan as compared to other countries, including the United States
and China. In their chapter, “Biases to Manufacturing Statistics from
Offshoring,” Fukao and Arai ﬁnd substantial price gaps for inputs sold
in developing countries and Japan, not only in products such as apparel
and textiles but also in machinery. They estimate that large price gaps
and growth of imported intermediates resulted in substantial underestimates of real input growth and overestimates of multifactor productivity
growth, especially in Japan’s machinery sector.
In the appendix to “Measuring Manufacturing: How the Computer
and Semiconductor Industries Affect the Numbers and Perceptions,”
Timothy Bartik, Timothy Sturgeon, and I use prior estimates of the
bias to real value-added growth for U.S. manufacturing (Houseman
et al. 2011) to estimate the biases to manufacturing real value-added
growth for each U.S. state. Over the decade ending in 2007, we ﬁnd
that adjusting for sourcing substitution bias lowers manufacturing real
value-added growth rates by 0.1 to 0.7 percentage points, with the largest adjustments occurring in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Indiana.
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The biases to manufacturing examined in our chapter could result
from a shift in sourcing of intermediate inputs from high-priced domestic suppliers to low-priced foreign suppliers (offshoring) or from
high-priced foreign suppliers to low-priced foreign suppliers (shifts in
import sourcing). Two chapters in the volume—“Import Sourcing Bias
in Manufacturing Productivity Growth” by Robert Inklaar and “Import
Allocation across Industries, Import Prices across Countries, and Estimates of Industry Growth and Productivity” by Samuels et al.—focus
solely on the latter source of bias.
Inklaar examines what he terms “import sourcing bias” in the manufacturing sector in all major trading countries from 1995 to 2008. To
estimate cross-country price differentials for speciﬁc products, Inklaar
computes unit values of imports from United Nations Comtrade data.
He acknowledges that this approach has certain drawbacks. One is that,
whereas the methodology used by statistics agencies assumes that all
cross-country price differences are attributable to product quality differences, the use of unit values assumes the opposite extreme: None
of the observed price differences reﬂect product quality differences.
Moreover, because unit values are computed on fairly aggregated product categories, there is likely to be considerable heterogeneity in the
products included in them. Despite these caveats, the average price
differentials that Inklaar ﬁnds are generally in line with case study evidence, and they fall over the period studied. For the advanced European
countries, the median price differential from importing a particular
product from another advanced EU country versus a new EU country
(the latter having been former Soviet bloc members) or from another
emerging economy (such as China) was 30 to 35 percent in 1995. That
price gap had fallen to 10 percent for new EU countries and to 20 percent for other emerging economies by 2008.
Inklaar estimates that annual multifactor productivity growth for
manufacturing sectors in 20 advanced countries was, on average, overstated by 0.18 to 0.34 percentage points, representing 13 to 25 percent
of MFP growth over the period. Evidence of import sourcing bias was
considerably higher in advanced European countries than in the United
States. Using Inklaar’s methodology, Samuels et al. also report little
import sourcing bias for U.S. manufacturing. Not surprisingly, Inklaar
ﬁnds no evidence of import sourcing bias in emerging economies.
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Although Inklaar’s ﬁndings should be interpreted with caution, they
suggest that import sourcing bias could be signiﬁcant in many countries.
Using detailed data on prices and product characteristics for speciﬁc
items, the chapters by Kovak and Michaels and by Kim and Reinsdorf
are not subject to these concerns and also report large cross-country
differences in prices, even after carefully controlling for differences in
product quality. Kovak and Michaels use detailed proprietary transaction price data between ﬁrms that specialize in the design and marketing
of semiconductor chips and foundries that specialize in fabricating chips
for these ﬁrms. They ﬁnd large cross-country differences in the transaction prices for chips with identical speciﬁcations, although the prices
display some convergence over time. Nonetheless, the authors acknowledge that at least some part of the observed price differentials could be
the result of differences in the services provided by the fabricators, such
as the rate at which chips are rejected for quality reasons. In an industry
such as semiconductors that is characterized by high switching costs in
the short term, Kovak and Michaels argue that cross-country price differentials observed late in the product cycle reﬂect time-invariant quality
differences. Adjusting for quality differences, their simulations suggest
that semiconductor price indexes substantially understate the true price
decline because price drops associated with switching to lower-cost providers in countries such as China are not captured.
In “The Impact of Globalization on Prices: A Test of Hedonic Price
Indexes for Imports,” Kim and Reinsdorf use hedonic price index
methodology to control for cross-country differences in product attributes and to test for the existence of substantial biases in import price
indexes. The authors note that both rapid technological change and
shifts in sourcing across countries are likely to result in biased import
price indexes. Products from different countries or products with substantially new attributes are treated as different products, and under
the matched model procedures used in the construction of import price
indexes, price changes associated with a shift in sourcing to a lower-cost
country or with the introduction of a new product are missed. Hedonic
price indexes adjust for quality differences between products, allowing
price changes associated with the introduction of new products or shifts
in product sourcing to be taken into account. While other BLS price
indexes sometimes use hedonic adjustments to avoid these price index
biases, hedonic indexes have not been used to adjust import prices.
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The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the feasibility of hedonic
indexes for import prices, using televisions and cameras as test cases.
Kim and Reinsdorf supplement information on product characteristics collected as part of the import price survey with information about
these products available on the Web. They ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant
biases in import price indexes for these product groups, both of which
were characterized by substantial technical advances and shifts in country sourcing. For televisions, they estimate an upward bias in the import
price index of 2.2 percentage points per year, of which 1.3 points derive
from undermeasured gains from new technology and 0.9 points from
unmeasured price declines from country substitution; for cameras they
estimate an upward bias of 10.5 percentage points per year, with 5.8
points deriving from technology and 4.7 points from country sourcing
changes.
The chapter by Kim and Reinsdorf underscores the importance of
accounting not only for shifts in sourcing but also for technological
change in those products when constructing price indexes. Failure to
properly account for technological improvements in imported products
could result in a signiﬁcant understatement in the real growth of imports
and correspondingly in an overstatement of measures of domestic real
output and productivity growth. By implication, consistent use of
hedonic price index methodology for domestic and imported products
is critical.
The use of hedonic indexes raises other concerns, however, as is
illustrated in my chapter with Bartik and Sturgeon. The U.S. CPI and
PPI use hedonic indexes to adjust for quality improvements in products subject to rapid technological change, most notably computers
and semiconductors. Although adjusting for improvements in product
quality is appropriate, we argue that it has led to substantial misinterpretation of U.S. manufacturing statistics. In recent decades, measured
real GDP growth in U.S. manufacturing has exceeded or kept pace with
aggregate GDP, except during recessions, and many have pointed to
these growth statistics as an indicator of manufacturing’s strength in
the United States. Virtually all of that growth, however, is attributable
to the computer and semiconductor industries. Although these industries account for a small share of nominal manufacturing output, their
prices, when adjusted for product improvements, are rapidly declining,
and their real value-added growth substantially outpaces that in other
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industries, thus explaining the outsized effect these industries have on
aggregate manufacturing statistics. Hedonic price indexes are highly
sensitive to methodology used. Moreover, using proprietary data on
global production of computers and semiconductors, we show that the
United States was declining as a location of production for these products, even while they were driving the apparent robust growth in U.S.
manufacturing.
Other problems may arise from the fact that countries generally
do not track the destination of imports in the economy. The chapters
by Samuels et al. and Fukao and Arai examine possible biases to input
price indexes, real value-added, and multifactor productivity resulting
from inaccuracies in the allocation of imported inputs to ﬁnal demand
and to industries as intermediate inputs. Samuels et al. ﬁnd that, compared to the standard import comparability assumption, allocating
imports to ﬁnal and intermediate uses based on broad economic categories—as proposed by Timmer (2012)—does result in a substantially
different allocation of imports to intermediate uses for some product
categories. This alternative allocation does not incorporate any new
information about import uses in the economy but instead simply varies
the assumption about their use. In contrast, Japan collects information
on the destination of imports in the economy. Fukao and Arai exploit
this information to test how real input and multifactor productivity
growth for Japanese industries vary under import allocations based on
survey data, as compared to allocations based on the import comparability assumption, which is used in most countries. They ﬁnd substantial
over- and underestimates of real input and productivity growth at the
detailed industry level, although they note that, by construction, these
errors will tend to cancel each other out in the aggregate economy.
It is important to note that errors in the allocation of imports at
the industry level have potentially important implications for economic
impact analyses commonly conducted with these data. Analysts often
use industry data to predict the effects of increases or declines in an
industry’s output on employment and income at the local, regional, or
national level. These effects depend critically on industry input-output
relationships, which govern the spillover effects on employment and
income in supplier industries. The employment and income effects of
policies targeting a particular industry, for instance, will be lower as the
imported inputs used by the industry become greater.
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SOLUTIONS
To address biases that rapid technological progress and globalization have likely exacerbated, several chapters propose fundamental
changes to the way various price indexes are constructed. Nakamura et
al. recommend that in many circumstances the BLS depart from its standard practice of collecting single-point-in-time price quotes for speciﬁc
products from speciﬁc establishments. They point out that the advent of
UPC codes and electronic communications enables ﬁrms to easily supply the universe of transaction prices on speciﬁc items over the course
of the month. Averaging these transaction prices within establishments
would eliminate biases to price indexes that result from sales promotions. Averaging UPC transaction prices across establishments would
be necessary to address outlet substitution bias in the CPI, the form of
sourcing substitution bias that occurs when buyers shift purchases to
stores offering lower prices. Some have argued that pure transaction
price data do not reﬂect auxiliary attributes that products acquire as
a result of where the products are sold; for example, some consumers
may ﬁnd shopping at a small but higher-priced store less time consuming or otherwise more pleasant than at a low-priced big-box store. As
the authors point out, however, international guidelines explicitly state
that the unpaid time consumers take in shopping should not be taken
into consideration in constructing price indexes.
While the averaging of transaction prices for UPC codes would
help address outlet substitution bias in the CPI, it would not deal with
other types of sourcing substitution bias, including biases stemming
from shifts in purchases to low-cost foreign suppliers. This is because
no matter how similar the products, UPC codes are unique to a producer—domestic or foreign. To address biases in import price indexes,
Kim and Reinsdorf propose using hedonic indexes in lieu of matched
model indexes, which miss price changes that occur whenever new
models are introduced or importers shift to lower-cost foreign suppliers. The authors demonstrate that information already collected as part
of the BLS import prices program, when supplemented with publicly
available information on the Internet, is sufﬁcient to implement hedonic
indexes, and that biases in matched model indexes can be sizable.
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The use of hedonic indexes in computing import price indexes
would only address sourcing substitution biases associated with shifts
from a high- to a low-cost foreign supplier. To more completely address
sourcing substitution bias in input price indexes, William Alterman, the
former BLS assistant commissioner for international prices, proposes a
new price index that would be based on a survey of input purchasers. As
noted, input price indexes miss price declines whenever ﬁrms shift from
high- to low-cost suppliers of intermediate inputs; these shifts could be
from a high- to a low-cost domestic supplier, from a high-cost domestic supplier to a low-cost foreign supplier, or from a high-cost foreign
supplier to a low-cost foreign supplier. When such price drops are not
captured, the growth of the industry’s input price index, real valueadded, and certain productivity measures are overstated. In theory,
input purchasers could report a price change, even when they source
the input from a new supplier. In “Producing an Input Price Index,”
Alterman reports ﬁndings from an initial examination of the feasibility
of constructing an input price index for materials inputs. Although some
technical issues along with budget constraints pose signiﬁcant challenges to the introduction of a new price survey, Alterman concludes
that ﬁelding a sample of materials purchasers is possible and that, in
general, businesses can periodically report prices on input purchases.
Nakamura et al. and Kim and Reinsdorf point out that, if implemented,
such a survey would need to collect data on product characteristics so
that prices could be adjusted for changes in product attributes whenever
models or suppliers change.
Alterman acknowledges that the proposed input price bias is not a
panacea. It would not, for instance, capture price declines when ﬁrms
outsource or offshore work previously done in-house. This is because
data on the price for work previously done in-house would not exist and
so could not be compared to the price from an arm’s-length transaction.
Moreover, because in ofﬁcial statistics aggregate GDP is computed
from the expenditure side as the sum of ﬁnal consumption, investment,
government purchases, and net exports—not as the sum of value-added
across industries—a fully implemented input price index would address
biases from sourcing substitution to real GDP and productivity measures for industries, but not for the aggregate economy. The use of
hedonic indexes for import prices, as proposed by Kim and Reinsdorf,
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would address some of the bias to both aggregate and industry real GDP
measures from sourcing substitution. Information from biases to the
input price index or from discrepancies between movements in the CPI,
PPI, and MPI, as discussed in Reinsdorf and Yuskavage, potentially
could be used to better address biases to aggregate output and productivity measures.
Adjusting prices for changes in product quality, however, also
may mean that products experiencing rapid technological change will
dominate movements in aggregate statistics, as Bartik, Sturgeon, and I
illustrate with the outsized effect that the computer and semiconductor
industries have on real GDP growth in U.S. manufacturing. To mitigate
confusion and misinterpretation of the data, we argue that statistical
agencies should make clear the inﬂuence certain industries have on
aggregate statistics—for example, by also publishing subaggregates
without these industries.
The case of U.S. manufacturing raises broader questions about how
to measure competitiveness in a global economy and in an era of rapid
technological change. Traditionally, economists and policymakers have
looked to real output and productivity measures to assess an industry’s
competitiveness. Yet the United States was declining as a location for
production of computers and semiconductors even while these industries accounted for the robust output and productivity growth in U.S.
manufacturing. My coauthors and I argue that international data on the
location of production are necessary to assess the global competitiveness of a particular industry or sector in a country.
In addition, the fragmentation of production raises difﬁcult classiﬁcation issues. For example, although the competitiveness of the United
States as a location for the production of computers and semiconductors
has declined, much of the product design work and marketing remains
in the United States. These activities usually are counted in the research
or wholesale trade sectors, though they traditionally are integral parts of
manufacturing. These developments arguably necessitate a rethinking
about how activities in the economy are classiﬁed.
The companion to this volume examines these issues in greater
depth. Several chapters focus on a recent proposal to classify so-called
factoryless goods producers in manufacturing, explaining the rationale
for the proposal, the current prevalence of FGP activities in the United
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States, and the likely effect of such a change in classiﬁcation on manufacturing statistics. The second volume also reports on recent efforts
to develop data sets measuring trade in value-added. Value-added of
a product produced in a global supply chain may be counted multiple
times in international trade statistics, which measure gross ﬂows of
imports and exports. Electronic components, for example, produced in
Japan may be exported to China for assembly into ﬁnal consumer goods.
The value-added of the electronic components will be counted once in
Japan’s exports and again in the Chinese exports of consumer electronics. Similarly, bilateral trade statistics can be misleading: Imports from
a particular country may contain substantial amounts of value-added
from other countries, and the import content of a country’s exports may
be sizable. Data on trade in value-added are needed to understand what
is made where and, ultimately, to assess the competitiveness of national
industries and activities in the supply chain. Advances in technology
and communications that have allowed the explosion of trade in manufactured products have permitted the rapid expansion of multinational
companies and of trade in services and intangibles, many of which were
previously regarded as “untradeable.” Chapters in the second volume
also examine the thorny issue of attributing output from multinational
companies to the countries in which they operate as well as evidence
that trade statistics greatly understate cross-border ﬂows of data, raising
concerns about recent policies in some countries to discourage these
ﬂows.

Note
1. The conference “Measurement Issues Arising from the Growth of Globalization”
was held November 6–7, 2009. Summaries of the conference research and of its
research papers are available at http://research.upjohn.org/externalpapers/7/ and
http://research.upjohn.org/reports/130/, respectively.
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Price indexes are fundamentally important for understanding what
is happening to national economies. Unfortunately, for reasons we will
explain, price-index bias problems seem likely to have grown with the
evolution of information technologies and accompanying changes in
business price setting and product-variant development practices, as
well as with the growth in the amount and timeliness of price information available to potential buyers. We argue, however, that speciﬁc
changes to statistical agency practices and data-handling capabilities
can greatly reduce the bias problems we focus on.
We recommend hybrid alternatives to the conventional price
indexes. Our hybrid indexes use unit values to combine price information for transactions that take place at different prices for homogenous product items. The hybrid indexes reduce to the conventional
price indexes when there is truly just one price per product each time
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period. This recommendation is in line with the advice provided in
several international price index manuals such as ILO et al. (2004a,b,
2009). For example, in the manual for the Producer Price Index (PPI)
it is stated that “having speciﬁed the [product] to be priced . . . , data
should be collected on both the value of the total sales in a particular
month and the total quantities sold in order to derive a unit value to be
used as the price . . .” (ILO et al. 2004a, p. 22).
Some of the prices used in a typical U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
PPI are calculated now in this way. Yet, as a rule, the conventional statistics agency practice does not measure prices as unit values.1 The conventional practice of national statistics agencies is to collect the price of
a precisely deﬁned product at a particular establishment and designated
point in time, with this collection process being designed to yield a
unique price each period for the given product-establishment combination. (See, for example, BLS [2007a,b,c,d].)
Throughout the chapter, a short list of terms is used in distinct ways
that are important to bear in mind: product unit (or “product” for short),
product unit item (or “product item,” or simply “item”), product content, index basket product unit (or simply “index basket product”), the
unit value (or, equivalently, the “unit value price,” or “unit price”), and
the product content unit value. Our usage of, and need for, these terms
are most easily conveyed in a speciﬁc context. We will use the example
of Campbell’s tomato soup, which is most often sold in a 10.75-ounce
can, but it is also available in a variety of other can sizes, including a
15.2-ounce can.
We deﬁne a product by the brand and the company that owns the
brand, or at any rate that is responsible for the product (if, say, it is not
marketed under a brand name), and by the precise nature of the product
content as well as by the speciﬁc sort and size of packaging the product
is sold in. A commercial product is assigned a Universal Product Code
(UPC) by the company responsible for the product. The rules for how
UPCs are to be assigned are maintained by (and conformity with them
is monitored by) an international governing body (as we explain subsequently), to which a company must belong in order to be able to assign
UPCs to the company’s products.
Products of different companies have different UPCs. The rules for
assigning UPCs also dictate that if either the content or the nature or
size of the packaging format differs for products produced by a com-

Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb 22

2/16/2015 8:31:50 AM

Sourcing Substitution and Related Price Index Biases 23

pany, then separate UPCs must be assigned. The way in which we use
the term “product unit” or “product” is consistent with how commercial
products are deﬁned for UPC assignment. Hence a 10.75-ounce can of
Campbell’s tomato soup, which is the most common can size, is a separate product from a 15.2-ounce can of Campbell’s tomato soup.
Each can of the 10.75-ounce size for Campbell’s tomato soup is
referred to as a “product item” or simply an “item.” No matter how
short the time period, different items of a product may sometimes be
sold by different merchants or even the same merchant at different
prices. For example, the same grocery outlet on the same day could
sell 10.75-ounce cans of Campbell’s soup at different prices because a
promotional sale began partway through the day, or because some cans
had stickers on them for a lower price owing to an earlier promotional
sale, or because of arrangements such as discounts for customers who
have coupons. The average of the prices for which items of a product
are transacted in a stated time period and market area is the unit value
(or unit price).
The product content is what is inside a can of Campbell’s tomato
soup, and that content is the same whether it is a 10.75-ounce can or a
15.2-ounce can. In many jurisdictions in the United States, a grocer is
required by law to display for each product not only the per-item price
for the product, but also the price being charged for a stated unit of
quantity of the product content, such as a ﬂuid ounce. The latter sort of
standardized prices are sometimes referred to as “unit value prices,” but
they do not result from any sort of averaging of the realized prices in
different transactions, and this is not what we mean (nor what is meant
in the index number literature) by the term “unit price” or “unit value.”
Price indexes are deﬁned for baskets of products. The basket for,
say, the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI) consists of product categories. At each retail outlet selected for price collection for the CPI
program, when price collection is initiated there, the price collector
chooses, based on outlet information about product sales at that outlet,
a speciﬁc product unit for each CPI product category for which prices
are to be collected there. Each selected product then becomes an index
basket product for which a price collector attempts to collect a price
each pricing period.
Suppose now that a 10.75-ounce can of Campbell’s tomato soup
has been selected as an index basket product to be priced, period after
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period, at a speciﬁc establishment. And suppose that the establishment
subsequently ceases to sell the 10.75-ounce cans and switches to instead
selling the 15.2-ounce can format for Campbell’s tomato soup. In this
situation, the decision could be made to “quality-adjust” the price for
the 15.2-ounce can so that the observed price for that product item could
be used as a proxy for the missing price for the 10.75-ounce Campbell’s
tomato soup index basket product. The simplest such adjustment would
be to compute the per-ounce price for the soup sold in the 15.2-ounce
can and then to multiply that times 10.75, with the resulting value being
used as a proxy price for Campbell’s tomato soup in a 10.75-ounce can.2
The chapter’s second section, titled “Background Material,” introduces the issues. Section Three, “Basic, Hybrid, and Conventional
Versions of Laspeyres, Paasche, and Fisher Price Indexes,” provides
notation and deﬁnitions used in the rest of the chapter. The Laspeyres,
Paasche, and Fisher price index formulas are introduced in the basic
forms in which these are usually presented in textbooks and in the
economics, accounting, and price-index scholarly literatures. Next we
develop hybrid price-index formulas that explicitly allow for possible
price differences in a given time period for homogeneous units of each
product. We proceed to develop grouped transaction variants of the conventional and hybrid price index formulas that allow us to conveniently
represent various bias problems for the conventional indexes.
In the fourth section, “Different Sorts of Price Index Selection Bias,”
we use our bias formula for a Laspeyres-type price index to characterize
certain ways in which bias can arise. The biases discussed include the
recognized problem of Consumer Price Index (CPI) outlet substitution
bias,3 the CPI promotions bias deﬁned in this chapter, and what Diewert
and Nakamura (2010) deﬁne as “sourcing substitution bias” in the PPI
and Import Price Index (MPI).4 We deal brieﬂy as well with sourcing
substitution bias in the proposed new Input Price Index (IPI).
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) produces the price
indexes we focus on in this chapter. The BLS largely abandoned the
use of unit values in price index compilation because of advice from
experts, including the 1961 report of the Stigler Committee (Price Statistics Review Committee 1961), and research by its own staff (exempliﬁed by Alterman [1991]).5 In the ﬁfth section, “Five Sorts of Barriers to Adoption of Unit Values for Ofﬁcial Statistics Purposes,” we
examine the problems with unit values that are highlighted in the Stigler
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Committee report and also by Alterman (1991). We explain why the
main basis of condemnation in those historical reports does not pertain
to our present unit-value recommendation.
Nevertheless, there are formidable practical challenges to implementing unit values as we recommend. Producers give their products
identifying names and Universal Product Codes (UPCs). UPCs have
come to play ubiquitous roles in business information systems for managing all aspects of the handling of products and their associated cost
and sales ﬁnancial ﬂows. Once a 10.75-ounce can of Campbell’s tomato
soup is shipped out from the production facility carrying the UPC that
Campbell’s has assigned to that product, then that UPC stays with that
soup can wherever it goes.
However, along the way from the original producer to the ﬁnal purchaser, a unit of a product can take on auxiliary attributes that may
matter to the ﬁnal purchaser, or to the ﬁnal user, or both, and that may
be associated with price differences. For example, some of the cans of
tomato soup may be shipped by the producer to convenience stores, and
some may be shipped to superstores.6
Separate UPCs are sometimes deﬁned for products that most users
might regard as differing only in ways that make no difference to them.
This issue can arise, for example, with products that differ in ways that
are necessary for avoidance of a patent infringement ruling but that
are intentionally the same in terms of all attributes of concern to most
users. Or a producer might bring out a slightly reformulated product
with a different UPC and with a price that yields a higher proﬁt margin.7
When a producer brings out a new product and discontinues an older
one, if the product change is trivial, a statistics agency may decide that
the reformulated version of the product should be treated as a continuation of the original version so that the price increase can be captured.
We discuss operational issues that arise in situations like these in the
subsections below that deal with what we refer to as “Impediment 3”
and “Impediment 4” (see also Reinsdorf [1999]).
How, then, can we best measure price change over time when units
of precisely deﬁned and interchangeable product items are sold at different prices in the same time period and market area? And when is it
best to treat highly similar but commercially distinguishable products
as separate products for inﬂation measurement purposes? Consideration
of these questions requires an understanding of the role of measures of
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inﬂation in the compilation of other key economic performance measures for nations: the topic of Section Six, titled “Inﬂation Measurement
Effects on Other Economic Performance Measures.” Finally, in the seventh section, “Possible Price Measurement Practice Reforms,” we suggest possible changes to conventional price-index-making practices.
Two brief appendices provide additional materials that some readers may ﬁnd helpful. In Appendix 2A, we show with a numerical example that the featured bias problem in the example cannot be ﬁxed simply
by adopting a superlative price index formula like the Fisher.8 Appendix
2B demonstrates why, ideally, the same product deﬁnitions should be
used both for price quote collection and for the collection of the data
needed to compute value-share weights.
This chapter is written with three different groups of readers in
mind. One group consists of those who view the averaging of observable prices for different items of the same product to form unit values
as an inferior practice. We hope to persuade these readers that for a
wide class of price index uses, including the deﬂation of gross domestic
product (GDP) components, it is important that the price quotes utilized
be representative of the prices for the transactions that make up the
associated value aggregates.
A second group we hope will beneﬁt from this chapter are those
who were already convinced by what early contributors to the price
index literature—Walsh (1901, p. 96; 1921, p. 88), Davies (1924, p.
183; 1932, p. 59), and Fisher (1922, p. 318) in particular—wrote long
ago on the use of unit values in price indexes. These are experts who
hold the view that there is no need to elaborate on the issues we deal
with in this chapter. We hope to persuade these readers that there is
considerable value in having a more explicit exposition of these issues.
We hope too that these readers will turn their research efforts toward
helping to develop feasible implementation strategies for the sort of
approach that we recommend.
A third group of readers that we hope to engage with this chapter are those not previously acquainted with some of the price index
bias problems that we focus on, including the sourcing substitution
bias problems deﬁned by Diewert and Nakamura (2010) and for which
Houseman et al. (2011) provide the ﬁrst empirical results. We hope to
provide these readers with a readily understandable exposition of these
biases. We feel it is crucial for economists at large to understand how
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these inﬂation measurement distortions arise and why they have likely
become more serious in recent years.

BACKGROUND MATERIAL
In this chapter, we focus mostly on three main price indexes produced by the BLS: the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the Producer Price
Index (PPI), and the Import Price Index (MPI). We focus on one aspect
of conventional ofﬁcial statistics price-index-making and abstract from
many other important issues in the process. It should also be noted that
although our discussion will focus on the handling of prices for physical
products with associated UPC codes, the major price indexes include
services as well as goods categories.
Knowing some speciﬁcs of how price indexes are produced is helpful for considering price index bias problems. The ofﬁcial price indexes
used to measure inﬂation ﬁrst aggregate price relatives into elementary
indexes for narrow categories of products, such as men’s suits or crude
petroleum. They then aggregate the elementary indexes, in most cases
employing a Laspeyres or similar formula.9 Price relatives are ratios of
current to previous period prices for speciﬁc products sold by speciﬁc
establishments. The aggregation formula for an elementary price index
typically includes weights for the price relatives that reﬂect shares of
the total value of the transactions (and may also take sample selection
probabilities into account). Similarly, weights that reﬂect shares of
total expenditure for the products covered by each of the elementary
indexes are used to aggregate the elementary indexes in order to arrive
at higher-level and overall inﬂation measures like the “All Items CPI”
or the “PPI for Final Demand.”
The CPI is intended to measure the inﬂation experience of households, so the value share weights used for the CPI are based on household survey information. However, the product units included in the
CPI basket are priced at selected retail outlets because it is operationally
easier to collect prices from businesses.
The PPI primarily measures changes in prices received by domestic
businesses in selling their products to other domestic or foreign businesses. Selected products are regularly priced at selected establishments
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of domestic producers. The PPI value-share weights are based on what
domestic businesses report as their sales revenues by product.
The BLS produces the MPI as part of its International Price Program. The MPI is intended to be a measure of the inﬂation experience
of domestic purchasers of imported products. Products are priced at
selected U.S. importer establishments, and the value-share weights are
based on U.S. survey and customs data for all imports.
We ﬁnd it useful to differentiate what we call primary product and
auxiliary product attributes. We deﬁne “primary product attributes” (or
simply “primary attributes”) as characteristics of an item of the product
when ﬁrst sold by the original producer that continue to be characteristics of the product item regardless of where and how it may be resold
on its way to the ﬁnal purchaser. We deﬁne “product item attributes”
as “auxiliary attributes” if an item acquires these attributes as a consequence of how it is cared for on its way to the merchant that makes the
ﬁnal sale or because of where or how it is sold. For example, being sold
during a promotional sale is a potentially relevant auxiliary attribute
of a product item in studies of price evolution and consumer behavior.
As Hausman and Leibtag (2007, 2009) note, markets typically offer
consumers product items that are sold by different merchants and have
differing amenities, with those amenities being one sort of auxiliary
product item attribute. For the issues we focus on in this chapter, it is
useful to differentiate auxiliary product item attributes from primary
product attributes that all items of a product have and that stay with
those product items wherever and however they are sold.10

BASIC, HYBRID, AND CONVENTIONAL VERSIONS OF
LASPEYRES, PAASCHE, AND FISHER PRICE INDEXES
We begin in this section with basic formulas for the Laspeyres,
Paasche, and Fisher price indexes. These are the usual deﬁnitions given
in economics and accounting textbooks and in the relevant scholarly
literatures, although it is important to note that the U.S. CPI now relies
on a weighted geometric mean formula to compute elementary indexes
for physical commodities. We next take up the case of multiple transactions per product. The hybrid price indexes we develop for the multiple
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transactions case are what we recommend be used: that is, these are
what we subsequently specify to be the target indexes.
We next show how our hybrid indexes that can accommodate the
multiple transactions case can be rewritten to allow for grouping the
transactions in each period. We then use the grouped-transaction representations of our hybrid price index formulas to relate what we label as
conventional formulas (which embody a key feature of current statistical agency practice) to our target hybrid indexes. Once we can explicitly relate the conventional formulas to our target indexes, we show
that formulas for various biases of the conventional indexes are easily
derived.
Basic versus Hybrid Price Indexes
We denote by n = 1,…, N the products in the index basket for a price
index. The time period is denoted by t. All the price indexes considered involve two time periods (e.g., two months for a monthly index),
denoted as t = 0 and t = 1. Each of the J nt transactions for product n in
period t ( j  1,, J nt ) involves a seller k and a purchaser k . Hence,
t, j
for transaction j in time period t for product n, qn,k,k
 is the quantity of
the product bought by purchaser k  from seller k. This quantity is given
in terms of the same units of measure used in reporting the price per unit
t, j
of the product, and that price is denoted by p n,k,k
.
In each segment of the chapter, we simplify the superscript and subscript notation by showing just the superscripts and subscripts needed
there. Hence, in the rest of this section, just the superscript t and the
subscript n are used. The total nominal revenue received or remittance
paid for product n in period t (t  0,1) is thus denoted here by Rnt , and
the total received or paid for all N products is
(2.1)

N

N

R t   n1 Rnt   n1 p nt q nt .

The basic Laspeyres price index ( PL ) is given by11
N

(2.2)

PL0,1
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the basic Paasche index ( PP ) is given equivalently by

 p1 
p1 q1 
0,1 n1 n n  N
PP 
 n1 S 1n  n 
N

 p0 
 n
n1 p n0 q1n 
N

(2.3)

1  1





;

and the basic Fisher price index ( PF ) is
(2.4)

PF0,1  (PL0,1 PP0,1 )1/ 2 ,

where S nt in Equations (2.2) and (2.3) denotes the value share of R t for
product n in period t given by
(2.5)

S nt 

p nt q nt



N
pt qt
n1 n n



Rnt
Rt

.

From the ﬁnal expression in Equation (2.2) and also in Equation (2.3),
and from Equation (2.4), we see that the basic Laspeyres, Paasche, and
Fisher price indexes are all summary metrics for price relatives for
product n ( n  1,, N ), where a price relative is given by
(2.6)

p1n / p n0 .

A price index is always evaluated for a given pair of time periods (i.e., the given current and comparison periods) and a given market area. To evaluate a basic price index formula like the Laspeyres
given by Equation (2.2), each speciﬁed product covered by the index
can only have one price in each time period. Historically, competitive
forces have been appealed to (i.e., the “law of one price”) as a justiﬁcation for this one-price-per-product approximation to reality for a given
time period and market area. Yet many businesses no longer set their
prices on a product-by-product basis (if, indeed, they ever did that).
Rather, they use pricing strategies aimed at maximizing their overall
rate of return on their product sales. Hence product items typically end
up being offered for sale at differing prices within a given market area,
sometimes even by a single supplier.12 Kaplan and Menzio (2014) use
a large data set of prices for retail store transactions and show that the
coefﬁcient of variation of the average UPC price is 19 percent. The
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rapid rise of online retail seems likely to give rise to even greater opportunities for complex pricing strategies (Tran 2014).
Allowing for Multiple Transactions per Product at Multiple Prices
Suppose that there are multiple transactions per product (i.e., multiple product items are sold) each period and product items can sell for
different prices in these transactions. Suppose, too, that we have the
price and quantity details for the item-level product transactions. For
these data to be used for price index evaluation, either we need a way
of choosing one representative price for each product (the conventional
approach), or the raw transactions-level data must be represented using
some sort of price and quantity summary statistics. We use the word
“must” because, in general, even if the number of products is the same,
the number of product items sold usually will not be the same from
one time period to the next. If we have an acceptable way of choosing
a single transaction each period for an index basket product item, then
it is those transaction prices that can be compared using a price index.
Or, alternatively, some summary metric must be used for the transactions data, and then the values of that summary metric can be compared
using a price index. Generating price observations that can be used to
form price relatives, and in this manner can be compared over time, is
a necessary step in constructing price indexes using raw transactions
data, including scanner data.
The existence of multiple prices for a product in a time period can
cause two kinds of bias in a conventional price index. The “formula
bias” problem arises if a single price is selected to represent the multiple prices that exist in a given time period, and if the formula for the
elementary price index is an arithmetic average of price relatives calculated as the ratio of the selected price for Period 1 to the selected price
for Period 0. When multiple prices are present in the population and a
single price is selected to represent the population in the price index,
the price that is used in the price index becomes a random variable.
Assuming that the two random variables are not perfectly correlated,
the expected value of a ratio of random variables is an increasing function of the variance of the denominator, so the greater the variance of
the price observations, the greater the upward bias in the average of
price relatives. In the CPI of the United States and many other coun-
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tries, formula bias is avoided by using geometric means to form the
elementary indexes. The geometric mean of a set of price relatives is the
same as the ratio of geometric means of the prices, so a geometric mean
elementary index is, in effect, a ratio of average prices. The variance of
the denominator will be so small that formula bias is not a problem if
many price observations are averaged and the index is calculated as a
ratio of the average prices.
The second kind of bias that can occur if a single price is used to
represent the multiple prices that are present in a time period is that
the behavior of the selected price may be unrepresentative of what is
going on with the distribution of prices that are available to buyers. It
is this problem that the rest of this chapter will focus on. Nevertheless, it should be noted here that the unit-value approach that we will
recommend for reasons of maintaining sample representativeness also
has beneﬁts for eliminating formula bias and improving the statistical
properties of the index. (For additional background on formula bias, see
McClelland and Reinsdorf [1999], Reinsdorf [1998], and Reinsdorf and
Triplett [2009].)
We denote the yet-to-be-speciﬁed price and quantity summary statistics for each product n in each period t by p nt ,S and q nt ,S. The nominal
value of the jth transaction is Rnt, j  p nt, j q nt, j . Thus the nominal value of
all transactions for product n in period t is
(2.7)

Jt

Jt

t, j
t, j t, j
n
n
Rnt   j1
Rn   j1
pn qn .

If any important auxiliary product unit attributes do not vary systematically across transactions, the following is a desirable condition
for the price and quantity summary statistics to satisfy for each of the N
products covered by the price index:
(2.8)



R n0 
R1n

 1,S
p 1,S
n  q n
0,S
p n0,S 
 q n


.



This condition says that the growth in the per-period value of all
transactions for product n from Period 0 to 1 can be expressed as the
product of a pure price-change ratio times a pure quantity-change ratio.
We call this condition the product-level product rule.13
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The product-level product rule will always hold if, for each period
(t = 0,1), the product of the price and quantity summary statistics equals
the nominal value ﬁgure:
(2.9)

Rnt  p nt,S q nt,S .

Moreover, it is readily apparent that the condition in Equation (2.9) will
always hold if the quantity and price summary statistics are deﬁned for
each period (t = 0,1) as
(2.10)

Jt

n
q nt,S   j1
q n  q nt

t, j

and
(2.11)

p nt,S  Rnt / q nt  p nt, ,

where the dot (  ) replaces the index over which the summation is taken
to compute the per-unit price average.14 The price summary statistic
given in Equation (2.11) is the period t unit value for product n. The
quantity summary statistic given in Equation (2.10) is the total quantity
transacted of product n in the given period t.
Substituting the period t unit value, p nt, , for the price variable p nt
in the basic speciﬁcations for the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes given
in Equations (2.2) and (2.3), and redeﬁning the quantity variable as the
summation over all transactions in the given period, we obtain, respectively, the following expressions for what we call the hybrid Laspeyres
index (the HLaspeyres index for short)15

§

(2.12)
0,1
PHL

¦
¦
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and for the hybrid Paasche index (the HPaasche index)
(2.13)

0,1
PHP

N
p1,x q1
n 1 n n
N
p 0,x q1
n 1 n n

¦
¦

ª
§
« N 1¨
S
«¦n 1 n ¨¨
«
©
¬

1

1
· º
p1,x
n ¸ »
.
0,x ¸¸ »
pn ¹ »
¼

Thus, the hybrid Fisher index (the HFisher) is given by
(2.14)

0,1
PHF

0,1 0,1 1/ 2
(PAL
PAP ) .

The value-share weights in Equations (2.12) and (2.13), S n0 and S 1n , are
given for all n by
(2.15)

S nt  Rnt / R t ,
N

where Rnt is now given by Equation (2.7) and where R t   Rnt .
n1
The HLaspeyres, HPaasche, and HFisher indexes use unit values for the ﬁrst stage of aggregation, so these indexes can explicitly
accommodate a product being transacted at multiple prices within a unit
time period. They reduce to the basic formulas in situations in which
there truly is just one price per period for each product. From Equations (2.12) to (2.14), we see too that the HLaspeyres, HPaasche, and
HFisher indexes are summary metrics for relatives of average prices
(i.e., what we will refer to as unit-value price relatives), deﬁned as
0,
(2.16) ( p1,
n / pn ) .

These unit-value price relatives reduce to the usual price relatives given
in Equation (2.6) when there is just one price per period for each product. Thus the HLaspeyres, HPaasche, and HFisher formulas are generalizations of the basic formulas.
Analysts who have estimated price indexes using raw scanner or
other transactions-level data16 from merchants or from ﬁnancial markets are, in fact, already accustomed to evaluating price indexes based
on unit-value price relatives,17 but they have not always made this practice explicit by spelling out the data-processing speciﬁcs. By calling
attention to how the formulas in Equations (2.12) through (2.16) depart
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from the corresponding basic formulas, and by providing terminology
for these practices, we hope to facilitate efforts aimed at ﬁnding practical solutions to the problems statistical agencies face in dealing with the
reality of multiple prices per index basket product per period.
An Important Historical Clariﬁcation
We chose to label as “hybrid” indexes the Laspeyres, Paasche,
and Fisher formulas given in Equations (2.12) to (2.14) above. But,
in fact, these are the “true” Laspeyres, Paasche, and Fisher indexes as
introduced by the original authors. Only one of the multiple authors of
this chapter (namely, Erwin Diewert) had the language skills needed
to go back to the original German articles by Laspeyres (1871) and
Paasche (1874). However, Walsh (1901, 1921) and Fisher (1922) wrote
in English and are quite explicit that unit-value prices and total quantities transacted in a given time period and market place are the “right”
p’s and q’s that should be used in a bilateral index-number formula at
the ﬁrst stage of aggregation over transactions that take place at different prices within the period.
Of course, when authors put their creations into the public domain,
they cannot control how others alter what they originally proposed. It is
clear that large numbers of authors have deﬁned and used the indexes
as in Equations (2.2) through (2.4) above, which correspond to what
we have labeled as the “basic” indexes. And ofﬁcial statistics agencies
have typically deﬁned and used the indexes in the form we give subsequently (in Equations [2.31] through [2.33]), and which we refer to as
the “conventional” indexes. It is in this context, and in the context of
uses we make of the indexes subsequently in this chapter, that we refer
to the formulas in Equations (2.12) through (2.14) as “hybrid” indexes.
Working with Grouped Transactions Data
Suppose we want to divide up the transactions for the N products
covered by a price index according to one or more auxiliary attributes.
For transaction j for product n in period t, the price and quantity are
t, j
denoted here by p n and q nt , j . We can designate a total of C exhaustive and mutually exclusive groups for the transactions: G1,,GC. For
each group of transactions, the total quantity and the average price (i.e.,
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the group quantity and the group unit value) are given, respectively, by
(2.17)

q nt,Gc

¦ qnt, j

and p nt,Gc

jGc

(

¦ p nt, j q nt, j ) / q nt,Gc .

jGc

Hence, for each product n, the overall quantity transacted in period t can
be represented as
§
·
GC
(2.18) q nt q nt,G1    q nt,GC ¦ Gc G1¨ ¦ q nt, j ¸ .
¨
¸
© jGc ¹
The overall unit price for product n in period t can now be given as
(2.19)

p nt ,x

GC

( ¦ Gc G1

(¦

GC
Gc G 1

GC

¦ Gc

G1

¦

p nt , j q nt , j ) / q nt

jGC

p nt ,Gc q nt ,Gc ) / q nt

p nt ,Gc s nt ,Gc ,

where for group Gc = Gc,…, GC, the following conditions hold for the
quantity shares: snt,Gc , for groups Gc = 1,…, GC:
(2.20)

snt,Gc qnt,Gc / qnt and s nt,G1    s nt,GC

1.

Note that the quantity shares deﬁned in Equation (2.20) can only
be meaningfully computed when the product units being added are
homogeneous with respect to their primary attributes. With this proviso,
when the total quantity transacted in period t is computed as in Equation
(2.18) and the period t unit value for each product n is computed as in
Equation (2.19), then the HLaspeyres, HPaasche, and HFisher formulas given in Equations (2.12) through (2.14) can be evaluated. In other
words, the only adjustment needed in this grouped-transactions case
is to use Equations (2.18) and (2.19), rather than (2.10) and (2.11), to
compute the quantity and price summary statistics.
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A Formula for the Bias in Conventional Laspeyres, Paasche, and
Fisher Indexes
As noted, with some exceptions, the conventional statistics agency
practice is to collect just one price per index basket product at a selected
establishment in a time period. Without loss of generality, we denote the
one transaction used in the conventional index as Transaction 1 (i.e.,
as j = 1). The full set of transactions in a given period t for each product n can then be divided into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive
groups, G1 and G2, with G1 containing the single transaction used in
compiling a conventional price index and G2 containing the rest of the
transactions, which are transactions ignored in the conventional way of
compiling the index. Hence, for G1, the quantity and price summary
statistics can be denoted, respectively, as
(2.21)

q nt,G1  q nt,1 and p nt,G1  p nt,1 ,

and, from Equation (2.17), we see that for group G2 we have
(2.22)

q nt ,G 2

Jt

¦ j n 2 q nt , j

¦ q nt ,G2

and p nt ,G 2

jG2

J nt

( ¦ j 2 p nt , j q nt , j ) / q nt ,G 2

(

¦ pnt , j qnt , j ) / q nt ,G 2 ,

jG 2

where q nt,G2 is the quantity total and p nt,G2 is the unit value for the G2
transactions.
The total quantity transacted for each product n in period t is the
sum of the transaction quantities for the G1 and the G2 groups, so we
have
(2.23)

Jt

n
q nt   j1
qn 

t, j

 q nt, j   q nt, j  q nt,G1  q nt,G2 .

jG1

jG2

And, from the last expression in Equation (2.19), the overall unit price
for product n in period t is
(2.24)

pnt,x
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where now for the quantity share statistics we have

s nt,G1  q nt,G1 / q nt and s nt,G2  q nt,G 2 / q nt with s nt,G1  s nt,G2  1 .

(2.25)

For our price index bias analyses in the next section, it will prove
useful to deﬁne a factor relating the average of the G2 transaction
prices to the single G1 price. The product-speciﬁc discount factor, d nt ,
is deﬁned so that 1 minus this discount factor is the factor of proportionality relating the average for the ignored G2 prices to the G1 price:

p nt,G2  (1  d nt ) p nt,G1 .

(2.26)

When the average price for the G2 transactions for product n in
period t is less than the corresponding G1 price, then d nt will be strictly
between 0 and 1. When the average for the G2 prices is greater than the
G1 price, then d nt will be negative, making (1 d nt ) greater than 1.
The overall average price can now be represented as follows for product
n in period t:
(2.27)

pnt ,x

( pnt ,G1 s nt ,G1  pnt ,G 2 s nt ,G 2 )
p

t ,G1 t ,G1
n
n

 (1-− d ) p

p

t ,G1 t ,G1
n
n

p

p

t ,G1
n

s
s

(s

t
n

t ,G1
n

using (2.24)

t ,G1 t ,G 2
n
n

s

t ,G1 t ,G 2
−
n
n

s

s

t ,G 2
n

(1-− d nt s nt ,G 2 ) pnt ,G1

using (2.26)

-d p

t ,G 1 t , G 2
n
n

t
n

s

) −- d p

t
n

s

t , G 1 t ,G 2
n
n

where snt ,G1  snt ,G2 1

after factoring out pnt,G1.

We see from the last line of Equation (2.27) that what we label as the
price quote representativeness term, given by (1  d nt s nt ,G 2 ), relates
the unit value for all the period t transactions for product n to the one
price quote used when following conventional index-making practice.
Now we deﬁne a product-speciﬁc price index representativeness
factor  0,1
n as the ratio of the price quote representativeness terms for
Period 1 versus Period 0:
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(2.28)

 0,1
n 

1  d 1n s1,G2
n
1  d n0 s n0,G2

.

This price index representativeness factor equals 1 when the representativeness term has the same value in both Period 0 and Period 1. As
long as this factor is approximately equal to 1, then the overall average
price for product n is related in the same manner in both Periods 0 and 1
to the one price quote conventionally utilized each period. In contrast,
values of  0,1
n that are appreciably different from 1 indicate that there is
a difference between Periods 0 and 1 in how the overall average price
relates to the price quote utilized. (Note that  0,1
n exists and is positive
if there are at least two transactions per period; s nt,G2 must be strictly
less than 1 because G1 must contain a transaction for some positive
quantity in both time periods, and d nt must be strictly less than 1 since
the average G2 price is positive in either time period.)
The last expression for the HLaspeyres price index given in Equation (2.12) can now be restated to incorporate the relative price index
representativeness factor  0,1
n :
(2.29)
0,1
PHL

N

¦n

§
0¨
S
n
1
¨¨
©

·
p 1,x
n ¸
¸
p n0,x ¸¹

N

¦n

1 1,G 2 1,G1 º
ª
) pn
0 (1  d n s n
S
«
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n
1
0 0,G 2
«¬ (1  d n s n
) p n0,G1 »¼

ª § 1  d 1 s 1,G 2 ·
º
n n
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¹
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Similarly, the HPaasche price index given in Equation (2.13) can be
restated as
(2.30)

0,1
PHP

ª
1,G1 · 1
§
« N S 1 ¨ J 0,1 u p n ¸
« ¦n 1 n ¨ n
p n0,G1 ¸¹
©
«¬

º
»
»
»¼

1

.

The HFisher counterpart of Equations (2.29) and (2.30) is still given by
Equation (2.14), but with the HLaspeyres and HPaasche components
now given by Equations (2.29) and (2.30).
We are now ready to deﬁne the price index formulas we will refer
to as conventional.18 To obtain the conventional Laspeyres price index
0,1
(PCL
), we substitute the single price relative, given by (pn1,G1/ pn0,G1), for
0,
the price relative of the average prices, given by ( p1,
n / p n ), in the
0,1
ﬁrst expression for PHL in Equation (2.29). This yields what we refer to
as the conventional Laspeyres index, based on the conventional practice of only using one price observation per product in each time period:

0,1
(2.31) PCL

¦

§
N
0¨
S
n
n 1
¨

·
p1,G1
n
¸.
0,G1 ¸
p
© n
¹

0,1
Similarly, to obtain the conventional Paasche price index (PCP
), we

0,
0,1
substitute (pn1,G1/ pn0,G1) for ( p1,
n / p n ) in the expression for PHP given
in Equation (2.30). This substitution yields what we refer to as the conventional Paasche index, based also on the conventional practice of
only using one price observation per product in each time period:

1

(2.32)

0,1
PCP

1
ª
§ p1,G1
· º
N
1
n
«
¸ » .
S ¨
«¦ n 1 n ¨ p 0,G1 ¸ »
© n
¹ »¼
¬«

0,1
) is given by
The conventional Fisher price index (PCF

(2.33)

0,1
PCF

0,1 0,1 1/ 2 .
(PCL
PCP )

In the index-number literature, the term “bias” refers to a systematic
difference between the result that would be obtained for some index in
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use or considered for use versus a speciﬁed target index. To this point,
we have only demonstrated the price index representativeness factor
as an outcome of sampling error: basing an index on one product item
will generally yield a different answer from using the entire population of product prices. In the next section, however, we present reasons
why the price of the selected item could have a systematically different expectation from the population unit value. If we use PHL, given in
Equation (2.29) as the target index, then the bias of the conventional
Laspeyres index given in Equation (2.31) is
(2.34)

0,1
BCL

PCL  PHL
§ 1,G1 ·
N
0 ¨ pn
¸
S
n 1 n ¨ 0,G1 ¸
© pn
¹

¦

¦

¦
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N
0 0,1 p n
S
»
«J
n 1 n n
«¬
p n0,G1 »¼

§ 1,G1 ·
N
0,1 0 ¨ p n
¸
(1
J
)S
n
n ¨ 0,G1 ¸
n 1
© pn ¹
1 1,G2
 d n0 s n0,G2
N §¨ d n s n
n 1¨
1  d n0 s n0,G2
©

¦

· 0§
¸S ¨
¸ n¨
¹ ©

·
p1,G1
n
¸ using (2.28).
p n0,G1 ¸¹

Similarly, using Equations (2.30) and (2.32), the bias for the conventional Paasche index is
(2.35)

0,1
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¦
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.

It is cumbersome to develop a bias formula for the conventional
Fisher index given in Equation (2.33). However, as Diewert and
Nakamura (2010, appendix) explain, it is straightforward to develop
formulas for the differences between the arithmetic averages of the
Laspeyres and Paasche components for the conventional and for the
target Laspeyres and Paasche components, respectively, of the conventional and the target Fisher indexes.19 Thus, the bias of the conventional
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Fisher index can be approximated by
(2.36)

0,1
BCF

0,1
0,1
0,1
0,1
0,1
0,1
PCF
 PHF
# [(PCL
 PCP
) / 2] [(PHL
 PHP
) / 2].

DIFFERENT SORTS OF PRICE INDEX SELECTION BIAS
In this section, we show how the expression in Equation (2.34)
can be used to represent and provide a framework of analysis for price
index bias stemming from various sorts of causes. We focus here on the
Laspeyres bias formula because the BLS (and other statistical agencies) mostly use the Laspeyres index in their inﬂation measurement
programs. However, comparable results for the Paasche and Fisher formulas can be derived starting instead from Equation (2.35) or (2.36).
Outlet Substitution Bias in the CPI
For the CPI, the BLS collects prices from selected retail outlets.
In an effort to control for possible price-determining factors that can
differ even for the same commercial product (i.e., to control for what
we call auxiliary product item attributes), the BLS only forms price
relatives for product items sold at the same retail outlet (see Greenlees
and McClelland [2011]). Suppose, however, that households mostly
care about what they must pay for products characterized by their primary attributes (including the brand and producer) and hence shift their
expenditures among retail outlets in response to advertising about pricing policies and temporary promotional sales. The beneﬁts of this sort
of price-informed shopping in terms of the prices actually paid for the
products used by any one consumer will be missed by a practice of
only pairing prices for product items purchased at the same retail outlet
in forming price relatives. If the ratio of the average price paid to the
price used in the index is falling because opportunities for paying lower
prices are increasingly being taken up by consumers using new forms of
Internet- and cell phone–based advertising, then the conventional index
will be upwardly biased.
The potential for outlet-speciﬁc evaluation to cause CPI price index
bias was noted decades ago. In a 1962 report, Edward Denison raised
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the concern that, in his words, “revolutionary changes in establishment
type that have taken place in retail trade” may have caused “a substantial upward bias” in the CPI (Denison 1962, p. 162).20
Marshall Reinsdorf empirically investigated Denison’s CPI bias
hypothesis. The BLS produces average price (AP) series for selected
food groups. These are unit-value series for certain food categories,
though not for strictly homogenous products, as we advocate. Reinsdorf
(1993) compared selected AP series for food and gasoline with the corresponding CPI component series. He discovered that from 1980 to 1990,
the CPI and AP series for comparable products diverged by roughly 2
percentage points a year, with the CPI series rising faster than the AP
series, as would be expected if the CPI systematically fails to capture
the beneﬁts to consumers of price-motivated retail outlet switching.
These empirical results captured the attention of Erwin Diewert, inspiring him to derive a formula for what he called the outlet substitution
bias problem (Diewert 1998).
Reinsdorf (1998) later found that formula bias in the CPI caused
part of the divergences between CPIs and corresponding AP series,
so the outlet substitution effects turned out to be less than what was
reported in his 1993 paper. However, a still substantial bias of 0.25
percentage points per year was found for both food and gasoline. The
combined efforts of Reinsdorf and Diewert then galvanized other economists and price statisticians to take the outlet substitution bias problem
seriously.21
If a signiﬁcant number of consumers regularly switch where they
shop among multiple retail outlets depending on the product prices each
is currently offering, then we would expect d nt , deﬁned in Equation
(2.26), to be strictly between 0 and 1 in value for both Periods 0 and
1. This alone, however, will not cause a bias problem. We see from
Equation (2.34) that the key question is whether the term d nt s nt,G2 has
been changing in value over time. If the value of this term happened to
stabilize, there would then be no outlet substitution bias. We believe,
however, that the G2 quantity share ( s nt,G2) has been growing over time
for two sorts of complementary reasons. The ﬁrst is that there have
been steady improvements in the access that consumers have to current
information about retail prices at different outlets in consumers’ market
areas, including now even “smart phone” geotargeted advertising. The
second is that modern information technologies have made it cheaper

Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb 43

2/16/2015 8:32:08 AM

44 Nakamura et al.

and easier for retailers to implement strategically designed temporary promotional sales, which tend to generate high demand given the
expanded abilities of advertisers to inform consumers of promotional
sales. Hence, we expect the Laspeyres index bias given by Equation
(2.34) to be positive.
CPI Promotional Sale Bias
Outlet substitution bias, discussed above, can result from a failure
to capture a growing trend for consumers to take advantage of temporary sale and other price differences among retail outlets. However,
even at the same retail outlet, units of a product are often sold at both
regular and promotional sale prices within a month, which is the unit
time period for the CPI. The frequency of temporary sales is believed
to be increasing in the United States. The information available to consumers about sale pricing has been steadily expanding, too, presumably
allowing consumers to take progressively greater advantage of temporary promotional sale prices.22
The BLS collects and uses for the CPI whatever prices are in effect
at the time the price quotes are collected from each selected retail outlet, regardless of whether the prices are identiﬁed as “sale” or “regular”
prices.23 Temporary sales are believed to be in effect for any one product at any one outlet for less than half of the days or hours of business.
Hence, the value of d nt is expected to be predominantly between 0 and
1. Nevertheless, because the capture of regular or sale prices is random,
the value of d nt can be either positive or negative.
The volumes sold at promotional sale prices tend to be large and, as
already stated, the frequency of temporary sales is believed to be rising,
in the United States at least. As is evident from Equation (2.28), the sign
of the change in the term d nt s nt,G2 determines the sign of the promotions bias.24 Because the U.S. CPI includes sales prices in proportion to
the percentage of time in which they are offered, increased frequency
of sales could result in either a rise or a fall in this term. A fall would
occur if the increased frequency of sale-price offerings increased the
relative frequency of sale prices being selected for the CPI by more than
it increased the relative frequency of sale prices being paid by consumers. On the other hand, if consumers’ costs of acquiring information
fell, the term would likely rise, implying a positive promotions bias.
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Information costs have, indeed, fallen, so promotions bias is expected
to be positive on average.25
Sourcing Substitution Biases in the PPI and MPI
Finding cheaper input sources and then making sourcing substitutions is a prevalent strategy for lowering business costs. Empirical evidence suggests that this sort of supplier switching behavior plays an
economically important role in the survival and growth of new ﬁrms
(e.g., Bergin, Feenstra, and Hanson 2009; Foster, Haltiwanger, and
Syverson 2008).26 If both the old and the new suppliers are domestic, it
is the uses of the Producer Price Index (PPI) as a deﬂator for inputs that
can be affected. If both the old and the new suppliers are foreign, it is
the Import Price Index (MPI) that can be affected.
For both the PPI and MPI cases, we would expect the values of d nt
in Equation (2.26) to be strictly between 0 and 1. Moreover, we would
expect the G2 quantity share ( s nt,G2 ) to have been growing over time
because of expanding information availability about suppliers and their
prices, enabling purchasers to take greater advantage of lower-priced
offers. Hence, we would expect positive biases in the relevant price
indexes from sourcing substitutions.27
We next provide a simple example illustrating the sourcing substitution bias problem for the MPI. We then go on to take up two other possible sorts of producer sourcing changes that may cause bias problems.
An Example of MPI Sourcing Substitution Bias Due to Import
Sourcing Switches
Here we distinguish a supplier (k) from a buyer ( k ). For our example, Businesses 1 and 2 are foreign suppliers (hence, k  1,2), and Businesses 3 and 4 are domestic buyers (hence, k   3,4 ) for a single prodt
t
and pk,k'
. With only one
uct. The quantities and prices are denoted by qk,k'
product, a Laspeyres (or Paasche or Fisher) price index reduces to a
ratio of a single price or average price for the one product in each of the
two time periods for the price index
The value ﬂows summarized in Table 2.1 reﬂect the following
speciﬁcs:
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Table 2.1 Value Flows for the Four Businesses
Output ﬂows
Input ﬂows
Business 1
Business 2
Business 3
Business 4
Period 0 value ﬂows
0 0
p1,3
q1,3

0
0
p 2,4
q 2,4

0 0
 p1,3
q1,3

0
0
 p 2,4
q 2,4

Period 1 value ﬂows
1 1
p1,3
q1,3

1 1
p12,3 q12,3  p12,4 q12,4  p1,3
q1,3  p12,3 q12,3

 p12,4 q12,4

• Business 1 is a developed-country supplier to Business 3, with
this supply arrangement having been in place already for more
than two periods as of the start of Period 0 for this example.
• Business 2 is a cheaper, developing-country supplier that has a
supply arrangement with Business 4 that was in place already for
more than two periods as of the start of Period 0.
• Business 3 purchases from Business 1 in both Periods 0 and 1.
In Period 1, Business 3 also enters into a new purchasing relationship with the low-cost supplier Business 2. Houseman et al.
(2011) note the potential importance of the entry of lower-cost
suppliers in the domestic economy (as well as competition from
foreign producers, which is the case to which they devote more
attention). What a new supplier charges has no effect on the
“conventional” price index.
• Business 4 has had an ongoing purchasing relationship with
Business 2 and continues to buy exclusively from Business 2 in
Periods 0 and 1.
• The following inequalities hold:
1
1
0
0
 p12,3  0 .
 p12,4  0 , p1,3
p1,3
 p 2,4
 0 , p1,3

The price indexes for domestic businesses 3 and 4 can be regarded
as the MPI index series.
(4)
is the same as
The conventional price index for Business 4, PCL
(4)
, because
our hybrid Laspeyres target price index for that business, PHL
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Business 4 uses just one supplier each period. That is, for this case, the
conventional price index equals the target price index:
(2.37)

(4)

(4)

0
p12,4 / p 2,4

PCL

PHL .

(4)
Thus there is no bias problem for PCL
.
In contrast, we can show that the conventional price index for Business 3 is biased, and we can show what the bias depends on. For Business 3, the conventional price index is

(2.38)

(3)
PCL

1
0
p1,3
/ p1,3

1 i ,

where (1 + i) is the measured inﬂation rate using this conventional price
index. This conventional price index takes no account of the fact that
in Period 1, Business 3 not only bought from Business 1 but also used
a new supplier, Business 2. In contrast, and under our assumption that
Business 3 views the products from the two suppliers as equivalent, the
speciﬁed target index for Business 3 uses the information for all the
transactions in Period 1. This price information is summarized in Period
1 by the unit value

p1,3 ; i.e., we have
(2.39)

p1,3



where
(2.40)

1
s1,3



1 1
p1,3
q1,3  p12,3 q12,3
1
q1,3

 q12,3

1
q1,3
1
(q1,3
 q12,3 )

, s12,3



1 1
 p1,3
s1,3  p12,3 s12,3 ,

q12,3
1
(q1,3

 q12,3 )

1
, and s1,3
 s12,3  1 .

Hence, the target output price index for Business 3 is given by
(2.41)

(3)
PHL

0
u13 / p1,3

1
0
1
0
( p1,3
/ p1,3
)s1,3
 ( p12,3 / p1,3
)s12,3 .

It is the price charged by the lower-priced supplier, Business 2, that
is ignored by the conventional price index for Business 3. The price
charged by Business 2 is what constitutes the G2 group price for this

Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb 47

2/16/2015 8:32:11 AM

48 Nakamura et al.

example, whereas p11,3 is the G1 price. Using Equation (2.26), we have
(2.42)

1
p1,3
 (1  d 1 ) p12,3 ,

where 0 < d1 < 1. In Period 0, there is only the one supplier for Business
3. Hence, applying Equation (2.34) yields the following:28
(2.43)

0,1
BCL

(3)

(3)

PCL  PHL
§ p1 ·
1 1 ¨ 1,3 ¸
d s 2,3 ¨
0 ¸¸
¨ p1,3
©
¹
d 1s12,3 (1  i) ! 0

using Equation (2.38).

The last two lines of Equation (2.43) are convenient alternative expres(3)
sions for the sourcing substitution bias of PCL
.
We note that the last expression in Equation (2.43) is the same as
Equation (2.12) in Diewert and Nakamura (2010).29 This bias is seen to
depend on
• the rate of price inﬂation as measured by the conventional index,
• the proportional cost advantage of any ignored supply source(s),
and
• the quantity share for any ignored supply source(s).
If estimates can be made for the above factors, then a rough approximation to the bias given in Equation (2.43) can be made using this
formula, which is a special case of our general bias formula found in
Equation (2.34).
Domestic to Foreign Supplier Switches and a Proposed True Input
Price Index (IPI)
We next consider the case of a business that switches from using
a domestic supplier to a foreign one, thereby beneﬁting from an input
cost decrease.30 Neither the PPI nor the MPI can capture the cost savings from this sort of a sourcing substitution. The PPI’s domain of deﬁnition does not include imports, and the MPI measures price changes
beginning in the second month in which a newly selected imported
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product is observed. The resulting price index coverage gap is worrisome, since most of the increase in the relative importance of trade
in the U.S. economy is accounted for by the expansion of imports of
intermediate products.31
The pricing gap between the PPI and the MPI programs could be
closed by creating a true Input Price Index (IPI) program that is deﬁned
to measure the inﬂation experience of producers in buying their inputs
from all sources: foreign as well as domestic. In this case, the price
evolutions measured should include those associated with shifts in purchase shares from more to less expensive domestic producers, and from
more to less expensive foreign producers, as well as from domestic to
cheaper foreign producers.
The BLS has put forward a plan for a true IPI (Alterman 2008,
2009; Chapter 10, this volume). With an IPI, a newly imported product
that matches the primary attributes of a domestically supplied product
could be brought into the IPI as a directly comparable substitute. Also,
in principle, the purchaser of the inputs would be able to report the price
per unit irrespective of the sources for inputs they treat as homogeneous
in terms of what is done with the product purchases.
However, current BLS practice is not to average over prices for
items of different products, even when they were explicitly designed
to meet the same product speciﬁcations and differ only in terms of the
producer of the product items. If this practice is retained for the IPI
program too, then the new IPI could also be subject to sourcing substitution bias.32 This potential IPI bias can be represented using Equation
(2.34) in the same manner as for the PPI and MPI cases, except that purchases for domestic as well as imported inputs must now be covered.
For the same sorts of reasons as discussed above for the PPI and MPI,
we would expect this potential bias problem to be positive.33
Inﬂation Measurement Problems Due to the Initial Switch
to Outsourcing
When a business switches from in-house production to procurement
of an intermediate input, this is usually done in hopes of realizing cost
savings. The fact that this sort of cost savings will not be picked up by
the PPI or MPI programs is sometimes treated as an aspect of the newgoods price index bias problem, even if there is nothing new in terms of
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the input product in question. We note, however, that there will usually
be no way for a business to make this sort of a change without alterations to the operating processes of the business. Perhaps, therefore, this
sort of sourcing change should be viewed as a business technology
change that should be counted as a contribution to productivity growth.
Nevertheless, regardless of which of these perspectives is adopted, this
sort of change is outside the scope of this chapter.

FIVE SORTS OF BARRIERS TO ADOPTION OF UNIT
VALUES FOR OFFICIAL STATISTICS PURPOSES
The target indexes we recommend incorporate unit values. As we
have noted, there are impediments to the adoption of indexes like this by
statistics agencies in their ofﬁcial published series. Here we deal with
what we see as the main impediments, grouped under ﬁve subheadings.
Impediment 1: Bad Reputation Due to Historical Misuse of
Unit-Value Indexes
More than a half-century ago, the Price Statistics Review Committee chaired by George Stigler, also known as the Stigler Committee,
considered the relative merits of unit value versus what is referred to
as speciﬁcation pricing. It recommended the latter. Under the heading
of “Speciﬁcation vs. Unit Pricing,” the Stigler Committee report states
the following:
In 1934, the Bureau of Labor Statistics adopted “speciﬁcation”
pricing, and since then has sought to price narrowly deﬁned commodities and services to obtain price relatives for price indexes….
The Committee believes that in principle the speciﬁcation method
of pricing is the appropriate method for price indexes. The changing unit values of a broad class of goods (say shirts or automobiles) reﬂect both the changes in prices of comparable items
and the shifting composition of lower and higher quality items.
(Price Statistics Review Committee 1961, p. 32, italics added)

Note, however, that the Stigler Committee’s opposition to unit values did not arise in the context of price collection for carefully and very
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narrowly speciﬁed products, as we are recommending; rather, it arose
in the context of prices collected for what nowadays would be viewed
as very broadly speciﬁed products.
The Stigler Committee report recommended that the BLS move to
probability sampling methods for narrowly speciﬁed products rather
than using the customs administrative data, which were for unacceptably broad product groups. For example, with the BLS practices based
on customs data, the price of new cars was based on the average of what
were referred to as the “low-priced three” makes of automobile (Chevrolet, Ford, and Plymouth), with no adjustment for quality as the models evolved over time. The committee report particularly was concerned
that “in the case of the Farm Indexes the classes over which unit values
are computed are still often too wide” (p. 33). An accompanying study
by Rees (1961) argued that the Farm Index measure of rugs, which did
not specify the ﬁber content, failed to capture a substantial rise in the
price of wool rugs as reﬂected in the BLS data (and in Sears and Ward
catalogs) because it increasingly captured the pricing of wool-rayon
blend rugs (pp. 150–153).34 Similarly, the old U.S. Census Bureau unitvalue indexes for imports and exports were based on customs administrative data for very broad product categories. As a result, the Census
Bureau unit-value average prices were clearly subject to mix shifts.
As part of its response to the Stigler Report, in 1973 the BLS began
producing rudimentary versions of an Import Price Index (MPI) and an
Export Price Index (XPI) using price quotes and value-share weights
produced by methods similar to those used for the PPI program. Full
coverage of import and export goods categories was achieved by 1982
for the MPI and XPI (Silver 2010). Nevertheless, the Census Bureau
unit-value indexes were not discontinued until July 1989. Alterman
(1991) takes advantage of data from the overlap years to conduct a comparative empirical study of the Census Bureau unit-value indexes versus the MPI and XPI produced by the BLS. That study notes that if unit
values are computed for what, in fact, are different products, then those
price indexes will reﬂect not only the underlying price changes but also
any changes in product mix as well. By way of example, he goes on to
state that if there were a market shift, say, “from cheap economy cars
to expensive luxury cars, the unit value of the commodity (autos) will
increase, even if all prices for individual products remain constant.”
This clarifying remark makes it clear that Alterman, in his 1991 paper,
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is referring to the commodity categories the Census Bureau used in
constructing its unit-value indexes rather than to precisely and very narrowly deﬁned products. Alterman’s remark was true for the customs
data that the Census Bureau used in constructing its unit-value indexes
but does not pertain to our proposals, as seen in the following quotation:
In comparing price trends of imported products, the BLS series,
surprisingly, registered a consistently higher rate of increase
between 1985 and 1989. Between March 1985 and June 1989 the
BLS index rose 20.8 percent, while the equivalent unit-value index
increased just 13.7 percent. . . .With the exception of motor vehicles, the major import components—foods, feeds, and beverages,
industrial supplies and materials, capital goods, and consumer
goods—all show larger increases in the BLS series than in the
unit-value series. The most dramatic difference between the two
series is found in the comparison for imported consumer goods.
Between March 1985 and June 1989 the BLS series recorded a
30.7 percent increase, while the comparable unit-value series rose
just 10.3 percent. (Alterman 1991, p. 116, italics added)

In the above quotation, Alterman (1991) also reports an interesting anomaly along with his other ﬁndings. As Alterman explains, his
discovery that the Census Bureau unit-value series shows smaller price
increases for imports than the MPI contradicts a common presumption
about the nature of unit-value indexes. This is the presumption that
quality levels tend to rise over time, so that the failure to adjust for
product mix changes within the product categories for which prices are
being averaged will typically cause unit-value indexes based on broad
product categories to overstate the true price increases.35
We, however, now suspect that what Alterman identiﬁed as an
“anomalous” result is a manifestation of sourcing substitution bias in
the MPI: a problem that would not have affected the Census Bureau
unit-value series in the same way. In particular, the MPI produced by
the BLS could not capture direct cost savings that buyers achieved by
switching to lower-cost suppliers. In contrast, the old Census Bureau
unit-value series probably did capture at least some of those pricemotivated buying switches among products sharing the same, or almost
the same, primary attributes.36
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Impediment 2: Questions Regarding the Proper Treatment of
Auxiliary Attributes
Producers of mass-marketed products try to ensure the homogeneity of items of what they label as being the same commercial product.
Producers usually want it to be the case that items of what they label as
“a product” can be advertised and sold interchangeably. For example,
a 10.75-ounce can of Campbell’s tomato soup, as this is deﬁned by the
company that owns the brand, is intended by Campbell’s to be the same
product no matter when, where, or how a can of the soup is purchased.
Nevertheless, as has been noted, product items that all have the same
primary attributes can acquire different auxiliary attributes such as having been sold at regular price or during a temporary promotional sale, or
at a neighborhood convenience store versus a superstore.
We argue that in terms of the ﬁnal uses made of products, it is usually just the primary attributes that matter. For example, when it comes
to using cans of soup in a kitchen cupboard that may have been purchased from different outlets to take advantage of price promotions,
typically no account is taken of the forgone effort or time of the family
member who did the shopping. This is in line with current practices for
compiling the gross domestic product (GDP). That aggregate is compiled for the United States by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
following the guidelines of the System of National Accounts (SNA). It
is explicit in the SNA that no account is taken of unpaid time expenditures of household members, whether for picking up groceries at a
superstore as opposed to a nearby convenience store, or for any other
activity (United Nations Statistics Division 2014). Moreover, the nominal value of the consumption aggregate includes all sales of consumer
products at the prices for which they were, in fact, purchased. One main
purpose of the CPI program is to provide components to be used for
constructing deﬂators for the consumption aggregate of the GDP.
We can, nevertheless, see reasons for wanting to hold a variety of
auxiliary attributes constant in estimating the price relatives that are
used in compiling a price index. After all, customers are willing to pay
more per unit for the soup cans sold in a convenience store, and, in that
sense, those cans of soup are deﬁnitely of “higher quality” than lowerpriced units of the product sold at a discount superstore. An important
secondary consideration from our perspective is that whatever product
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differentiation and index basket deﬁnitions are adopted for price-quote
collection purposes, it is important that those same index basket product
deﬁnitions are used as well in collecting the data for and in producing
the product-speciﬁc value-share weights for the price index. The question of if and when auxiliary product unit attributes should be used in
forming index basket product deﬁnitions is deep, and largely beyond
the scope of this chapter.
Impediment 3: Producer Goods with Different UPCs but the Same
Primary Attributes
The mechanics of price measurement for producer goods are greatly
simpliﬁed when the products can be speciﬁed as individual product
UPCs or predeﬁned groups of these. It is the primary product characteristics that usually matter for how product units are utilized in a production process, and differences in primary attributes are always reﬂected
in different UPCs.
Nevertheless, UPCs for product units sometimes differ even though
the product units are, for all practical purposes, identical. For example,
as previously noted, many large manufacturers issue precise speciﬁcations for needed intermediate products, and then purposely select multiple suppliers from among the businesses that bid on the supply contract
opportunity. If intermediate product units are produced according to
speciﬁcations that are identically the same but they nevertheless come
from different producers, then the product units from each producer
will have a different producer-speciﬁc UPC. For price index compilation purposes, we recommend that items of products that are believed to
be the same and are utilized in the same manner by the ﬁnal user should
usually be treated as the same product for price index evaluation purposes even when their UPCs may differ. In addition, if a producer indicates that the product items from different suppliers are used or sold in
the same way except for some allowance for a quality difference (e.g.,
through purchase order adjustments to allow for supplier-speciﬁc defect
rates), then the producer could also be asked to report and evaluate the
quality difference, and that information could be used in implementing
quality adjustments so that the items from the different suppliers can all
be treated as quality-adjusted items of the same index basket product.
However, deﬁning meaningful classiﬁcation systems of UPCs can
be expected to be a laborious process.
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Impediment 4: Consumer Products Sharing Primary Attributes
but Not UPCs
Concerns have also been raised regarding the inﬂation measurement
implications of a growing proliferation of retail products with different
UPCs even when the producer is the same and the primary productattribute differences are trivial. One reason for this proliferation may be
that producers supplying retail products fear that their customers may
switch to buying the products of competitors if they raise their prices.
Hence, they instead may bring out new versions of a product that are
minor variants: variants that are advertised as being improved and that
are offered at increased prices that yield higher proﬁt margins. The corresponding old versions can then continue to be sold too, only to be
discontinued if and when a new version has become a sales success (see
Nakamura and Steinsson [2008, 2012]).
Another reason for the introduction by a producer of a new product
that intentionally has primary attributes that are highly similar to the
attributes of an existing product may be a desire to take market share
from competitors with successful products. In these cases, the producer
wants the new product to differ enough from the old one marketed by
the competitor to avoid successful trademark or patent infringement
lawsuits but hopes that potential users will judge the new product to
meet all the needs and uses of the old one they were purchasing. We
view this as the spirit, for example, in which large grocery store chains
often introduce their own “private label” variants of popular established
brand-name products. Similarly, clothing makers often try to bring out
styles like those of popular designers. And pharmaceutical companies
often try to ﬁnd ways of producing drugs as effective as the successful
drugs produced by competitors. These products have different UPCs
but are deliberately similar to existing products in terms of the primary
attributes.
Conversely, but equivalently for measurement purposes, a producer
may have the goal of maintaining a constant price by replacing a product with another that is less costly to produce.
Although statistical agencies like the BLS do not average over
changing sets of multiple-price quotes for individual products, for price
change to be measured correctly, unit values are sometimes deﬁned
in BLS price index programs to encompass multiple UPCs that repre-
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sent the same index basket product. Adoption of our recommendations
implies an extension of these practices. However, the task of determining when consumer products with different UPCs should be treated as
the same index basket product for inﬂation measurement purposes may
be harder than the corresponding problem discussed above for producer
products. There are three reasons for this:
1) Consumers are far more numerous than producers, and they
generally each buy much smaller amounts than producers purchasing intermediate products. Hence the product-use views
and experiences of much larger user groups would need to be
considered to follow an approach for consumers like what we
suggest above for producers.
2) Producers inevitably keep and analyze data about the performance of units of an intermediate product that are obtained
from different suppliers. Consumers, on the other hand, are not
usually in a position to systematically note primary attribute
quality differences for similar product items from different
producers.
3) Producer products that are similar enough that it might make
sense to consider them as being the same index basket product
were often requested by the purchaser. Thus, the product item
sameness is an openly declared objective to satisfy speciﬁcations issued by the purchaser. In contrast, sameness in the consumer case that results from an effort to expand or enter a market by competing with the product of a competitor is usually
illegal if the duplication is exact. Hence, for consumer products, design work is needed to produce a similar product that is
nonetheless sufﬁciently different so that allegations of patent or
trademark infringement can be defended against. Foreign suppliers trying to gain market share from domestic producers of
consumer products often invest heavily in that sort of product
design work. A great deal of effort can go into legally producing a product that is almost identical to one that already is being
sold by some other producer.
Even when a very similar new product is developed by a producer
as an alternative for one of the producer’s own established products—
perhaps in the hopes of being able to use the new product as a means of
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making a de facto price adjustment—design work is usually required.
This is so no matter how small the differences may seem. From some
perspectives, product development should be treated as part of productivity growth rather than as a price change mechanism. Hence, maybe
these products truly should be treated as new products rather than as
quality-adjusted old products. Kaplan and Menzio (2014) offer data
on the distribution of prices across similar products as well as within
UPCs; their analysis sheds some light on the relative importance of
alternative product speciﬁcation methods. We do not attempt to provide
answers here to these difﬁcult questions.
Nevertheless, the issue must be faced of when and how to average
prices over units of consumer products with very similar primary attributes, as is now sometimes done on the consumer side using hedonic
and other quality-adjustment methods. This is so whether or not our
recommendation to use unit-value price indexes is adopted. The BLS is
already engaged on an ongoing basis in deciding when different commercial products are similar enough to be treated as the same index
basket product, but those efforts, however important, are outside the
scope of this chapter and are not covered here.
Impediment 5: A Need to Change Current Data
Collection Arrangements
The most straightforward impediment to conquer might be the most
serious. The information requirements for a unit-value price approach
based on narrowly deﬁned index basket products are much larger than
for the approaches used for conventional price indexes. Nevertheless,
private businesses have paved the way. Businesses formerly carried out
their decision making and forecasting using sample and other sorts of
incomplete information for their own transactions. In contrast, modern big businesses strive to operate with full, real-time transactional
visibility.
Thus the nature of the needed changes at the BLS and other national
statistics agencies can be seen from the way in which large privatesector businesses have remade their data systems over the recent
decades and have then also remade their business processes to utilize
their improved information capabilities. The needed hardware and software have been developed. Nevertheless, moving a national statistics
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agency into a position of roughly equivalent data storage and handling
capabilities with what big companies now have will require budget allocations and investments in training and hiring people with the needed
capabilities. Private-sector data system experts do not have ofﬁcial
statistics expertise, and those already with the statistics agencies have
had no opportunity to master data capture, warehousing, and utilization
methods of the sort that have become common for big businesses, or the
intricacies of the UPCs.37
It is instructive to brieﬂy examine the steps that the private sector
had to take to attain its modern data-handling capabilities. The 1961
Stigler Report was written before the business world had UPCs. Indeed,
for most of the twentieth century, as stores got bigger and varieties multiplied, the only way for a grocer or other retailer to ﬁnd out what was in
stock was by physically counting all the cans, boxes, bags, and cartons.
The achievement of widespread use of UPCs was the result of sustained
business-world efforts of many sorts. A machine-readable product-code
design had to be devised and agreed on. Equipment for cost-effectively
reading the product codes and for storing and processing the productcode data had to be invented, produced, purchased, and put to use by
businesses. A product-code numbering system had to be invented and
widely accepted. And an organization had to be developed to oversee
the assignment and use of product codes over time. Also, business processes had to be redesigned to make use of the product-code data.
More than a decade before the Stigler Report was written, Bernard
Silver and Norman Joseph Woodland developed (and in 1952 were
granted a patent for) a bar-code design consisting of concentric circles
that could be scanned from any direction. However, without a cheap,
fast, and convenient way to read and record bar-code data, their invention could not be put to use. The development of cheap lasers and
integrated circuits in the 1960s made bar-code scanners and bar-code
data handling potentially affordable for retailers. However, the original
Silver-Woodland “bull’s-eye” bar-code design performed poorly in an
important ﬁeld test. Also, there was the challenge still to be met of getting all needed participants to more forward together.
In the early 1970s, IBM researcher George J. Laurer devised a new
bar-code design for which the ﬁeld test results were acceptable. He then
succeeded as well in getting the U.S. Supermarket Ad Hoc Committee
interested in what was named the IBM Universal Product Code (UPC)
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system.38 On April 3, 1973, the Ad Hoc Committee voted to accept the
symbol proposed by IBM.
Standardization made it worth the expense for manufacturers to put
bar codes on their packages and for printers to develop the needed new
ink types, plates, and other necessities for reproducing the code with
the accuracy required for the UPC scanners, and the Ad Hoc Committee
succeeded in bringing the grocery industry and other needed participants together to implement UPC scanning at the point of sale (POS).
This included agreement on a standardized system for assigning and
retiring bar-code product numbers. To facilitate this, the nonproﬁt Uniform Code Council (UCC) was established. Businesses applied for registration with the UCC, which eventually changed its name to Global
Standards One, or GS1.39 Each business that was accepted as a registered member began paying an annual fee and was then issued a manufacturer identiﬁcation number and given training on how to register its
products and on how to assign and retire UPCs as needed.
Use of scanners grew slowly at ﬁrst. In 1978, less than 1 percent of
grocery stores nationwide had scanners. By mid-1981, the ﬁgure was
10 percent. Three years later it was 33 percent. And by 1999, it was
already over 60 percent.40
GS1 today manages what is collectively referred to as the Global
Trade Item Number (GTIN) System, which includes the UPCs (GS1
.org 2014). The ofﬁcial GS1 member organization for the United States
is now called GS1 US. The modern logistics, inventory management,
pricing, advertising, and supply chain coordination operations of businesses of many sorts, especially including grocers and general merchandise retailers, would be inconceivable without the information derived
from tracking items of product units identiﬁed by UPCs.
In 1999, the Supermarket Ad Hoc Committee commissioned PricewaterhouseCoopers to make a report examining the extent to which the
aims of the original Ad Hoc Committee business plan had materialized (Jones, Garg, and Sheedy 1999). The resulting report ﬁnds that
the direct savings from bar-code adoption (i.e., savings at the checkout
counter) proved greater than originally projected. The report also ﬁnds,
however, that it was the general merchandise companies, rather than the
supermarkets, that managed to most fully realize the projected indirect
savings from bar-code scanning, and it argues that the supermarkets
have been losing market share to superstores because of this reality.

Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb 59

2/16/2015 8:32:20 AM

60 Nakamura et al.

(The indirect savings envisioned by the original Ad Hoc Committee
pertain to business functions such as inventory management.) We see
Walmart as a notable example of this last point.
From 1973 on, as grocery and other retail chain stores grew, the
chains almost all established semiautonomous regional data centers
that collected and processed bar-code scanner data. The reason for the
regional data centers that most chains created and many still have is
that the volume of the bar-code data seemed too large for processing
in a single data warehouse for even a midsized chain store. Nevertheless, in 1979 Walmart built an initial company-wide data warehouse
(Metters and Walton 2007). Walmart was also the ﬁrst large retailer to
give its suppliers access to Walmart’s point-of-sale and inventory data
for the products of each of those suppliers, thereby helping the suppliers
reduce costs due to under- or overproducing. Walmart recognized that
by sharing this information with its supply-chain partners, the company
and its suppliers could all gain from improved coordination.
To improve the reliability of access to its data warehouse, Walmart
in 1987 also built the world’s largest private-sector satellite communications system. Then, in 1991, the company reportedly spent $4 billion more to create its new Retail Link company-wide data warehouse.
Nowadays, Walmart suppliers are able to monitor in almost real time
how their products are selling on Walmart store shelves everywhere that
Walmart carries their products. The POS data is credited with enabling
Walmart suppliers to reduce their inventories, shorten their lead times,
and increase their proﬁtability. Also, with product items being electronically identiﬁed at the checkout counters and with ﬁnancial as well as
physical inventory records being updated on an ongoing, almost realtime basis, store managers in Walmart outlets everywhere as well as
those in the company headquarters can plan better.
Investments that bring the data capabilities of ofﬁcial statistics
agencies more into line with what big companies have could pay big
dividends.41 This and our other reform suggestions are presented in
the ﬁnal section. However, before proceeding to those suggestions, we
brieﬂy note how price indexes affect some other key economic performance metrics.
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INFLATION MEASUREMENT EFFECTS ON OTHER
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Price indexes are used to measure inﬂation for nations and to transform nominal into real values. Real values of national output are then
used to measure economic growth, and for creating measures of productivity growth and growth in material well-being over time.
Previously we deﬁned Rt in Equation (2.1) as the sum of either the
nominal period t revenue for all products sold by some economic entity
or the nominal period t remittance paid (i.e., the cost) for all products
bought by a given economic entity. However, outputs need to be distinguished from inputs for productivity and economic well-being measurement purposes. Productivity is a measure of the efﬁciency of an
economic entity in turning inputs into desired outputs (see, e.g., Diewert
[2007] and Diewert and Nakamura [2007]), and economic well-being
is usually gauged by restating in per-capita terms a measure of the total
output for a nation (such as GDP).
For some given economic entity, here we redeﬁne R t , p nt , q nt , and the
index limits N and J as pertaining just to output products (rather than
including inputs too, as in our previous deﬁnitions). Thus the total nominal revenue in period t for a speciﬁed economic entity is now given by
(2.44)

N

N

Jt

n
R t  n1 R nt  n1  j1
pn qn .

t, j t, j

Here, we redeﬁne P 0,1 as an index measure of output price change from
t = 0 to t = 1.
The most commonly used productivity performance metric for
nations is labor productivity growth. Suppose Lt is deﬁned as a pure
quantity measure of labor services input such as aggregate hours of
work. Labor productivity growth from Period 0 to 1, denoted here by
LP 0,1, can be measured as the ratio of real revenue growth to a growth
ratio for aggregate hours of work:
(2.45)

LP 0,1
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The interpretation people want to make of labor productivity values is
that values greater than 1 (less than 1) mean that real GDP has grown
faster (slower) over time than the quantity of labor required to produce
the real output.
We now consider how the price-index bias problems discussed in
previous sections of this chapter could distort measures of real GDP
growth. Nominal GDP for period t is deﬁned as
(2.46) GDP = C + I + G = (X − M),
where C denotes aggregate consumption, I is investment, G is government expenditure, X is exports, and M is imports. If inﬂation is overestimated (underestimated) for the C component of GDP, this will cause
the growth of real GDP to be underestimated (overestimated), since
C enters with a positive sign into GDP. If inﬂation is overestimated
(underestimated) for the M component of GDP, this will cause the
growth of real GDP to also be overestimated (underestimated), since M
enters with a negative sign into GDP.
The outlet substitution bias problem explained in the subsection
titled “Outlet Substitution Bias in the CPI” is believed to have contributed to the overestimation of inﬂation for C, and hence to the underestimation of real GDP growth. The MPI sourcing substitution problem explained in the subsection “Sourcing Substitution Biases in the
PPI and MPI” is also believed to have contributed to an overestimation
of inﬂation—for imports in this case—which would contribute to an
overestimate, rather than an underestimate, for GDP growth because M
enters the expression for GDP with a negative sign.42
The extent to which these bias effects on real GDP cancel each other
out is an empirical question. Although for the United States the C component of nominal GDP is much larger than the M portion, there are fairly
narrow limits on the proportion by which it makes sense for a retailer
selling in any given market area to undercut the prices of competitors.
This places bounds on the likely size of the CPI outlet substitution bias
problem. In contrast, intermediate product-supply contracts can be very
large, and suppliers sometimes have labor, raw-materials access, patent,
government subsidy, or other cost advantages that make it possible for
them to proﬁtably sell their products, if they wish, at prices far below
what competitors are charging. Hence, it is plausible that positive MPI
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bias problems have outweighed positive CPI bias problems, resulting in
the systematic overestimation of real GDP growth. There is an urgent
need for empirical research on this point.
Haskel et al. (2012) paint a vivid picture of real income declines for
the large majority of Americans over the previous decade. They classify U.S. workers into ﬁve groups by their levels of education—ﬁve
groups that all enjoyed substantial increases in average real income in
the second half of the 1900s. However, since 2000, these same groups
of workers have suffered real average-income declines. This is perplexing, Haskel et al. note, since the U.S. economy enjoyed superior measured labor-productivity growth.43 They point out that the last 10 to 15
years have also brought dramatic changes in economic globalization,
but that connections between globalization and the observed economic
trends are unclear based on available research. Our own results, considered along with other ﬁndings cited in our chapter, raise the possibility
in our minds that price-index bias problems that have been indirectly
worsened by the growth of electronic information processing and communications and associated business process changes (changes that
enabled globalization) may, in part at least, be responsible for the perplexing picture of how the U.S. economy has been doing, as reported
by Haskel et al.
We conclude with suggested changes in ofﬁcial statistics price
measurement that we feel could improve our ability to understand the
evolving economy.

POSSIBLE PRICE MEASUREMENT PRACTICE REFORMS
We have shown that the bias formulas derived in this chapter can be
used to represent the sourcing substitution bias problem in the Import
Price Index (MPI) and the Producer Price Index (PPI), and the potential
sourcing substitution bias problem in the proposed Input Price Index
(IPI) (see Alterman 2008, 2009, and Chapter 10 of this volume), as well
as the outlet substitution and promotions biases in the Consumer Price
Index (CPI). Our recommendations in this ﬁnal section are aimed at
reducing the noted bias problems.
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Our main recommendation is that when items of the same commercial product unit are sold at multiple prices even by the same merchants
during a time period such as a month, then the conventional practice of
using a single price observation per period for the product from each
establishment where the product is priced during the time period (with
this single price then being used to represent the price distribution at
each establishment) should be replaced by the use of establishmentspeciﬁc unit-value prices. Hence, we argue for greater adoption of unitvalue-based price indexes to handle cases of multiple prices for the
same product in the same period. This ﬁrst recommendation implies a
need for modiﬁcations of both data collection operations and compilation procedures. In the text, the need for these modiﬁcations is part of
what we allude to as the ﬁfth and most serious of the impediments to
the adoption of unit-value-based price indexes. We propose a way here
in which the BLS might proceed incrementally toward a capability for
unit-value-based price-index compilation.
At present, the BLS price-quote-collection operation for each of
the agency’s main price index programs (e.g., the CPI, the PPI, and
the International Price Program) starts with selecting establishments on
a probabilistic basis from comprehensive lists of various sorts. Next
comes the selection of products on a probabilistic basis at each selected
establishment. Then, the BLS collects a single price quote in each pricing period (typically a month) for each selected product at each of the
selected establishments.44 The way products are selected for pricing
at different establishments does not usually result in the same product
being chosen for price collection at more than one establishment in a
given geographic market area. Moreover, even when the BLS price collection approach does yield multiple price observations for the same
product version, the BLS does not average over changing sets of the
price observations.45 In addition, for producer products, an effort is
made to only make price comparisons over time for the same buyerseller pairs. These are the main reasons why the BLS price-collection
operations could not, at present, support a switch to compiling unitvalue-based price indexes.
Yet most businesses in a developed country like the United States
have their full transactions data for at least the current month readily
available in electronic form. Hence, with equal ease, a business could
give the BLS information on the quantity of the selected product that
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was bought or sold along with the price per unit that the BLS presently
collects. Moreover, most modern businesses could provide their transaction value and quantity as well as price data for all transactions over
some recent time period, such as a month, for a list of UPC-identiﬁed
products. Feenstra and Shiells (1997) made a similar recommendation
almost 20 years ago. The respondent burden would barely vary depending on the length of the product list. Hence, the same basic probabilistic
selection approach for products at each selected establishment could
be retained if desired, but the products selected at each establishment
could be added to a common product list for all establishments, and
then a month’s worth of transactions data could be obtained from all
selected establishments for all products on the common list.46 The BLS
would then have the option of producing various sorts of unit-value
price indexes.
If averaging of prices for UPC-identiﬁed products is done over time,
month by month, for each establishment, it should be possible to produce unit-value-based price indexes that are largely free of promotions
bias problems. However, the outlet substitution bias would remain as
long as there is no averaging over establishments. Alternatively, if unit
values are produced by averaging of prices for UPC-identiﬁed products
over the establishments in each designated market area, then it should
be possible to produce unit-value-based price indexes that are largely
free of outlet substitution as well as promotions bias problems.
Unfortunately, though, even averaging over establishments and
time will not help with MPI and PPI sourcing substitution bias problems. The reason is that items of intermediate products that are the same
from the perspective of how the purchasing ﬁrm plans to use the items
are often bought from multiple suppliers, and product items from different producers have different UPCs even when all their attributes are
identical. Thus the sourcing substitution bias problem would remain.
Nor would this averaging of prices help with the product replacement
bias phenomenon identiﬁed by Nakamura and Steinsson—another
important case in which the UPCs differ for product items that have
essentially the same attributes and that should perhaps be treated as the
same index basket product.
At least for producer intermediate products, however, the user of
the intermediate product units is in a position to specify the UPCs that
are, from that user’s perspective, for the same product. Hence, we rec-
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ommend asking all producers from whom price quotes are collected
whether they regard some of the UPC-identiﬁed products they purchase
as identical, in that they use the product items interchangeably and in
identically the same manner. Moreover, if a producer indicates that the
product items from different suppliers are used or sold in the same way
except for some allowance for a quality difference (e.g., purchase order
adjustments to allow for supplier-speciﬁc defect rates), then the producer could also be asked to report and evaluate the quality difference,
and that information could be used in implementing quality adjustments
so that the product items from the different suppliers could be treated as
items of the same constant-quality product.
As we have noted, there are also four other sorts of impediments to
the adoption of unit-value-based price indexes by an ofﬁcial statistics
agency like the BLS. One is an established and somewhat indiscriminate prejudice against unit values. We have argued that the reasons that
led to this prejudice do not apply when the unit values are for UPCidentiﬁed or similarly very narrowly deﬁned products, which is what
we recommend.47
We differentiate what we call primary product and auxiliary product
attributes. We deﬁne primary product attributes as characteristics that
a product item has when ﬁrst sold by the original producer and that
normally continue to be characteristics of the product item regardless
of where and how it may be resold. We deﬁne auxiliary product item
attributes as attributes that a product item acquires as a consequence
of where and how it is sold. A second impediment we then identify is
that some of what a producer ships out as items of the same product
can acquire additional auxiliary price-determining attributes, depending on where and how the product items are sold. We note that there are
difﬁcult conceptual and operational questions that arise regarding the
treatment of auxiliary product attributes.
We can, as already acknowledged, see reasons for wanting to hold a
variety of auxiliary attributes constant in estimating the price relatives
that are used in compiling a price index. However, if an auxiliary attribute is used in product differentiation for price-quote collection purposes, then it is important for that same auxiliary-product attribute to
be taken into account too in collecting the data for and in producing the
product-speciﬁc value-share weights for a price index.
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A third impediment is that there are unresolved issues regarding
the price measurement appropriateness and the operational difﬁculty of
recognizing the sameness of units of producer intermediate inputs from
different suppliers that are viewed as identical (or almost so) by the
businesses using these inputs. Related issues arise as well for consumer
products, and we label those issues as the fourth impediment. So both
Impediments 3 and 4 relate to situations where the UPC product deﬁnitions may be narrower than ideal for inﬂation measurement purposes.
We view the task of determining when units of consumer products with
different UPCs are, in fact, the same—or sufﬁciently similar that they
should be treated as the same for inﬂation measurement purposes—as
intrinsically harder than the corresponding problem discussed above for
producer products.
Clearly, we do not provide full solutions to all the problems noted,48
and some of our proposed solutions may prove to be suboptimal. We
offer these suggestions in the spirit of a search for better ways, which
we believe are possible now, given product code and other modern
information-technology developments.
The incremental new transactions data collection approach outlined
above would allow estimates to be made of the importance of the identiﬁed price-index bias problems, since this recommended approach nests
the current BLS price-quote collection processes. The BLS could also
draw on the growing experiences of other national statistics agencies
that are now producing unit-value-based price indexes using electronic
data from businesses (though, as we understand, without designating
them as different from the conventional price indexes or explaining the
relationship).49
We note too that the suggested incremental new data-collection
approach would vastly enrich the BLS research databases, in addition
to contributing to the price-index improvement agenda. Price indexes
are ubiquitously used as measures of inﬂation and as deﬂators. In addition, however, the BLS research databases have been enabling a true
empirical examination of the origins and transmissions of price signals in the U.S. economy.50 If the BLS is given the resources needed
to harness the power of the new information technologies, including
making fuller use of the product codes now ubiquitously used by businesses, and if our recommendations (or appropriate modiﬁcations of
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these) are accepted, we believe the eventual result will be far superior
price indexes.51 We also believe this will result in great improvements
in the accuracy of a host of other economic measures that embed price
indexes as component parts, as well as an even greater ﬂowering of
insights into price signals, which are fundamental to the functioning of
a free-market economy.
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in the seventh section, titled “Possible Price Measurement Practice Reforms.” In
addition to those agencies, many countries rely on monthly unit values for some of
the prices used to compile their PPIs.
2. If that is how the proxy price is arrived at, an implicit assumption is being made
that consumers are indifferent between the 10.75-ounce and the 15.2-ounce formats
for the Campbell’s tomato soup content. Other, more elaborate methods of quality
adjustment might be utilized if that assumption were believed to be inappropriate.

Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb 68

2/16/2015 8:32:27 AM

Sourcing Substitution and Related Price Index Biases 69
3. Reinsdorf (1993) and Diewert (1995, 1998) deﬁned and brought attention to this
price-index bias problem. For related materials, see Greenlees and McClelland
(2011), Moulton (1993, 1996a,b), Reinsdorf (1994a,b,c, 1998, 1999), and Reinsdorf
and Moulton (1997), as well as Hausman (2003), Nakamura (1999), and White
(2000).
4. Diewert and Nakamura (2010) deﬁne this bias problem and provide a measurement formula for it, having been inspired to work on this problem by the arguments and empirical evidence of Houseman (2007, 2009, 2011), Mandel (2007,
2009), and Mandel and Houseman (2011). See also Fukao and Arai (Chapter 7,
this volume), Houseman et al. (2011), and Inklaar (2012).
5. Reinsdorf and Triplett (2009) review the context and content of the Stigler Committee’s recommendations.
6. The person who purchases a can of soup may have preferences regarding shopping
at a convenience store or a superstore for various sorts of products, but others who
end up eating the soup at home will likely not care where a particular can of the
soup happened to have been purchased and often will not even be aware of that
detail.
7. See Nakamura and Steinsson (2008, 2012) for more on this sort of “price ﬂexibility” and its signiﬁcance for understanding and for the management of inﬂationary
pressures in the macro economy.
8. Superlative indexes, deﬁned by Diewert (1976, 1992), have many desirable properties when it comes to taking account of buyer substitution behavior, but they
cannot properly account for the effects on the prices paid by buyers when that behavior changes because buyers progressively learn about cheaper sources of products rather than because of suppliers lowering their prices. See also Diewert (1987,
2013a,b); Diewert and Nakamura (1993, 2007); Nakamura (2013); and Reinsdorf,
Diewert, and Ehemann (2002) regarding aspects of the Fisher index of relevance
for the use of price indexes in the making of productivity indexes for nations.
9. The Laspeyres formula is deﬁned below. It can be calculated in multiple stages of
aggregation or in a single step. The Paasche index, also deﬁned below, shares this
convenient property.
10. Note that attributes of the product content will always be primary attributes of a
product item.
11. See, for example, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe et al. (2009),
Chapter 10, p. 147, expression 10.1. There, the quantity weights are for a base period other than the base period for the price observations because of the additional
time often needed to obtain the data for estimating the index weights. We ignore
this additional complication in this chapter.
12. There are many documented examples of narrowly deﬁned products for both
households and businesses being available from different producers for different
prices. See, for example, Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2009); Foster, Haltiwanger,
and Syverson (2008); and Klier and Rubenstein (2009).
13. While not deﬁning the product-level product rule as we do here, von der Lippe
and Diewert (2010) do make a similar sort of argument. They note that economic
agents often purchase and sell the same commodity at different prices over a single
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23.

accounting period. They assert that a bilateral index-number formula requires that
these multiple transactions in a single commodity be summarized in terms of a
single price and quantity for the period. They explain, moreover, that if the quantity is taken to be the total number of units purchased or sold during the period
and it is desired to have the product of the price summary statistic and the total
quantity transacted be equal to the value of the transactions during the period, then
the single price must be the average value. They note that this point was also made
by Walsh (1901, p. 96; 1921, p. 88) and Davies (1924, 1932) and more recently
by Diewert (1995). See Diewert (1987) and Diewert and Nakamura (2007) on the
conventional product test.
Note that if there truly is just one price for each unit time period as each product
n is deﬁned, then each individual price observation equals pnt,• for the given n,t
combination. Hence, the condition in Equation (2.11) will be satisﬁed when the
conventional statistical agency practice of utilizing a single price observation for
each product in each time period is followed.
The term “hybrid” was suggested to Marshall Reinsdorf by Harlan Lopez of the
Central Bank of Nicaragua.
By “raw” we mean transactions data not already aggregated over time. Providers
of what is labeled “transactions data” often, in fact, deliver data sets consisting of
the total quantities transacted and the unit values for some unit time period such as
a week. See, for instance, Nakamura, Nakamura, and Nakamura (2011) for a study
done using transactions data of this sort.
See, for example, Ivancic, Diewert, and Fox (2011) and Nakamura, Nakamura,
and Nakamura (2011).
In deﬁning these formulas, we ignore the important aspect of conventional practice
that is the focus of the Lowe index literature: namely, that the data used in estimating the value shares is collected separately from the price information used in
index making, and is not usually even for the same time periods. See Balk (2008,
Chapter 1) and Diewert (1993) for more on this issue.
For a formal proof of this result, see Diewert and Nakamura (2010, appendix),
where this result was ﬁrst presented.
For more on the practical aspects of these “revolutionary changes” that Denison
(1962) noted and foresaw, see Brown (1997); Freeman et al. (2011); Hausman and
Leibtag (2007, 2009); Jones, Garg, and Sheedy (1999); and Senker (1990).
Important papers on this topic include Greenlees and McClelland (2011), Hausman
(2003), Hausman and Leibtag (2007, 2009), and Moulton (1993, 1996a,b). Also,
White (2000) presents related evidence for Canada.
For more on the importance of temporary sales for explaining retail price dynamics, see Nakamura and Steinsson (2008, 2012), Pashigian (1988), and Pesendorfer
(2002).
The same is true for Statistics Canada (1996, p. 5): “Since the Consumer Price
Index is designed to measure price changes experienced by Canadian consumers,
the prices used in the CPI are those that any consumer would have to pay on the
day of the survey. This means that if an item is on sale, the sale price is collected.”
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24.

25.
26.

27.
28.

29.

30.

31.
32.
33.

The BLS does, however, have other special procedures for handling sale prices of
apparel at the end of the selling season.
The statistical agencies for some U.S. trading partners exclude temporary sale
prices in compiling their Consumer Price Index (CPI). For example, price collectors are instructed by the Statistics Bureau of Japan not to collect sale prices.
More speciﬁcally, price collectors are instructed that “the following prices are excluded: Extra-low prices due to the bargain sales, clearance sales, discount sales,
etc., which are held for less than seven days” (Statistics Bureau of Japan 2012, p.
3, item 10). (See also Imai, Shimizu, and Watanabe [2012].) This methodology
difference could deﬁnitely affect inter-nation comparisons of inﬂation, economic
growth, and well-being, and the formula in Equation (2.34) can be useful for understanding these effects.
We thank Brent Moulton for comments that greatly improved this section of the
chapter.
Supply chain models like what Oberﬁeld (2013) speciﬁes assume that much of
what typically is measured as technical progress in fact reﬂects the cost savings
from supplier switches.
Houseman et al. (2011) provide a variety of relevant empirical evidence for the
MPI case.
Note that the terms in Equation (2.34) involving d n0 drop out of the ﬁnal expression
in this case, and also that here we have S 0 = 1 because, in period 0, there is only the
one supplier for Business 3, charging a single price.
Equation (2) in Reinsdorf and Yuskavage (2014) modiﬁes this formula to use a
value share weight instead of a quantity share by multiplying by a factor that is
between 1 and 1/d 1. Also, Houseman et al. (2010, p. 70) derive a formula for calculating quantity shares from value shares and the discount d 1. A related formula
for outlet substitution bias is found in Diewert (1998, p. 51).
Houseman et al. (2011) also provide relevant empirical evidence for the IPI bias
case, including pointing out evidence in studies of others about the cost savings
possible to a business from switching from domestic to foreign suppliers for intermediate products. They note as well that “the foreign price deﬂator for intermediate materials rose somewhat faster than the domestic deﬂator” (p. 122). This result
is the opposite of what, as they explain, would be the expected result and could
be explained by price-index bias problems of the sort we consider here and in the
previous section. They empirically implement a bias correction to an input price
index under a range of alternative possible assumptions.
See Eldridge and Harper (2010); Kurz and Lengermann (2008); and Yuskavage,
Strassner, and Medeiros (2008).
This point was independently noted both by Diewert and Nakamura (2010) and by
Reinsdorf and Yuskavage (2014).
An additional conceptual test is international aggregation, as in Maddison (2001).
The sum of world GDP should be a consistent measure of world investment and
consumption; this implies that exports and imports (with shipping costs) equate
across nations in real terms. Eliminating sourcing biases moves us toward an ability to meet this test.
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34. From 1948 to 1959, the relevant BLS price index services and Sears and Montgomery Ward prices grew by 50 percent, whereas the Farm Index series grew by
less than 10 percent.
35. Alterman (1991) proposes and checks out other possible explanations as well for
the results he observed, but he reports that those other hypotheses were rejected
by the data.
36. Written comments by Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg on Nakamura and Steinsson
(2012), shared with us by those authors, led us to see this point, and made us aware
that similar issues may affect a variety of other studies and views on changes over
time in price ﬂexibility and related issues for the U.S. economy and for international comparisons.
37. There is an even larger knowledge gap opening up between the business world
and the ofﬁcial statistics agencies as the business world now begins to move from
UPCs and bar code scanners to Electronic Product Code (EPC) and Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation (RFID) usage. See Roberti (2005) for more on the nature of
and reasons for this continuing evolution.
38. The Ad Hoc Committee consisted primarily of presidents, vice presidents, and
CEOs who were selected from manufacturers, distributors, and retailers so as to
ensure that the interests of all parts of the grocery supply chain were represented.
In addition to being corporate executives, the individuals selected for the committee had signiﬁcant knowledge, respect, and inﬂuence within the entire industry.
39. See http://www.upccode.net/upc-guide/uniform-code-council.html.
40. On how bar codes can be obtained in each nation, see http://www.gs1.org/barcodes/
need_a_bar_code. For more on this history, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Universal_Product_Code and also Kennedy (2013).
41. Walmart’s superior information systems have even enabled the company to respond better to emergencies such as hurricanes than government agencies, as was
widely reported during Hurricane Katrina (see, e.g., Barbaro and Gillis 2005).
42. We focus on just the bias problems for the CPI and MPI here because those bias
problems affect the computation of real GDP. In contrast, whereas bias problems
for the PPI or the proposed IPI are relevant for estimation of real input values for
intermediate products, these problems do not affect in any direct way the computation of ofﬁcial real GDP estimates, hence they do not directly affect the labor productivity growth estimates of ofﬁcial statistics agencies like the BLS. Houseman
(2007, 2009, 2011) and Mandel (2007, 2009) have explored and helped raise interest in these issues. See also Fukao and Arai (Chapter 7, this volume); Howells et
al. (2013); Inklaar (2012); and Strassner, Yuskavage, and Lee (2009).
43. Haskel et al. (2012) refer to BLS data series #PRS85006092 at http://www.bls.gov.
44. So if an establishment, in fact, charged or paid multiple per-unit prices for a chosen
product in a given month, there would be no evidence of this in the BLS pricequote data.
45. As noted above, the geometric mean indexes used in the CPI amount to averaging
prices, but the sample of prices that are averaged is held constant between the two
time periods being compared. In contrast, unit-value indexes allow the composition of the averages to change.
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46. It is important for this sampling to include Internet and multichannel retailers
(Metters and Walton 2007).
47. Indeed, the UPC-identiﬁed products may be too narrowly deﬁned in some cases,
so sometimes it may be judged to be better for inﬂation measurement purposes to
treat a stated group of UPCs as being all for the same product.
48. For example, we have not even made a start on considering the problems of producing unit values for products such as computers that are currently handled using
hedonic methods (see, for example, Baldwin et al. [1996], Berndt and Rappaport
[2001], Pakes [2003], and Pakes and Erickson [2011]), or pharmaceuticals and
medical services (Berndt and Newhouse 2012).
49. The Australian Bureau of Statistics and the New Zealand Bureau of Statistics have
reportedly been exploring ways of obtaining supermarket scanner data directly
from the main supermarket chains in those nations and then of using weekly unitvalue prices for grocery products that are computed by the statistical agencies
directly from grocery-store scanner data. Also, as Guðmundsdóttir, Guðnason, and
Jónsdóttir (2008) explain, Statistics Iceland collects electronic data from the information systems of ﬁrms. Besides prices and quantities, the data Statistics Iceland
harvests show customer identiﬁers and business terms for each customer at the
time of the trade. Statistics Iceland reports that electronic data collection has resulted in lower collection costs and lighter response burdens for the participating
ﬁrms. Statistics Iceland also reports that when the agency switched to electronic
data collection from ﬁrms, it was also able to adopt a superlative approach for
price-index compilation. Feenstra et al. (2013) analyze several sources of mismeasurement in the U.S. terms of trade and ﬁnd that one important source of bias
comes from the fact that the import and export price indexes published by the BLS
are Laspeyres indexes, rather than being based on a superlative formula.
50. The CPI Research Database is a conﬁdential data set that contains all the productlevel nonshelter price and characteristics data that were used to construct the CPI
from 1988 to the present. The goods and services included in the CPI Research
Database represent about 70 percent of consumer expenditures, the excluded categories being rent and owners’ equivalent rent. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008,
2012) created analogous data sets from the production ﬁles underlying the PPI and
also the MPI and XPI. Those data sets have become the new research databases
for the PPI and International Price Program. These BLS research databases are
enabling far-reaching and fundamental advances in economic understanding.
51. It is possible that more than ﬁnancial resources will be required. Participation in
all BLS price surveys is voluntary, unlike the situation in many nations, and some
businesses may consider the provision of electronic price and quantity data to be
more burdensome than the current BLS data collection procedures.
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Appendix 2A
Putting the Picture Together with a Final Example
The BLS collects and uses prices for the CPI regardless of whether they
are “regular” or “sale” prices. In contrast, as noted in the text, some U.S. trading partners, such as Japan and the EU countries, exclude sale prices in compiling their CPI programs. A numerical example may help clarify why this choice
matters. Consider the hypothetical data in Table 2A.1.
Table 2A.1 Regular and Temporary Sale Transaction Data for a Product
Price ($)
Regular price transactions for product n
Temporary sale discount price transactions
Total

2.00
1.00

Regular price transactions for product n
Temporary sale discount price transactions
Total

2.20
1.15

Quantity
Period (t = 0)
2,000
3,000
5,000
Period (t = 1)
1,000
4,000
5,000

Transaction
value ($)
4,000
3,000
7,000
2,200
4,600
6,800

Case 1. Suppose that only the regular price quotes are used for compiling
a price index. As for the estimates of the value weights, following conventional
practice, suppose these come from a household survey that does not distinguish between regular and sale transactions and will reﬂect all transactions for
a product. With the hypothetical data in rows 1 and 4 of Table 2A.1 for regular
price transactions, the resulting Laspeyres, Paasche, and Fisher price indexes1
all equal 1.1.
Case 2. Next, suppose that both the regular and sale prices are used, treating the items of product n sold at regular price as a different product from the
items sold during temporary sale periods. If we do that,2 we get PL0,1  1.121,
PP0,1  1.333 , and PF0,1  (PL0,1 PP0,1 )1/ 2 =1.127.3 Note that only the quantities of the product sold at the regular price are used now as weights for the
observed regular-price quotes, and only the quantities of the product sold at a
temporary sale price are used as weights for those price quotes, which is what
one might expect to be the procedural implication of treating the two groups of
units of the product as different products.
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Case 3. Finally, suppose we treat each unit of a product as being the same
regardless of whether it is sold at regular price or at a discount during a temporary sale period. In this case, we ﬁrst compute the average price for the product
n in each period:

p n0, 

$4,000  $3,000
 1.4 and
2,000  3,000

p1,n  

$2,200  $4,600
 1.36.
1,000  4,000

Using the average prices for the price variable and the total transaction
volumes for the quantity variable in each price index,4 now we get

PL0,1  PP0,1  PF0,1  0.9714.
In Period 0 and also in Period 1, the quantity of 5,000 units of product n
was transacted. These transactions had a nominal value of $4,000 in Period 0
and $6,800 in Period 1. If we deﬂate the Period 1 nominal value by 0.9714,
we get a real value of $7,000, so we ﬁnd no change in the “real value” from
Period 0 to 1: a result that is in agreement with the data on the physical quantities transacted. This result only pertains to the last of the above approaches for
calculating a price index; the others do not yield this outcome.

Appendix Notes
1. PL0,1

$2.20u(2,000 3,000 items )
$2.00u(2,000 3,000 items )

1.1 , PP0,1

$2.20u(1,000  4,000 items )
$2.00u(1,000  4,000 items )

1.1 ,

and PF0,1 = (PL0,1 PP0,1)1/2 .
2. We note again that the U.S. CPI actually would employ a geometric mean, rather
than Laspeyres, formula.
3. PL0,1

($2.20u2,000 items )($1.15u3,000 items )
($2.00u2,000 items )($1.00u3,000 items )

PP0,1

($2.20u1,000 items )($1.15u4,000 items )
($2.00u1,000 items )($1.00u4,000 items )

PL0,1

$1.36u(2,000  3,000 items )
$1.40u(2,000  3,000 items )

PL0,1

$1.36u(1,000  4,000 items )
$1.40u(1,000  4,000 items )
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Appendix 2B
An Example Showing How
Product Deﬁnitions Matter
The producer-side product substitution bias problems identiﬁed by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008, 2012) and the sourcing substitution bias problems
identiﬁed by Diewert and Nakamura (2010) have in common the fact that the
solutions to both necessarily involve some sort of averaging of per-unit prices
for products with different UPCs. As already noted, these bias problems force
a consideration of how products are deﬁned.
UPCs have the desirable attributes of being documented and electronically
recognizable. Also, business data systems are built to keep track of product
purchases and sales using UPC information, making it easy for businesses to
provide information to statistical agencies for products identiﬁed by UPCs.
Consider the case of an economy with just two commercially distinct output products, A and B. We will brieﬂy examine the measurement consequences
of treating the two products as distinct for both price and value-share data collection purposes versus grouping them together as a single product. We will
assume we have full price and quantity data for all transactions for the two
products in both periods t = 0 and t = 1, and that there truly is just one price per
product in each time period.
In row 1 of Table 2B.1 we show the nominal output growth ratio. Below
that on the left-hand side we show the Fisher price index, the real output
growth ratio created by deﬂating the nominal revenue ratio by the Fisher price
index (which equals the Fisher quantity index), and the Fisher labor productivity index. (The results if a Laspeyres price index is used instead can be seen by
ignoring the second term in the left-hand column and not taking the indicated
square root in both row 2 and row 3 and also in the numerator in row 4.)
The counterpart expressions that are obtained if we use the same full transactions data but treat products A and B as the same product for measurement
purposes are shown on the right-hand side of the table. The nominal revenue
ratio is shown in the middle of row 1 because it is unchanged by whether we
treat products A and B as distinct or as the same product for measurement
purposes.
The consequences of choices made about product deﬁnitions are clearest perhaps from the quantity growth ratios in row 3. When we distinguish
the products, the quantity growth measure involves price-weighted aggregates,
whereas when we treat the items of A and B as all being items of the same
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index basket product, then the numbers of items of each are simply added into
the total for each period without the use of weights.
Table 2B.1 The Consequences of Treating Two Products as Distinct
versus the Same Index Basket Product
Using a Fisher price index for deflation with A and
and BB Using a Fisher price index for
treated as distinct index basket products
deflation with A and B treated as
the same index basket product
R1

p1A q1A  p1B q1B

0

p 0A q 0A  p B0 q B0

R

PF0,1

ª§
«¨
«¨
¬©

p1A q 0A  p1B q B0
p 0A q 0A  p B0 q B0

§ R1 · 0,1
¨
¸/ P
¨ R0 ¸ F
©
¹

LPF0,1

ª§
«¨
«¨
¬©

ª§
«¨
«¨
¬©

·§
¸¨
¸¨
¹©

p 0A q1A  p B0 q1B ¸·¨§ p1A q1A  p1B q1B
p 0A q 0A  p B0 q B0 ¸¹¨© p1A q 0A  p1B q B0

p 0A q1A  p B0 q1B
p 0A q 0A  p B0 q B0

Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb 78

(1 / 2)
p1A q1A  p1B q1B ·¸º
»
p 0A q1A  p B0 q1B ¸¹¼»

·§
¸¨
¸¨
¹©

p 0A q1A  p B0 q1B
p 0A q 0A  p B0 q B0

L1A  L1B / L0A  L0B

·º
¸»
¸»
¹¼

·º
¸»
¸»
¹¼

( p1A q1A  p1B q1B ) /(q1A  q1B )

PF0,1

0 0
0
( p 0A q 0A  p B
q B ) /( q 0A  q B
)

§ 1 ·§ q 0  q B0 ·¸
¨ R ¸¨ A
¨ R 0 ¸¨ q1  q1 ¸
¹© A
©
B¹
(1 / 2)

§ 1
¨R
¨ 0
©R

·
¸ / P 0,1
¸ F
¹

(1 / 2)

LPF0,1

q1A  q1B
q 0A  q B0

§ q1  q1
B
¨ A
0
¨ 0
© q A  qB

·
¸
¸
¹
1
1
0
L A  LB / L A  L0B
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Assessing Price Indexes for
Markets with Trading Frictions
A Quantitative Illustration
Brian K. Kovak
Carnegie Mellon University and
National Bureau of Economic Research
Ryan Michaels
University of Rochester

In the last half-century, reductions in transportation and communication costs have dramatically reshaped the spatial organization of
manufacturing production. It is becoming common, for instance, for an
input to be manufactured abroad and then shipped back to the ﬁrm that
designed it (Hummels, Ishii, and Yi 2001). The physical manufacturing of the good in this case is increasingly concentrated in developing
economies such as China, which tend to offer lower prices than incumbent producers.
What is the source of these lower prices? They may represent real
discounts on the same physical good. But there is also a possibility the
price differentials are spurious. They may reﬂect, for instance, unobserved differences in the composition of goods. Furthermore, even if
the inputs are physically identical, the quality of the production service
may vary—as judged, for instance, by the timeliness of delivery and
the reliability of the ﬁnished product. As Carlton (1983) stresses, the
service quality factors into the true price of the good to the buyer (and
into the real resource cost of the transaction).
The answer to our question is of considerable importance to price
index measurement. If price differentials are mistakenly assumed to be
spurious, price indexes will be constructed to ignore the true decline
that occurs when lower-price suppliers enter an intermediate market.
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However, it is equally perilous to neglect the scope for unobserved variation in product and service quality. The challenge to statistical agencies is that, in practice, it is very difﬁcult to isolate real price dispersion
given data limitations.
In reaction to this, the present paper attempts to provide some guidance for price measurement. We explore how well imperfect, but feasible, price indexes approximate the true price change in markets where
quality variation and real dispersion commingle. A price index is feasible if it can be computed from data only on observable outcomes, such
as market prices. We apply these feasible indexes to markets characterized by two key features. First, even if physical products are identical,
there is scope for variation in service quality that would be unobservable
to the analyst. Second, the same product and service can still be priced
differently because of a certain trading friction that impedes arbitrage.
We carry out our experiment within a simple duopoly pricing model.
The structure of the model is designed to mimic salient features of the
market for semiconductor wafers, the subject of our empirical application below. The latter market is an excellent example of the contract
manufacturing sector, in which domestic ﬁrms design products and offshore all fabrication activities. This sector is expanding at a remarkable
rate in the United States (Bayard, Byrne, and Smith 2013).
In the model, two large suppliers—a leader (the founding ﬁrm in
the market) and a follower (who enters the market last)—produce an
input for overlapping generations of buyers. We assume that the physical (observable) dimensions of the input are the same across suppliers.
This assumption is relatively safe in our context since, in our empirical
application, we have exceptionally detailed data on physical attributes.
However, the model allows for variation in the quality of the manufacturing service. We make this notion more precise below; the bottom line
is that lower-quality service will raise the effective price of transacting
with the follower. At the same time, we introduce a trading friction that
takes the form of a setup cost that must be paid if a buyer switches suppliers during the life of its product. The setup cost applies regardless of
the identity of the supplier to whom the buyer is switching. This friction
implies that, when the follower enters the market, the leader’s customers may pay its high price even if there is no difference in production
service.
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In the second section (“A Pricing Game with Costly Switching”),
we ﬁrst solve the model numerically to illustrate its key implications
for price dispersion and price dynamics. The presence of the setup cost
implies that, when the follower enters, the extent of price dispersion
exceeds that which could be attributed to quality variation. However,
as the leader’s contracts with its original customers end, it will compete
more aggressively for new generations of buyers. This causes price dispersion between ﬁrms to narrow. In fact, under certain circumstances,
the effect of the setup cost on price dispersion will abate to the point
that the price differential at the end of the product life will reﬂect only
variation in service quality. This is a key distinguishing property of the
model—constant differences in service quality alone do not induce this
pattern in the dynamics of price dispersion.
Before we apply the model to price index measurement, we ﬁrst
look for evidence consistent with these predictions. To that end, the
third section (“An Application to the Semiconductor Industry”) presents results from Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) that are consistent
with these dynamics. The authors have data on transaction-level prices
of semiconductor wafers along with the key technological attributes of
each wafer. They can therefore control for differences across suppliers
in product composition. However, there may still be differences with
respect to service quality. Indeed, it is often thought that the leader in
this market, Taiwan, has software tools that enable it to provide higherquality service, for which it presumably charges a higher price than its
main competitor, China.1 The theory in Section Two suggests a way of
identifying quality-adjusted dispersion in this setting: Byrne, Kovak,
and Michaels can test for whether the price difference between these
suppliers narrows after China’s entry into a particular wafer market.2
They ﬁnd that, on average, the price differential between Taiwan and
China does close substantially over the life of a given semiconductor
technology: It falls from 39 percent in the year of Chinese entry to 10
percent after ﬁve years. This narrowing is consistent with the presence
of real dispersion, although the differential remaining even at the end of
the product life is suggestive of quality dispersion.
In light of this evidence, Section Four (“Feasible Price Indexes”)
returns to the model and uses it to study the performance of different price indexes when the observed change in average market price
reﬂects both real dispersion and variation in quality. This section ﬁrst
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calculates a benchmark index that assumes the analyst has perfect information regarding quality and is able to directly adjust for the effective
cost of transacting with the follower. It then compares the results of this
benchmark with feasible price indexes that can be calculated even when
the analyst has access only to data on market prices. We consider three
examples.
The ﬁrst feasible index is based on the idea that price dispersion
across suppliers derives exclusively from quality variation. In this case,
the index can be computed by analogy to a standard superlative index,
which treats a supplier’s service as a separate “good” and averages price
changes across providers. The second feasible index takes the opposite view: All of the observed differential represents a real discount.
Accordingly, one can simply average price levels across suppliers and
compute the change in the average price across periods. Not surprisingly, this index yields the largest declines in the price level when the
lower-priced supplier enters the market. The third index is our preferred
index, since it tries to strike a compromise between these two. It relies
on a simple implication of the theory, noted above: the effect of the
setup cost on price dispersion abates over the course of the product life
cycle, leaving a price differential that reﬂects only variation in service
quality. As a result, we can use the observed price differentials late in
the product life cycle to proxy for unobserved quality variation. This
enables a simple correction to market price data while not foreclosing a
role for real price dispersion.
Section Four conﬁrms that our preferred index performs best. Yet,
as we detail later, the correction here is still somewhat conservative in
that it continues to slightly understate the extent of the true price decline
that occurs when the follower enters the market. We then illustrate how
to adjust our preferred index so that it delivers an upper bound on the
extent of the price decline. The true price change can then be bracketed.
Section Five offers a conclusion.

A PRICING GAME WITH COSTLY SWITCHING
This section begins by describing an extension of the simple pricing
game in Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013). Our modeling is guided
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by a large literature that studies price setting in markets under costly
switching.3 The model here deviates slightly from this preceding literature, which typically restricted attention to the analytics of games with
symmetric players. Reﬂecting our interest in the quantitative dynamics
following the entry of a low-cost supplier, we analyze a calibrated game
with asymmetric actors. The leader is the founding ﬁrm in the market
and enjoys monopoly status for a time. The follower enters the market
subsequently and has a lower unit cost of production but inferior production technology. Each ﬁrm competes to supply an input to overlapping generations of ﬁnal-goods producers—the consumers, or buyers,
in this market.
The Model
The basic environment
The model is perhaps the minimalist structure needed to consider
some of the questions of interest. There are three periods, and there
are two types of agents in the market—buyers and manufacturers of
an intermediate good. A cohort of buyers enters in each of the three
periods. The period-1 cohort is present in periods 1 and 2, the period-2
cohort is present in periods 2 and 3, and the period-3 cohort is present in
period 3. Each cohort is of mass 1. Buyers have unit demand, and they
purchase from one of the suppliers as long as the price is less than the
reservation value, a constraint that we discuss in detail below.
Even though buyers purchase the same physical input from both
suppliers, we assume there are details of the production process that
have to be tailored to the buyer’s order. To preview the example in Section Three, consider the market for semiconductor wafers, where buyers are designers of integrated circuits. Suppliers are ﬁrms that fabricate
silicon wafers on which the design is implanted. Each buyer purchases a
wafer with the same size and density of transistors, but there are details
of the design—the precise manner in which transistors are arrayed on
the wafer—that require some specialization of the production process.
Formally, we follow in the spirit of Klemperer (1995) and assume that
design complexity, y, is distributed uniformly from 0 (lowest quality)
to 1 (highest quality). This heterogeneity across buyers would be unobservable to an econometrician who has data only on the physical wafer
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size and line width. In this sense, the model allows for price dispersion
that reﬂects unobserved heterogeneity.
Turning to the manufacturers, Firm A is the leader and is present in
the market from period 1 onward. Firm B is the follower; it joins the
market in period 2. We assume Firm A is at the technology frontier. To
again borrow an example from the semiconductor wafer market, it is
thought that Taiwan’s fabrication ﬁrms have intellectual property that
enables them to more efﬁciently produce a highly complex design. This
means that, although Firm B (China, in the case of the wafer market)
can fabricate any chip, the consumer must pay a cost to monitor and
consult with this supplier. We assume that buyers who purchase from
Firm B pay a per-period monitoring cost, τy (with τ > 0), that is increasing in design complexity. What helps Firm B to compete in the face of
this disadvantage is that it enjoys a lower unit cost of production, which
we denote by cB. Speciﬁcally, we assume that both ﬁrms have constant
unit costs, and that cA > cB.
When a buyer initiates production with a supplier, it must pay a
startup cost, s. This cost has to be paid again if the buyer switches
suppliers. Thus, if a buyer purchased from Firm A in period t − 1 but
switches to Firm B in period t, it must pay s again (independent of its
quality). Hence, this buyer would pay a price, p At, to remain with Firm
A in period t, and would pay p Bt + τy + s to switch to Firm B, where p Bt
is Firm B’s posted price in period t, τy is the monitoring cost, and the
startup cost s acts as a cost of switching.
There are very clear examples of switching costs in the wafer market. To illustrate, certain equipment has to be supplied by the customer
and calibrated to the processes and technologies of each supplier. For
instance, the customer supplies the mask, through which its design of
transistors is projected onto a wafer. The mask must be speciﬁed to
sync with the supplier’s proprietary technologies, which are generally
incompatible across manufacturers. This makes it difﬁcult to re-source
a product once wafer production begins. In the case of a mask, the price
of a new one is high, at over $1 million. As a result, notes one industry
association, “The time and cost associated with [switching] tend to lock
customers into a particular [supplier]” (Gabriel Consulting Group 2006,
p. 1).4
Last, following much of the literature on costly switching, the
model prohibits price discrimination. This restriction is roughly con-
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sistent with wafer supplier contracts, which limit a supplier’s freedom
in charging appreciably different prices across its customers.5 Thus, we
assume the price p At (p Bt ) applies to all Firm A (B) buyers in period t.
The terminal period problem
The problem is solved by backward induction. To analyze the
period-3 problem, we ﬁrst conjecture that there is a threshold y2 so that
Firm B attracts all period-2 entrants with designs y that satisfy y ≤ y2.
In other words, we assume the least “advanced” producer attracts buyers with the least complex designs. This conjecture will be conﬁrmed
in equilibrium. In what follows, since y is uniformly distributed, we
refer to the mass of buyers y2 as Firm B’s customer base at the start of
period 3. The mass of higher-quality buyers 1 − y2 makes up Firm A’s
customer base.
There are three groups of buyers to whom Firm A may sell: members of its own customer base, members of Firm B’s customer base, and
buyers who enter in period 3 (period-3 entrants). The demand schedules for each of these cohorts are given below. Throughout, we let σtj j
represent the share of Firm j’s customer base that it retains in period t,
σtj 0 the share of period-t entrants that it attracts, and σtj i the share of Firm
i’s customer base acquired by Firm j. Hence, for Firm A, we have
(3.1)

ߪଷ ൫ଷ Ǣ ଷ ǡ ݕଶ ൯ ൌ ሾଷ  ଷ  ߬ ݕ ݏȁ ݕ ݕଶ ሿ
ߪଷ ൫ଷ Ǣ ଷ ǡ ݕଶ ൯ ൌ ሾଷ   ݏ ଷ  ߬ݕȁ ݕ ݕଶ ሿ
ߪଷ ൫ଷ Ǣ ଷ ǡ ݕଶ ൯ ൌ ሾଷ  ଷ  ߬ݕሿ

where ptj denotes the price of Firm j in period t.
Each of the components of Equation (3.1) is straightforward. Firm
A retains a member y > y2 of its customer base if its price, p 3A, is less than
the quality-adjusted price of its rival, p 3B + τy, plus the cost of switching
production to a new supplier, s. It poaches a buyer y ≤ y2 in Firm B’s
customer base if its price, plus the cost of switching, is less than p 3B +
τy. Last, Firm A attracts a new (period-3) entrant if its price is less than
the quality-adjusted price of Firm B. Observe that s does not appear in
the entrant’s decision, since it must pay the cost of setting up regardless
of the supplier from which it sources.
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Absent from Equation (3.1) is any mention of the buyer’s (gross)
payoff from the sale of its ﬁnal good. This is because the gross payoff
is independent of the identity of the supplier. Thus, conditional on participation in the market, the buyer’s choice of supplier depends only on
the relative (quality-adjusted) prices and setup costs. We only assume at
this stage that the gross payoff exceeds the minimum cost to the ﬁnalgoods maker. Later, we will specify the payoff and calibrate it so that
the participation constraint does not in fact bind in periods 2 and 3.
Firm A’s terminal-period problem may now be stated as follows.
From Equation (3.1), we have that total sales by Firm A in period 3 are
given by
(3.2)
ܻଷ ൌ ߪଷ ሺଷ Ǣ ଷ ǡ ݕଶ ሻሺͳ െ ݕଶ ሻ  ߪଷ ሺଷ Ǣ ଷ ǡ ݕଶ ሻ  ߪଷ ሺଷ Ǣ ଷ ǡ ݕଶ ሻݕଶ Ǥ

The leader then sets its price to maximize proﬁts, (p 3A − c A)Y3A , which
yields an optimal price of the form p 3A (p 3B , y2). Firm B faces the analogous problem, the solution of which is represented by p 3B (p 3A , y2). The
intersection of the two best responses yields the terminal-period equilibrium, conditional on y2. We denote the equilibrium prices by P3A(y2)
and P3B(y2).
The (pure-strategy) pricing policy of a ﬁrm can typically be partitioned into three regions. Consider, for instance, the behavior of Firm
A, whose optimal price is shown in Figure 3.1 as a function of Firm B’s
price. Over a range of low Firm B prices, Firm A will concede all new
entrants to its rival. The reason for doing so is that it can earn greater
proﬁts by setting a higher price and selling exclusively to its partially
“locked-in” buyers. As Firm B raises its price, it becomes proﬁtable
for Firm A to compete for new entrants. Thus, there is an intermediate
range of Firm B prices over which Firm A both retains its own customer
base and captures a share of new entrants. Lastly, still higher Firm B
prices enable Firm A to poach from Firm B’s customer base.
Interestingly, the pricing rule in Figure 3.1 is not necessarily continuous across these regions. As a result, one ﬁrm’s best response can
pass through the “gap” in the other’s, yielding no equilibrium (in pure
strategies).6 The reason for these discontinuities can be traced to the fact
that, given s > 0, no ﬁrm wishes to charge a price so as to acquire only

Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb 96

2/16/2015 8:32:48 AM

Assessing Price Indexes for Markets with Trading Frictions 97
Figure 3.1 Firm A Best Response
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NOTE: This shows Firm A’s optimal price, given the Firm B price shown along the
horizontal axis. The three regions of the graph are discussed in the main text.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of simulation results from the model in Section Two.

a marginal share of new entrants. If Firm A does this, for instance, it
renders the y = 1 entrant (the most complex design) indifferent between
suppliers. But in that case, A’s incumbents will be strictly inframarginal
because they face s > 0. As a result, the ﬁrm can increase proﬁt by discretely raising its price: It makes a higher proﬁt from incumbents while
sacriﬁcing an inﬁnitesimal share of new entrants. Accordingly, Firm A
delays reducing its price to compete for incoming buyers. Then, when
p B is sufﬁciently high, Firm A can increase proﬁts by reducing its price
discontinuously and capturing a discrete share of new entrants, even
while still charging a reasonably high price level to its incumbents.
Despite these discontinuities in the best responses, we identify a
realistic calibration of the model under which there does in fact exist a
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, in which both suppliers sell to new
entrants in each period (a “no-sale” equilibrium, to borrow from Farrell
and Klemperer’s [2007] language). We discuss this calibration in greater
detail below.
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The period-2 problem
We now turn to the period-2 problem. There are two types of buyers: new entrants and members of Firm A’s customer base. We begin
with the former. A period-2 entrant with design y will purchase from
Firm A only if the presented discounted sum of period-2 and period-3
prices is less than what the entrant would face if it purchased from Firm
B. This implies that the buyer at the threshold y = y2 must be indifferent
across suppliers. Accordingly, y2 solves
(3.3)

ଶ  ߚ ሾܲଷ ሺݕଶ ሻǡ ܲଷ ሺݕଶ ሻ  ߬ݕଶ  ݏሿ
ൌ ଶ  ߬ݕଶ  ߚ ሾܲଷ ሺݕଶ ሻ  ݏǡ ܲଷ ሺݕଶ ሻ  ߬ݕଶ ሿ ,

where β < 1 is the discount factor. Equation (3.3) implicitly deﬁnes the
threshold, y2 , as a function of period-2 prices, y2(p2A, p2B). Thus, Firm A’s
demand schedule among period-2 entrants is 1 − y2(p2A, p2B) ≡ σ2A0 (p2A, p2B).7
In addition, Firm A begins the period with a customer base. Let y1
denote the threshold level of quality so that all entrants in period 1 (the
initial period of the market) with y ≥ y1 participate and so purchase for
Firm A. Thus, Firm A’s customer base is 1 − y1. These buyers remain in
the market for period 2 and then exit. Hence, their problem is a static
one: they remain with Firm A if p2A ≤ p2B + τy + s. Since y is uniformly
distributed (conditional on y ≥ y1), Firm A retains a measure of its old
customers equal to
ߪଶ ൫ଶ ǡ ଶ Ǣݕଵ ൯ ൌ ሾଶ  ଶ  ߬ ݕ ݏȁ ݕ ݕଵ ሿ ൌ

߬ െ ଶ  ଶ  ݏ
Ǥ
ሺͳ െ ݕଵ ሻ߬

Firm A now solves
ቄ൫ଶ െ ܿ  ൯ ή ܻଶ ൫ଶ ǡ ଶ Ǣݕଵ ൯
ߨଶ ሺଶ ǡ ݕଵ ሻ ൌ 
ಲ
మ

 ߚ ቀܲଷ ቀݕଶ ൫ଶ ǡ ଶ ൯ቁ െ ܿ  ቁ ή ܻଷ ቀݕଶ ൫ଶ ǡ ଶ ൯ቁቅ ,

subject to period-2 sales
ܻଶ ൫ଶ ǡ ଶ Ǣݕଵ ൯ ൌ ߪଶ ൫ଶ ǡ ଶ ൯  ߪଶ ൫ଶ ǡ ଶ Ǣݕଵ ൯ሺͳ െ ݕଵ ሻ
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and period-3 sales YA3 (y2 (p 2A, p2B)), given in Equation (3.2). Firm B solves
the analogous problem. We denote the equilibrium prices in the period
by P2A (y1) and P2B (y1).
The initial period problem
The period-1 problem is a monopoly problem, as Firm A is the only
supplier. The period-1 cohort’s problem is to source its input from Firm
A or not participate in the market at all. To solve this cohort’s problem, then, we must make more explicit the demand side of the market.
Our goal here is modest: We wish to introduce a reduced-form demand
schedule that enables us to pose a simple monopoly problem for Firm
A in period 1 and is consistent with the full participation of all period-2
and period-3 entrants. To this end, we assume that the payoff, F, to the
buyer from its (unit) sale of the ﬁnal good has the form
(3.4)

F(y) = R + ry,

where R,r > 0. This assumes, reasonably in our view, that higher-quality
ﬁnal goods “fetch” a higher price, so the payoff is increasing in y.
Given Equation (3.4), the buyer’s problem in period 1 can be made
straightforward, if we make three assumptions. First, if the buyer
chooses to leave the market altogether in period 2, exit is costless. This
means that a sufﬁcient condition for participation in period 1 is F(y) >
p A1. To see this, note that a buyer who enters in period 1 and remains
in the market through period 2 has a present discounted payoff from
participation equal to
F(y) − p 1A + β max{F(y) − p 2A, F(y) − p2B − τy − s, 0}.
Since exit is costless, the buyer will leave the market if the maximum
payoff across the two suppliers is negative. Furthermore, it pays no cost
to leave. In this case, could a lower-y buyer ever be better off if it waited
and signed up with the lower-price supplier, Firm B, in period 2? If it
did, its discounted payoff would be β max{F(y) − p2B − τy − s, 0}. Notice
the presence of s, since the setup cost has to be paid upon entry. Comparing the two payoffs, it is clear that, as long as F(y) − p 1A > 0, the buyer
is always better off participating in period 1 than waiting until period 2.
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However, the latter is not, in general, a necessary condition. Even
if F(y) < p 1A , a buyer may stand to make a proﬁt in period 2. Thus, it
may still enter in period 1 if that is the only opportunity for it to enter.
There are a number of ways to make F(y) > p 1A a necessary condition.
We choose to do this by assuming that the ﬁrm has no access to external ﬁnance. This implies the ﬁrm cannot borrow to cover losses during
period 1, which in turn implies a nonnegativity constraint on dividends:
F(y) − p 1A > 0. Thus, F(y) > p 1A is a necessary and sufﬁcient condition
for participation in period 1.
Last, what happens to a ﬁrm if it declines to participate on account
of F(y) < p 1A ? We assume that ideas are not storable. This means that
ﬁrms for which F(y) < p 1A do not retain the option to return to the market in period 2.8 Therefore, we do not have to keep track of buyers that
decline to enter in period 1.
These assumptions achieve a substantial simpliﬁcation. In particular, if F(y) > p 1A is necessary and sufﬁcient, then the choice of participation collapses to a static problem. From Equation (3.4), we see that
the buyer, y, participates if y ≥ y (p 1A ) ≡ (p 1A − R)/r. It follows that the
monopolist supplier faces a linear demand schedule 1 − y1 (p 1A ) = (R +
r − p 1A )/r. The monopolist then selects its price p 1A to maximize present
discounted proﬁts,





൛ሺ
ଵ െ ܿ ሻ൫ͳ െ ݕଵ ሺଵ ሻ൯  ߚߨଶ ൫ݕଵ ሺଵ ሻ൯ൟ,
ಲ
భ

where π2A (y1) is the discounted present value of proﬁts as of the start of
period 2 conditional on the equilibrium plays in periods 2 and 3.
Quantitative Analysis
Calibration
We now illustrate the model’s mechanics. To that end, we calibrate
and solve it numerically. There are seven parameters (β,c A ,cB ,s,τ,R,r)
that have to be chosen. Of these, only the discount factor β can be set
without reference to a particular input market. We assume the period
is one year and set β = 0.95, which implies an annual real interest rate
slightly higher than 5 percent (Table 3.1). The remaining parameters
will vary across markets. We calibrate the model to the offshore semiconductor wafer market.9
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Table 3.1 Calibration
Parameter Interpretation
Discount factor
β
Unit cost, Firm A
cA
Unit cost, Firm B
cB
Monitoring cost
τ
Switching cost
s
Buyer’s payoff
r
Buyer’s payoff
R

Value
0.95
400
334
395
197.5
432
688

Target moment/reason
Real interest rate
Long-run Taiwan price
Long-run China price
Long-run Taiwan mkt. share
Probability of switching
Period-1 mkt. size
Firm A proﬁts

NOTE: This presents the calibration of the pricing game. The parameters are chosen so
that the model induces the moments on the far right side of the table.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of the values for the parameters used in the model
simulation.

The costs of production and the quality premium, τ, are chosen to
target the two suppliers’ long-run price levels and the leader’s (Firm
A’s) market share. To be more precise, we seek to have the model’s
terminal-period outcomes match observed outcomes “late” in a product’s life cycle. As for how “late” ought to be measured, the model
suggests that we would like to observe market outcomes after the initial cohort of Taiwan’s customers conclude their production runs. The
evidence available from supplier agreements indicates that customers
arrange for at least three-year production runs, but with an option to
renew.10 To allow for some “slippage” around the three-year mark, we
focus on market outcomes after the ﬁrst ﬁve years of a product’s life.
Next, we select s. We have no direct estimates of this, but the testimony of industry experts (see footnote 4) suggests that switches are very
rare. We also observe that customers remain in very long-term arrangements with suppliers. Fabless ﬁrms’ annual reports to shareholders, for
instance, show that fabless ﬁrms maintain relationships with Taiwan’s
TSMC and China’s SMIC for at least four to ﬁve years at a time. Therefore, we choose s to imply a “low” switch rate, which we take to be on
the order of 10–15 percent of Firm A’s period-2 customer base.
Last, we now calibrate Equation (3.4). For given R, the slope, r, in
Equation (3.4) pins down the ﬁrm’s incentive to target high-y buyers:
if r is high, the supplier charges a high price to take advantage of these
buyers’ willingness to pay. But as a result, many low-y buyers elect not
to participate. We therefore set r to target a size for the period-1 market
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relative to the size of the period-2 market. The idea here is that, in many
markets, there is a ramp-up in terms of the volume of business after the
introduction of a new product. Our data from the wafer market suggest
that the size of the market at the time of product introduction is around
one-half of its size in the mature phase of the product’s life. Since there
will be a measure 2 of period-2 buyers, we must then set r so that nearly
a measure 1 of buyers elect to participate. This means that y1 is not far
from zero. Since there is a measure 2 of buyers in period 2, this corresponds to about one-half of the size of the market in the mature phase
of the product life cycle.
As for R, this is chosen to ensure that all period-2 and period-3
entrants wish to participate. If R is sufﬁciently high, then Equation (3.4)
indicates that even the lowest-quality buyer (y = 0) will make a purchase. In particular, one can easily show that, in order to guarantee full
participation in periods 2 and 3, it is sufﬁcient that R > R̂ ≡ maxt = 2,3
{p At , p Bt }.11 Of course, this provides only a lower bound; it does not
point-identify R. To do the latter, we note that our model very likely
understates the degree of competition in this market. Though Taiwan
and China are the most signiﬁcant producers, there are others. Therefore, we choose R in order to contain the rather outsized proﬁts implied
by the model. This means that R is set to roughly target R̂ .
Results: Price dispersion
We focus here on the model’s predictions regarding the dynamics of
price dispersion. We delay a discussion of aggregate price changes until
later. Table 3.2 reports the results. There are two we wish to highlight.
First, the model implies that the degree of price dispersion declines
over the product life cycle. The model implies a gap of roughly $250
in the period in which the lagging supplier enters, and a gap of around
$150 in the next period. The source of these dynamics is very intuitive.
In period 2, the leader charges a relatively high price to its customers,
who are partially locked in because of the cost to switch. However, as
the leader’s original customers exit the market, it has a stronger incentive to compete aggressively for new entrants. The difference in prices
between the leader and the follower therefore narrows. This result is a
simple but important property of the model, and it is one that is absent
if the only source of price dispersion is time-invariant unobserved het-
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Table 3.2 Equilibrium Prices and Market Shares
Firm B period-2 price, p2B
Firm B period-3 price, p3B
Period-2 price differential, Δ2
Period-3 price differential, Δ3
Frictionless (s = 0) price differential
Measure of participants in period 1
Firm A period-2 market share
Firm A period-3 market share
Measure of switchers in period 2
Measure of switchers in period 3

456.37
686.80
252.00
150.38
153.67
0.99
0.67
0.55
0.13
0.00

NOTE: This presents the equilibrium of the pricing game discussed in the main text.
The calibration underlying this solution is shown in Table 3.1.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of simulation results from the model in Section Two.

erogeneity. Thus, it gives us a testable prediction to take to data, which
we do in the next section.
We also note here that the magnitude of dispersion in period 2, and
the extent of its decline in period 3, line up reasonably well with the
estimates from the semiconductor wafer market discussed in Section
3. For this reason, we believe that our calibrated model, although quite
simple, provides some insight into price determination in this market.
As such, it should serve as a useful laboratory in which to study the
properties of various price indexes, a topic to which we return in Section Four, “Feasible Price Indexes.”
Second, the price differential not only narrows in period 3, but it
very nearly approaches the differential in the frictionless model where
s = 0. To see more clearly how this comes about, return to the period-3
problem for a moment. We impose the restriction that each supplier
retains its customer base from the period-2 cohort, as occurs in equilibrium for our calibration (see the ﬁnal row in Table 3.2). Under these
conditions, a little bit of algebra reveals that the difference, Δ3 ≡ p A3 − p B3 ,
in period-3 prices is given by the expression
(3.5)

ȟଷ ൌ ȟ כ ሺʹሺͳ െ ݕଶ ሻ െ ͳሻ

߬
,
͵

where Δ* represents the difference between Firm A and B prices in the
frictionless (s = 0) equilibrium.
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We unpack Equation (3.5) in two steps. First, it is straightforward to
show that Δ* is the difference in market prices that makes the marginal
buyer with design y* indifferent across suppliers. This means that Δ*
compensates for the transaction cost, so that Δ* = y*τ. We therefore interpret Δ* as the difference in market prices that could be accounted for by
(unobserved) heterogeneity in quality. Second, the source of the wedge
between Δ3 and Δ* is intuitive. To see this, note that the wedge vanishes
if y2=1/2. Each supplier in this case charges a higher price level than in
the frictionless model, but the two suppliers’ incentive to exploit their
customer bases is the same. Hence, the price difference reﬂects entirely
the difference in the quality of the production service. If y2 < 1/2 , in
contrast, then Firm A’s market share is relatively large. As a result, it
charges a relatively high price to “milk” its customer base, and Δ3 > Δ*.
For our calibration, it is true that y2 ≈ 1/2, which implies Δ3 ≈ Δ*. This
suggests that one might use the observed difference in market prices
late in the product cycle to proxy for the contribution of unobserved
heterogeneity to the price differentials. In particular, one can subtract
Δ3 from price differentials earlier in the product life cycle, such as Δ2,
and thereby adjust prices all along the product life cycle for unobserved
heterogeneity. This yields an estimate of the share of the period-2 differential that is due to frictional dispersion. More exactly, we have that
(3.6)

ȟଶ െ ȟଷ ʹͷͲ െ ͳͷͲ
ൎ
ൌ ͶͲΨ ,
ʹͷͲ
ȟଶ

which is the percentage of the observed differential that is “real.”12 As
we discuss in greater detail below, this simple correction will signiﬁcantly aid our measurement strategy in Section Four.
Before we turn to the model’s implications for aggregate price
changes, we digress slightly in the next section to consider some recent
evidence for the model’s key prediction regarding the dynamics of price
dispersion.

AN APPLICATION TO THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
We believe that the model presented in the previous section captures features common to many intermediate input markets. Indeed, it
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is, in principle, relevant to any market with entry and clearly deﬁned
product turnover. But our empirical exploration of the model’s implications is, of course, limited by available data. In a prior work (Byrne,
Kovak, and Michaels 2013) we focused on the contract semiconductor
manufacturing industry, for which we have detailed, transaction-level
data. In the remainder of this section, we brieﬂy review the structure of
this market and the ﬁndings reported in Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels.
Semiconductor production involves a number of discrete steps.13
A chip is ﬁrst designed using computer-aided tools that convert the
desired functionality into a network of transistors and interconnections.
The chip is then fabricated by depositing and etching away conducting
and insulating materials to create a three-dimensional pattern of transistors and connections on the surface of a silicon wafer. Each step in the
process is repeated for each of many chips, called “die,” resulting in
a grid of identical, completed die on the surface of the wafer. The die
are then tested, sliced up, and placed in protective packages with leads
allowing the chips to be connected to circuit boards in a ﬁnal product.
Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) focus on the second step in this
production process—the fabrication of semiconductor chips based on
a particular design. Semiconductor fabrication technology has evolved
steadily over time and can be characterized by a few observable technological traits such as the size of the wafer and the size of the smallest feature that can be produced on the surface of the wafer, called the
“line width.” The number of physical layers needed to create the chips
has also increased over time, reﬂecting increased design complexity
and leading to increased fabrication cost. Semiconductor technology
evolves discretely over time, with only a few speciﬁc wafer sizes and
line widths present in the market at any moment in time, making it
possible to control for technological differences across products very
ﬂexibly.
Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels’ (2013) empirical results use data on
arm’s-length transactions between ﬁrms specializing in chip design and
marketing, called “fabless ﬁrms” since they have no fabrication facilities, and ﬁrms called “foundries” that specialize in fabricating other
ﬁrms’ chips. Most fabless ﬁrms are located in the United States and
Europe, and they correspond to the buyers in the model just described.
The largest foundries are located in Taiwan and China, which together
account for 74 percent of foundry output. Taiwanese foundries enter a
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product market, deﬁned by a wafer-size and line-width combination, at
least eight quarters ahead of Chinese foundries. The dominant Taiwanese foundry, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC),
is the overall market leader—it is Firm A in the model. TSMC is widely
considered as possessing the most advanced design integration tools
and engineering support.
The data come from a proprietary database collected by the Global
Semiconductor Alliance (GSA), a nonproﬁt industry organization.
Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels’ (2013) extract spans 2004–2010 and covers a representative sample of about 20 percent of the wafers produced
by the worldwide foundry sector. The GSA data are unique in providing details on transaction prices, along with all technological characteristics of ﬁnished semiconductor wafers that are relevant for pricing,
including wafer size, line width, and numbers of various types of layers. This detailed product-characteristic information makes it possible
to compare average prices for physically identical inputs across suppliers located in different countries.
Formally, Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) implement such a
comparison in a hedonic regression framework that relates wafer prices
to observable technological characteristics, quarter indicators, and indicators for supplier’s location.14 The controls for product characteristics
enable them to estimate the effect of location on price, holding ﬁxed
the composition of goods. The data reveal substantial price differences
across suppliers. Comparing the two largest suppliers, a Chinese wafer
sells at a 17 percent discount compared to an otherwise identical Taiwanese wafer.15
This average difference masks, however, interesting dynamics in
price dispersion. Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) go on to estimate
how the price differential evolves following Chinese entry. The key
result is replicated in Figure 3.2 (which is Figure 4 in Byrne, Kovak,
and Michaels). The dashed gray line plots raw quarterly price differences for the process technology with the largest sales during our time
period, 200mm wafers with 180nm line width. Despite the noise in the
series, it is clear that the average price differential closes considerably
over the life of this technology. It falls from around $600 to around $150
more than ﬁve years after Chinese entry. This pattern applies to other
technologies with smaller sales as well. The black solid line in the ﬁgure plots the difference in price averaged across all technologies in each
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Figure 3.2 The Closing China-Taiwan Price Gap Following China’s
Entry
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NOTE: This presents the difference between China’s and Taiwan’s price for certain categories of wafers. The 200mm/180nm is one of the most popular wafers in the sample. The cross-technology average measures the mean of the price differentials across
wafers. The within-technology ﬁt is derived from a regression model with wafer ﬁxed
effects and thus uses only within-technology variation in the price differential. See
Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) for more.
SOURCE: Based on regression results in Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013).

quarter following Chinese entry and exhibits quite consistent declines
in the gap between Chinese and Taiwanese prices.16 Last, whereas the
solid line pools across technologies, the dotted line in the ﬁgure estimates the price differential based exclusively on the typical variation
within the life of a technology. It reveals a very similar pattern.
As Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) stress, this dynamic pattern is unlikely to be driven by unobserved differences in products or
services across Chinese and Taiwanese suppliers. The price differences
start out large and then converge for each new process technology, so
constant differences across suppliers or differences that evolve over
calendar time for all technologies are unlikely to explain the observed
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pattern. In other words, steady improvements in the quality or reliability of China's production service may explain price differentials across
technologies, but they are unlikely to account for the sharp, withintechnology dynamics we observe. This also rules out explanations
related to brand recognition, customer service, intellectual propertyrights protection, tax policy, and other factors that might make Chinese
producers more attractive over time.
Accordingly, Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) argue that the
dynamics reﬂect the presence of real, frictional price dispersion. The
pattern of narrowing differentials is clearly consistent with that predicted
by the theory of switching costs sketched in Section Two, “A Pricing
Game with Costly Switching.” This ﬁnding motivates our work in the
next section, as we consider developing a price index that admits roles
for both frictional dispersion and constant, unobserved heterogeneity.17

FEASIBLE PRICE INDEXES
Our goal is to measure the change in price of a production service in
an environment in which the quality of service varies across suppliers.
The source of the difference in service quality is not especially critical,
though, for the purpose of this exercise. In our model, the quality of
service varies inversely with the complexity of the design, y. But this is
merely one way to operationalize the idea; heterogeneity across designs
is not, per se, signiﬁcant.
It is worth taking a moment at the outset to elaborate on this point.
The following discussion should help reveal the generality of the problem confronting price index construction. In so doing, it also points the
way toward developing the “ideal” price index in this setting, which
will serve as the benchmark against which all feasible alternatives are
judged.
A Benchmark
There is a way to reinterpret the model that is particularly helpful. Imagine that suppliers produce and ship the input to customers.
Assume, moreover, that Firm B has an inferior transport technology. In
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this context, it is natural to reinterpret y as distance from Firm B. The
cost, τy, is then read as a transport cost, so that a Firm B customer with
unit demand who is y units away must purchase 1 + τy units because
τy are “lost in transit.” In this interpretation, it is the customer who
implants its own design on the chip after receipt of the product.
This problem is formally identical to our own. But what design the
retailer implants on the wafer after it is shipped by Firm B is clearly
orthogonal to how we measure the price of the production (and transportation) service. In other words, in this (re)interpretation, the measurement of the input’s price is unrelated to, and unaffected by, the presence of heterogeneous designs. All that matters, in terms of the real
resource cost to customers, is the transaction cost, τy.
It follows that, in our preferred interpretation of the problem, design
heterogeneity matters for price measurement only insofar as it implies a
particular transaction cost. If we could just observe these costs (τy), we
would fold them into a comprehensive, or quality-adjusted, measurement of the price paid by Firm B buyers, p̂ B ≡ p B + τy, for the production
service. After adjusting for τy, this is the same service provided by Firm
A. Hence, at that point, we simply aggregate across the p A’s and p̂ B’s
in a particular period and compare the result with the average price in
the prior period. This is, in fact, how we will build our benchmark price
index, to which we now turn.
Our benchmark index requires the most information on the part of
the analyst. In particular, the analyst is assumed to observe the transaction cost, τy, paid by a Firm B customer with design y. Hence, the
analyst measures prices, p A and p̂ B.
Since each price in the model (inclusive of τy) pertains to the same
service, it is not hard to aggregate across observed prices. In any period
t, there is a set It of buyers with measure μt . The period-t (with t = 2 or
3) price is then given simply by
ͳ
න  ሺ݅ሻ݅ ,
ߤ௧ ூ ௧

where pt (i) is the price paid by buyer i ϵ It (and equal to either ptA or p̂ tB).
This aggregates prices paid across the measure μt of buyers, weighting
each equally, since all participants purchase one unit of the input.18 This
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price is compared to the average price in the prior period to derive the
price change.
To illustrate the calculations, consider the period-2 problem. It
is helpful to ﬁrst take the case where Firm A retains the full measure
1 − y1 of its period-1 customers but only sells to new entrants with
y ≥ y2. It follows that a measure 2 − y1 − y2 pays p 2A for the input, whereas
each new entrant y ϵ [0,y2] pays p 2B + τy. Therefore, the average period-2
price, P2*, is
ܲଶؠ כ

௬మ
ͳ
ʹ െ ݕଵ െ ݕଶ 
ͳ
න
න ሾଶ  ߬ݕሿݕǤ
ଶ 
ଶ ሺ݅ሻ݅ ൌ
ʹ െ ݕଵ ሾ௬భ ǡଵሿሾǡଵሿ
ʹ െ ݕଵ 
ʹ െ ݕଵ

Since the only price in period 1 is p A1 , the price index in period 2 would
be P2* / p A1 .
The problem is slightly more cumbersome if Firm B poaches in
period 2, as occurs in the model. In this case, Firm B poaches from Firm
A for all qualities less than a threshold, y 2p, where the threshold satisﬁes
y1 < y 2p < y2. Therefore, Firm A supplies a measure 1 − y2 of entrants
and 1 − y 2p of incumbents. Firm B supplies, in turn, a measure of y2 of
entrants and y 2p − y1 of incumbents. Given this distribution of buyers
across designs, the average price becomes




(3.7)

ܲଶכ

௬మ
௬మ
ʹ െ ݕଶ െ ݕଶ 
ͳ
ؠ
ଶ 
൝න ሾଶ  ߬ݕሿ ݕ න ሾଶ  ߬ݕሿݕൡǤ
ʹ െ ݕଵ 
ʹ െ ݕଵ
௬భ

In what follows, it will be instructive to integrate the terms enclosed in
braces on the right half of Equation (3.7) and rewrite this as a weighted
average of the suppliers’ quality-adjusted prices,19


(3.8)

ܲଶؠ כ
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where


(3.9)
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ʹ
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is the average design supplied by Firm B. Hence, the average price
(Equation [3.8]) is a weighted average of the market prices plus a measure of the average transaction cost paid by Firm B buyers. Again, the
price index is simply P2*/p A1.
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Feasible Alternatives
In practice, the BLS does not observe the level of detail—namely,
τ—needed to calculate the benchmark index. We now consider several
indexes with less demanding data requirements. We refer to these as
feasible price indexes.
Within index
The ﬁrst of these is consistent with our understanding of BLS-IPP
practice, which typically treats the identity of the seller as a priceforming characteristic (Nakamura and Steinsson 2012). In this case,
there are, in effect, two types of goods: those sold by Firm A and those
sold by Firm B. Under these circumstances, standard practice is to compute the price index by ﬁrst calculating price changes within each supplier and then averaging these changes across suppliers. We refer to this
as the within index. This contrasts with the benchmark index, which
ﬁrst averages prices across suppliers and then takes the difference.
Applied to the period-2 data, the within index is very simple. Since
Firm B does not participate in period 1, the within index is computed
just by taking the ratio of Firm A’s market, p2A/p A1.
Average index
The second measure takes the opposite approach to the problem of
unobserved quality. The strategy here is to take the average period-2
posted market price across suppliers for all qualities greater than y1 and
compare it to the period-1 price. We refer to this as the average index.20
This index is distinguished by the fact that it takes no account of
the transaction costs—it makes no quality adjustment. Accordingly, the
average index is calculated by simply excluding τy from the price paid
by each of Firm B’s customers in the benchmark index (Equation [3.7]).
The average period-2 price is then




(3.10)
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and the index is calculated according to P2α /p A1. This approach is more
concerned that the new supplier is likely to sell the same qualities at
lower prices, which does in fact happen if y1 < y2. In these instances,
quality-adjusted price declines faced by buyers are not recorded by the
within index.
Diff-in-diff index
Last, we present an index that attempts to strike a compromise
between the within and average indexes. The index confronts the challenge of unobserved heterogeneity but does not abandon the idea that
there may be quality-adjusted price dispersion in equilibrium. At the
same time, it does not place the same data requirements on the analysts
as the benchmark index does.
The construction of what we will call the diff-in-diff index is guided
by the model in Section Two (“A Pricing Game with Costly Switching”). One of the key points of the section was the idea that one can
use the observed price differentials late in the product life cycle, Δ3 , to
proxy for the contribution of unobserved heterogeneity, denoted by Δ*.
This implies that the quality-adjusted period-2 differential, Δ2 , can be
estimated by netting off Δ3 , which is the most that could be attributed to
quality. This boils down to doing quality adjustment by simply inﬂating
Firm B’s price by Δ3. To see this, let p̆ 2B denote our estimate of Firm B’s
period-2 price adjusted for service quality. We deﬁne p̆ 2B according to
the quality-adjusted period-2 differential, p2A − p̆ 2B = p2A − p2B − (p3A − p3B ).
Canceling the p2A’s, we have that p̆ 2B = p2B + Δ3.
This corrected price differential is the key input into the diff-in-diff
index. The index itself is now easy to construct. We add Δ3 to p2B in
the average index (Equation [3.10]), use the proxy Δ3 =Δ* = τy*, and
integrate. (Recall that y* is Firm B’s market share in the frictionless
equilibrium.) The result can then be written as


(3.11)

ܲଶఋ
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Comparing Equation (3.11) to the benchmark (Equation [3.8]), we
see our adjustment is exact only if y * = θ. In fact, a discrepancy between
y * and θ will likely arise. To see why, recall from Section Two that what
drives a wedge between market prices in the frictionless equilibrium
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is the transaction cost faced by the marginal buyer (who is indifferent
across the two suppliers). That is, the difference, Δ*, in market prices
is given by y *τ. However, a quality-adjusted price index like those in
Equations (3.7) and (3.8) requires calculation of the average price inclusive of transaction costs among all Firm B buyers, as represented by θ.
Since the transaction cost increases with y, the marginal cost exceeds
the average. It is very likely, then, that θ < y*. In that case, P2δ would
overestimate P2*.
The comparison between y* and θ becomes clearer if we consider
a special, but informative, case. Suppose that y1 = 0 = y2p . This is an
instructive case because, in our calibrated model, most buyers do in
fact participate in period 1 (so that y1 ≈ 0), and switching is minimal in
period 2. It follows that Equation (3.9) collapses to θ = y2 /2, where y2 is
Firm B’s share of period-2 entrants under s > 0. Hence, in this case, θ =
y* only if y2 = 2y*: Firm B claims twice as many period-2 entrants under
s > 0 as it does in the frictionless equilibrium. The intuition behind
this is that the average transaction cost, θ, approaches y* only if Firm
B supplies very complex designs when s > 0. This is unlikely, and our
calibrated model doesn’t bear this out. It follows that the quality adjustment is too large in Equation (3.11), so that P2δ > P2*.
Reacting to this, we wish to make two observations. First, if we
make no changes to Equation (3.11), it could still be used productively
by agencies with the understanding that it provides an upper bound on
the true quality-adjusted price. Second, we can complement this upper
bound by considering a lower bound; a comparison of the two will help
better identify the true change. To see this, suppose the switching cost
did not distort the distribution of market shares, so that y* = y2. Accordingly, in the special case where θ = y2 /2, one can align P2δ with P2* by
just dividing Δ* = y* τ in Equation (3.11) by 2. This yields an alternative
to Equation (3.11),


ܲଶఋ ؠ
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In all likelihood, the switching cost will affect the distribution of
market shares—in particular, the entering ﬁrm will compete relatively
aggressively to attract customers, since the buyers will be subsequently
locked in. This suggests that y* < y2 = 2θ. As a result, y*/ 2 < θ, which
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means that Pˆ 2δ < P2* : we obtain an estimate of P2* that is downwardly
biased. Comparing P̂ 2δ to the baseline diff-in-diff index (Equation
[3.11]), one can better gauge the true price change. We implement this
procedure below.
We complete this discussion by quickly mentioning how to apply
these indexes to period 3. In correspondence with the calibrated model,
we assume both ﬁrms retain all buyers in period 3. Hence, Firm A sells
to a measure 1 − y2 + 1 − y3 , and Firm B sells to a measure y2 + y3 .
The calculations of each index then follow by analogy to their period-2
counterparts. For instance, the benchmark index is P*3 /P*2 , where P*3 is
given by

ܲଷؠ כ
and ȣؠ

ʹ െ ݕଶ െ ݕଷ  ݕଶ  ݕଷ 
ሺଷ  ȣ߬ሻ ,
ଷ 
ʹ
ʹ

ݕଶ ݕଶ
ݕଷ ݕଷ
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is the average design supplied by Firm B in period 3. Next, the within
index is obtained by ﬁrst computing the change in each supplier’s market price and then aggregating these price changes across suppliers. We
use Tornqvist weights in the latter step, which yields
߱

ଷ
ଷ
ሺͳ


െ
߱ሻ
,
ଶ
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is the average Firm A market share across periods 2 and 3. Finally,
using the appropriate period-3 market shares, the average and diff-indiff indexes can be computed according to the expressions contained in
Equation (3.10) and Equation (3.11).
Results
Table 3.3 uses our calibrated model to assess the accuracy of the feasible indexes. Each column corresponds to a period. Each row reports
the gross price change implied by the index relative to the gross price
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Table 3.3 Feasible Indexes Relative to Benchmark
Period 2
Within
1.082
Average
0.958
Diff-in-diff, baseline
1.032
Diff-in-diff, alternative
0.995

Period 3
1.047
0.990
1.001
0.997

NOTE: This table uses the solution to the calibrated model to calculate the gross price
changes implied by a variety of price indexes. The results are expressed here relative
to the true gross price change. See main text for a discussion of the indexes and Table
3.1 for the calibration.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of simulation results from the model in Section Two.

change implied by the benchmark. For instance, with respect to period
2, the row that reports the average index presents
ܲଶఈ Ȁଵ .

ܲଶ כȀଵ

Thus, if the estimate in the row is less than 1, the feasible index understates the true change. Equivalently, the feasible index overstates the
decline in the price level between periods 1 and 2.
The within and average indexes yield estimates in line with our
expectations. As we showed in Section Two, roughly 40 percent of the
period-2 price differential cannot be attributed to quality dispersion;
Firm B does provide a real discount. As a result, the within index fails to
capture the full extent of the decline in the average price level driven by
the entry of Firm B. The table reveals that it overstates the price change
(understates the price decline) by 8 percentage points. At the same time,
as our discussion in Section Two noted, there is a quantitatively signiﬁcant component of price dispersion owing to difference in service
quality. The average index fails to account for this and so understates
the true price change. Equivalently, it overstates the price decline—in
this case by about 4 percentage points.
We now turn to the performance of the diff-in-diff index. The table
reports results for both the baseline index derived from P2δ and the alternative based on P̂ 2δ . As we anticipated, the baseline index (Equation
[3.11]) outperforms the within index, since it treats a portion of Firm
B’s price as a real, quality-adjusted discount relative to Firm A’s price.
Accordingly, it better captures the decline in the average price level
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when Firm B enters. Yet it still understates the extent of the price decline
by 3 percentage points. Interestingly, the alternative index, based on P̂ 2δ,
performs noticeably better. As we noted earlier, it should be the case
that P̂ 2δ > P2* , but this discrepancy depends on the distance between y2
and y*. This distance turns out to be rather limited in this calibration, but
we stress that it is hard to judge the robustness of this result.
As for period 3, the diff-in-diff indexes perform very well. Mechanically, the reason is that P2δ and P3δ both overstate the corresponding
true prices. These errors appear to cancel each other out, so the gross
change, P3δ /P2δ , turns out to very nearly equal P3* /P2* . The same idea
applies to the average index. However, with respect to the within index,
errors do not cancel each other out so fortuitously; this continues to
overstate the true price. Again, it is difﬁcult to know if these results hint
at a more general lesson. We hope continued work in this area will help
elucidate this.

CONCLUSION
This paper has studied the problem of price index construction for
intermediate inputs when observed price differentials are combinations
of unobserved heterogeneity and real, or frictional, price dispersion.
In particular, it assesses several price indexes that can be feasibly constructed. Our results provide some guidance for how to adjust price
indexes when a new low-price supplier, such as China, joins a market.
In our application to the semiconductor market, we ﬁnd that if frictional
dispersion is ignored, the price index overstates the true price decline
due to entry by ﬁve to eight percentage points. Ignoring unobserved heterogeneity, in contrast, means that lower-quality service by the entrant
is not accounted for, and thus the price decline is overstated. We then
try to provide a pathway between these extrema. Our diff-in-diff index
exploits a simple insight: the cost of switching to a new supplier in this
market sustains frictional dispersion during the early life of a product,
but this inﬂuence abates as the market matures and the market leader’s
original customers exit. Thus, late in the product life cycle, the price
difference largely reﬂects time-invariant quality differences. Accordingly, one can use these observed late-in-life price differences to correct
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for unobserved heterogeneity and thereby isolate the extent of real price
dispersion. For this reason, our diff-in-diff index performs quite well as
an approximation to the true price change.
Our assessment, of course, is conﬁned to a particular market in the
semiconductor sector. Yet we believe our approach provides a fruitful
way forward in this literature. That approach, in sum, consists of a few
components: gather detailed data for a particular industry; develop a
quantitative model of industry dynamics that can be ﬁtted to these data;
and assess alternative, feasible price indexes within the context of the
parameterized model. If applied to several industries, we believe this
approach has the promise of revealing more general lessons for price
index measurement.

Notes
1. By “Taiwan,” we mean Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation, or
TSMC, the largest wafer fabrication ﬁrm in Asia. Most of its properties are in Taiwan, though it has one plant in Shanghai. However, the vast majority of production in China is due to Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation,
or SMIC. When we refer to “China,” then, we mean SMIC.
2. China typically enters two years after Taiwan initiates production.
3. See Farrell and Klemperer (2007) and Klemperer (1995) for surveys.
4. This quote is from a report describing the Common Platform technology alliance.
This is an industry group consisting of a few large chip manufacturers—IBM,
Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing, and Samsung. The group advocates for
a “common platform” that would standardize aspects of semiconductor production technology. However, this alliance has not yet had a material impact on standardizing mask sets (McGregor 2007).
5. We have obtained a handful of these contracts. A representative agreement in terms
of how price discrimination is handled is one between Altera Corp. and TSMC. It
states that “TSMC shall calculate an average price for such Process in use at all of
TSMC’s . . . plants,” and if the buyer’s price “deviates, up or down, by more than
three percent (3%) from the [average price],” the buyer’s price will be adjusted
in the direction of the average price. Note that this agreement does not commit
TSMC to a particular price path over time. The contract merely restricts price
discrimination in a given period, consistent with the model’s assumptions. This
agreement is found at http://corporate.ﬁndlaw.com/contracts/operations/purchase
-agreement-taiwan-semiconductor-manufacturing-co-ltd.html (accessed April 22,
2014).
6. See Nishimura and Friedman (1981) for an analysis of this class of games. They
provide sufﬁcient conditions to ensure a pure-strategy equilibrium, but these conditions can only be conﬁrmed ex post. This is, in effect, what we aim to do.
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7. It is not immediate that there is a unique solution for y2 , but we have always
located one in practice. The intuition for this is as follows. The discounted sum of
Firm B prices is relatively low when y2 is low (i.e., when Firm B’s customer base
is small, it sets lower prices in period 3 to attract new entrants). But the discounted
sum of Firm B prices is also increasing at a relatively fast rate as y2 rises. This
reﬂects the quality premium, as captured by τy2. Together, these features imply
a single crossing, with the right side of Equation (3.3) cutting the left side from
below.
8. Interestingly, another way to make F(y) > p1A a necessary condition is to drop the
nonnegativity constraint and to assume that ideas are instead perfectly storable.
This would imply that a ﬁrm would never produce in period 1 if its instantaneous
proﬁts were negative; it would just store the idea and join the market in period 2.
Note that, since production runs for two periods, these late entrants would presumably live through period 3. This points to the downside of this approach: delayed
entry reverberates through the model’s periods 2 and 3 and creates a more complicated dynamic problem. Moreover, the payoff from this added complication is
rather small. As we discuss, the model will be calibrated in such a way that the
measure of ﬁrms that delay entry is very small, so its quantitative implications
cannot be too great. For this reason, we choose the simpler approach in the main
text.
9. The subsequent two paragraphs are taken from Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels
(2013) (see Appendix 6D).
10. For example, a contract between Quicklogic and TSMC states, “The term of this
Agreement shall . . . continue for a period of three (3) years, renewable annually
as a rolling three (3) year Agreement.”
11. Since the lowest-quality buyer in Firm A’s cohort has payoff R + ryt in period
t = {2,3}, it follows that Firm A buyers will in fact participate if R exceeds
maxt{ptA }. Furthermore, if r > τ (as it does, in our calibration), then the highestquality customer of Firm B will participate if R is greater than maxt{ptB}.
12. We also stress that, although y2 ≈ 1/2 in our model, the approach suggested by
Equation (3.4) can be applied robustly to real-world data even if there are certain
deviations from this. For instance, if y2 is smaller than ½, then Δ3 overestimates its
frictionless counterpart. As a result, if we used Δ3 as a proxy for the contribution of
unobserved heterogeneity to the price differential, we would obtain a lower bound
on the degree of pure (frictional) price dispersion. This property can be desirable
in certain circumstances. For instance, though we assume the suppliers provide the
same physical input here, data limitations may make it impossible for a statistical
agency to do any direct hedonic-style quality adjustments for product composition. In that case, it may want to err on the side of unobserved heterogeneity.
13. Turley (2003) provides an accessible overview of semiconductor technology,
manufacturing, and business.
14. The GSA data do not provide ﬁrm identiﬁers, only the country in which the supplier is located.
15. See Table 3 in Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) for the full list of regression
coefﬁcients from the hedonic model.
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16. To be more precise, Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) regress the price differential on, among other controls, a quadratic time trend and product ﬁxed effects;
the latter control for changes in the composition of technologies. The dotted line,
referred to in Figure 3.2 as the “within-technology ﬁt,” is the estimated time trend.
17. Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels make the correction embodied in Equation (3.6) to
the raw wafer price differentials in order to isolate the component that is due to
real dispersion. In their application, they interpret “late in the product life cycle”
to be roughly ﬁve years after Chinese entry, based on the length of typical semiconductor fabrication contracts (see the subsection titled “Quantitative Analysis,”
beginning on p. 100). Then, drawing from Figure 3.2, the authors interpret Δ3 = Δ*
≈ $150. Netting this off of the observed period-2 differential, Δ2 , yields the qualityadjusted component. For instance, the average differential 10 quarters after Chiെ ͳͷͲ
nese entry is about $375, so the authors estimate that 60 percent ൬͵ͷ͵ͷ
൰ reﬂects
real price dispersion. Hence, the wafer data indicate more frictional dispersion
than implied by the model.
18. Simple averaging across buyers is appropriate within our theoretical model
because the production service, modulo τy, is in fact identical. The BLS does not
follow this approach when aggregating across outlets’ prices at the most detailed
level (the item-area stratum) of the CPI. This is because BLS staff worry that different outlets’ items are not in fact the same. See Hausman and Leibtag (2009) for
more on this practice. See Shapiro and Wilcox (1996) for a general discussion of
aggregation within the CPI.
19. The weights are formed from the quantity of units sold by each supplier. Throughout, we do assume that the statistical agency has access to price and revenue data
from the supplier, so that quantities may be inferred. The BLS International Price
Program does request data on the dollar value of trade for each good when a ﬁrm
is initiated into the survey.
20. The average index does embody a slight recognition of quality differences, in
that it excludes never-before-priced designs in period 2. In this sense, the index
acknowledges that some period-2 goods are “too different” from the basket of
goods in period 1 to be included in the index. We take this approach to try to
capture the fact that the statistical agency does observe repeated sales of the same
product, even if it does not observe quality precisely. Still, this inclusion only of
designs y > y1, as opposed to all designs, makes little quantitative difference to our
results, since y1 is so close to zero.
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Speciﬁc Trade Costs,
Quality, and Import Prices
Benjamin Bridgman
Bureau of Economic Analysis

Recently, quality differences among internationally traded goods
have received signiﬁcant attention. Differing import quality across markets, characterized by lower-income countries producing lower-quality
products, is a robust empirical ﬁnding.1 Johnson (2011) shows that quality differences account for most ﬁrm heterogeneity in trade. Baldwin
and Harrigan (2011) argue that, in order to match the data, trade models
must account for such differences. However, international price indices
frequently cannot make quality adjustments. Correctly accounting for
quality differences is important to the measurement of real trade, since
mismeasurement of trade ﬁlters into other indicators such as real GDP
and productivity. (See Feenstra et al. [2013], Houseman [2007], and
Houseman et al. [2011].)
While quality measurement is an issue for all price indices, it is a
particular challenge for international prices. There has been a signiﬁcant
increase in the number of goods that are traded. A large number of
goods that are traded are only traded intermittently. The “new goods
problem”—determining the quality of new goods relative to previously traded ones—is a frequent issue in international prices. A lack of
quantiﬁable characteristics or agency resources often prevents explicit
adjustments for quality, such as hedonics.
Statistical agencies have developed techniques to deal with environments with shifting sets of goods. A common way of accounting for the
quality of newly measured goods is matched modeling. If an explicit
adjustment for quality cannot be done, a good may be matched to a
similar good. The price difference is attributed to quality differences.
To avoid having frequent replacement of goods in the sample, sampling techniques intentionally focus on consistently traded goods. Price
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changes of consistently traded goods within a category stand in for
price changes of all goods in that category.
I examine these techniques in light of recent advances in trade
theory. I use a version of the model in Baldwin and Harrigan (2011)
to show theoretically that both methods are vulnerable to mismeasurement for goods with quality differences that pay speciﬁc (per-unit) trade
costs. I then analyze the quantitative impact of these forces using U.S.
import data.
I show theoretically that matched modeling will tend to overstate
quality differences between goods. Speciﬁc trade costs weaken the link
between price and quality. Prices are set as markup over production and
trade costs. Lower-quality goods cost less to produce, and all goods pay
the same speciﬁc cost regardless of quality. Therefore, a bigger share
of a low-quality good’s price is due to trade costs. The price difference
between goods will be smaller than their quality differences. Using
matched modeling will tend to overstate real imports of new goods.
Since matched modeling overstates the quality of new goods, it underestimates the (quality-adjusted) price.
Dropping intermittently traded goods will tend to underestimate
price changes. Speciﬁc trade costs systematically make goods that
enter and exit different from continuing goods. Lower-quality goods
are the least proﬁtable, so they are the most sensitive to cost changes.
Relatively small cost changes can make a previously proﬁtable market
unproﬁtable, and vice versa. Low-quality goods are more likely to be
traded intermittently, and the prices of these intermittently traded lowquality goods are likewise more sensitive to cost shocks.
I show that the quantitative impact of this mismeasurement can
be signiﬁcant: in some cases, applying matched modeling leads to
signiﬁcant overstatement of the quality of new goods. For leather footwear, a major import category, matched modeling understates the quality
gap between the highest- and lowest-quality goods by over 30 percent.
However, the average impact has fallen over the period of 1974–2004,
since transportation costs, which tend to be speciﬁc, have fallen.
The impact of dropping intermittently traded goods from the sample has likely increased. The size of the effect is proportional to the
price gap between continuing and newly traded goods, a gap that has
widened. By 2004, the model predicts that newly traded goods’ prices
were twice as sensitive to cost shocks as previously traded ones.
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This chapter is part of a literature that examines mismeasurement of
international prices. Feenstra and Romalis (2012) also examine international prices with speciﬁc trade costs. However, their focus is on macrolevel data, while I analyze the micro-level data and the techniques used
by statistical agencies. A number of papers have examined difﬁculties
in matched modeling. Reinsdorf and Yuskavage (2011) examine country substitution bias, which arises when imports are sourced from new
countries with different price levels. Gagnon, Mandel, and Vigfusson
(2012) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) look at whether the tendency to introduce price changes at product introduction biases import
price indices. This chapter is complementary to those papers, as it looks
at a different mechanism. Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012) examine whether entry and exit in response to exchange rates dampen the
pass-through of exchange rate ﬂuctuations. The mechanism is similar,
though they do not examine its impact on statistical agency methods.
A theoretical literature examines how to accommodate new goods
in international price measurement. Feenstra (1994) derives a method of
calculating the ideal price index with new goods. This chapter focuses
on statistical agency practice and does not deal with welfare.

MODEL
The model is adapted from that found in Bridgman (2013). This
model is based on the Quality Heterogeneous Firm Trade (QHFT)
model developed by Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) and is similar to that
of Gervais (2008).
Households
There are J number of countries. The preferences of the representative household in each country is given by the following equation:
(4.1)

1

1
U    c j i  q i  
 i
 j
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where cj (i) is units consumed of variety i in country j, and Ωj is the set
of available varieties. The preference parameters q(i) are the quality of
the variety and σ > 1. The household is endowed with L units of labor.
Production
Consumption goods are produced using labor. The wage in country
j is wj. There is a constant set of ﬁrms, each endowed with a technology
to produce a variety. Output of a variety is

y i  

L i 
.
a i 

Higher-cost ﬁrms produce higher-quality goods. A ﬁrm with unit cost a
produces a good of quality q according to the following equation:

q i   a i 

1

(4.2)

,

where θ > 0. The assumption that θ > 0 implies that the consumer’s valuation of quality increases faster than marginal cost, so proﬁt increases in
marginal cost. Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) argue that the data support
this assumption. Following Eaton, Kortum, and Sotelo (2012), proﬁts
are spent outside the economy.
Trade
There are three costs to export a variety. There is a market-entry
ﬁxed cost of Fodf  i  units of labor to export variety i from origin country
o to destination country d. There is a speciﬁc (per-unit) cost with unit
labor requirement Fods  i  . Finally, there is an ad valorem charge τod (i).
Given a mill price pod (i), consumers pay delivered price

pd  i   pod  i  1  od  i    wo Fods  i  .
Solution
This section characterizes the solution but does not fully solve it.
A full solution to the model would require specifying a distribution of
unit costs. Since the results do not require a distribution, I do not fully
close the model.

Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb 124

2/16/2015 8:33:11 AM

Speciﬁc Trade Costs, Quality, and Import Prices 125

Each representative household chooses cj (i) for i   j to maximize
Equation (4.1) subject to



i j

p j  i  c j  i   Lw j .

For varieties that are available in a market, expenditure in destination
country d is given by
(4.3)

 q i  
pd  i  cd  i   

 pd  i  

where Bd 

(4.4)

wd Ld
and
Pd1

 1

Bd ,

1

  p  i  1  1
Pd     d
 
 i  q  i   



is the quality-adjusted price index of destination country d. The demand
function in terms of the mill price pod(i) in origin country o for a good
exported to destination country d is

cd  pod  i    q  i  

 1

 pod  i  1  od  i    wo Fods  i  



Bd .

Firms are monopolistic competitors that set prices to maximize
proﬁts. They can set different prices for each market. As a simplifying
assumption, the ﬁrm takes the price index P as given.2 The optimal mill
price pod(i) is the solution to
(4.5)

max pod  i  cd  pod  i    wo a  i  cd  pod  i    Fodf  i  wo .
pod  i 

The mill price solution is

Fods  i  
wo 
pod  i  
 ,
a i  
1  od  i  
 1 
which generates the delivered price

pd  i  
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The ﬁrm will only export if proﬁts are nonnegative. The goods that are
available are determined by whether it is proﬁtable to sell to the market.
A variety i will be exported from origin country o to destination country
d if
 1
 a  i 1
   1  1
Bd
(4.6) 
 Fodf  i  wo .
 

s
 a  i   Fod  i    wo  1  od  i    



SAMPLING
In this chapter, I attempt to match the model to how international
prices are actually collected. Statistical agencies cannot collect price
data for all goods that are traded. They must use a sample to stand in for
nonsampled goods. In this section, I describe the sampling process the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) uses for its International Price Program (IPP).3 The BLS’s sampling process is the most germane, since
the empirical work examines U.S. trade. The sampling techniques and
constraints faced are similar at other statistical agencies, so much of the
description applies to other countries.
Selecting Quotes
Based on trade data, the BLS sets a sample to determine the number of price quotes needed for each item. The BLS then selects a set of
companies to ask for quotes and determines which quotes to ask of each
company. A ﬁeld economist then approaches the company to determine
the particular products that will be priced.
The BLS sets a number of goals for its price program and faces a
number of constraints when setting its sample. Therefore, the sampling
is not a pure proportional probability sample, but a compromise that
attempts to achieve its goals within the constraints.
The sample is designed to get prices covering total trade as well as
a number of subaggregate price indices. Therefore, it will oversample
some products to maintain sufﬁcient coverage of those subindices.
The survey is voluntary and requires the ongoing cooperation of
importers or exporters. Resource constraints restrict the number of
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new prices that can be gathered and how often the sample is reset. It is
more difﬁcult to obtain prices from intermittently traded products, since
items that trade too infrequently do not yield usable price changes, so
ﬁeld economists focus on items that are regularly traded. Firms that are
involved in trade intermittently tend to cooperate with data collection
less frequently; therefore, the survey design intentionally downweights
such products and companies.
Not all intermittent trade is due to the effects identiﬁed in this chapter. For import prices, the BLS does not have jurisdiction to ask overseas
exporters for price data. A foreign company’s goods may be imported
consistently, just not by the same importer. Since the BLS can only
track the importer’s side of the relationship, the goods from that foreign
company will be intermittently traded in the sample. Some goods, like
machinery installed in a new factory, are only demanded irregularly.
Quote Replacement
Quotes will drop out and need to be replaced periodically. There is
both planned and forced substitution.
Planned substitution is replacement built into the sampling design.
The sample is reset periodically to reﬂect changes in the set of products
that are traded. Old items are cycled out and replaced by items in the
new sample. Forced substitution is due to a product being discontinued or a ﬁrm ceasing business. In such cases, the ﬁeld economist will
attempt to get a replacement quote from the trading ﬁrm if possible.
Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) report that about half of the quotes
that drop out do so because of forced substitution and that a quarter
drop out because of planned substitution. The remaining quarter are
cases where the ﬁrm ceases to provide quotes and gives no reason for
stopping. Depending on factors such as how much longer the item was
to be included in the sample, the item may either be replaced by a new
quote from a different ﬁrm or discontinued.
If there is a forced substitution and the new item is substantially
different, the reporter is asked for the value of change so it can be subtracted from the new item’s price, a process called “linking.” Gagnon,
Mandel, and Vigfusson (2012) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2012)
argue that this method is used relatively infrequently. If a new item is
added (as in a planned substitution), there is no item with which to link.
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When the import prices are put together by the BEA to deﬂate trade,
quality adjustments are made to a few items, largely durable goods,
where established hedonic methods are available (BEA 2011).
Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) argue that since explicit quality
adjustment is done infrequently, import/export prices are approximately
matched-model indices. That is, level differences between items within
an index are attributed to quality differences and omitted. Of course,
the data collection does not explicitly use matched modeling. However,
quotes are often added to a cell without quality adjustment, and level
differences between items do not get included. From the standpoint of
the theory, this method is equivalent to matched modeling.

RESULTS
This section examines the theoretical difﬁculties in adjusting for
quality. Speciﬁcally, I examine matched modeling and the problems
posed by sampling intermittently traded goods less frequently. I show
that speciﬁc trade costs interfere with the assumptions that support the
use of these methods.
In the subsections that follow, I will focus on how statistical agencies measure international price change. The BLS uses a Laspeyres
index for its import price indices (BLS 1997). The expression for the
index measuring a price change from period 0 to period t is
(4.7)

Pt  
i

ω
w0  i 

pod ,t  i 

 wω  i  p  i 
i

00

,

od ,0

where ω0  i   pod ,0  i  cd ,0  i  .
This measure is distinct from the theoretical price index that measures the welfare effects of price change. The BLS (1997) states explicitly that the purpose of the international price indices is not to measure
welfare.
To isolate the differential impact of costs on price across goods of
different qualities, I assume throughout this section that trade costs are
the same for all varieties.
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Matched Modeling
Matched modeling works off the assumption that if two similar goods are available in the market at different prices, the price gap
reﬂects differences in quality. We can recover the quality gap between
an existing and a new good by examining the price gap. In this section,
I show that speciﬁc costs weaken the link between price and quality.
Without speciﬁc costs (F s = 0), prices closely reﬂect quality. The
relationship between unit cost a(i) and quality q(i) can be written as
1

a  i   q  i 1 .

The relative price of two goods i and i′ that only differ in quality is
1

(4.8)

q  i 1  wo
1
1


pod  i 
q
i


 1


 .
q  i  
pod  i  q i 11  w

 
o
 1

In this case, matched modeling works well. As long as wages paid by
the producers of the two products are the same, the price difference
reﬂects only quality differences. If a comparison good from a producer
with similar input costs can be found (for example, from the same country), matched modeling is a practical method for dealing with the newgoods problem.4
This clear relationship between price and quality breaks down with
speciﬁc costs. The relative price is now

Fods
pod  i 
1  od .

1
Fs
pod  i 
q  i 1   od
1  od
1

q  i 1  

(4.9)

As the speciﬁc cost term increases, prices are determined more by
trade costs than by quality. Breaking the relationship between price and
quality makes matched modeling more difﬁcult. In matched modeling,
the price gap between an old and a new good is attributed to quality. As
Proposition 1 shows, this method underestimates the quality gap.

Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb 129

2/16/2015 8:33:16 AM

130 Bridgman

Proposition 1: Suppose aL  aH . Then

po  L  qL

.
po  H  qH

Proof: From the solution to the model,

po  L  qL
if

po  H  qH

(4.10)

Fods 
wo 
a
L




1  od 
 1 

1

 a  L 


s
wo 
Fod   a  H  
a  H  
1  od 
 1 

.

This condition holds if

 a  H   
Fods

a  H   


1

 1   od
 a  L  



 a  H   

  1  0 .

 a  L  



aH 
 1 and θ > 0 by assumption.
a  L
The speciﬁc cost Fods has more inﬂuence on the price of lowquality goods. Therefore, the price difference will be smaller than quality differences. New goods are of lower quality than prices indicate.
This force will tend to overstate the real value of new goods imports.

This condition is always true, since

Sampling
As long as the nonsampled prices move in the same way as the
sampled goods, this method gives accurate price measures. However,
speciﬁc trade costs can introduce differences. Newly and intermittently
traded goods are likely to have systematically lower quality than continuing goods. These lower-quality goods react to trade cost changes
differently, so deﬂating these goods by prices of high-quality goods can
lead to mismeasurement.
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Quality of new goods
Newly traded goods tend to be of lower quality than continuing
goods. Since lower-quality goods are the least proﬁtable, they are the
most sensitive to cost changes. High-quality-goods exporters will serve
even high-trade-cost markets, since they have high margins. Lowmargin exporters of low-quality goods are much closer to the zero-proﬁt
cutoff. Relatively small cost increases can make a market unproﬁtable,
so these exporters are the most likely to exit.
In the paragraphs that follow, I will vary a cost and hold all other
quantities constant. That is, if an exercise changes a speciﬁc trade cost
so that

Fods ,t 1  Fods ,t ,
all other trade costs and wages are held constant:

Fodf , t 1  Fodf ,t , τod, t +1 = τod,t , and wo ,t 1  wo ,t .
I deﬁne cutoff quality qod as the quality level that sets Equation (4.6)
at equality; however, changes in trade costs or input prices will change
this cutoff. Lemma 1 shows that falling wages and trade costs (holding
the other quantities constant) will lead to entry of low-quality goods.
Lemma 1: Holding all other quantities constant, if any of the following four conditions hold:
1)

Fods ,t 1  Fods ,t ,

2)

Fodf ,t 1  Fodf ,t ,

3)  od ,t 1   od ,t , or
4) wo ,t 1  wo ,t ,
then qod ,t 1  qod ,t .
Proof: For proofs of the ﬁrst three conditions, see Lemmas 2, 3, and
4 in Bridgman (2013). For the proof of the ﬁnal condition, rearranging
the cutoff condition (Equation [4.6]) gives us
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 1

 a  i 1  1 
(4.11) 

 a  i   Fods  i  



Bd

1   i   



 Fodf  i  wo .

od

If wo ,t 1  wo ,t , the right-hand side of the condition falls. This decline is
equivalent to the ﬁxed cost Fodf ,t falling. Following the proof of Lemma
3 in Bridgman (2013), this implies that qod ,t 1  qod ,t .
Quality and price changes
The fact that new and intermittently traded goods are of lower quality would not be a problem for sampling if the price changes of low- and
high-quality goods were the same. However, low-quality goods react
more to cost changes than do high-quality goods. Since more of the
price of low-quality goods reﬂects trade costs, these goods are more
sensitive to changes in these costs. The prices of low-quality goods fall
(rise) more when speciﬁc trade costs fall (rise) than do the prices of
higher-quality goods. I show this formally in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: If a(H) > a(L) and either
1)

Fods ,t 1  Fods ,t or

2)

 od ,t 1   od ,t

then

,

pt 1  L   pt  L 
p  H   pt  H 
.
 t 1
pt  L 
pt  H 

Proof: Deﬁne Δp(i) by pt +1(i) = pt(i) + Δp(i). For the condition
pt 1  L   pt  L 
p  H   pt  H  to hold, we have
 t 1
pt  L 
pt  H 
p  L  p  H 
.

pt  L 
pt  H 
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If either trade cost  Fods ,t or  od ,t  changes, p  L   p  H  . Formally, if
Fods ,t 1  Fods ,t , then
p  L   p  H  
p  L   p  H  

1

pt  L 



Fods ,t 1  Fods ,t
1 
Fods

1  od ,t 1



, and if  od ,t 1   od ,t , then

Fods . The condition holds if
1  od ,t

1 . Since a H  a L ,
    p  H   p  L  and the
pt  H 

condition holds.
Since they show more price volatility, dropping low-quality goods
will tend to underestimate price changes. To see this more concretely,
consider the case where both a high- and a low-quality good—c(H)
and c(L), respectively—are traded in a category, but only the highquality good is included in the sample. Suppose the speciﬁc cost falls
 Ft s  Ft 1s  . The measured price change for the category is
wtt  L   pt  H 
wtt  H   ω
ω
. The price change should be
Pt M  
 i wωtt  i  pt 1  H 

Pt 

ω
ω
wtt  H  pt  H 
w  L  pt  L 
.
 tt
 i wωtt  i  pt 1  H   i ωwtt  i  pt 1  L 

By Proposition 2,
(4.12)

pt 1  L  pt 1  H 
. That implies that

pt  L 
pt  H 

wt  H  pt  H 
w  L  pt  H 
ω
ω
 t

 i ωwtt  i  pt 1  H   i wωtt  i  pt 1  H 

ω
wt  H  pt  H 
w  L  pt  L 
ω
.
 tt
 i ωwtt  i  pt 1  H   i ωwtt  i  pt 1  L 
Therefore, Pt M  Pt , so the measured price change underestimates the
price fall.
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The previous section showed theoretically that speciﬁc trade costs
can lead to mismeasurement. In this section, I examine how important
this mismeasurement is empirically.
This section only performs an initial assessment of the empirical
scope of the theoretical mechanisms. It does not “ﬁx” the import price
index. While I ﬁnd that these mechanisms appear to have a quantitative
impact in some cases, doing a full adjustment of the data will require
additional work.
Data
The basic data I use in the data analysis are U.S. goods import data
from the Census Bureau, as collected by Hummels (2007). These data
give trade value on a customs value (FOB, or free on board), tariffs,
freight charges, and weight of shipments from 1974 to 2004. A “good”
is deﬁned as an SITC Revision 2 item-and-country-of-origin pairing.
There are a couple of caveats to using these data. First, they are
not the data that are used by the BLS to calculate import price indices.
The price concept I use is unit value (value per weight) rather than
price per product.5 A product is much more aggregated compared to the
prices used by statistical agencies, so it will likely underestimate the
real impact of speciﬁc costs. Furthermore, the analysis does not cover
all trade. Weight data only cover shipments brought in by water or air.
Therefore, the portion of trade with Mexico and Canada shipped by rail
or truck is excluded. Additionally, not all goods report a weight.
Despite the limitations of the data, they do have advantages that
lead me to use them. Most importantly, they are publicly available,
unlike the microdata. Quality variation across exporters and locations
is a robust ﬁnding. (For example, see Bastos and Silva [2010]; Choi,
Hummels, and Xiang [2009]; and Hummels and Klenow [2005].) Therefore, country-level variation generates sufﬁcient quality differences to
get a ﬁrst-pass impact of quality difference on price measurement.
In the subsection that follows, I assume that tariffs are all ad valorem
charges and that freight rates are all speciﬁc costs. That is, τod(i) is the
tariff rate and wo Fods  i  is freight charge per kilogram. Price pod(i) is unit
value. Hummels and Skiba (2004), among many others, ﬁnd that freight
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rates are charged on a speciﬁc basis. Tariffs in the post–World War II
era are typically charged on an ad valorem basis.
Matched Modeling
As documented in Proposition 1, speciﬁc trade costs change the
relationship between quality and price compared to the case without
such costs. To get an empirical measure of this impact, I compare the
model’s estimates of the cost parameter a(i) with and without speciﬁc
costs. Since we know that speciﬁc costs are present, I will assume that
the speciﬁc trade-cost model is the “true” model. I will use the ratio
of the “true” a(i) and the estimate without these costs, as is usually
assumed, as my indicator of quality mismeasurement.
The mill price is given by pod  i  

Fods  i  
wo 
.
a i  
 1 
1  od  i  

We can rewrite this equation as follows:
(4.13) a  i  wo 

wo Fosd  i  
1
 pod  i  1 
 .

1  od  i  

Neglecting the impact of speciﬁc costs (setting Fs = 0) will give an
estimate of â(i):
(4.14) aˆ  i  w

pod  i 



.

Taking the ratio gives us a measure of the overstatement of quality differences from assuming only ad valorem costs:6
(4.15)

a i 
wo Fosd  i 
.
 1
aˆ  i 
pod  i  1  od  i    1

Speciﬁc trade costs are more likely to be an issue when one or more of
the following characteristics are present:
1) High speciﬁc-cost goods (high Fs)
2) Low-quality goods (low a(i))
3) Inelastically demanded goods (low σ)
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Microanalysis
I begin the empirical analysis by examining one good, leather footwear, in detail. I selected this good for a number of reasons. It is one of
the 10 largest import categories in the period examined. A wide variety
of countries export this good to the United States, with the potential
for signiﬁcant quality differences. In addition, there are few observable
attributes that can be used for hedonic quality adjustment. Therefore,
there may be room for alternative methods such as the one proposed in
this chapter.
I need a value of σ to estimate the mismeasurement. I use a value
of 2.02, taken from Broda and Weinstein (2006).7 Table 4.1 reports the
estimated a(i) ratio for Switzerland and Sri Lanka at the beginning and
end of the sample period. I use these two countries since they represent
the high and low ends of unit value, with Swiss exporters charging more
than ﬁve times the price of their Sri Lankan counterparts in 1974. This
spread reﬂects the fact that the richer countries tend to export higherquality goods (Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman 2011).
In 1974, the impact of speciﬁc costs on mismeasurement is much
stronger for Sri Lanka than it is for Switzerland. Price overstates quality by nearly 40 percent for Sri Lanka, whereas it overstates quality by
only 4 percent for Switzerland. FOB prices are selected as a markup
over production cost, which is correlated with quality, and over speciﬁc
cost, which is not. For Switzerland, trade costs are low relative to price.
Therefore, most of the price reﬂects production cost, which reﬂects
quality. Speciﬁc costs relative to unit value are much higher for Sri
Lanka, so more of the charged price is a markup over trade costs. In
2004, Sri Lanka’s mismeasurement falls signiﬁcantly. Speciﬁc costs
Table 4.1 Leather Footwear a(i) Ratios
Switzerland
Sri Lanka
1974
1974
15.41
2.97
Po
s
0.70
0.93
F wo
0.08
0.13
τ
â(i)
1.04
1.37
a(i)

Switzerland
2004
30.97
1.49
0.08
1.05

Sri Lanka
2004
13.01
0.80
0.11
1.06

SOURCE: Author’s calculations, using data from Hummels (2007).
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relative to unit value are much lower. Switzerland and Sri Lanka are
much more similar in cost structure, so prices are more reﬂective of
quality.
If each good was mismeasured by the same amount, there would be
no impact on matched modeling. As shown above, speciﬁc costs affect
low-quality goods more, so we would not expect the impact to be the
same. To measure the impact on measurement, we need to compare
goods across producers. An issue with the trade data is that the producers are different countries, so input costs are unlikely to be the same.
The price levels of wealthier countries tend to be higher, as a result of
the “Penn effect.” (See Marquez, Thomas, and Land [2012] for a recent
empirical conﬁrmation of this effect.) Certainly, wages in Switzerland
and Sri Lanka are different.
We can use the model to eliminate the wages from our estimates. If
good k is produced by countries i and j, the price ratio without speciﬁc
costs is
pi  k  wi aˆi  k 
. The equivalent ratio with the true a(i) ratio is

p j  k  w j aˆ j  k 

(4.16)

wi ai  k  wi aˆi  k  ai  k  aˆ j  k 
.


×
×
w j a j  k  w j aˆ j  k  aˆi  k  a j  k 

The degree to which matched modeling underestimates quality gaps is
(4.17)

wi ai  k  w j aˆ j  k  ai  k  aˆ j  k 
.


×*
×
w j a j  k  wi aˆi  k  aˆi  k  a j  k 

In 1974, the unadjusted price ratio overstates the quality difference
by 32 percent. The unadjusted price ratio
 wa k 
wi aˆi  k 
is 5.19, while the adjusted ratio  i i    is 6.83.
 w a k  
w j aˆ j  k 
 j j


In 2004, the overstatement falls to 1 percent. Since Swiss and Sri
Lankan costs are more similar, so is the degree of mismeasurement.
Therefore, the data better reﬂect the assumptions of matched modeling.
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Overstating the quality of new goods will overstate imports. The
effect is strongest for low-quality goods. Therefore, this effect will tend
to overstate the U.S. trade deﬁcit. American producers tend to produce
higher-quality goods, since the United States is a high-income country.
U.S. imports have begun to shift to lower-income countries, for whom
the effect is stronger. Therefore, imports are more likely to be overstated than exports.
The size of the mismeasurement is sensitive to the elasticity used.
For example, the a(i) ratio for Sri Lanka in 1974 drops from 1.37 to 1.10
if σ is increased from 2.02 to 4.00. On the other hand, the ratio jumps up
to 2.24 if σ falls to 1.50. The elasticity governs the degree to which price
is marked up over cost. For low values of σ (inelastic goods), there are
high markups that magnify the impact of speciﬁc costs.
Aggregate analysis
I now turn to the aggregate effect on quality measurement. I use
σ = 4 for all goods. This is the value Simonovska and Waugh (2011)
settle on as a consensus value using U.S. data; the value is within the
usual range used in the literature. This will tend to underestimate the
impact, since more differentiated goods tend to have a lower value of σ.
The impact of speciﬁc costs is heterogeneous. The range is large,
from a ratio of 1 (no distortion) to 3 (200 percent overstatement).
The average

aˆ  i 
ratio over the sample is 1.039, with a standard deviaa i 

tion of 0.067. The goods with the largest ratios are those shipped by air.
The mismeasurement is larger for goods with high speciﬁc-trade costs.
Since air charges are much larger than charges for goods shipped by
water, goods shipped mostly or exclusively by air are more subject to
this distortion.
So far, I have treated each good equally. To get a sense of the overall
impact, Figure 4.1 plots the a(i) ratio against its share in total imports
within the sample for 2004.8 The most distorted goods tend to be a
smaller share of imports. However, there are a number of goods that are
relatively important that show signiﬁcant distortion.
As a measure of the aggregate impact, I calculate a trade-weighted
ratio of all goods:
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Figure 4.1 Estimated Mismeasurement vs. Log Share of Total Imports
for 2004 (σ = 4.00)
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SOURCE: Author’s calculations, using data from Hummels (2007).

(4.18)

s

i

i

where si 

wi aˆ  i 
,
wi a  i 

po  i  c  i 
.
 i po  i  c  i 

Figure 4.2 shows the weighted ratio, which declines from 1.029
to 1.015. This decline follows the fall in freight rates documented in
Hummels (2007). Of course, what matters for matched modeling is the
relative mismeasurement within a category. As shown above with Sri
Lankan shoes, the decline in speciﬁc costs will reduce the scope of this
source of mismeasurement. Since the typical good’s price reﬂects its
quality more over time, the typical relative mismeasurement will likely
decline as well.
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Figure 4.2 U.S. Trade–Weighted Estimated Mismeasurement (σ = 4.00)
1.03

Log a(i) ratio

1.025

1.02

1.015

1.01

1.005
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

SOURCE: Author’s calculations, using data from Hummels (2007).

The matched modeling issue may be important for at least some
goods. There is reason to believe that this calculation underestimates
the degree of mismeasurement. The data may understate actual speciﬁc
costs. They do not include any other speciﬁc costs that accrue because
of internal transportation and wholesale and retail trade. Rousslang and
To (1993) ﬁnd that internal trade barriers are signiﬁcant. Internal transportation costs are 37 percent of international rates. If any of these costs
are speciﬁc, these estimates will be too low. Using Norwegian data,
Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla (2011) estimate that the median
speciﬁc trade cost is 34 percent of a good’s value.
Using the same σ for all goods understates the impact on some differentiated goods whose demands are less elastic than σ = 4. If we set
σ at 2, the magnitude of the average mismeasurement increases to 9.9
percent in 1974 and 5.4 percent in 2004.
Even if the impact for the average good is small, there are some
goods for which it is likely to matter. Lower-income countries, which
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tend to produce lower-quality goods, have become more important in
U.S. imports. The shift to air transportation, which has much higher
freight rates, has increased the speciﬁc cost for some goods.
Sampling
The sampling method is less likely to collect quotes for intermittently traded goods, whereas the model predicts that new and intermittently traded goods are of lower quality than continuing goods. I begin
the analysis by examining whether these goods are of lower quality in
the data. Though quality cannot be observed directly, there is evidence
that such goods are of lower quality than continuing goods.
Goods that were not traded in the previous year have lower unit
values. This set of goods includes both completely new goods and intermittently traded goods that are imported again. Bridgman (2013) shows
that newly traded goods enter at a lower unit value, while trade costs are
similar across the two sets of goods.
Beginning with Besedes and Prusa (2006a,b), a growing literature
has examined the duration of trading relationships. (See Besedes and
Prusa [2010] for a survey.) This literature ﬁnds that most trade relationships are very short, with the median product being traded for only a
year. Lower exporter income, as measured by GDP per capita, is associated with shorter trading relationships. As discussed above, lowerincome countries tend to export lower-quality goods.
There is direct evidence that entering and exiting items are of lower
quality than continuing goods. Mandel (2010) ﬁnds that U.S. goods that
cease to be exported are of lower quality. In a later work, Mandel (2013)
ﬁnds that Chinese exporters to the United States entered at low quality.
Impact of sampling
These data do not allow us to assess the quantitative impact of
sampling, since we cannot identify which goods are excluded from
the sample. However, we can do a back-of-the-envelope calculation to
get a sense of quantitative impact. I examine the impact of trade cost
changes for low- and high-quality goods. Speciﬁcally, I compare what
the theory predicts the new prices would be if F s changed to F s,. To
parameterize the exercise, I use new and old goods in 2004 as reported
in Bridgman (2013). I identify old and new goods as high- and low-

Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb 141

2/16/2015 8:33:31 AM

142 Bridgman

quality goods, respectively. Their prices are po(H) and po(L). (H and L
stand for high and low.)
Equation (4.19) gives us a(i)wo. Using the price equation, we can
calculate po  i  for i   H , L, the predicted price when F s changes to
F s,′ and all other quantities are held constant.
If trade costs F s and τ are the same for high- and low-quality goods,
which is the case for new and old goods in 2004, the relative growth
rate of prices is
(4.19)

 po  H    po  L   po  L 
.
1 / 
1 

 po  H    po  L   po  H 

In 2004, we have

po  L  0.59

 0.49 .
po  H  1.20

Therefore, high-quality goods are half as responsive to a change in
speciﬁc trade costs.
While this example is quite stylized, it indicates that there can be
signiﬁcant differences in price responsiveness among goods of different
quality. Using only high-quality goods will tend to underestimate price
changes.
There are forces mitigating this effect. Most trade value results
from trade relationships that are long lasting. If a trade relationship survives the ﬁrst few years, the chances that it will end fall signiﬁcantly
(Besedes and Prusa 2010).
Trade relationships in differentiated goods tend to be longer. Besedes
and Prusa (2006b) compare trade duration for goods in organized markets with differentiated goods using the classiﬁcation reported in Rauch
(1999). Trade relationships for commodities traded in organized markets tend to be shorter, since such markets lower the cost of switching.
These are the goods for which the measurement issues resulting from
quality differences are less important.
The impact on aggregate trade measurement is probably small.
Most trade value is not impacted by this effect. However, it may have
an impact on subindices. The price gap between new and old goods
has been increasing, suggesting that the scope for mismeasurement is
increasing.
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This increasing scope of mismeasurement could have an impact on
some of the other uses of trade prices, aside from deﬂating trade. For
instance, it may have a role in explaining the low responsiveness of
trade prices to exchange rates. Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) note
that trade quotes change very little over time. The items that tend to be
included in the price sample are those that are the least affected by cost
shocks.

CONCLUSION
This chapter shows theoretically that two frequently used techniques in international price measurement, matched modeling and
dropping intermittently traded goods from the sample, will mismeasure
prices when there are quality-differentiated goods and speciﬁc trade
costs. Speciﬁc costs weaken the link between a good’s quality and its
price. This effect causes matched modeling to overstate the quality of
low-quality goods. Intermittently traded goods are typically low-quality
goods, those whose prices are the most sensitive to shocks. Removing
them from the sample will understate price movements. These effects
may lead us to overstate the amount of trade from new, low-income
exporters, since they tend to produce lower-quality goods. Determining
the extent of this overstatement will require additional work using more
granular data. However, initial data work indicates that these effects
may be quantitatively important for some types of goods.
Notes
I thank Jeffrey Blaha, John Greenlees, Larry Lang, and Dave Mead for comments. The
views expressed in this chapter are solely those of the author and not necessarily those
of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis or the U.S. Department of Commerce.
1. For example, see Hallak (2006); Hallak and Schott (2011); Henn, Papageorgiou,
and Spatafora (2013); Hummels and Skiba (2004); Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and
Opromolla (2011); Manova and Zhang (2012); Martin (2012); and Spearot (2011).
2. This assumption provides closed-form solutions for prices. As shown in Bridgman
(2013), the impact of this assumption is small as long as there are a large number
of varieties sold.
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3. I thank the BLS’s Jeffery Blaha, Larry Lang, and Dave Mead for extensive assistance in explaining the sampling process.
4. There are other issues with match modeling. If there are menu costs, ﬁrms may use
the introduction of new models as an opportunity to change prices (Nakamura and
Steinsson 2012). That concern does not arise in this model, since prices are fully
ﬂexible and there are no strategic or informational reasons for not adjusting prices.
Therefore, that literature is complementary to this paper.
5. Amiti and Davis (2009) use unit values and argue that they are a reasonable proxy
for broad price movements.
6. Quality is actually a function of this cost q(i) = a(i)1 + θ. By only examining the
ratio of the a(i), we do not have to assign a value for θ. This ratio shows the impact
of speciﬁc trade costs on quality measurement, but we would need a value of θ to
assess the impact on welfare measurement.
7. This value is the 1974–1988 value for SITC Revision 2 Code 85102, taken from
the working-paper version (Broda and Weinstein 2004). The published version
reports elasticities for the more aggregated three-digit SITC level, while the working paper reports at the ﬁve-digit level.
8. I log both variables to make the ﬁgure easier to see. I use 2004, the ﬁnal year of
the sample, since it has the most observations.
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Measuring Manufacturing
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Industries Affect the Numbers and Perceptions
Susan N. Houseman
Timothy J. Bartik
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Timothy Sturgeon
Industrial Performance Center, MIT

Since 2000, the U.S. manufacturing sector has lost more than ﬁve
million jobs, or over 30 percent of its employment base. Large-scale
employment losses in manufacturing are not conﬁned to a few Rust Belt
states. Manufacturing employment over the period has fallen in all but
one state (Alaska), and the drop has exceeded 20 percent in 40 states. In
response to these employment losses, as well as to a large trade deﬁcit
in manufactured goods and concerns that U.S. manufacturing is losing
its international competitiveness, President Obama created a cabinetlevel Ofﬁce of Manufacturing Policy, and Congress has considered a
number of measures to help U.S. manufacturers.1
The development of special policies to promote U.S. manufacturing has many detractors, however. At the heart of the debate is a basic
disagreement over the state of U.S. manufacturing. Those who oppose
government intervention typically argue that there is little need, pointing to robust output growth in the sector. Over the past decade the average annual growth of real value-added in manufacturing has outpaced
that in the aggregate economy, except during recessions, and in quantity
terms, the output of U.S. manufacturers relative to the rest of the economy has remained steady (Figure 5.1).2 These statistics, by themselves,
provide compelling evidence that manufacturing remains highly competitive. Citing such ﬁgures, Robert Lawrence and Lawrence Edwards

151

Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb 151

2/16/2015 8:33:37 AM

152 Houseman, Bartik, and Sturgeon
Figure 5.1 Growth in Real GDP for the Aggregate Economy and for
Manufacturing, 1997–2011
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recently asserted, “The concerns about U.S. manufacturing are not
about output or growth but relate to employment” (Lawrence and
Edwards 2013). High growth in real value-added coupled with large
employment losses implies high labor productivity growth: many inﬂuential researchers and analysts promote the narrative that employment
losses in manufacturing, as in agriculture, are largely a consequence of
automation, not import competition.3 As U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Ofﬁcer David Chavern
put it, “Where did those [manufacturing] jobs go? Mostly to a country
called ‘productivity’” (Chavern 2013).
Statistics, and their interpretation, play a crucial role in shaping our
understanding of the economy and informing policy. Yet, the debate
over the state of U.S. manufacturing, with its dueling narratives, bolstered by apparently contradictory sets of statistics, illustrates how the
rapid pace of globalization and technological change greatly compli-
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cates the collection and interpretation of economic data. Building on
Houseman et al. (2011), we raise concerns about the widely cited output
growth statistics in Figure 5.1, which have served as a basic indicator of
the health of American manufacturing. That article focuses on biases to
manufacturing statistics resulting from the rapid shift toward imported
intermediates from low-wage countries and estimates that real GDP
growth in manufacturing was overstated by up to 20 percent between
1997 and 2007. In this chapter, we argue that, even in the absence of
such biases, the manufacturing output statistics in Figure 5.1 are misleading and commonly misinterpreted.
First, it is generally unknown that the robust growth in real GDP in
the manufacturing sector is largely driven by one industry: computers
and electronic products. For most of manufacturing, real output growth
has been relatively weak or negative.4 When the computer and electronic products industry is excluded, real GDP growth in manufacturing
falls by two-thirds between 1997 and 2007, the decade leading up to
the Great Recession. In 2011, without computer-related industries, real
GDP in the manufacturing sector was actually lower than in 2000. The
computer and electronic products industry similarly drives real manufacturing output growth in most U.S. states. Real manufacturing GDP
growth between 1997 and 2007 falls by more than half in a majority of
states and by at least 25 percent in all but 10 states.
Furthermore, the extraordinary growth in real value-added in
manufacturing and the accompanying productivity growth in the computer and electronic products industry results largely from two sets of
products, computers and semiconductors, that, when adjusted for quality improvements, have prices that are falling rapidly. These quality
improvements, in turn, largely reﬂect better design and increases in the
density of electronic circuitry. While changes in manufacturing processes are necessary to produce these improved designs, the production processes in computers and semiconductors have been automated
for many decades. Thus, the high growth in real value-added and productivity in the computer and semiconductor product segments, and by
extension the manufacturing sector, reﬂects, to a large degree, product
improvements from research and development rather than automation
of the production process. Unlike productivity resulting from automation, which involves the substitution of capital for labor, productivity
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arising from improvements to product design and already-automated
production processes does not, in and of itself, cause job losses.
Ironically, the extraordinary growth in real value-added and productivity in the computer and semiconductor industries does not signal
the competitiveness of the United States as a manufacturing location for
these products. Drawing on new market research data, we provide evidence of the shift in the location of computer and semiconductor manufacturing to Asia. Few personal computers and servers are assembled
in the United States today, and, consequently, the United States runs a
large trade deﬁcit for these products. The United States retains a signiﬁcant presence in semiconductor wafer fabrication, but over the past
decade manufacturing capacity has expanded much more rapidly in
Asia, and, as a result, U.S. market share has declined rapidly. Although
many of the computers and semiconductors produced overseas are still
designed in the United States, the shift in the location of production has
a direct bearing on the number and types of U.S. jobs.
The effect that computer-related industries have on measured
growth in manufacturing real GDP has important implications not only
for the interpretation of published statistics but also for research based
on them. We illustrate with an empirical analysis of the relationship
between employment and real output growth using state manufacturing data. The computer and electronic products industry is an outlier
in manufacturing, characterized both by extraordinary real value-added
growth and by above-average employment declines. An increase in
a state’s manufacturing output resulting from higher demand for its
products should lead to an increase in employment, but we ﬁnd no
such employment effect in instrumental variables regression analyses. Although a naïve interpretation of this ﬁnding would suggest that
policies to promote U.S. manufacturing will fail to generate jobs, the
ﬁnding makes no sense, and such an interpretation would be incorrect.
When the computer and electronics product industry is dropped from
the manufacturing measures, the expected relationship between output
and employment holds: higher demand generates roughly equal percentage increases in real manufacturing shipments and employment.
Misleading statistics have helped shape an important policy discussion concerning U.S. manufacturing. To address the problem, statistical
agencies ﬁrst and foremost should take steps to assure that the outsized
effect that computer-related industries have on manufacturing-sector
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statistics is transparent to data users. This could easily be accomplished
by publishing real output and productivity statistics for the manufacturing sector less computer-related industries.
In the remainder of the paper, we do three things. First, we detail
the inﬂuence that computer and electronic products manufacturing has
on real manufacturing GDP growth nationally and in states. We also
estimate the bias to real GDP growth in state manufacturing sectors
from offshoring in the appendix to this chapter. Second, we examine
the global competitiveness of the U.S. computer and semiconductor
industry segments and the sources and interpretation of the rapid real
value-added and productivity growth in them. And third, we illustrate
the distorting effect computer-related industries may have on research
ﬁndings through an empirical examination of the relationship between
output and employment growth using state manufacturing data. We
conclude with recommendations for statistical agencies.

THE EFFECT OF THE COMPUTER AND ELECTRONIC
PRODUCTS INDUSTRY ON REAL GDP GROWTH
IN MANUFACTURING
Manufacturing output statistics mask divergent trends within the
sector. Figure 5.2 displays annual average growth rates for each threedigit NAICS manufacturing industry. Real value-added in the computer
and electronic products industry, which includes computers, semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, and other electronic products
manufacturing, grew at a staggering rate of 22 percent per year from
1997 to 2007.5 In contrast, real value-added in petroleum and coal products manufacturing, the second-fastest growing industry, expanded less
than 5 percent per year. Real value-added declined in seven industries
over the decade. As shown formally below, without the computer and
electronic products industry, which accounted for just 10 to 13 percent
of value-added throughout the decade, manufacturing output growth in
the United States was relatively weak.
The rapid growth of real value-added in the computer and electronic products industry, NAICS 334, can be attributed to two subindustries: computer manufacturing, NAICS 334111, and semiconductor
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Figure 5.2 Real Value-Added Average Annual Growth Rate, 1997–2007
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SOURCE: Authors’ tabulations using BEA industry accounts data.

and related device manufacturing, NAICS 334413.6 The extraordinary
real GDP growth in these subindustries, in turn, is a result of the adjustment of price indexes used to deﬂate computers and semiconductors for
improvements in quality. From 1997 to 2011, for example, the BLS producer price indexes have fallen at a compound annual rate of 52 percent
for microprocessors, 36 percent for portable computers, and 28 percent
for desktop personal computers and workstations.
Contribution of the Computer and Electronic Products Industry
to Aggregate Manufacturing Growth
Growth rates for industry subsets may be approximated from published data using a Törnqvist formula. Speciﬁcally, the growth rate of
real value-added for a subset of industries, expressed as a logarithmic
change, is approximately equal to the weighted average of the growth
rates of the component industries:
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quantity index for industry i in year t and wit is the average of industry
i’s share of nominal manufacturing value-added in adjacent time periods (t, t − 1);7
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Figure 5.3 shows average annual growth in real GDP for U.S. manufacturing as published and for manufacturing excluding the computer
and electronic products industry (NAICS 334) along with aggregate
real GDP growth rates from 1997 to 2007 and from 2000 to 2010.8
Although the computer and electronic products industry only accounted
for between 10 and 13 percent of value-added in the U.S. manufacturing sector throughout the period, it has an outsized effect on manufacturing statistics. Without NAICS 334, U.S. manufacturing’s real GDP
growth was only 1.2 percent per year from 1997 to 2007, a third of the
published aggregate manufacturing growth rate, and was much weaker
than overall growth in the economy. The manufacturing sector is disproportionately affected by recessions, and so when computed over a
more recent period, real GDP growth was somewhat lower in manufacturing than in the aggregate economy. From 2000 (a business cycle
peak) to 2011, real GDP grew at an annual rate of 1.3 percent in manufacturing compared to 1.7 percent for the economy overall. Without the
computer and electronic products industry, however, real value-added
in manufacturing was about 5 percent lower in 2011 than in 2000. The
computer and electronic products industry has a similarly large impact
on manufacturing productivity statistics. For example, manufacturing’s
multifactor productivity growth rates between 1997 and 2007 fall by
almost half when NAICS 334 is excluded (Houseman et al. 2011).
Contribution of the Computer and Electronic Products Industry
to State-Level Manufacturing Growth
The nationwide pattern of strong manufacturing output growth in
combination with a large employment decline is also apparent in most
states. In the decade leading up to the Great Recession, real manufactur-
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Figure 5.3 Average Annual Growth Rate in Real GDP for the Aggregate
Economy and for Manufacturing with and without Computer
and Electronic Products Manufacturing
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using BEA industry accounts data.

ing value-added declined in only four states (Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
Kentucky, and West Virginia), while the growth rate of real manufacturing value-added exceeded 20 percent in 33 states and real value-added
more than doubled in seven (Oregon, Idaho, Nevada, Arizona, California, South Dakota, and Texas). In spite of strong manufacturing output
growth, the large majority of states experienced signiﬁcant employment
declines in the sector. Manufacturing employment declined by more
than 10 percent in 37 states and the District of Columbia and expanded
in just four states over the decade.
Paralleling our analysis of national manufacturing data, we examine the extent to which state-level manufacturing’s real GDP growth
is attributable to the computer and electronic products manufacturing
industry (NAICS 334). Figure 5.4 displays state-level average annual
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Figure 5.4 Manufacturing Real Value-Added Growth Rates, 1997–2007
(% annual growth)
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growth rates of real GDP for all manufacturing and for manufacturing excluding NAICS 334 from 1997 to 2007. The inﬂuence of this
industry on the manufacturing sector’s real value-added growth naturally is greatest in states with relatively high or signiﬁcantly growing
concentrations of computer and electronic products manufacturing.9 For
example, when NAICS 334 is omitted, manufacturing’s average annual
real GDP growth rate between 1997 and 2007 falls from 8.7 percent to
2.4 percent in Arizona, from 7.9 percent to 2.5 percent in California,
from 5.9 percent to 1.0 percent in Colorado, from 12.8 percent to 1.5
percent in Idaho, from 6.3 percent to −0.3 percent in Massachusetts,
from 5.4 percent to −1.4 percent in New Mexico, and from 15.1 percent
to 1.1 percent in Oregon.
The inﬂuence on manufacturing output growth rates is substantial, however, even in states in which computer and electronic products
manufacturing has a modest presence. That growth rate falls by more
than half in 28 states and the District of Columbia when NAICS 334
is excluded and by at least 25 percent in all but 10 states. And without
NAICS 334, real GDP for the rest of manufacturing experienced an
absolute decline in 10 states and the District of Columbia in the decade
before the Great Recession.
A state’s manufacturing output growth often is used to assess the
sector’s overall health and competitiveness vis-à-vis manufacturing in
other states. Although computer and electronic products manufacturing
is an important component of manufacturing in some states, we argue
below that the extraordinary growth in real value-added and productivity in this industry segment largely reﬂects product innovations resulting from research and development (R&D), and such innovations may
not have occurred in the state, potentially giving a distorted picture of
the relative competitiveness of states’ manufacturing sectors.
Table 5.1 shows, for selected states, rankings according to manufacturing’s real value-added growth from 1997 to 2007, as published, and
new rankings based on real value-added growth rates of manufacturing excluding NAICS 334. For 22 states and the District of Columbia,
rankings change by at least 10 when growth rates exclude NAICS 334;
rankings for ﬁve states fell by more than 20. As expected, states with
large or growing shares of computer and electronic products manufacturing tend to have the highest manufacturing GDP growth rates and
experience the largest decline in ranking when the growth is calculated
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Table 5.1 Rankings by Growth Rate in Manufacturing Real ValueAdded and Real Value-Added Excluding NAICS 334, 1997–
2007, Selected States
Rank, mfg. less
Rank, all mfg.
NAICS 334
Change in rank
New Mexico
11
49
−38
Massachusetts
9
43
−34
Oregon
1
25
−24
New Hampshire
22
45
−23
Vermont
13
35
−22
Idaho
2
20
−18
Colorado
10
27
−17
Maryland
25
41
−16
District of Columbia
35
46
−11
Arizona
4
14
−10
Connecticut
Georgia
Indiana
Iowa
Louisiana
Alabama
Montana
Wyoming
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Michigan
Mississippi
Alaska

27
39
18
29
17
24
21
14
28
42
40
33
41

17
28
7
18
6
12
9
2
15
29
26
19
23

10
11
11
11
11
12
12
12
13
13
14
14
18

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using BEA regional data.

without NAICS 334. Still, the changes are dramatic. Most notable are
the drops in the rankings for New Mexico (from 11 to 49) and Massachusetts (from 9 to 43). Oregon, the state with the highest manufacturing GDP growth rate over the period in ofﬁcial statistics, falls to 25 in
the new rankings. Correspondingly, 12 states with a relatively small
presence of computer manufacturing experience signiﬁcant improvements under the new ranking. In sum, states with apparently rapidly
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expanding manufacturing sectors are for the most part simply states
with sizable computer and semiconductor industries.

INTERPRETING THE EXTRAORDINARY REAL OUTPUT
AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN THE COMPUTER AND
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRIES
So far, we have argued that U.S. manufacturing-sector statistics
are often misinterpreted because it is not understood that computer and
related industries largely drive the apparent robust growth in real manufacturing GDP and have a large effect on the manufacturing productivity measures. One might suppose, at least for this industry segment,
that the strong real output growth indicates the competitiveness of the
United States as a location of production and that the sharp drop in
employment is a consequence of productivity growth. Both, however,
would be a misinterpretation of the numbers.
The Competitiveness of the United States as a Location for
Production of Computers and Semiconductors
As noted, the inﬂuence of computer and electronic products manufacturing (NAICS 334) on aggregate manufacturing’s real GDP growth
largely derives from electronic computer manufacturing (NAICS
334111), whose key product segments are personal computers and servers, and from the semiconductor industry (NAICS 334413), which in
the United States largely comprises the production of integrated circuits.
To put their inﬂuence into perspective, we plot data on the (nominal)
value of shipments published by the Census Bureau in these two subindustries for the 2002–2011 period in Figure 5.5.10 Semiconductor shipments were relatively ﬂat until the 2008 recession, declined during the
recession, and have expanded signiﬁcantly since 2009.11 In contrast, the
value of shipments in electronic computer manufacturing was relatively
ﬂat until the recession in 2008 and has declined precipitously since.
Although these two subindustries accounted for most of the growth in
manufacturing real GDP over the period, because of rapidly declining
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Figure 5.5 Computer (NAICS 334111) and Semiconductor (NAICS
334413) Shipments, 2002–2011 ($ billions)
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SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of Manufactures.

price deﬂators their share of the manufacturing sector’s output did not
increase; together, they accounted for only 2 to 3 percent of all manufacturing shipments throughout the period. Real output and productivity statistics are commonly used as indicators of the competitiveness of
U.S. industries, but the extraordinary growth of these measures for the
computer and semiconductor industries may be a poor indicator of the
overall competitiveness of the United States as a location for manufacturing these products.
How competitive is the United States in computer and semiconductor manufacturing? To address this question, we present market
research data and analysis on trends in the global location of production
of personal computers, computer servers, and semiconductors. We supplement these data with import and export data in these product groups
from the UN Comtrade database.
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Personal computers and servers
Personal computers (termed “single-user computers” in U.S. statistics) include desktop and portable computer devices, while servers
(termed “multiuser computers”) provide shared data services. Figure
5.6 displays estimates by the market research ﬁrm International Data
Corporation (IDC) of the share (in units) of worldwide production of
personal computers (PCs) and servers assembled in the United States
since the early 2000s. In both product segments, the share assembled
in the United States is small and has fallen dramatically over the last
decade. In 2001, an estimated 12 percent of personal computers were
manufactured in the United States; by 2012 that share had fallen by
more than half, to about 5 percent. U.S. assembly is most common with
desktop computers; portable computers are almost exclusively manufactured in Asia. The shift in demand away from desktops in favor of
portable computers partly explains the decline in U.S. market share.
As with PCs, a growing share of servers are manufactured in Asia and
Mexico and a declining share in the United States. Large Internet content providers (e.g., Google), retailers (e.g., Amazon), and social media
companies (e.g., Facebook) did some assembly in the United States for
their own server farms in the early 2000s—explaining the increase in
U.S. market share around 2003 in Figure 5.6—but have since discontinued that practice, according to the IDC.
What PC product segments are still assembled in the United
States? According to IDC analysts, U.S. assembly is primarily done for
government- and education-sector orders that require domestic content.
In addition, for PCs, last-minute customized conﬁguration is sometimes
carried out domestically for desktop PC units, though several such
plants have recently closed (Ladendorf 2012). PC conﬁguration generally entails inserting speciﬁc processors, memory, and hard disk drives
into mostly built-up machines to meet the requirements of speciﬁc
orders. Because the manufacturing process requirements are minimal,
PC conﬁguration facilities are sometimes referred to as “screwdriver
plants” in the industry.
The shift of PC production away from the United States is reﬂected
in trade statistics. The nominal value of U.S. PC exports rose only 3.6
percent on an average annual basis from 2002 to 2012 (from $1.8 to
$2.6 billion), while world exports rose 18.4 percent annually (from
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Figure 5.6 U.S. Share of Personal Computers and Computer Servers
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$28.3 to $153.1 billion), causing the U.S. share of world PC exports to
fall from 6.5 percent in 2002 to 1.7 percent in 2012. Most of this growth
in world exports has come from China. China’s exports rose 42 percent
on an average annual basis from 2002 to 2012 (from $3.5 to $117.4 billion), and its share of world exports soared from 12.4 to 76.6 percent.
During the same period, PC imports to the United States rose at an
average annual rate of 14.7 percent, and as a result, by 2012 the United
States ran a trade deﬁcit of $38.3 billion in PCs.
The center of PC production clearly has shifted to China, where
PCs (increasingly in notebook format, since that format is costeffective to ship by air) are assembled in huge numbers, largely by
Taiwan-headquartered contract manufacturers such as Quanta and Foxconn for major global brands such as Lenovo, Hewlett-Packard, and
Apple. Although U.S.-based PC companies remain important as brand
leaders and orchestrators of the global PC value chain, little production
occurs within the borders of the United States.12
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World trade in computer servers displays a similar pattern. In 2005,
China surpassed the United States as the world’s largest exporter of
computer servers. The nominal value of U.S. server exports rose only
4.4 percent on an average annual basis from 2002 to 2012 (from $2.8 to
$4.2 billion), while world exports have risen 5.8 percent annually (from
$18.3 to $32.1 billion). During the same period, China’s exports rose
25 percent per year (from $1.1 to $10.2 billion), and the number-two
server exporter, Mexico, increased exports at a rate of 12.4 percent per
year (from $1.3 to $4.3 billion). At the same time, huge server farms
were being erected in the United States to support the expansion of the
Internet, driving import growth at an annual average rate of 16.3 percent
per year, from $2.9 billion in 2002 to $13.1 billion in 2012. By 2012,
server imports to the United States accounted for 34.9 percent of the
world total, far higher than server imports to Japan, the second largest
importer, which accounted for only 7.8 percent of total world imports.
These ﬁgures reﬂect the continued dominance of the United States as a
hub of the global Internet, with imports to the United States rising much
faster than worldwide imports (16.3 percent per year for the United
States compared to 5.8 percent worldwide). As with PCs, the shift of
server manufacturing to outside the United States does not mean that
American-branded server companies are losing global market share,
only that the United States is losing ground as a location for server
manufacturing. As a result, the U.S. trade balance has declined dramatically in the past 10 years in both PCs and servers (see Figure 5.7).
Semiconductors
To gauge the relative position of the United States as a location for
semiconductor manufacturing, we acquired annual data on all major
semiconductor fabrication plants (called “fabs”) worldwide from the
market research ﬁrm IHS Global Inc. for the period 2000 to 2013.
Semiconductor fabs fall into two general categories: 1) integrated
device manufacturing (IDM) plants (e.g., Intel and Samsung), which
mainly produce semiconductors that are designed and sold by the fab’s
owner, and 2) “foundries,” which produce semiconductors designed by
others on a contract basis (the largest are Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company and United Manufacturing Corporation, both based
in Taiwan). Foundries are analogous to the PC contract manufacturers
(e.g., Foxconn) mentioned earlier.
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Figure 5.7 U.S. Trade Deﬁcit in PCs and Servers, 2002–2012
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For IDMs, the data include, among other things, information on
plant capacity (normalized to eight-inch wafer size), product type
(logic, memory, analog, microcontroller, and discrete), plant location,
and the average cost of producing wafers (also normalized to eight-inch
equivalence) by product type and level of technology. For foundries,
which almost exclusively produce logic chips (programmable, often
application-speciﬁc [ASIC] microprocessors), the data include the
same information, except product type.
Figure 5.8 shows the growth of total semiconductor production
capacity by country or region between 2000 and 2013. Strikingly, total
capacity has grown at a considerably slower pace in the United States
and Europe than in key semiconductor-producing countries in East Asia.
Speciﬁcally, the compound annual growth rate of total capacity was 4.2
percent in the United States and 2.3 percent in Europe, compared to 8.0
percent in South Korea, 8.7 percent in Singapore and Malaysia, 11.3
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Capacity per month in 8-inch wafer equivalents, 000s

Figure 5.8 World Semiconductor Wafer Production Capacity by
Country or Region, 2000–2013
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percent in Taiwan, and 23.8 percent in China. (Table 5.2 translates Figure 5.8 into numerical values and gives the rankings of the countries.)
While China’s growth is measured from a low base, its global share of
semiconductor capacity nonetheless grew by 7 percentage points, from
less than 1 percent in 2000 to 8 percent in 2013. At the same time, the
U.S. share of global semiconductor capacity shrank from 19 percent to
13 percent, and Europe’s share fell from 14 percent to 7 percent. Most
strikingly, Taiwan’s share of world semiconductor fabrication capacity
increased from 12 percent to 20 percent over the same period, driven
mainly by the popularity of the fabless/foundry model, as we will discuss below.
The trends displayed in Figure 5.8 may be misleading because
capacity is aggregated across all types of semiconductors, combining
products with quite different design parameters, prices, and manufacturing requirements. As Table 5.3 shows, the most expensive and
design-intensive semiconductors are digitally programmable devices
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Table 5.2 World Semiconductor Wafer Production Capacity by Country
or Region, 2000 and 2013
2000
2013
Annual
growth
for latter
Country ranking Wafer units Country ranking Wafer units country (%)
1 Japan
1,590,549 1 South Korea
3,570,447
8.0
2 South Korea 1,262,014 2 Japan
3,265,501
5.5
3 United States 1,178,370 3 Taiwan
3,136,841
11.3
4 Europe
889,309 4 United States 2,042,534
4.2
5 Taiwan
722,255 5 China
1,274,393
23.8
6 Other Asia
360,645 6 Europe
1,194,959
2.3
7 China
57,687 7 Other Asia
1,124,601
8.7
NOTE: Units normalized to eight-inch wafer equivalents.
SOURCE: IHS Global Inc.

Table 5.3 Semiconductor Manufacturing Requirements, Design
Requirements, and Typical Selling Prices, by Product Type
Typical
Manufacturing
Design
selling
Product type requirements requirements
prices
Typical use
Logic
High
High
High
Digital processing
(programmable devices, such as CPUs
and ASICs)
Memory
Very high
Low
Medium Information storage
to low
and retrieval
Analog
Low
High
Medium Analog signal
processing (e.g.,
radio and other “real
world” signals)
MicroLow
Medium
Low
Single-function
controllers
to low
systems (nonprogrammable, such as
engine controls)
Discrete
Very low
Very low
Very low Single function
(transistors, resistors,
capacitors, etc.)
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
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called “logic semiconductors.” They include central processing units
(CPUs) such as Intel processors, but also a wide variety of applicationspeciﬁc devices that provide functionality for nearly all electronicbased products that can be programmed by users (from mobile-phone
handsets to automated factory equipment). While design requirements
for logic semiconductors are extremely high because they include millions of microcomponents and multiple technologies in a single chip of
silicon, manufacturing requirements, while also high, are not extreme.
Computer memory chips, by contrast, contain even greater numbers of
microcomponents per area of silicon and are thus extremely demanding to produce, but the circuitry is relatively simple, with information
storage grids dominating the design. Other major semiconductors vary
in regard to design intensity, but they are generally less demanding to
produce and are produced in lower volumes.
Figure 5.9 displays global capacity by product type from 2000 to
2013, along with the U.S. market share by product type in the beginning and at the end of the period. The greatest increase in capacity has
occurred in memory chips, which are predominantly produced by IDMs
such as Samsung (from Korea). Only one company, Micron Semiconductor, produces memory in the United States. While U.S. memory
capacity expanded at a compound annual growth rate of 6 percent, the
share fabricated in the United States has declined as production has
shifted to Asian countries, notably Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and
China. A large share of analog, microcomponent, and discrete semiconductor products are fabricated in the United States, but these are
relatively small segments of the semiconductor market.
Changing patterns in the location of production of logic semiconductors is linked to the rise of the foundry model. So-called fabless
semiconductor design companies design and sell logic semiconductors,
which are associated with high manufacturing and design requirements
as well as high proﬁt margins, and contract out production to foundries. Many dominant fabless design companies, such as Qualcom and
Broadcom, are located in the United States, while foundries are concentrated in Taiwan and Singapore. In 2000, 41 percent of the capacity to
produce logic semiconductors was in foundries, but by 2013 foundries
accounted for 65 percent of logic capacity.
The United States accounted for only 3.1 percent of world foundry
capacity in 2013, down from 4.6 percent in 2000 (Table 5.4). Manufac-
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Figure 5.9 Global Semiconductor Capacity, by Product Type, 2000–2013
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turing of logic semiconductors in the United States is concentrated in
the domestic plants of highly successful IDMs, such as Intel and Texas
Instruments.13 While the share of IDM logic semiconductor capacity in
the United States has expanded since 2000, the U.S. share of total world
logic semiconductor capacity has fallen, from 12.8 percent in 2000 to
9.9 percent in 2013—again, mainly because of the rise of the fabless/
foundry model. In sum, a more detailed analysis does not alter the genTable 5.4 U.S. Global Capacity Share by Product Type, 2000 and 2013
(%)
U.S. global capacity share by product type and
business model
IDM logic
IDM memory
IDM other (analog, microcomponent, and discrete)
Foundry (mostly logic)
IDM logic and foundry, combined

2000
18.4
15.5
29.3
4.6
12.8

2013
22.5
8.9
33.2
3.1
9.9

SOURCE: IHS Global Inc.
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eral picture of decline in the importance of the United States as a location for semiconductor manufacturing, depicted in Figure 5.8.
As with computers, this decline is reﬂected in trade statistics. Semiconductor exports, in nominal dollars, from the United States (of all
types) fell at an average rate of 2.5 percent per year from 2002 to 2012
(from $26.3 billion to $20.5 billion), while worldwide exports increased
at a rate of 8.7 percent per year (from $161.9 billion to $371.1 billion).
As a result, the U.S. share of world semiconductor exports fell from
16.3 percent in 2002 to just 5.5 percent in 2012. This pattern is similar
to export trends in PCs and computer servers.
However, changes in world semiconductor imports show a different pattern. Instead of rising imports, as shown for the United States
in PCs and servers, semiconductor imports were stagnant, increasing
at an average annual rate of less than 1 percent from 2002 to 2012.
Since semiconductors are only of use as components in larger systems,
imports have mainly risen for the major producers of PCs, servers, and
other electronics-based products. China’s semiconductor imports, not
surprisingly, grew the most rapidly from 2002 to 2012, at an average
annual rate of 21.3 percent, and China’s share of total world imports
grew from 15.3 percent to 41.6 percent. During this same period, the
U.S. share of world semiconductor imports shrank from 8.4 percent to
3.6 percent, reﬂecting the general decline of the United States as a location for ﬁnal goods manufacturing in electronics.
The location of production of computer and semiconductor manufacturing has clearly shifted away from the United States toward Asian
countries, both overall and within the most important and technologically demanding product types (from a manufacturing perspective).
Again, this does not necessarily imply that the U.S.-based computer
and semiconductor industries, broadly deﬁned to include research and
design functions, have lost global competitiveness. U.S. companies
continue to drive innovation and growth in the ITC industry, pioneering and dominating new industry segments such as Internet search and
retailing, social media, and cloud computing. However, these softwarebased systems now run, in large part, on hardware manufactured outside
the United States. In semiconductors, the addition of new and acquired
U.S. IDM fabs outside the country and the rise of the foundry/fabless
design business model have enabled U.S. semiconductor companies to
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continue to design chips in the United States while shifting production
overseas (Brown and Linden 2011). The shift of manufacturing to Asia,
however, has important implications for the number and types of jobs
located in the United States.
In sum, despite the extraordinary real output growth in the U.S.
computer and semiconductor manufacturing industries, as measured in
ofﬁcial statistics, the competitiveness of the United States as a manufacturing location for these products has substantially eroded. Exactly
how, over the longer term, the shift in the locus of production to Asia
will affect research and development activities in the United States
remains to be seen.
Interpreting Productivity Growth
The rapid growth in real output, coupled with a sharp drop in
employment—39 percent since 1997 compared to 30 percent for all
manufacturing—has led to surging labor productivity in the computer
and electronic products industry. Analysts often interpret productivity
growth to mean that workers are working faster or that automation (the
substitution of capital for labor) is driving the growth, as illustrated in
a recent White House report on manufacturing, which stated, “Manufacturing workers have paradoxically often been the victims of their
sector’s own success, as rapid productivity growth has meant that goods
can be produced with fewer workers” (Executive Ofﬁce of the President 2009).
Productivity growth in computer-related industries, however, is
largely attributable to rapidly falling price deﬂators that aim to capture consumer valuation of improvements in product quality. These
improvements, we argue, primarily reﬂect innovations from research
and development and innovations in the production processes. While,
for example, the typical computer produced in the United States today
may in some statistical sense be the equivalent of several computers
produced a decade ago, that does not, in and of itself, mean that fewer
workers are needed to manufacture a computer today than in the past.
For an industry where full automation has reigned for many decades,
the notion of capital substituting for labor appears quaint. Indeed, a
recent report by the McKinsey Global Institute concluded that all of
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the large-scale net job losses in U.S. computer and electronic products manufacturing are attributable to the offshoring of production
(Roxburgh et al. 2012).

IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH
The outsized effect that the computer and electronic products
industry has on real output and productivity measures holds important
implications for empirical research. While computer-related industries show extraordinary real GDP growth owing to price deﬂators that
account for improvements in product quality, they registered aboveaverage employment declines and import penetration. Such an outlier
may distort relationships between economic variables, result in anomalous ﬁndings, and lead researchers to draw incorrect inferences—
for example, about the causes of the sharp decline in manufacturing
employment or the effects of imports on domestic industry.
In addition to the large effect that computer-related industries have
on measured aggregate and state-level manufacturing’s real valueadded growth, the sizable growth of imported intermediates used in
manufacturing has likely imparted a signiﬁcant bias to real value-added
in the published statistics for all manufacturing industries. The BEA
estimates that the import share of materials intermediates used in manufacturing rose from 18 percent in 1997 to 25 percent in 2007. Moreover,
most of the growth in imported intermediates came from developing
countries, most notably China, whose market share increased largely
because suppliers from these countries offered lower (quality-adjusted)
prices for these intermediate inputs. So-called offshoring bias arises
because the price declines associated with the shift in sourcing to lowcost countries are unlikely to be captured in the import and producer
price indexes constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and used
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis to deﬂate intermediate inputs in
the industry accounts data. As a result, ofﬁcial statistics may substantially understate the quantity of inputs used by U.S. manufacturers and
overstate the growth in manufacturing’s real valued-added (Houseman
et al. 2011).
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Although growth in a state’s real manufacturing GDP should be a
good predictor of a state’s manufacturing employment growth, computer-related industries and offshoring bias may substantially weaken
the relationship between measured output and employment in manufacturing.14 Consequently, we expect that a state’s real value-added growth
in manufacturing, adjusted for the contribution from computer-related
industries and for offshoring bias, will be a better predictor of the state’s
employment growth than published real value-added growth measures.
Here we test that proposition by regressing a state’s manufacturing
employment growth over the 1997–2007 period on real value-added
growth over the same period, measured three ways: ﬁrst as the published aggregate manufacturing measure, next as the published measure excluding NAICS 334, and ﬁnally as a measure that both excludes
NAICS 334 and adjusts for offshoring bias.15
(5.2)

ln(Es,07 / Es,97) = α + β ln(Qs,07 / Qs,97) + εs

Ordinary least squares estimates of Equation (5.2) may be subject
to simultaneity bias because employment and output growth in a state’s
manufacturing industry are determined by both demand- and supplyside forces: while overall national demand conditions for an industry’s
product affect state-level industry demand for labor, a state’s supply of
workers may affect industry growth in that particular state. For example, industries may expand relatively more in states with higher population growth and hence growth in their supply of labor. In addition,
state-level labor productivity shocks may expand output while reducing
employment to output ratios. In other words, the ordinary least squares
estimates of Equation (5.2) do not correspond to any well-deﬁned structural relationship.
To address possible simultaneity bias and to focus on how demand
forces at the national level affect state labor markets, we instrument
state-level manufacturing’s real GDP growth rates using national
industry-level growth rates: the instrument is a weighted average of
the national industry-level growth rates, where the weights are the
state’s nominal shares of value-added in the component industries.16
This instrument proxies for what would happen to state-level demand
for manufacturing output if each of a state’s manufacturing industries
were to maintain its current competitiveness and hence its market share
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of national demand. With this instrument, Equation (5.2) estimates a
structural relationship showing the effects of national demand shocks
to products produced in a state’s manufacturing sector on that state’s
manufacturing employment.
Table 5.5 presents ordinary least squares and two-stage least
squares estimates of Equation (5.2). The ﬁrst two columns of Table 5.5
are based on observations from all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Strikingly, the coefﬁcient estimate on the output growth term more
than doubles, from 0.23 to 0.56, in the OLS model when NAICS 334
is omitted from the growth measure. State-level employment growth is
much more strongly related to output growth when we omit the information from this industry.
Table 5.5 The Effect of Manufacturing Output Growth on Employment
Growth, 1997–2007
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
OLS
2SLS
OLS
2SLS
Growth in mfg.
0.227
0.057
0.228
0.084
real value-added
(0.066)
(0.106)
(0.050)
(0.080)
Constant
−28.041
−21.907
−27.588
−22.146
(3.231)
(4.473)
(2.478)
(3.512)
Growth in mfg.
0.560
1.067
0.504
0.692
real value-added
(0.095)
(0.741)
(0.069)
(0.338)
w/o computers
Constant
−26.493
−33.353
−25.196
−27.900
(2.271)
(10.312)
(1.692)
(5.061)
Growth in mfg.
0.559
0.990
0.502
0.700
real value-added
(0.095)
(0.621)
(0.068)
(0.299)
w/o computers,
adjusting for
offshoring bias
Constant
−24.518
−28.839
−23.372
−25.499
(2.093)
(6.619)
(1.548)
(3.534)
51
51
48
48
N
NOTE: Each panel represents the regression of state employment growth on output
growth for the period 1997−2007. Standard errors of the coefﬁcient estimates are
reported in parentheses. A weighted average of national-level industry real valueadded growth is used as an instrument for state growth measures in the two-stage least
squares models. See text for further discussion.
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In the 2SLS models reported in column 2, the coefﬁcient on the
aggregate manufacturing growth term is 0.06, whereas the coefﬁcient
on the manufacturing growth measure that excludes computer-related
industries is 1.07. A coefﬁcient estimate of approximately 1 implies that
a 1 percent increase in a state’s output results in a 1 percent increase in
employment, which is a reasonable estimate of the effect of a demand
shock. In contrast, the coefﬁcient close to zero on aggregate manufacturing growth implies that demand shocks to a state’s industries have
little effect on state employment growth, a ﬁnding that makes little
sense and suggests problems in using the aggregate manufacturing data.
The output measure in the bottom panel of Table 5.5 excludes
NAICS 334 and adjusts for offshoring bias. This last output measure is
subject to important caveats. As discussed in the appendix, estimates
of offshoring bias in real GDP measures of state manufacturing likely
signiﬁcantly understate true variation across states in offshoring bias.
Given this fact, it is perhaps not surprising that also adjusting for offshoring bias has little effect on the point estimates. Nevertheless, it
does substantially reduce the standard error of the estimate in the 2SLS
model: the coefﬁcient estimate of 0.99 in the third panel of column 2
has a p-value of 0.12.
In the models reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.5, we omit
observations from the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and Alaska, which
have the smallest manufacturing sectors and which differ from other
states in geographic proximity or size. The patterns of the coefﬁcient
estimates are similar to those reported in columns 1 and 2, but excluding these very small states substantially improves the precision of the
estimates, particularly in the 2SLS models. In the models that instrument for state output growth, the coefﬁcient on manufacturing real
value-added growth is 0.08 and insigniﬁcant. The coefﬁcients on the
growth measures that either exclude NAICS 334 or exclude NAICS
334 and correct for offshoring bias are 0.69 and 0.70, respectively, and
both are signiﬁcant at conventional levels (p-values 0.05 and 0.02).17
Although, using state-level data, the results from these regressions show that the computer and electronic products industry breaks
the empirical link between real output and employment growth in the
manufacturing sector, this analysis does not provide insights into the
reasons underlying the sharp trend of decline in U.S. manufacturing
employment since 2000. It does, however, underscore the point that the
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strong output and productivity growth in the aggregate manufacturing
statistics is not evidence, in and of itself, that automation caused the
decline, as many researchers and analysts have concluded.18
The dominance of the computer-related industries in measured real
output growth in manufacturing may lead to other perverse research
ﬁndings, as illustrated in Acemoglu et al. (2014, Appendix Table 2). In
an analysis of the effect of import penetration on domestic shipments
in manufacturing industries, the study’s authors ﬁnd that an increase in
import penetration signiﬁcantly lowers nominal shipments but has no
effect on real shipments in the affected industry. The naïve researcher
would conclude, therefore, that imports have had no adverse impact on
the quantity of goods manufactured in the United States. This ﬁnding,
however, is driven by computer-related industries, which are outliers—
simultaneously experiencing extraordinary real output growth and high
growth in import penetration. Acemoglu et al. show that the coefﬁcient on
the import penetration term is negative and signiﬁcant when computerrelated industries are excluded from the regression.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATISTICAL AGENCIES
Statistics play a critical role in informing policymakers and shaping
their responses to economic issues. The recent debate over manufacturing policy in the United States, however, illustrates how the numbers
can obfuscate as much as enlighten. More transparency in the publication of the data—in particular, making clear to data users the inﬂuence the computer and semiconductor industries have on the aggregate
manufacturing numbers—could have avoided much of the confusion.
The extraordinary growth of real value-added and productivity in the
computer and semiconductor industries also naturally raises the question: Are these numbers right? The outsized effect that this small industry has on aggregate statistics is reason for further scrutiny of the data.
In addition, the growth of globalization, accompanied by rapid shifts in
the location of production, underscores the inadequacy of current price
indexes to capture price changes associated with changes in sourcing.
In this closing section, we recommend steps the statistical agencies can
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take to improve communication with data users and highlight several
areas for further research.
Improve Transparency and Communication with Data Users
Many inﬂuential economists and policy analysts have cited the
robust growth in U.S. manufacturing’s real value-added and productivity as evidence of the sector’s strength (Atkinson et al. 2012). It
is unlikely that most citing those statistics understand that one small
industry segment largely accounts for the sector’s growth, that the output and productivity growth in the computer industry primarily derives
from product innovation, or that the manufacturing presence of these
industries in the United States appears to be declining. Making these
facts more transparent to data users is important. The statistical agencies could easily highlight the inﬂuence of computer-related industries
by publishing separate tabulations for real value-added in manufacturing excluding these industries. The statistical agencies also should
disseminate information to users clarifying how price deﬂators affect
the industry’s measured output growth and what the output growth
measures mean. Ideally, the statistical agencies would develop better
measures of the global competitiveness of domestic industries by generating and publishing systematic comparisons of U.S. manufacturing
industries with industries elsewhere in the world.
State policymakers are among the many users who would beneﬁt
from more transparent manufacturing data. In seeking to understand
how national manufacturing trends might be affecting their state labor
markets, state policymakers will not learn much from a naïve use of
the ofﬁcial statistics. Adjusting statistics to exclude computer-related
industries and to correct for import price biases will result in data that
are more sensible and useful for understanding trends in state labor
markets.
A proposed change to the industry classiﬁcation system would
put so-called factoryless goods producers (FGPs)—organizations that
design and sell products but contract out their production—in the
manufacturing sector.19 Currently, such organizations usually are classiﬁed in wholesale trade or research. The proposed change—originally
intended to take effect in 2017 but indeﬁnitely postponed—is expected
to signiﬁcantly increase measured manufacturing output in a number of
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industries, including computers and semiconductors. While their classiﬁcation in manufacturing has merit, the activities in FGPs (such as
fabless semiconductor design ﬁrms and computer ﬁrms that use contract manufacturers in China) are a far cry from the factories of old. At
the very least, extensive education of data users about any change and
the publication of separate tabulations on FGPs within manufacturing
would be critical to avoid even further misinterpretation of the manufacturing statistics.
Research on Price Deﬂators
The price deﬂators for a small number of products within the computer and electronic products industry fundamentally drive growth in
the manufacturing sector and have a large inﬂuence on aggregate GDP
growth as well. Those price deﬂators, however, are potentially sensitive to methods used to adjust for quality improvements. Existing price
indexes for computers and related electronic products, for example,
implicitly assume that consumers and businesses derive value solely
from the hardware embedded in these products. In practice, however,
consumers beneﬁt from the interaction of the hardware with software
and from networking with other computer users via the Internet. In the
presence of network externalities, the welfare implications for an individual consumer of some change in computer-related hardware characteristics and prices depend upon the hardware and software used by others. When some users upgrade their computers, it may force others to
upgrade theirs in order to maintain the same level of interaction. These
negative externalities must be taken into account in order to capture real
output measures that correspond to changes in consumer well-being.
However, current price index procedures do not take these externalities into account. A version of this problem was explored in Ellison
and Fudenberg’s (2000) article on excessive upgrades in the software
industry.20
Future research should address this and other critiques that current
methodology may signiﬁcantly overstate the true beneﬁts to consumers
and businesses from technological advances in computer and related
hardware.
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Crediting Gains from R&D
Rapid advances in research and product development in the computer and electronic products industry have resulted in rapid declines
in measured quality-adjusted product prices, which in turn have driven
rapid measured output and productivity growth in manufacturing.
Conversely, recent plant closures and associated downward revisions
to shipments in the computer industry have contributed to a substantial downward revision in real GDP growth in manufacturing.21 And
if offshoring of computer and semiconductor production continues, it
likely will signiﬁcantly dampen measured value-added and productivity growth in manufacturing in the future.
But one might ask whether the true economic impact of increased or
decreased production in this industry is commensurate with its impact
on the manufacturing statistics? Should, for example, the effect on real
output and productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing from the closure
of a computer assembly plant be an order of magnitude greater than the
closure of a similarly sized auto assembly plant, particularly if research
and development for the former still takes place in the United States?
Crediting the output and productivity growth from product improvements to production would matter little if ﬁrms were vertically integrated—performing tasks from product design to the manufacturing of
the products—and if these tasks were all performed in one ﬁrm in one
country. As the computer and electronic products industry illustrates,
however, the United States increasingly is moving away from making
things and instead specializing in services and product design (Corrado
and Hulten 2010). Research should address distortions to statistics arising from the fact that gains from technical advances are being credited
solely to the manufacture of physical products.
Research on Price Index Construction
Finally, research indicates that the rapid shift in sourcing of products to low-cost foreign suppliers is imparting a signiﬁcant bias to real
value-added and productivity statistics in the computer and electronic
products industry and in manufacturing overall. The bias is part of a
more general problem in the construction of price indexes: the way they
are constructed implicitly assumes that the “law of one price” holds, and

Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb 181

2/16/2015 8:34:04 AM

182 Houseman, Bartik, and Sturgeon

thus that observed price differences across suppliers reﬂect differences
in the quality of their goods. The entry and market expansion of lowcost suppliers, however, is an important part of the ongoing dynamics in
prices facing consumers and businesses. The input price index proposed
by Alterman (this volume), which would be based on a survey of input
purchasers, represents a ﬁrst step toward addressing this important gap
in price measurement. Research is needed to pilot the index and determine its feasibility.
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1. McCormack (2013) reports on the status of congressional action on manufacturing policies.
2. Throughout this chapter, we use the terms “real value-added” and “real GDP”
interchangeably. Although nominal value-added in manufacturing has declined as
a share of GDP in the United States, this decline may be attributed to the fact that
prices have risen less quickly for manufactured products than for services.
3. See, for example, Becker (2012), Hassett (2010), and Perry (2012). Atkinson et al.
(2012, pp. 24–25) includes citations to many other prominent analysts and policymakers promoting this view.
4. Houseman et al. (2011) originally made this point. Atkinson et al. (2012) also
emphasized this fact.
5. NAICS 334 also includes the manufacture of audio and video equipment; navigational, measuring, electromedical, and control instruments; and magnetic and
optical media.
6. This information was provided to us by Erich Strassner at the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Detailed industry value-added data are not published by the BEA,
and consequently the analysis presented below is based on data aggregated to the
three-digit NAICS level.
7. Atkinson et al. (2012, Figure 30) present similar calculations. In the late 1990s,
the Bureau of Economic Analysis along with the other U.S. statistical agencies
introduced the use of chained aggregates. Although the BEA publishes valueadded in “real chained dollars” for all individual manufacturing industries, these
industry-level real chained dollars cannot be summed to create a real series for
subsets of industries. The BEA publishes annual ﬁgures on industry contributions
to aggregate real GDP growth.
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8. Because of revisions to the data, the compound annual growth rates for the 1997–
2007 period reported in Figure 5.3 differ somewhat from those reported in Houseman et al. (2011). The BEA issued additional revisions to the national industry
accounts data in January 2014 but had not updated state data at the time of this
writing. The analyses in this chapter are based on national and state manufacturing
data available as of December 2013. Recent updates to the national manufacturing
statistics do not affect the substantive ﬁndings of this chapter.
9. The share of manufacturing value-added in NAICS 334 exceeded 20 percent
in 1997 in 10 states: Arizona (50%), California (30%), Colorado (28%), Idaho
(29%), Massachusetts (28%), New Hampshire (43%), New Mexico (81%), Oregon (44%), South Dakota (22%), and Vermont (27%).
10. At the time of this writing, 2011 is the last year for which shipments data are available. Data on industry value-added are not published at the six-digit NAICS level.
11. It is possible that the semiconductor industry includes some fabless (that is, without fabrication plants) entities, which design integrated circuits but contract out
production, typically to overseas foundries.
12. According to Gartner, U.S. PC brands Hewlett-Packard and Dell ranked number two and number three in unit sales worldwide in the third quarter of 2013,
with market shares of 17.1 percent and 11.6 percent, behind China’s Lenovo,
which held a 17.6 percent market share. See http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/
id/2604616. Although little computer assembly takes place in the United States,
the United States remains an important location for PC design. Even Lenovo, the
Chinese company that purchased IBM’s PC division in 2005, maintains a large
design center in North Carolina.
13. According to IHS Global Inc., ﬁve of Intel’s nine logic fabs are located in the
United States, along with two in Ireland, one in Israel, and one in China. Four of
Texas Instruments’ ﬁve logic fabs are in the United States, with the additional fab
in Japan. Besides these logic fabs, Intel has seven fabs producing microcomponents, all in the United States, and Texas Instruments has 14 smaller fabs producing analog semiconductors, half of which are in the United States.
14. This is particularly true if a state’s real output growth results from increased
demand for a state’s products, rather than from state-level productivity shocks, as
we would expect demand would have only modest effects on productivity.
15. In the second and third measures, we exclude employment in NAICS 334 from
the manufacturing employment measure, but doing so has little effect on our estimates. The appendix to this chapter provides details on our adjustment of state
manufacturing’s real GDP growth for offshoring bias, which is based on estimates
in Houseman et al. (2011).
16. Speciﬁcally, we generate a new annual quantity index series for each state so that
the rate of real value-added change between years for the state s is ln(qs,t / qs,t − 1) =
∑ wi,s,t ln(qi,US,t / qi,US,t − 1) , where the weight for industry i is the average of industry
t
i’s nominal share of value-added in years t and t − 1. See Bartik (1991) for further
discussion of the instrument.
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17. These coefﬁcient estimates of about 0.7—though not signiﬁcantly different from
1—imply that long-run demand shocks to a state’s industries may boost labor
productivity somewhat. Such a boost to labor productivity could occur if healthy
demand conditions allow greater investment and hence increased use of newer
technologies and vintage capital. Healthy demand conditions also may permit
greater exploitation of scale economies. However, because technology innovations
can be shared nationwide, these productivity effects should be limited, and indeed,
point estimates of 0.7 indicate that output demand shocks do considerably boost
state labor demand. In contrast, the point estimate of 0.08 on the aggregate manufacturing growth term reported in column 4, panel 1, implies that almost all of a
demand shock to state output growth is manifested in productivity growth rather
than in employment growth, which is hard to believe.
18. Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2014) provide the most
rigorous analysis to date of the causes of the recent decline in manufacturing
employment and its associated impacts on regional employment and labor force
participation. They ﬁnd strong evidence that the growth of imports from China
caused a substantial share—potentially most—of the large decline in manufacturing employment in the years leading up to the Great Recession.
19. Three chapters in the second conference volume—those by Doherty; Kamal,
Moulton, and Ribarsky; and Bayard, Byrne, and Smith—provide extensive analyses of the proposed change in classiﬁcation of factoryless goods producers.
20. Feenstra and Knittel (2004) consider a related problem: that individuals purchase
computer hardware beyond its current usefulness because they anticipate future
changes in software that will make it necessary to have better computer hardware.
As a result, short-run changes in consumer well-being are overstated by the measured decline in computer hardware prices for constant-quality models.
21. For a discussion of the revision, see Mandel (2012).
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Appendix 5A
Biases to Real Growth from Offshoring
Background on Offshoring Bias
The potential bias from the shift in sourcing to a low-cost foreign supplier
occurs because of the methodologies the BLS uses in constructing its price
indexes. The BLS samples the prices paid by importers for the import price
index and the prices received by producers for the producer price index. Each
observation used in the construction of a particular price index represents the
period-to-period price change of an item as deﬁned by very speciﬁc attributes
and reported by a speciﬁc importer or domestic producer. These price changes
will not necessarily capture price changes purchasers experience when they
shift from one supplier to another.
Consider the case where a low-cost foreign supplier enters the U.S. market and captures market share from high-cost domestic suppliers of intermediates used by U.S. manufacturers. Hypothetically, the price drops that U.S.
manufacturers realize when they shift to the foreign supplier could be fully
captured in the import and input price indexes if three conditions hold: 1) the
foreign supplier initially offers the same (quality-adjusted) price as the domestic suppliers; 2) markets instantaneously clear, and thus any expansion of
the foreign supplier’s market share reﬂects contemporaneous price declines
relative to the domestic supplier that occur after entry; and 3) the new foreign supplier is picked up in the import price sample prior to any decline in
its relative price. In practice, however, these conditions are likely to be violated: The lag between the time when a new supplier enters the market and
its products are integrated into the BLS price sample can be considerable;
new suppliers often enter the market with a lower price than incumbent suppliers, and because of information and other adjustment costs that decline
over time, businesses may not immediately switch to the low-cost supplier,
and thus price differentials between low- and high-cost suppliers may persist
(see, for example, Griliches and Cockburn [1994]; Foster, Haltiwanger, and
Syverson [2008]; Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels [2013]; and Kovak and
Michaels [Chapter 3, this volume]). Diewert and Nakamura (2009) formally
show that the bias to the input price index from shifts in sourcing, which is
analogous to outlet substitution bias in the Consumer Price Index, is proportional to the growth in the low-cost supplier’s market share and to the percentage discount offered by the low-cost supplier.1
In the case of shifts in sourcing from high-cost domestic to low-cost foreign
suppliers, import and intermediate input price deﬂators—which are weighted
185
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averages of the domestic and import price indexes—are upwardly biased. This,
in turn, results in an underestimation of the real growth in imports and an overestimation of the growth in real value-added produced domestically (Diewert
and Nakamura 2009; Houseman et al. 2010, 2011; Mandel 2007; Nakamura et
al., this volume; Reinsdorf and Yuskavage 2009).
Biases to the input price index may occur whenever a producer shifts from
a high-cost to a low-cost supplier, irrespective of whether the low-cost supplier
is domestic or foreign. However, the rapid growth of imported intermediates
from emerging economies raises concerns that biases in the data from offshoring have been empirically important. Houseman et al. (2010, 2011) estimate
the size of the potential bias to the growth of real value-added and multifactor productivity in U.S. manufacturing from the growth in imported materials
intermediates over the 1997–2007 time period. Because the size of the price
decline associated with the offshoring of an intermediate good to a low-cost
foreign supplier is not observed, it is necessary to make some assumptions
about the size of the discount. Houseman et al. compute offshoring bias at the
three-digit NAICS level under a variety of assumptions about the size of the
price differentials, drawing on information from case studies and micro import
price data collected by the BLS.
In addition, U.S. statistical agencies do not track the destination of imports
and consequently do not know which industries use imported intermediates.
In generating the industry-level data used in Houseman et al. (2010, 2011),
the BEA assumes that all industries use imported inputs in proportion to their
overall use of the input in the economy. For example, if an industry accounts
for 20 percent of the use of an intermediate product economy-wide, then, under
the so-called import proportionality assumption, it is assumed the industry uses
20 percent of the imports of this intermediate product. While certain inputs are
speciﬁc to an industry, often products are inputs to a wide variety of industries.
If manufacturers more intensively (less intensively) engage in offshoring than
businesses in other sectors, the estimates in Houseman et al. will understate
(overstate) the degree of offshoring bias in manufacturing. Similarly, within
manufacturing there may be considerable variation in the intensity with which
industries offshore speciﬁc intermediate inputs; the import comparability
assumption will dampen any differences in estimates of offshoring bias among
manufacturing industries.
Houseman et al. (2010, 2011) estimate that the substitution of imported
for domestic material inputs used by U.S. manufacturers resulted in an overstatement of the annual growth in real value-added by between 0.2 and 0.5
percentage points per year from 1997 to 2007. Estimates of the bias to real
value-added growth from the offshoring of material intermediates were the
largest in the computer and electronic products industry—ranging from 0.5 to
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1.4 percentage points per year—although because the average annual growth
rate in NAICS 334 exceeded 20 percent, adjusting for the bias lowers that
growth by only 4 to 7 percent. For manufacturing excluding NAICS 334,
Houseman et al. estimate that the growth in real value-added was upwardly
biased by 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points per year, implying that real value-added
growth was upwardly biased by as much as 50 percent over the period in the
rest of manufacturing.
Estimates of the bias from materials offshoring to multifactor productivity
ranged from about 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points per year for all manufacturing
and from about 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points per year for the computer and
electronic products industry.
Offshoring Bias in State Manufacturing Real GDP
The adjustments to state manufacturing real GDP growth for offshoring
bias, which are used in the regressions reported in Table 5.5, are based on
estimates generated in Houseman et al. (2010). A couple of caveats should be
made about these state-level adjustments. First, and perhaps most importantly,
as noted above, imports are imputed to industries using the import proportionality assumption, and thus differences across states in their industry mix
generate cross-state differences in our estimates of biases to real value-added
growth from offshoring. Because the import proportionality assumption minimizes measured variation in import use across industries, it also minimizes
measured cross-state variation in offshoring bias.
In addition, the BEA has revised the manufacturing GDP numbers since
the estimates in Houseman et al. (2010) were generated. We use the revised
manufacturing real GDP ﬁgures and assume that the bias from offshoring
affects measured growth rate in the same proportion as estimated in that paper:
௧

(5A.1)

ͳ  ݎǡ
݆ܳ݀ܣǡ௦ǡ௧
 .
ൌቈ
ܳǡ௦ǡ௧
ͳ  ݎǡ

The left-hand expression is the ratio of adjusted to unadjusted manufacturing real value-added in industry i, state s, and year t; rai is the growth rate in
industry i adjusted for offshoring bias; rmi is the measured or baseline growth
rate of real value-added in industry i as estimated in Houseman et al. (2010);
and t is an index for year, 1997 = 0.2
We estimate the effect of offshoring bias on state manufacturing growth
rates under two assumptions about the quality-adjusted price differences of
products between developing countries (e.g., China) and the United States and
the quality-adjusted price differences between countries with an intermediate
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level of development (e.g., Mexico) and the United States: 1) the developing
country discount is 30 percent, and the intermediate country discount is 15
percent; and 2) the developing country discount is 50 percent, and the intermediate country discount is 30 percent. These two assumptions yield estimates of
offshoring bias on the low and high end of those presented in Houseman et al.
(2010) (see Table 5A.1).
Compared to real value-added growth measures that exclude NAICS 334,
measures that also adjust for biases to the input price index from the growth
of imported material intermediates result in an additional downward adjustment of 0.1–0.7 percentage points. The largest adjustments occur in Michigan (a 0.3–0.7 percentage-point reduction), followed by Kentucky (a 0.3–0.5
percentage-point reduction) and Ohio and Indiana (a 0.2–0.5 percentage-point
reduction). Our estimates of the bias for another 20 states fall in the 0.2–0.4
percentage-point range. As previously noted, however, the import comparability assumption used to allocate imports to user industries tends to minimize
cross-state differences in offshoring bias and consequently may introduce considerable error into these estimates.
The state manufacturing real GDP ﬁgures utilized in the regressions
reported in Table 5.5 assume a price discount of 50 percent with developing
countries and 30 percent with intermediate countries. Corrections based on
these assumptions performed somewhat better in regressions than those based
on smaller discount assumptions.

Appendix Notes
1. Outlet substitution bias is an example of a shift in sourcing from high- to low-cost
domestic suppliers. Diewert and Nakamura (2009) show that the characterization
of the bias to the input price index that results when producers shift sourcing of
intermediates is identical to the characterization of the bias to the CPI from outlet
substitution.
2. We do not have access to the detailed data on imported and domestic intermediate
inputs needed to generate entirely new estimates. The growth rate rm for industry
i corresponds to column 2, and the rate ra for industry i corresponds to those in
columns 10 or 11 of Table 9 of Houseman et al. (2010). Houseman et al. detail the
classiﬁcation of countries as developing, intermediate, or advanced, as well as the
evidence on price discounts.
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Table 5A.1 Average Annual Growth of Real Value-Added in
Manufacturing, Adjusted for Computer and Electronic
Products Manufacturing and Offshoring Bias, by State,
1997–2007 (%)

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
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Mfg. less
NAICS 334

Mfg. less NAICS
334, adj. for
offshoring bias,
15/30a

Mfg. less NAICS
334, adj. for
offshoring bias,
30/50a

3.4
1.3
8.7
0.5
7.9
5.9
2.9
2.2
1.9

2.5
1.2
2.4
0.1
2.5
1.0
1.9
0.7
−0.9

2.3
1.1
2.2
−0.1
2.3
0.8
1.8
0.6
−1.0

2.1
1.0
2.0
−0.3
2.1
0.7
1.6
0.4
−1.2

4.6
1.5
0.1
12.8
1.1
3.9
2.7
3.8
−0.4
3.9
1.8
3.3
6.3
1.4
4.1
2.0
0.2
3.5
3.7
9.7
3.4

1.4
0.9
0.0
1.5
0.0
3.4
1.8
2.9
−0.9
3.8
0.6
−0.1
−0.3
1.0
1.2
1.6
−0.1
3.1
2.6
8.7
−0.4

1.2
0.7
−0.1
1.3
−0.2
3.2
1.6
2.7
−1.2
3.7
0.4
−0.3
−0.4
0.7
1.0
1.5
−0.3
3.0
2.5
8.5
−0.6

1.1
0.5
−0.2
1.2
−0.3
2.9
1.4
2.5
−1.5
3.5
0.2
−0.4
−0.6
0.3
0.8
1.3
−0.6
2.8
2.3
8.4
−0.7

All
manufacturing
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Table 5A.1 (continued)

New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

All
manufacturing

−0.2
5.4
2.4
3.2
6.8
0.4
2.9
15.1
−0.1
1.6
1.2
7.5
2.1
7.1
5.4
5.4
1.6
3.4
−2.1
2.0
5.1

Mfg. less
NAICS 334

Mfg. less NAICS
334, adj. for
offshoring bias,
15/30a

Mfg. less NAICS
334, adj. for
offshoring bias,
30/50a

−1.6
−1.4
0.2
1.4
4.6
−0.3
2.3
1.1
−1.0
0.2
0.8
4.9
0.6
4.1
3.4
0.4
0.4
2.0
−2.3
0.5
5.0

−1.8
−1.6
0.0
1.3
4.4
−0.5
2.1
0.9
−1.2
0.0
0.6
4.7
0.4
4.0
3.2
0.2
0.3
1.8
−2.5
0.4
4.8

−1.9
−1.7
−0.2
1.1
4.2
−0.8
1.9
0.7
−1.3
−0.2
0.3
4.5
0.2
3.8
3.0
0.0
0.1
1.6
−2.7
0.2
4.7

Adjustments for offshoring bias use estimates from columns 10 and 11 of Table 9 in
Houseman et al. (2010). Offshoring bias adjustments labeled “15/30” assume that the
intermediate country discount is 15 percent and the developing country discount is 30
percent, while offshoring bias adjustments labeled “30/50” assume that the intermediate country discount is 30 percent and the developing country discount is 50 percent.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using BEA data.
a
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6
Import Sourcing Bias in
Manufacturing Productivity Growth
Evidence across Advanced and Emerging Economies
Robert Inklaar
University of Groningen

One of the main features of the current wave of globalization is
the rise in outsourcing to emerging economies. Manufacturing industries, especially, are at the forefront of this development, sourcing ever
more of their materials from emerging economies.1 The motive for
this development is straightforward enough: from the perspective of
advanced economies, materials sourced from emerging economies are
often considerably cheaper than those from domestic producers or other
advanced economies. The consequences for U.S. productivity of the
shift from high-cost domestic producers to cheaper imports is the topic
of two separate works by Houseman et al. (2010, 2011). 2 As the authors
show, many of the cost savings associated with this offshoring of production are not captured in ofﬁcial statistics, leading to what they label
“offshoring bias.” This bias results because lower prices for imports
from an emerging economy are often fully attributed to differences in
quality; such assumptions overlook the possibility of real cost savings.3
Correcting for this, Houseman et al. conclude that U.S. manufacturing value-added and multifactor productivity growth are considerably
biased upwards because input growth is biased downwards.
This chapter provides an international comparative perspective on
this topic. In order to achieve such a perspective, I limit the scope of the
analysis to the effect on productivity growth of changing the source of
imports; thus, I do not take into account shifts from domestic to foreign
sources. I will refer to this effect as “import sourcing bias” rather than
use Houseman et al.’s (2010, 2011) term of “offshoring bias.” While
this is a narrower concept than that of Houseman et al., it can be more
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widely applied, since it relies on unit values of imported products from
UN Comtrade. This is in contrast to Houseman et al.’s combination
of conﬁdential transaction-level prices used by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) to compile the U.S. import price indexes and U.S. case
study evidence. My analysis of import sourcing bias thus allows for a
comparison of the import sourcing bias in manufacturing productivity
growth across countries.
The import sourcing bias measure is based on comparing two polar
alternatives for treating the same product imported from different countries. A product imported from Country A could be treated as being different from the same product imported from Country B, or it could be
considered a perfect substitute. In the ﬁrst case, any observed price differences would be considered quality differences, while in the second
case, observed price differences would be considered actual price differences. These two alternatives were also outlined in Diewert (1995,
1998), in the context of dealing with consumer prices from different
outlets. I will assume that ofﬁcial statistics treat imports from A and
B as different products. Because of this ﬂawed approach, cost savings
from switching to cheaper source countries will be missed, and the
import price index will be biased.
Whether this bias estimate is correct depends, ﬁrst, on whether it
accurately reﬂects price (rather than quality) differences across source
countries and, second, on whether the “different products” price index is
an accurate reﬂection of the approach in the ofﬁcial import price statistics. Caution is in order on both grounds. First, the trade unit values are
available at the four-digit Standard International Trade Classiﬁcation
(SITC) level, so there is still ample scope for quality differences within
these product categories, as shown in Feenstra and Romalis (2012).
When some of the price differences are actually quality differences, the
true import sourcing bias is likely closer to zero than the bias estimated
here. Second, it almost goes without saying that if statistical agencies
already accurately distinguish between price and quality differences in
estimating their import price indexes, then there is no import sourcing
bias.4 However, there is reason to believe that statistical agencies would
sooner err on the side of ascribing too much of price differences to
quality differences, although reliable information on statistics methodologies is hard to come by.5 These considerations suggest that import
sourcing bias is certainly possible in ofﬁcial statistics, but also that the
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current analysis is likely to overstate any true bias. From that point of
view, this analysis is more exploratory regarding the potential scope of
this problem, rather than a deﬁnitive estimate of its precise magnitude.
The impact of import sourcing bias on productivity growth in
manufacturing is computed based on input-output tables. I calculate
the bias in manufacturing multifactor productivity (MFP) growth for
the period from 1995 to 2008 for 38 economies included in the World
Input-Output Database (WIOD).6 Results show that MFP growth in
manufacturing, on average, is overstated by between 0.18 and 0.34
percentage points in advanced economies. Bias estimates for emerging economies are more mixed and include many negative bias estimates as well, which imply shifts toward higher-priced imports. As it
would be highly unlikely that manufacturers would willingly switch to
higher-cost sources of materials, this suggests that these are actually
shifts toward higher-quality products. In the case of the United States,
the import sourcing bias found here is between 14 and 33 percent of
the offshoring bias of Houseman et al. (2010, 2011). The fact that it is
lower comes as no surprise, as import sourcing bias ignores the shifts of
sourcing from domestic to foreign suppliers. Even so, it still represents
a notable fraction. Howells et al. (2013) have taken a similar approach
for the United States as the one I discuss here. Theirs is based on more
detailed unit value data, and they ﬁnd import sourcing bias estimates
that are similar to those presented here.
My estimates indicate that import sourcing bias is larger in Western
Europe than in the United States. This may be due to the integration
of many central and eastern European countries into European supply
chains, following their accession to the European Union (EU). Sinn
(2006) questioned the apparent solidity of Germany’s growth in light
of increased offshoring. My ﬁndings of lower bias-corrected productivity growth in Germany would seem in line with his argument. But
while productivity growth is quite noticeably affected by import sourcing bias, the impact is also not so large that it materially affects crosscountry growth patterns. So productivity growth in Germany, after correcting for import sourcing bias, is still quite healthy.
From the perspective of the quality of statistics, my results indicate that import sourcing bias should also be of concern in advanced
economies outside the United States. This is certainly not to argue that
my unit-value approach would be a superior alternative to import price
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surveys. Instead, surveying prices of inputs directly from ﬁrms, as suggested by Alterman (2009 and Chapter 10 of this volume), would be an
approach that would solve import sourcing bias as well as the broader
offshoring bias.

METHODOLOGY
Import Sourcing Bias
The bias this chapter aims to quantify can best be illustrated using
a stylized example, adapted from Houseman et al. (2010, 2011) to the
case of switching between importers. Table 6.1 compares the price of a
television in two periods from two foreign suppliers. Both suppliers—
Sri Lanka and Switzerland—export televisions, and we assume the
product is identical. Given the lower price and identical nature of the
product, the number of televisions that is imported from Switzerland
drops from 75 to 50 units, while Sri Lanka supplies 25 units in the ﬁrst
period and 50 in the second period. For simplicity’s sake, we assume
that the price of both suppliers remains unchanged between the two
periods, so the price change, shown in the ﬁnal column, is equal to zero.
We distinguish between two cases: Case 1, where the two suppliers are treated as supplying a different product from each other, and
Case 2, where they are treated as supplying the same product. Case 1
is assumed to correspond to current statistical practice (more on that
Table 6.1 Hypothetical Import Switching Example—Sri Lankan and
Swiss Televisions
t
t+1
Change (t + 1/t − 1) (%)
Swiss price
10
10
0
Sri Lankan price
5
5
0
Swiss quantity
75
50
−33
Sri Lankan quantity
25
50
+50
Import price
Case 1: measured
0
Case 2: true
8.75
7.5
−14
SOURCE: Author’s construction.
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below), while Case 2 is the true input price, given that we are dealing
with identical products. Using a Törnqvist price index, the import price
change in Case 1 is calculated as
(6.1)
log Pt M PtM1

1
2

SL
SW
slt  slt1 log Pt SL Pt1
 12 swt  swt1 log Pt SW Pt1

1
2

slt  slt1 log 5 5  12 swt  swt1 log 10 10

0,

where superscript SL refers to the price of televisions from Sri Lanka,
sl is the share of Sri Lankan televisions in the total value of imports,
and SW and sw refer to the price and import value share for Switzerland.
Since the price of both suppliers is constant over time, the weighted
average price change is zero.
In Case 2, the input price in period t is a weighted average of the
price of the two suppliers, so (25 × 5 + 75 × 10) / 100 = 8.75. Here the
(correct) assumption is made that these products are substitutes, and
the true import price change is thus a 14 percent drop. This drop will be
missed by standard statistical methods, even if all the relevant information is available, simply because the products from the two suppliers are
assumed to be different even though they are the same. So if the statistical agency decides (mistakenly here) that the price difference reﬂects a
difference in quality, there will be an import sourcing bias.
In this example, it is assumed that the two suppliers sell an identical
product. If this is not the case—because, for instance, the quality of the
domestic supplier’s product is higher—then the quality-adjusted price
difference is smaller. Adjusting trade-unit values for quality differences
is not straightforward, but it is feasible, as shown by Hallak and Schott
(2011) and Feenstra and Romalis (2012). However, such adjustments
rely on a speciﬁc underlying theoretical model. Furthermore, even
when adjusting for quality differences, Mandel (2010); Byrne, Kovak,
and Michaels (2013); and Feenstra and Romalis (2012) still ﬁnd substantial deviations from the law of one price. This implies that there is
certainly scope for import sourcing bias.
The main analysis compares import prices for individual products
according to the two cases outlined in Table 6.1. The main difference
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is that many different foreign suppliers are compared, rather than the
simple two-supplier case. For Case 1, the price change for product i
from t − 1 to t can be written as
(6.2)

1

dPit1 { log Pit Pit1

where v vijt

1
2

§
¨ Vijt
©

¦v

ijt

log Pijt Pijt1 ,

j

¦V

ijt

 Vijt1

j

¦V

ijt1

j

·
¸ is the two-period average share
¹

of imports from country j in the total value of imports of product i. The
subscript for the importing country is omitted to avoid notational clutter. The price of each product is computed using import quantities and
values as Pijt  Vijt Qijt ; see also the next section for more details about
the data and implementation. The price change for Case 2 is deﬁned as
(6.3)

2
it

dP { log Pit Pit1

2

§ ¦ Vijt
j
¨
log
¨ ¦ Vijt 1
¨©
j

¦Q
¦Q

·
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so the weighted average unit value of imports is calculated by summing
import values and quantities across all source countries.
If the example from Table 6.1 is the typical case, we would expect
to see that Pijt , used in Case 1, would be lower for emerging economies compared with advanced economies and that the share of imports
from those countries, vijt , would increase over time. As a result, the
import price dPit2 (Equation 6.3) would typically increase by less than
dPit1 (Equation 6.2). The difference between the two price changes,
' it dPit1  dPit2 , is used to determine the import sourcing bias in manufacturing value-added growth.
What is speciﬁcally included in this difference, ∆it , is not immediately obvious when comparing Equations (6.2) and (6.3). However,
Diewert and Nakamura (2010) have shown that it is possible to write the
true index, dPit2 here, as a function of the typically observed index dPit1
and a bias term. In their simplest case, with a new, lower-priced product
entering in the second of a two-period example, the bias is equal to the
price discount of the lower-priced entrant times the quantity share that
this entrant captures in the second period. In the more general case,
with many products and arbitrary quantity shares, the expression for the
bias becomes more complicated, but it still only depends on the shifts
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in imports and the price difference between different source countries.7
This implies that the difference, ∆it , captures only import sourcing bias
and would not be affected by other measurement problems.
There will be a bias if ∆it is different from zero, since in that case
the import price measure used by the statistical ofﬁce, which I assume
is well-proxied by dPit1, is not the same as the true import price measure,
which I assume is well-proxied by dPit2 . In general, I would expect ∆it to
be positive, which implies that the price index used to deﬂate imports
is increasing too fast, and thus the quantity of imports increases too
slowly.
The “true” import sourcing bias is likely to be smaller (closer to
zero) than the bias I estimate here. This is because all true quality differences are considered to be price differences, and it seems likely that
sellers of a high-quality product would not charge a lower (true) price
than sellers of a low-quality product. To see this, consider a modiﬁcation of the example in Table 6.1. The assumption in that example is that
the Swiss television and the Sri Lankan television are identical, but say
that the Sri Lankan product is of lower quality. For instance, assume
that 20 percent of the Sri Lankan product is defective, compared with
no defects for the Swiss product. The quality-adjusted price of the Sri
Lankan product is then 6 rather than 5 because you have to buy 20 percent more of the product to get the same amount of nondefective units.
The true price change would then be −11 rather than −14 percent.8
The same logic holds for a shift of imports toward higher-quality
imports. Bias estimate ∆it would then be negative because quality differences are assumed away. Accounting for quality differences would
reduce the observed price differences and thus bring ∆it closer to zero.
The estimated ∆it could also be understated if the high-quality product
has a lower price than the low-quality product. While this cannot be
ruled out, it seems less likely a priori. For instance, the results of Feenstra
and Romalis (2012) indicate that estimates of quality and prices based
on their model are positively correlated.
The Impact on Value-Added and Productivity Growth
Value-added growth is calculated as a residual, in a process called
“double deﬂation”: the growth in output that is not accounted for by
growth in intermediate inputs. Imports make up part of intermediate
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inputs, so if growth in the quantity of imports is too low, then growth
in value-added is too high. To be more precise, the price of imported
materials used in manufacturing will be biased to the following degree:
(6.4)

' tMM

¦w

m
it

' it ,

i

where witMM is the two-period average share of product i in the total
value of imported materials used in manufacturing. Imported materials
are, in turn, part of total materials used, which together with energy and
services make up total intermediate inputs. Nominal gross output, PYY,
can thus be written as the following accounting identity:
(6.5) PtY Yt

PtVAVAt  Pt I I t

PtVAVAt  Pt MM MM t  Pt DM DM t  PtOI OI t ,

where VA is value-added, I stands for total intermediate inputs, MM signiﬁes imported materials, DM stands for domestically sourced materials
and OI for other intermediate inputs, and PX is the price of X. In national
accounts, prices are available for gross output and the different intermediate inputs, and the price of value-added is solved for implicitly. The
Törnqvist index for the change in the value-added price is deﬁned as
(6.6)
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where an upper bar denotes a two-period average and a lowercase variable is the share of that variable in gross output—thus, for example,

va t

1
2

VA
PtVAVAt PtY Yt  Pt1
VAt1 PtY1Yt1 .

Based on the argument above, the price of imported materials, PMM, is
biased by ∆mm , so using Equation (6.6), the bias in the price of valueadded is
(6.7)

' tPVA
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Since the bias in prices has no bearing on the growth of nominal
value-added, the bias in the growth of the quantity of value-added is
equal to the negative of the bias in the growth of the price of value-added,
= −∆PVA
. As the bias in the growth of imported materials has no
∆VA
t
t
effect on the growth of labor or capital, the growth bias of value-added
translates one-for-one into a bias in MFP growth, ∆MFP
= ∆VA
.
t
t

DATA SOURCES AND IMPLEMENTATION
To implement the bias calculation in Equation (6.7), two data
sources are used, one with data on import prices and the other with
data on the economies’ input-output structure. The import prices are
based on the UN Comtrade database, which provides information on
the quantity and value of imports by product, importing country, and
source countries for each year in the period 1995–2008. There are data
for up to 804 products, classiﬁed according to the four-digit level of the
SITC Revision 2 (SITC Rev. 2) system. The valuation concept for the
import value is CIF (cost, insurance, and freight), so it reﬂects the full
price the importer has to pay to get the product into the country.
I undertake two processing steps before implementing Equations
(6.2) and (6.3). First, I only keep observations for which the quantity
unit is kilograms. This is done to ensure that the unit values are comparable across source countries.9 Second, I compute the median unit value
of a product across all 38 importers and 139 source countries and drop
observations for which the unit value is either smaller than 1 percent
or larger than 100 times the median unit value, as these are more likely
to reﬂect data errors. (The sensitivity of the results to these trimming
criteria is discussed below.) Also included in the data error category
are observations for which the quantity is equal to zero while the value
is positive. Around 1 percent of observations are dropped as a result.
Based on the resulting price and value data, Equations (6.2) and (6.3)
are implemented and the price change difference, ∆it , is computed.
The price change difference for each imported product then needs
to be weighted by the share of that product in imported materials used
in manufacturing, as discussed in Equation (6.4). From the World
Input-Output Database (WIOD), I have annual data on the composition
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of imported intermediates for the 38 countries that are analyzed. However, this composition is only available at a higher level of aggregation,
namely, for 14 manufacturing industries that deliver materials to manufacturing.10 So I ﬁrst use a concordance of SITC Rev. 2 to the International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation Revision 3 (ISIC Rev. 3) industrial classiﬁcation to aggregate product-level price-change differences
to the level of these 14 manufacturing industries, using the share of each
product in total imports by each country. Then Equation (6.4) is applied
as described, and the outcome is used in Equation (6.7) to arrive at the
estimate of the bias in manufacturing productivity growth.
I use the Socio-Economic Accounts (SEAs) that are part of WIOD
to compute the growth of manufacturing MFP:11
(6.8)
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log ¨
© MFPt 1 ¸¹
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Based on the SEAs, there is information for manufacturing on valueadded at constant prices (VA), employment by skill type (Hit), the total
capital stock (Kt), and the share of labor compensation going to each
skill type in value-added (αit). Ideally, there should be data on capital
stocks by asset type, but this is not available for all countries. As a result,
the contribution to growth from changes in the composition of the capital stock is included in this measure of MFP growth.
For my analysis, I assume that statistical agencies treat imports of
the same product from different countries as different products. Establishing whether this is actually the case is a much harder challenge. As
a general principle, the main concern in ofﬁcial statistics is to avoid
ignoring quality differences, and statistical agencies would thus be
likely to treat products from different countries as having a different
quality, rather than a different price—see, e.g., Eurostat (2001) and IMF
(2009). How U.S. statisticians deal with this issue is discussed in detail
in Houseman et al. (2010, 2011).12 Put brieﬂy, unless it is clear that
a “new” product imported from a different country is identical to the
“old” product, price differences are assumed to be due to quality differences. European countries would have to follow a similar approach
as the United States to be in line with Eurostat requirements. Since
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separate import price indices are published for imports from euro-area
countries and for imports from non-euro-area countries, this suggests
that products from different countries are not treated as close substitutes. For other countries, information on import prices and the estimation methodology is even harder to establish. For instance, the Reserve
Bank of India (2012) shows import prices for India based on unit values, but it is unclear what level of detail these are constructed from. If
they distinguish import unit values by source country, then there would
be scope for import sourcing bias, but otherwise, their measure may
be similar to my dPit2 . This paucity of methodological documentation
presents a challenge in gauging the possible scope for import sourcing
bias for most countries outside the United States.13
This might not be a major problem if dPit1 from Equation (6.2) were
close to ofﬁcial import prices. Using data provided by Eurostat, a comparison can be made for nine European countries, and the results actually show substantial differences. Indeed, dPit1 is much more similar to
dPit2 (a correlation of 0.93) than to the ofﬁcial import prices (0.18). The
standard deviation of dPit1 and dPit2 is also about three times larger than
that of the ofﬁcial indices. To some extent, this is unsurprising, as dPit1
will capture many changes that ofﬁcial import prices are designed to
ignore. While both capture the changes in price of individual products
by a speciﬁc producer in a particular country, dPit1 will also capture
shifts between producers of the same product in the same country, shifts
between products within the SITC four-digit category, and changes in
the importance of individual products in the broader category.
However, as discussed above, Diewert and Nakamura (2010) show
that it is possible to express the true price index, dPit2 , as a function of
the typically observed price index dPit1 and a bias term. This bias term,
∆it , the difference between dPit1 and dPit2 , depends only on the price difference and shifts in imports across source countries. In other words,
even when dPit1 is a poor approximation of ofﬁcial import prices, the
import sourcing bias estimate ∆it is not “contaminated” by factors unrelated to import price differences and sourcing patterns.
This discussion implies that caution is in order in interpreting the
results on two counts. First, if statistical agencies adequately account
for price and quality differences across source countries, the method
employed here would incorrectly ascribe a bias to the import price
index of that country. A bias would only occur if the statistical agen-

Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb 205

2/16/2015 8:34:21 AM

206 Inklaar

cies ascribe too much of the price differences across source countries to
quality differences. Second, our trade unit values are available at a level
of detail at which quality differences will still be a notable factor. As
long as the correlation between (true) prices and quality is not negative,
the bias estimates are likely to be too large. Given these caveats, the
results should be regarded more as indicative of the likely scope of this
problem than as the ﬁnal word on the precise magnitude.

RESULTS
The increased sourcing of materials from lower-cost countries is
shown in Figure 6.1 for the three largest European countries and the
United States. Between 1995 and 2008, each of these countries considerably increased the share of imported materials from emerging economies. I deﬁne two groups of emerging economies. The ﬁrst group consists of the (mostly) central and eastern European countries that have
joined the European Union since 2004, the EU12.14 The second group,
“Other emerging,” includes Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico,
Russia, and Turkey. The advanced economies are the EU1515 and the
group labeled “Other advanced,” which includes Australia, Canada,
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the United States.16 This grouping is informative, as the share of imports from advanced economies went down
considerably over this period, while both groups of emerging economies gained considerably in import market share.17
This shift in import market share toward emerging economies is an
indication that imports from these economies are cheaper. To illustrate
this, we can compare the import price for the same product across countries. To make this more straightforward to visualize, I ﬁrst compute
the median unit value by source country group (advanced/emerging,
EU/other), importer, product, and year. These median unit values are
then compared with the median unit value of imports from the EU15.
Figure 6.2 plots the median price difference relative to the EU15 for
each country group over time. The median price for imports from other
advanced economies18 was about 20 percent higher than the price for
imports from the EU15 throughout the period. To give an indication of
the distribution around the median price difference, the percentage of
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Figure 6.1 Share of Source Country Groups in Imported Materials Used
in Manufacturing, Selected Countries for 1995 and 2008
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SOURCE: Computations based on WIOD, see www.wiod.org.

products that had a lower price than imports from EU15 countries is
also indicated. For imports from other advanced economies, only about
40 percent of products are cheaper than imports from EU15 countries.
The generally higher prices of imports from other advanced economies
could be a “Washington apples” effect (Alchian and Allen 1964). Since
most countries in the analysis are EU countries (27 out of 38 countries),
imports from other advanced economies tend to come from farther
away and would thus need to be of higher quality to overcome higher
trade costs.
Throughout the period, and for most countries, importing from
emerging economies was much cheaper than importing from EU15
countries. The median difference in 1995 was around 30–35 percent
for imports from the EU12 and other emerging economies. The price
advantage shrank over this period to about 20 percent for other emerging economies and to about 10 percent for EU12 countries. Most prod-
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Figure 6.2 Median Price Difference Relative to EU15 Imports and
Percentage of Products That Have Lower Prices than EU15
Imports, by Country Grouping, 1995–2008
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NOTE: The lines show the median price difference of imports from a speciﬁc country
grouping relative to imports from EU15 countries. The percentages indicate the
percentage of products with lower prices.
SOURCE: Author’s computations.

ucts from both groups of countries had lower prices than when imported
from EU15 countries. This ﬁgure, though, treats all products identically
even if they represent only a small part of imports.
We therefore turn to the results from estimating import sourcing
bias, where products are weighted by their share in the value of imports.
In these results, we focus on how the difference in price levels translates
to a different rate of import price change, rather than on the price-level
differences in themselves. Table 6.2 illustrates the products and country
groups for which the import sourcing bias is most relevant. For each
traded product, I calculate the difference between a price index under
the assumption products are different when imported from a different
country (Equation [6.2]) and a price index under the assumption prod-
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Table 6.2 Offshoring Bias across Product Groups and Country Groups,
1995–2008
Type of product

Differentiated
Reference-priced
Exchange-traded
Conservative Liberal Conservative Liberal Conservative Liberal
Overall
0.33
0.29
−0.01
0.03
−0.06
−0.06
EU15
0.51
0.44
0.02
0.08
−0.04
−0.04
Other advanced
0.53
0.51
0.07
0.09
0.02
0.03
EU12
0.26
0.15
−0.06
0.05
−0.06
−0.06
Other emerging −0.08
0.04
−0.04
−0.15
−0.18
−0.18
NOTE: The table shows the weighted average difference between the price change for
a “different products” price index versus a “perfect substitutes” price index over the
period from 1995 to 2008. The “different products” price index is deﬁned in Equation (3.2), and the “perfect substitutes” index is deﬁned in Equation (3.3). The price
changes for each product are multiplied by the two-period average share of that product in country imports and summed across product groups. The product groups are
deﬁned by Rauch (1999) and are used to indicate the extent to which products are
homogenous (exchange-trade) or differentiated; both Rauch’s conservative and liberal groupings of products are shown. The differences in price changes for each group
are then averaged across countries.
SOURCE: Author’s computations.

ucts imported from different countries are perfect substitutes (Equation
[6.3]). This difference is then weighted by the share of each product in
the total imports of each country and summed across three groups of
products.
This product grouping, introduced by Rauch (1999), distinguishes
between homogenous and differentiated products. Some products, typically commodities such as oil or lead, are traded on exchanges and are
thus considered homogenous. For a second category of products, it is
possible to ﬁnd so-called reference prices in trade journals, such as for
chemicals. The remainder of products—i.e., those for which no “standard” prices are available—are considered to be differentiated. This
determination is made at the ﬁve-digit SITC level, and in translating
this to the four-digit SITC level (which is used here), Rauch formulates
two alternative classiﬁcations, a “conservative” and a “liberal” one.
In the conservative classiﬁcation, products are labeled as “differentiated” when the four-digit category also consists (in part) of “referencepriced” or “exchange-traded” products. In the liberal classiﬁcation, the
alternate choice is made, thus allocating a product to the “reference-
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priced” or “exchange-traded” categories, rather than the “differentiated” category. The ﬁnal step is to compute an (unweighted) average of
the price-change differences across countries.
The top row of Table 6.2 shows that, across all countries, there is
only evidence of a (positive) import sourcing bias for differentiated
products.19 For reference-priced and exchange-traded products—i.e.,
the more homogenous products—there is little indication that a shift
toward low-cost sources is biasing import price indexes, especially in
Rauch’s (1999) conservative product grouping (which uses a stricter
rule for classifying products as homogenous). Indeed, the negative
import sourcing bias numbers for some product and country groups
imply shifts toward higher-cost sources. Across country groups, only
advanced economies show notable positive import sourcing bias numbers, and then only for differentiated products. This group of products is
where one would expect products of different prices—but also of different quality levels—to be able to coexist. The positive import sourcing
bias numbers in Table 6.2 could then imply that advanced economies
are shifting toward lower-quality imports or toward lower-cost imports
(at a given quality level). In that regard, the import sourcing bias estimates in Table 6.2 and those that follow are likely to be an overestimate
of the true bias.
Figure 6.3 moves to the country level and shows the import sourcing bias in combination with average annual growth in manufacturing
MFP for the 20 advanced economies between 1995 and 2008 (ordered
by measured MFP growth). The total bar equals manufacturing MFP
growth as computed from the SEA (Equation [6.8]), which is divided
into the bias calculated from Equation (6.7) and the corrected MFP
growth. This illustrates how the bias is substantial in most countries and
positive in all but Luxembourg and Greece. For this set of countries,
the average bias is 0.34 percentage points, which is 25 percent of the
(corrected) average annual MFP growth of 1.38 percent. In other words,
measured MFP growth in advanced economies could very well substantially overstate actual growth. At the same time, the cross-country
pattern of MFP growth is not much distorted: Though the growth rates
are lower, the measured MFP growth and corrected MFP growth rates
are very highly correlated across countries (0.98).
The import sourcing bias found for the United States of 0.07 percentage points is smaller than the offshoring bias found by Houseman
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Figure 6.3 Average Annual Manufacturing MFP Growth in Advanced
Economies, Bias and Bias-Corrected Measures, 1995–2008
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et al. (2010, 2011), whose estimates range from 0.21 to 0.51 percentage points over mostly the same period.20 Since any bias from shifting
from domestic to foreign suppliers is not included in my import sourcing bias, this is as expected. It does suggest that import sourcing bias
captures a notable share (14–33 percent) of the overall offshoring bias.
In countries with smaller, more open economies than that of the United
States, my import sourcing bias is likely to be an even larger part of the
overall offshoring bias.
To gauge the robustness of these bias estimates, I repeated the analysis with more restrictive criteria for removing outliers in the unit value
data. Rather than removing unit values that were 100 times larger or
0.01 times as large, I used parameters of 20 times larger or 0.05 times as
large, as well as 10 times larger or 0.1 times as large. The resulting bias
estimates are noticeably smaller, indicating that mostly small unit values are dropped from the data set. For advanced economies, the average
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bias drops from 0.34 in the 100–0.01 case to 0.28 in the 20–0.05 case
and 0.18 in the 10–0.1 case.21 The cross-country pattern is very similar,
though, conﬁrming the ﬁnding that the cross-country pattern of MFP
growth is not affected by import sourcing bias.
Figure 6.4 shows the bias estimates for the 18 emerging economies.
As already shown in Table 6.2, there is no clear positive import sourcing bias: the average bias is −0.06 and varies between −1.89 (Estonia)
and +1.37 (Hungary). Taken at face value, the negative bias estimates
suggest that measured productivity growth is understated because manufacturers are shifting toward imports of higher-cost materials. This is
hard to fathom unless these materials are also of higher quality. These
negative biases could reﬂect an increasing integration of emerging
economies into advanced economies’ supply chains, with, for instance,
(high-quality) car parts arriving from western European manufacturers
for assembly in countries such as Slovakia. From the perspective of
productivity measurement, import sourcing bias seems to be less of a
problem in these emerging economies.

CONCLUSION
While manufacturers increasingly buy their materials from lowercost countries, ofﬁcial statistics lag behind this trend. Methods to measure the price change of imported materials miss out on cost-savings
that manufacturers achieve by sourcing from lower-cost countries. By
overestimating price changes of imports, statisticians underestimate the
growth in the quantity of imports, leading to an upward bias in growth
of productivity. In this chapter, I quantify this import sourcing bias
for 38 advanced and emerging economies and estimate bias-adjusted
growth of manufacturing value-added for the period 1995–2008. This
relies on data for import unit values across importing countries, so that
price changes of import products can be calculated under the assumption that imports from different countries are either different products or
perfect substitutes. Treating imports from different countries as substitutes allows for cost savings to be registered in the statistics.
The analysis for advanced economies shows that there is a shift
toward imports with lower unit values for the group of differentiated
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Figure 6.4 Average Annual Manufacturing MFP Growth in Emerging
Economies, Bias and Bias-Corrected Measures, 1995–2008
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products. As a result, manufacturing MFP growth in advanced economies is biased upwards by, on average, 0.18 to 0.34 percentage points,
or 10 to 20 percent of measured growth. In emerging economies, there
is no clear bias in either direction. The true import sourcing bias is
likely to be closer to zero than these estimates, as the method used here
ascribes none of the price differences to differences in quality. Furthermore, if statistical agencies already deal well with price and quality
differences across source countries, then there is no bias to begin with.
From that perspective, it is reassuring to discover that even with the
larger estimate of import sourcing bias, the cross-country pattern of
productivity growth is not affected. On the other hand, this analysis is
limited to analyzing import sourcing bias, and any bias stemming from
shifts between domestic and foreign suppliers is not accounted for.
Yet even the current estimates have implications for the reliability of output and productivity statistics. These questions cannot easily
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be resolved in the standard statistical framework, where price changes
are measured separately for inputs from domestic and different foreign sources. Instead, surveying an input price index, as discussed by
Alterman (2009 and Chapter 10 of this volume), may hold greater
promise, since for such an index ﬁrms would provide the overall input
price, regardless of source. The earlier experiences of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics in surveying margin prices (i.e., the sales price minus
the purchase price of the product) in wholesale and retail trade suggest
that this would be feasible. Those new prices led to much lower productivity growth, particularly in retail trade (Harchaoui 2012), which
points to the importance of accurately measuring not only output but
also input prices. From a policy perspective, these ﬁndings suggest that
some of the offshoring of activities, in particular from western Europe
to central and eastern European countries, has led to an overestimation
of productivity growth. However, import sourcing bias by itself is not a
large enough factor that the cross-country productivity growth patterns
are materially affected.

Notes
The author would like to thank the participants at the “Measuring the Effects of Globalization” conference, held February 28–March 1, 2013, in Washington, D.C., and in
particular Susan Houseman and Ana Aizcorbe, for helpful comments and discussions.
1. See, e.g., OECD (2010).
2. There has also been earlier work on this; see, e.g., Schott (2004) and Reinsdorf
and Yuskavage (2009).
3. In the literature on bias in consumer prices, this is known as outlet substitution
bias; see, e.g., Reinsdorf (1993), Diewert (1998), and Hausman (2003).
4. There would still be offshoring bias until prices of domestic and foreign sources
of inputs were compared and any price differences accounted for.
5. See IMF (2009) for international measurement guidelines, but also Inklaar,
Timmer, and van Ark (2008) on the topic of the measurement of industry output
prices across Europe in relation to measurement guidelines.
6. See http://www.wiod.org. Taiwan is excluded because of missing trade data, and
Malta because of highly erratic unit values.
7. Diewert and Nakamura (2010) show this for a Fisher index, whereas here a
Törnqvist index is used. Given the similarity in the structure of these two indexes,
there is likely a similar decomposition for the Törnqvist as for the Fisher. Furthermore, import sourcing bias estimates based on the Fisher index are similar in size
to the Törnqvist estimates shown in the chapter.
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8. The ﬁrst-period price is now 25% × 6 + (1 − 25%) × 10 = 9, and the second-period
price is 8, so the price decline between the two periods is 11 percent.
9. More than 90 percent of the unit values are based on quantities in kilograms. Furthermore, the same product could be reported in kilograms by some countries and
in another unit (e.g., number of items) by other countries. To avoid mixing prices
per kilogram and prices per unit for the same product, only prices per kilogram are
used.
10. WIOD distinguishes inputs from 35 industries, but these also include nonmanufacturing inputs.
11. See, e.g., Timmer et al. (2010) for more detail on (industry-level) growth accounts
and MFP growth estimates.
12. See also Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) and BLS (1997).
13. See, for instance, Inklaar, Timmer, and van Ark (2008) on price measurement of
industry output across Europe.
14. These are Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
15. The EU15 consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom.
16. We could not include Taiwan in our full analysis because of missing trade price data.
17. Note that the share of imported materials in total material use also increased, so
imports from advanced economies did not decline in the absolute sense.
18. The import price data cover more countries than the input-output data, so there
are more advanced economies. All non-EU countries with a 2008 GDP per capita
level exceeding 55 percent of the U.S. level are labeled “advanced.” This threshold was chosen because it is the dividing line between the EU15 and the EU12.
19. Results based on unweighted average price changes are very similar.
20. The bias in value-added-based MFP growth is identical to the bias in value-added
growth, as was noted in the discussion of Equation (6.7), so I use Houseman et
al.’s (2010, 2011) estimate of the bias in value-added growth here.
21. In the 10–0.1 case, the import sourcing bias for the United States drops almost to
zero, which would imply that all of the offshoring bias is due to switching from
domestic to foreign suppliers.
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7
Biases to Manufacturing
Statistics from Offshoring
Evidence from Japan
Kyoji Fukao
Sonoe Arai
Hitotsubashi University and RIETI

As manufacturing sectors of developed economies outsource more
and more to developing economies, this may give rise to a serious measurement problem. If a manufacturing industry (or ﬁrm) procures a lot
of parts and components from developing economies at exceptionally
low prices and we do not correctly take account of these low prices, we
will overestimate the productivity of this industry (or ﬁrm).
In this chapter, we investigate two types of biases to manufacturing
statistics from the growth in manufacturers’ use of imported intermediates—commonly known as offshoring.
The ﬁrst type of bias concerns measuring the use of imported products in the economy. Most countries, including the United States, do
not track whether imports are destined for ﬁnal demand or intermediate uses but instead assume that industries use imports in proportion to
their overall use of these products in the economy—this is the so-called
import proportionality assumption. Measures using the import proportionality assumption will differ from measures based on actual input
use if two conditions occur: 1) industries’ use of imports differs signiﬁcantly from that assumed under the import proportionality assumption, and 2) the price movements of imported and domestic intermediates within commodity classes differ signiﬁcantly.1 In this study, we
call these types of biases the bias caused by the import proportionality
assumption.

219
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The second type of bias concerns the price gap between domestically produced inputs and imported inputs. If manufacturers shift sourcing from a high-cost domestic supplier to a low-cost foreign supplier
and statisticians do not take account of this price gap, statisticians’ estimates of the inputs of these manufacturers will be downwardly biased,
and estimates of the total factor productivity (TFP) will be upwardly
biased. This has been referred to as “offshoring bias” in the literature
(Diewert and Nakamura 2011; Houseman et al. 2011).
Japan presents an ideal case study to examine both the bias caused
by the import proportionality assumption and the bias caused by offshoring. The reason is that every ﬁve years, the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and Communications publishes the Input-Output Tables for
Japan (I-O tables), in which domestically produced intermediate inputs
and imported intermediate inputs are treated separately. The Japanese
government estimates the input structure by conducting a special survey, implemented by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry
(METI), on the sources of each industry’s procurements. Moreover,
because of Japan’s location, imports of intermediate inputs from China
and other developing economies in East Asia have increased rapidly
in recent decades. Against this background, using Japan’s I-O tables
and price indices for imported and domestic products, one of the major
aims of this study is to estimate the bias from the import proportionality assumption by examining differences in estimates of import use in
the I-O tables based on actual data and estimates based on the import
proportionality assumption.
In order to estimate offshoring bias, we need—in addition to data on
import use in the economy and price indices for imported and domestic
products—data on the price gap between domestically produced inputs
and imported inputs. In Japan, such data are available from the Survey on Foreign and Domestic Price Differentials for Industrial Intermediate Input, conducted by METI every year. This survey provides
information on differentials in customer delivery prices among Japan,
China, the United States, Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong
Kong for about 180 commodities and 40 services. Using these data,
we estimate the price gap between domestically produced inputs and
imported inputs by country of origin.
The structure of the article is as follows. In Section Two, “Approach
to Measuring the Two Types of Biases,” we explain our methodology to
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estimate the two types of biases using data on Japan. We then explain
our data in Section Three, “Data Used.” We also detail what data METI
collects and how it collects these data. In Section Four, “Estimation
of Bias Caused by the Import Proportionality Assumption,” we report
our results on bias created by the import proportionality assumption. In
Section Five, “Estimation of Offshoring Bias,” we report our results on
the second type of bias. Section Six concludes.

APPROACH TO MEASURING THE TWO TYPES OF BIASES
This section presents the approach we use to measure the two types
of bias: 1) bias caused by the import proportionality assumption and 2)
offshoring bias.
We start by explaining our approach to measuring the bias caused
by the import proportionality assumption.
In Japan, input-output tables, in which domestically produced intermediate inputs and imported intermediate inputs are treated separately,
are constructed every ﬁve years. Therefore, data on the nominal value
of imported intermediate inputs from sector i to sector j, Xi,jM(t), and
data on the nominal value of domestically produced intermediate inputs
from sector i to sector j, Xi,jH(t), are available separately. Here, superscript M stands for imported intermediate inputs and superscript H stands
for domestically produced intermediate inputs. In the United States,
only data on the total value of intermediate inputs from sector i to sector j, Xi,jM(t)+Xi,jH(t), are available to construct input-output tables; the
extent to which the intermediate inputs used in sector j are imported or
domestically produced is unknown.
Let us theoretically examine biases caused by this shortcoming
of U.S.-type input-output tables based on the import comparability
assumption.
Assume that imported intermediate inputs from sector i to sector j
and domestically produced intermediate inputs from sector i to sector
j are different products and the cost share of each product reveals its
marginal contribution to production in sector j.
In Japan, as in the United States, data on the absolute price levels
of imported products and domestic products are not available. In both
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countries, only the price indexes of imported products and domestic
products are available. Let PiM(t) / PiM(0) denote the price change of
imported product i from year 0 to year t and PiH(t) / PiH(0) denote the
price change of domestically produced product i from year 0 to year t.2
For our estimation of the bias, which would be caused by a lack
of information on imports, we ﬁrst prepared nominal and real import
input-output tables for 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2008 in Japan using
data on import use in the economy. As we will explain in detail in the
next section, the main sources of our I-O tables are the 1995-20002005 Linked Input-Output Tables, published by the Statistics Bureau of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC), and the
2008 Updated Input-Output Tables, published by METI. Both of the
statistics set 2005 as their benchmark year.
The key variables we would like to estimate are the real input
indexes for each sector. For the calculation of these quantity indexes,
we use 2005 as the base year. That is, we weight input quantity changes
by the nominal input values of 2005. Using Japan’s I-O tables, which
incorporate information on the use of imports in the economy, we derive
the real input index for sector j for year t (t = 1995, 2000, 2005, 2008),
xjJ(t), as follows:

(7.1)
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where the superscript J means that this index is based on noncompetitive import-type I-O tables like Japan’s. T denotes the base year, 2005.3
In most countries, data on the destination of imports in the economy are not regularly available, and the ordinary approach is to assume
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that a sector’s imports of each input, relative to its total demand, are
the same as the economy-wide imports relative to total demand (as is
assumed in the I-O tables for the United States)—the so-called import
proportionality assumption.
That is, an industry’s imports are calculated as follows: let mi(t)
denote the economy-wide imports of product i relative to total demand
for product i:
(7.2)
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where Fi,kM(t) and Fi,kH(t) denote the value of imports of product i used
to satisfy ﬁnal demand k and the value of domestic output of product i
used to satisfy ﬁnal demand k.
In this shortcut approach, growth of real inputs from sector i to sector j is estimated by
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Moreover, the real input index for sector j for year t, xjU(t), is deﬁned by
(7.3)
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where the superscript U means that this index is drawn from U.S.-type
input-output tables based on the import proportionality assumption.
Equation (7.3) shows that when the price of imports relative to that
of domestic output declines (PiM(T) / PiH(T) > PiM(t) / PiH(t)) from T to
t for most inputs i, we will underestimate the increase in intermediate
inputs in sectors where imports of product i relative to the sector’s total
demand is higher than the economy-wide imports/domestic output ratio
((Xi,jM(t) / ( Xi,jM(t)+ Xi,jH(t)) > mi(t)) for these inputs. As a result, we will
overestimate the TFP growth of such sectors.
This type of bias is caused by the assumption that an industry’s
imports of each input, relative to its total demand, are the same as the
economy-wide imports relative to total demand. This bias will be large
if imports of each input, relative to the total demand for that input, are
quite different across sectors, and if changes in the relative prices of
imports and domestic products are large.
Biases caused by the import proportionality assumption have zerosum characteristics. In some sectors, the imports-total demand ratio
is higher than the economy-wide average, while in others, the ratio is
lower. Therefore, these biases will tend to cancel each other out when
we calculate macro-level TFP growth. However, if imports tend to be
used more as intermediate inputs and domestic output tends to be used
more for satisfying ﬁnal demand, we will overestimate TFP growth
of the macroeconomy when the prices of imports relative to those of
domestic output decline.
Using Japan’s I-O data from 1995 to 2008, we will analyze how
the intermediate input index based on Equation (7.1) moves differently
from the intermediate input index based on Equation (7.3).
Next, let us explain our methodology for measuring offshoring
bias. The offshoring bias concerns an important caveat regarding our
real input index xjJ(t), which is deﬁned by Equation (7.1) and is based
on import I-O tables like Japan’s. If quality-adjusted prices of imports i
and that of domestic output i are different, then our intermediate input
index deﬁned by Equation (7.1) is not appropriate for measuring true
intermediate input growth. This issue was ﬁrst pointed out by Diewert
and Nakamura (2011) and empirically examined by Houseman et al.
(2011).
If we express the (quality-adjusted) absolute price level of imported
products by PiM(t) and the (quality-adjusted) absolute price level of

Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb 224

2/16/2015 8:34:35 AM

Biases to Manufacturing Statistics from Offshoring 225

domestically produced products by PiH(t), then the appropriate input
index of sector j for year t is deﬁned by
(7.4)
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where the superscript O means that this index is based on information on
price gaps between domestically produced inputs and imported inputs
and is free from offshoring bias.
Assume that imports are cheaper than domestically produced
inputs and that both prices, PiM(t) and PiH(t), are constant over time.
Also assume that ﬁrms in sector j substitute imports for domestically
produced inputs by the same amount, and that imports and domestically produced inputs make the same marginal contribution to production. Then the true intermediate input index must remain constant. Input
index xjO(t), which is deﬁned by Equation (7.4), satisﬁes this condition. But both the input index xjJ(t), which is deﬁned by Equation (7.1),
and the input index xjU(t), which is deﬁned by Equation (7.3), decline.
When we use xjJ(t) or xjU(t), we will judge incorrectly that the intermediate input in sector i has decreased. Thus, we will overestimate the TFP
growth of sector i.
Using METI’s Survey on Foreign and Domestic Price Differentials
for Industrial Intermediate Input (METI 1999) and Japan’s I-O data, we
will evaluate offshoring bias by comparing the intermediate input index
xjU(t) deﬁned by Equation (7.3) and the intermediate input index xjO(t)
deﬁned by Equation (7.4).

DATA USED
In this section we explain the data we use for our analysis. For
information on the nominal use of imports in the Japanese economy
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in 1995, 2000, and 2005, we use the Input-Output Tables for Japan for
each of these years, published by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC). For these years,
tables of imports reporting the nominal value of imports used as inputs
in sector j, Xi,jM(t), and the nominal value of imports used to satisfy ﬁnal
demand k, Fi,kM(t), for each product i are available.
In order to construct these tables on imports, METI, which collaborates with MIAC to compile the I-O tables, conducts its survey on the
use of major imports at the HS nine-digit level.4 Online Appendix Table
7A.1 provides an outline of the questionnaire form, which has been
partially ﬁlled out by the authors with made-up industry names to illustrate the conceptual framework of the METI survey.5 About 200 trading
companies and producer associations are interviewed; the latter, such
as the association of electronics parts producers and the association
of automobile parts producers, make up the majority. This means that
METI mainly asks the Japanese producers of each commodity about the
destination industries for imports of these commodities, most of which
are produced by their rivals abroad. (Of course, some Japanese producers are now multinationals and import from their own afﬁliates abroad.)
To extend our analysis to more recent years, we estimate import
input-output tables for 2008 using the 2008 Updated Input-Output
Tables and the 2005 Input-Output Tables for Japan. The updated I-O
Tables do not contain tables on imports, so we therefore estimate tables
on imports by extrapolating data in import tables for 2005 using import
data for 2008.
We obtain deﬂators for imports and domestic output separately for
each sector i from the 1995-2000-2005 Linked Input-Output Tables,
published by the Statistics Bureau of MIAC, and the 2008 Updated
Input-Output Tables. In these I-O tables, the major original sources
of deﬂators for commodities are the Domestic Corporate Goods Price
Index (DCGPI) and the Import Price Index (IPI), taken from the Corporate Goods Price Index, published by the Bank of Japan.
Using these various sources, we prepared nominal and real import
input-output tables for 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2008. The endogenous
sector table for each year has 514 rows and 401 columns. In our analysis, we set 2005 as our benchmark year for our calculation of the quantity and the price index before and after 2005.
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Moreover, for data on price gaps necessary for our analysis we use
the Survey on Foreign and Domestic Price Differentials for Industrial
Intermediate Input (METI 1999). This survey has been conducted every
year since 1993 and reports differences in the customer delivery price
for about 150 intermediate goods and 30 services between Japan on the
one hand and the United States, China, Germany, and the newly industrializing economies (NIEs, consisting of South Korea, Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and Singapore) on the other. The survey speciﬁes each commodity and service in great detail. In the case of commodities, the survey in principle follows the commodity speciﬁcation of the Corporate
Goods Price Index.
As we will report in detail in Section Five, “Estimation of Offshoring Bias,” unit prices in the developing economies included in the survey
(i.e., China and the NIEs) for many products tend to be much lower than
unit prices in the developed economies (i.e., Japan, the United States,
and Germany). This implies that it would be inappropriate to assume,
as is done in Equation (7.4), that the unit prices of Japanese imports are
identical regardless of the country of origin. We therefore distinguish
between imports from developed and from developing economies.
The number of goods and services covered by the survey differs
across countries and across years. Data are relatively abundant for U.S.Japan and China-Japan price differences from 2000, and we therefore
use data for the two pairs for 2000 and 2008.6
We grouped Japan’s trade partners into two groups: 1) developed
economies, consisting of the United States and countries that were
members of the European Union in 2000, and 2) developing economies,
consisting of China and the rest of the world. We assume that price differentials between Japan and the developed economies are the same as
the U.S.-Japan price differentials, and that price differentials between
Japan and the developing economies are the same as the China-Japan
price differentials.
A potential problem is that customer delivery prices in the United
States and China reported in METI’s survey may include prices of
goods imported into the United States and China, but what we would
like to know is the price gaps between domestically produced goods
and imported goods from China and the United States in Japan. However, because we have no way of knowing whether the customer delivery prices in the United States and China reported in the METI survey
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include imported goods, we assume that the price gaps reported in the
survey are good indicators of the price gaps between domestically produced goods and imported goods in Japan.
Another, related issue is that in Japan’s I-O tables, the value of
domestic products is given on a producer price basis, while the value
of imported products is on a CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) basis.
On the other hand, METI’s survey reports price gaps between customer
delivery prices in Japan and customer delivery prices in other countries.
Because of trade costs, it is likely that the ratio of the price of imported
products on a CIF basis over the price of domestic products will tend to
be higher than the ratio of customer delivery prices in other countries
over customer delivery prices in Japan. In order to adjust for this factor,
we assume for each commodity that the ratio of the price of imported
products on a CIF basis over the price of domestic products is 10 percent higher than the ratio of customer delivery prices in other countries
over customer delivery prices in Japan.
In our analysis of offshoring bias, we use 2000 as the base year and
set the producer prices of domestic product i in year 2000, PiH(2000),
equal to one for all i. We derive the CIF price of product i in year 2000
imported from developed economies, PiD(2000), and the CIF price of
product i in year 2000 imported from developing economies, PiL(2000),
for each i using the following equations:
(7.5)
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where ΠiH(2000), ΠiD(2000), and ΠiL(2000) respectively denote the
customer delivery price of product i in year 2000 in Japan, the United
States, and China, which we take from the Survey on Foreign and
Domestic Price Differentials for Industrial Intermediate Input (METI
1999).
As for the CIF prices of product i in Year 2008 imported from developed and developing economies (both developed and developing mea-
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sured in terms of the producer price of domestic product i in Year 2000
in Japan), one way to estimate this is to use the customer delivery price
in Year 2008 in Japan, the United States, and China and sectoral deﬂators in the I-O tables. That is, we can derive the CIF price of product i in
Year 2008 imported from developed economies, PiD(2008), and the CIF
price of product i in Year 2008 imported from developing economies,
PiL(2008), for each i, as well as the producer price of domestic product i
in year 2008, PiH(2008), for each i, using the following equations:
(7.7)

Pi D 2008

1.1

3 iD 2008 Pi H 2008 H
Pi 2000 ,
3 iH 2008 Pi H 2000

(7.8)

Pi L 2008

1.1

3 iL 2008 Pi H 2008 H
Pi 2000 , and
3 iH 2008 Pi H 2000

(7.9)

Pi H 2008

Pi H 2008 H
Pi 2000 ,
Pi H 2000

where ΠiH(2008), ΠiD(2008), and ΠiL(2008) denote the customer delivery price of product i in Year 2008 in Japan, the United States, and
China, respectively. We obtain PiH(2008) / PiH(2000) from the sectoral
deﬂators in the 1995-2000-2005 Linked Input-Output Tables and the
2008 Updated Input-Output Tables.
We should note that there is another important source of import
price change in addition to the combined data of the Survey on Foreign and Domestic Price Differentials for Industrial Intermediate Input
(METI 1999) and the sectoral deﬂators in the 1995-2000-2005 Linked
Input-Output Tables and the 2008 Updated Input-Output Tables—
namely, the import deﬂators in the I-O tables. The import deﬂators in
the I-O tables are mainly based on the Bank of Japan–published Corporate Goods Price Index, which covers many more commodities and
countries of origin than METI’s survey. The import deﬂators in the I-O
tables therefore likely are more reliable than our estimates using Equations (7.7), (7.8), and (7.9), but the I-O tables do not contain data on
import prices by country of origin or on absolute price gaps. Taking
these advantages and disadvantages of the import deﬂator in the I-O
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tables into account, we use these deﬂators as a kind of a control total, as
we shall explain below.
The CIF price of product i in year 2008 imported from developed
economies, PiD(2008), and the CIF price of product i in year 2008
imported from developing economies, PiL(2008), are expected to satisfy
the following equation:
(7.10)

Pi M 2008
Pi M 2000

miD 2008

Pi D 2008
Pi L 2008
D

1

2008
m

i
Pi D 2000
Pi L 2000 ,

where PiM(t) denotes Japan’s import price of product i from the rest of
the world in year t, and miD(t) denotes the percentage of Japan’s imports
of product i from developed economies in Japan’s total imports in 2008.
We obtain these data from the Trade Statistics of Japan, published by
the Ministry of Finance.
Because of the differences in data sources and other factors (such
as the fact that we use price difference data only for the U.S.-Japan
and China-Japan pairs, whereas the import deﬂators in the I-O tables
cover all of Japan’s imports from the world), PiD(2008) and PiL(2008),
derived from Equations (7.8) and (7.9), do not necessarily satisfy Equation (7.10). To make PiD(2008) and PiL(2008) consistent with Equation
(7.10), we add an adjustment term γ on the right-hand side of Equations
(7.8) and (7.9) and redeﬁne PiD(2008) and PiL(2008) as follows:
(7.11)
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It can be easily conﬁrmed that PiD(2008) and PiL(2008), deﬁned by
Equations (7.11) and (7.12), satisfy Equation (7.10).
Our input index for sector j for year t, which is based on information on price gaps between domestically produced inputs and imported
inputs and is free from offshoring bias, is deﬁned by the following
equation:
(7.13)
O
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for t = 2000, 2008, and T = 2000. This is a modiﬁed version of Equation
(7.4).
Two additional caveats with regard to our data should be pointed
out. First, METI’s survey on price differentials does not cover food
processing and agricultural, ﬁshery, and forestry output, while the coverage of service output is very limited. Therefore, we calculate price
gaps only for the output of the mining and manufacturing sectors other
than processed food, and we assume that there are no price differentials
in the case of agricultural, forestry, and ﬁshery products; food processing; and services. Moreover, because of this limitation in the data, we
excluded the food processing sector from our analysis of the offshoring
bias.
Second, even in the case of nonfood commodities, the number of
commodities reported in the survey (about 180) is not sufﬁcient for
the estimation of price gaps for our disaggregated three-digit-level
I-O tables in which we have 285 rows, consisting of the mining sector and of manufacturing sectors other than processed food. Therefore,
for industries in the I-O tables that we could not match at the threedigit level, we assumed that the price gap was the same as at the more
aggregated two-digit industry level. Moreover, when the METI survey
provides price gap data on multiple commodities that correspond to one
of the 285 industry rows, we calculate the industry average price gap
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for that industry by employing the weights used in the METI survey.
The original source of the weights is the Corporate Goods Price Index.

ESTIMATION OF BIAS CAUSED BY THE IMPORT
PROPORTIONALITY ASSUMPTION
Using our data, we analyze how the prices of imported inputs relative to domestically produced inputs changed between 1995 and 2005,
as well as how much the share of imported inputs in total inputs differs
across sectors and how this share changed between 1995 and 2005. In
addition, we estimate the bias from the import proportionality assumption by comparing the intermediate input index based on information
from the tables on imports. We estimate the index based on the assumption that an industry’s imports of each input, relative to its total demand,
are the same as the economy-wide imports relative to total demand (as
is assumed in the I-O tables for the United States).
As we explained in Section Two, “Approach to Measuring the Two
Types of Biases,” the bias caused by the assumption that an industry’s
imports of each input, relative to its total demand, are the same as the
economy-wide imports, relative to total demand, will be large if changes
in the relative prices of imports and domestic products are large and if
imports of each input, relative to the total demand for that input, are
quite different across sectors.
Figure 7.1 shows how the ratio of the average price index of
imported inputs over the average price index of domestically produced
inputs has changed over time. As can be seen, the ratio declined by 40
percent in the period 1995–2008. This decline was not caused by yen
appreciation, since, as Figure 7.1 also shows, the value of the yen as
measured by the real effective exchange rate fell by more than 50 percent during the same period. Rather, a likely reason for the decline in
relative import prices is the increase in Japan’s imports of low-priced
products from Asian countries and the decline of output price in countries of origin.7
Figure 7.2 shows the regional composition of Japan’s imports of
manufactured products for 2000, 2005, and 2008. Similarly, Figure 7.3
shows the regional composition of Japan’s imports of machinery for
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Figure 7.1 Average Price of Imported Inputs over Average Price of
Domestically Produced Inputs (1995 = 1) and Japan’s Real
Effective Exchange Rate (yen/foreign currency): 1995–2008
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Japan's real effective exchange rate
(Yen/Foreign currency, BIS data, 1995 = 1)
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NOTE: “BIS” stands for Bank for International Settlements.
SOURCE: 1995-2000-2005 Linked Input-Output Tables, published by the Statistics
Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC); 2008
Updated Input-Output Tables, published by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and
Industry (METI); and effective exchange rate, Bank of Japan.

2000, 2005, and 2008. The ﬁgures show that the share of imports from
China and other Asian countries in Japan’s total manufacturing and
machinery imports increased rapidly in the 2000s.
Next, Online Appendix Table 7A.2 provides a list of commodities
for which the ratio of the price of imports over the price of domestic
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Figure 7.2 Regional Composition of Japan’s Imports of Manufactured
Products: 2000, 2005, and 2008
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SOURCE: Trade Statistics of Japan, published by the Ministry of Finance.

Figure 7.3 Regional Composition of Japan’s Imports of Machinery:
2000, 2005, and 2008
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SOURCE: Trade Statistics of Japan, published by the Ministry of Finance.
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products declined by more than 25 percent from 1995 to 2008. The
table conﬁrms that the import price–domestic price ratio of many commodities, including important parts and components, sharply declined
during the period. For instance, in the case of integrated circuits and
semiconductor devices, the relative price declined by 33 percent and 28
percent, respectively.
The next issue we examine is how much the share of imported
inputs in total inputs differs across sectors, and how this share has
changed over time. We do so by two illustrations, Figures 7.4 and 7.5,
that use the examples of integrated circuits and semiconductor devices,
which are important inputs in manufactured products.
Starting with integrated circuits, the nominal value of total intermediate inputs increased from 3.0 trillion yen in 1995 to 3.6 trillion yen in
2005.8 While this increase in the nominal value is not particularly large,
intermediate input in real terms in fact increased threefold. The share of
the total nominal input of imports in total nominal input increased from
34 percent to 58 percent. The increase in the share of the total nominal
input of imports was even more pronounced in the case of semiconductor devices, where it jumped from 18 percent to 61 percent.
However, as can be seen in Figures 7.4 and 7.5, the share of imports
in total demand differs considerably across sectors. In the case of both
ﬁgures, the import ratio tends to be high in electrical machinery sectors
but relatively low in other sectors such as automobiles and precision
machinery. This means that we will underestimate the growth of these
electronics parts inputs in electrical machinery sectors and overestimate
it in other machinery sectors if we assume that an industry’s imports of
each input, relative to its total demand, are the same as the economywide imports relative to total demand.
We calculate the extent of underestimation, ln(xjU(2008) / xjI(2008))
− ln(xjU(1995) / xjI(1995)), for all of the 202 manufacturing sectors,
other than processing food, and all of the six mining sectors, using our
data. Table 7.1 shows the 25 sectors in which the underestimation of
intermediate input growth is largest among these 208 mining and manufacturing sectors.9 By multiplying this value with two values—that
is, with −1 and with the average of the nominal intermediate input–
nominal gross output ratio of a particular sector for 1995 and 2008, we
also calculate the extent of the overestimation of TFP growth for the
period 1995–2008.
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Figure 7.4 Share of Imported Inputs in Total Inputs: Integrated
Circuits, 1995–2005
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SOURCE: 1995 and 2005 Input-Output Tables, published by the Statistics Bureau of
MIAC.
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Figure 7.5 Share of Imported Inputs in Total Inputs: Semiconductor
Devices, 1995–2005
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Table 7.1 Underestimation of Intermediate Input Growth as a Result
of the Import Proportionality Assumption: Top 25 Sectors,
1995–2008

Sector
Animal oils and fats
Ordnance
Aircrafts
Liquid crystal elements
Methane derivatives
Organic fertilizers, n.e.c.
Video recording and playback
equipment
Thermo-setting resins
Salt
Bicycles
Turbines
Glass ﬁber and glass ﬁber
products, n.e.c.
Integrated circuits
Processed meat products
“Tatami” (straw matting) and
straw products
Wooden chips
Other resins
Other glass products
Nonferrous metal castings and
forgings
Dextrose, syrup, and isomerized
sugar
High function resins
Electronic computing equipment
(except personal computers)
Optical ﬁber cables
Applied electronic equipment
Watches and clocks

Underestimation of
intermediate
input growth,
ln(xU/xJ) (%,
1995–2008)
A
−14.04
−12.62
−9.85
−8.13
−6.90
−4.49
−4.25

Intermediate
input/gross
output (average value
of 1995 and
2008)
B
0.715
0.619
0.538
0.727
0.742
0.657
0.722

Overestimation of TFP
growth on a
gross output
basis (%,
1995–2008)
A×B
10.04
7.81
5.29
5.91
5.12
2.95
3.07

−4.13
−4.13
−3.73
−3.38
−3.20

0.733
0.546
0.720
0.643
0.604

3.03
2.25
2.68
2.17
1.93

−2.62
−2.62
−2.47

0.650
0.710
0.703

1.70
1.86
1.74

−2.39
−2.34
−1.94
−1.85

0.733
0.749
0.537
0.703

1.75
1.75
1.04
1.30

−1.72

0.820

1.41

−1.49
−1.45

0.778
0.716

1.16
1.04

−1.28
−1.22
−1.21

0.740
0.716
0.630

0.95
0.88
0.76

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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In the top 14 sectors in which the underestimation of intermediate
input growth caused by the import proportionality assumption is largest (namely, animal oils and fats, ordnance, aircraft, liquid crystal elements, methane derivatives, organic fertilizers not elsewhere classiﬁed,
video recording and playback equipment, thermo-setting resins, salt,
bicycles, turbines, glass ﬁber and glass ﬁber products not elsewhere
classiﬁed, integrated circuits, and processed meat products), the negative bias of intermediate input growth caused by the import proportionality assumption is more than 2.6 percent, and the positive bias of TFP
growth is more than 1.7 percent. These sectors include important hightech machinery sectors, such as aircraft and integrated circuits.
Next, Table 7.2 shows the 27 sectors in which the overestimation of
intermediate input growth is largest among all the manufacturing sectors. These include six sectors—cellular phones, radio and television
sets, coal products, other nonferrous metal products, repair of aircraft,
and other photographic and optical instruments—where the positive
bias of intermediate input growth is at least 3.25 percent, and the negative bias of TFP growth is more than 1.9 percent.

ESTIMATION OF OFFSHORING BIAS
Using our data, we estimate offshoring bias by comparing the real
input index based on information on the price gaps between domestically produced and imported intermediate inputs. That is, we estimate
Equation (7.13) in Section Three (“Data Used”), which is a modiﬁed
version of Equation (7.4) in Section Two (“Approach to Measuring the
Two Types of Biases”). We also estimate the real input index, based on
the assumption that an industry’s imports of each input, relative to the
total demand for that input, are the same as the economy-wide imports
relative to total demand (as is assumed in the I-O tables for the United
States)—i.e., Equation (7.3) in Section Two. For the estimation, we use
the year 2000 as our base year and calculate how the two types of intermediate input indexes for each sector changed from 2000 to 2008. In
addition, we analyze how much of a price gap there exists between
domestically produced intermediate inputs, inputs imported from devel-
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Table 7.2 Overestimation of Intermediate Input Growth as a Result
of the Import Proportionality Assumption: Top 27 Sectors,
1995–2008

Sector
Cellular phones
Radio and television sets
Coal products
Other nonferrous metal products
Repair of aircraft
Other photographic and optical
instruments
Confectionery
Electric audio equipment
Leather and fur skins
Bottled or canned vegetables and fruits
Chemical fertilizer
Other electrical devices and parts
Retort foods
Dishes, sushi, and lunch boxes
Synthetic dyes
Other metal products
Batteries
Other electronic components
Medicaments
Dairy farm products
Steel pipes and tubes
Other industrial organic chemicals
Soap, synthetic detergents, and surface
active agents
Synthetic ﬁbers
Preserved agricultural foodstuffs (other
than bottled or canned)
Nuclear fuels
Inorganic pigment

Intermediate UnderestimaOverestimation input/gross
tion of TFP
of intermediate output (aver- growth on a
input growth,
age value
gross output
ln(xU/xJ) (%,
of 1995 and
basis (%,
1995–2008)
2008)
1995–2008)
A
B
A×B
5.49
0.782
−4.30
5.47
0.780
−4.27
4.04
0.825
−3.33
3.70
0.715
−2.64
3.49
0.656
−2.29
3.25
0.592
−1.92
3.04
2.96
2.87
2.69
2.54
2.41
2.40
2.16
2.12
1.88
1.80
1.78
1.67
1.49
1.42
1.26
1.21

0.580
0.742
0.692
0.770
0.685
0.630
0.704
0.697
0.649
0.463
0.733
0.690
0.608
0.779
0.759
0.672
0.715

−1.76
−2.20
−1.98
−2.07
−1.74
−1.52
−1.69
−1.50
−1.38
−0.87
−1.32
−1.23
−1.01
−1.16
−1.08
−0.84
−0.86

1.21
1.21

0.633
0.631

−0.77
−0.76

1.21
1.18

0.541
0.687

−0.65
−0.81

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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oped economies, and inputs imported from developing economies, as
well as how these price gaps changed from 2000 to 2008.
As Diewert and Nakamura (2011) and Houseman et al. (2011)
explain, offshoring bias tends to be greater when there are large price
gaps between domestically produced intermediate inputs and imported
inputs and when ﬁrms substitute imports for domestically produced
inputs to a substantial extent.
Online Appendix Figures 7A.1 and 7A.2 show our results for estimating the price gaps between domestically produced intermediate
inputs, inputs imported from developed economies, and inputs imported
from developing economies for 2000 and 2008, respectively. For the
calculation, we use Equations (7.5), (7.6), (7.9), (7.11), and (7.12). In
the two ﬁgures, the price levels of domestically produced products are
set to 1 for both 2000 and 2008. Moreover, for the ﬁgures, we aggregate
the estimated price gaps for the 285 sectors into 53 sectors. As explained
in Section Three, titled “Data Used,” our estimation of the price gaps
between developed economies and Japan is based on U.S.-Japan price
differentials, and our estimation of the price gaps between developing
economies and Japan is based on China-Japan price differentials.
The two ﬁgures show that in the case of price gaps between domestically produced inputs and inputs imported from developed economies, domestically produced inputs are not always more expensive than
imported inputs. On the contrary, in many sectors, including most of the
machinery sectors, the price level of domestically produced inputs was
lower than the price level of inputs imported from developed economies, both in 2000 and in 2008.
In the case of price gaps between domestically produced inputs
and inputs imported from developing economies, imported inputs are
cheaper than domestically produced inputs in most of the sectors. Moreover, in both 2000 and 2008, the price gap is considerable, not only in
the case of most of the light-industry products (such as apparel and
other textile products, timber and wooden products, and fur skins and
miscellaneous leather products), but also in the case of most machinery
products.
In comparing the price gaps between domestically produced inputs
and inputs imported from developing economies in 2000 and 2008, the
gaps do not seem to have widened in most sectors, although there are
some exceptions such as electronic computing equipment and acces-
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sories as well as semiconductor devices and integrated circuits. In fact,
price gaps narrowed slightly in some sectors, probably because of rapid
increases in wages in China (as well as appreciation of the Chinese
exchange rates).
These results suggest that during this period there was no large offshoring bias caused by a sharp decline in the prices of inputs imported
from developing economies, except in the case of the electrical machinery industry. However, even though prices of imported inputs generally
may not have fallen, it is still possible that there was substantial offshoring bias as a result of the rapid increase of imported inputs at prevailing
price gaps. As seen in Figures 7.2 and 7.3, the share of imports of manufactured products from China, Hong Kong, and other Asian economies in Japan’s total imports increased considerably between 2000 and
2008. Moreover, Figure 7.6 shows that Japan’s imports of machinery
increased not only in the case of ﬁnal goods but also in the case of many
types of parts and components.
To examine whether the rapid rise in imported inputs from developing countries gave rise to offshoring bias, we calculate the extent of
underestimation of intermediate input growth, ln(xjU(2008) / xjO(2008))
− ln(xjU(2000) / xjO(2000)), using our data. By multiplying this value
with −1 and with the average value of the nominal intermediate input–
nominal gross output ratio of a particular sector for 2000 and 2008, we
also calculate the extent of the overestimation of TFP growth for the
period 2000–2008.
Table 7.3 shows the 27 sectors in which the underestimation of
intermediate input growth is largest among all of the 208 mining and
manufacturing sectors other than food processing. Probably reﬂecting
the fact that Japan’s imports of cheap electrical parts and components
from developing economies have increased substantially, the 27 sectors include many electrical machinery sectors such as liquid crystal
elements, personal computers, electronic computing equipment (except
personal computers), and electric measuring instruments. Among the
27 sectors, about half produce machinery.
In many sectors, especially in machinery sectors, offshoring bias
is of a substantial size that cannot be ignored. For example, Table 7.3
shows that the TFP growth rate in liquid crystal elements and in personal computers is overestimated by 5.92 percent and 5.34 percent,
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Table 7.3 Underestimation of Intermediate Input Growth and Total
Factor Productivity Growth from Offshoring Bias: Top 27
Sectors, 2000–2008
Underestimation Intermediate
Overestimation
of intermediate
input/gross
of TFP growth
input growth, output (average
on a gross
ln(xU/xO) (%,
value of 2000 output basis (%,
2000–2008)
and 2008)
2000–2008)
Sector
A
B
A×B
Tatami (straw matting) and straw
−15.47
0.738
11.41
products
Nuclear fuels
−13.14
0.551
7.24
Toys and games
−9.92
0.700
6.95
Pumps and compressors
−8.90
0.644
5.73
Rayon and acetate
−8.84
0.678
6.00
Other nonmetallic ores
−8.55
0.578
4.94
Liquid crystal element
−8.21
0.721
5.92
Metallic ores
−7.78
0.465
3.62
Salt
−7.10
0.535
3.80
Repair of aircraft
−6.87
0.674
4.63
Pulp
−6.87
0.858
5.90
Food processing machinery and
−6.85
0.582
3.98
equipment
Sheet glass and safety glass
−6.72
0.582
3.91
Personal computers
−6.56
0.814
5.34
Paperboard
−6.36
0.722
4.59
Other nonferrous metal products
−6.29
0.706
4.44
Electronic computing equipment
−6.25
0.748
4.68
(except personal computers)
Electric measuring instruments
−6.24
0.660
4.12
Other ofﬁce machines
−6.13
0.737
4.52
Coal mining, crude petroleum,
−5.84
0.428
2.50
and natural gas
Boilers
−5.66
0.575
3.25
Textile machinery
−5.46
0.594
3.24
Machinists’ precision tools
−5.44
0.540
2.93
Bearings
−5.40
0.596
3.22
Other structural clay products
−4.87
0.537
2.62
Chemical machinery
−4.77
0.574
2.74
Other wooden products
−4.75
0.547
2.60
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 7.6 Japan’s Imports of Machinery from Developing Economies:
2000 and 2008 (billions of yen)
Precision instruments
Other transportation machines

2000

Motor vehicle parts and accessories

2008

Other cars
Passenger motorcars
Other electronic components
Semiconductor devices and integrated circuits
Electronic computing equipment and accessory equipment
Household electronics equipment
Household electric appliances
Other electrical equipment
Applied electronic equipment and electric measuring instruments
Electrical devices and parts
Machinery for office and service industry
Other general machines
Special industrial machinery
General industrial machinery

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

SOURCE: Trade Statistics of Japan, published by the Ministry of Finance.

respectively (the annual rate in log value is 0.74 percent and 0.67 percent, respectively).
We should note that the biases shown in Table 7.3 contain both
biases caused by the import proportionality assumption and biases
caused by gaps in the absolute price levels between imported products and domestically produced products. It is probably for this reason
that many electrical machinery sectors such as liquid crystal elements,
personal computers, electronic computing equipment (except personal
computers), and electric measuring instruments appear in both Tables
7.1 and 7.3.
Comparing Tables 7.1 and 7.3, we also ﬁnd that the biases in Table
7.3 tend to be much larger than those in Table 7.1, although the period
covered by Table 7.3 is ﬁve years shorter than the period covered by
Table 7.1. The minimum value of the bias in TFP growth in Table 7.3 is
3.04 percent (for leather and fur skins), which is much larger than the
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minimum value of the bias in TFP growth in Table 7.1, 0.70 percent
(for cameras). It seems that biases caused by gaps in the absolute price
levels between imported products and domestically produced products
are a more serious problem than biases caused by the import proportionality assumptions.
In the case of the overestimation of intermediate input growth, such
overestimation occurred in only 29 out of the 208 mining and manufacturing sectors other than food processing. In other words, in 179 sectors,
intermediate inputs were underestimated. Among the 29 overestimated
sectors, only ﬁve sectors produce machinery. We also ﬁnd that in many
sectors the magnitude (absolute value) of the underestimation of TFP
growth caused by offshoring bias is smaller than the magnitude (absolute value) of the overestimation of TFP growth caused by offshoring
bias, which is reported in Online Appendix Table 7A.3.
As pointed out in Section Two, biases caused by the import proportionality assumption have zero-sum characteristics. In some sectors, the
imports–total demand ratio is higher than the economy-wide average,
while in others, the ratio is lower. Therefore, these biases will tend to
cancel each other out when we calculate macro-level TFP growth.
However, offshoring biases do not have such zero-sum characteristics. If a majority of sectors shift their sourcing from high-cost domestic suppliers to low-cost foreign suppliers, then the TFP growth of all
these sectors will be overestimated, and the TFP growth of the economy
as a whole will also be overestimated. Table 7.3 and Online Appendix
Table 7A.3 show that TFP growth was overestimated in 179 out of the
208 mining and manufacturing sectors during the period 2000–2008.
It therefore seems likely that the TFP growth of Japan’s economy as a
whole during this period may also have been overestimated.

CONCLUSION
Using import tables and other data from Japan’s input-output tables
for 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2008, we estimated how much and in what
direction the intermediate input index and TFP growth will be biased
if we assume that an industry’s imports of each input, relative to the
total demand for the input, are the same as the economy-wide imports
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relative to total demand. We also examined offshoring bias, which concerns the price gap between domestically produced inputs and imported
inputs. For this analysis, we used the Survey on Foreign and Domestic
Price Differentials for Industrial Intermediate Input (METI 1999) in
addition to I-O tables.
Our main ﬁndings are listed in the following 10 points:
1) Our theoretical analysis shows that the bias caused by the
import proportionality assumption will be large if imports of
each input, relative to the total demand for it, are quite different
across sectors and changes in the relative prices of imports and
domestic products are large.
2) Japan experienced a 40 percent decline in the ratio of the average price of imported inputs over the average price of domestically produced inputs in the period 1995–2008. This decline
was not caused by yen appreciation, since the value of the yen
as measured by the real effective exchange rate in fact fell by
more than 50 percent during the same period. Rather, a likely
reason for the decline in relative import prices is the increase in
Japan’s imports of low-priced products from Asian countries.
3) The import price–domestic price ratio of many commodities,
including important parts and components, declined sharply
during the period 1995–2008.
4) We examined how the share of imported inputs in total inputs
differs across sectors, focusing on the cases of integrated circuits and semiconductor devices. We found that for both types
of input, the import ratio tends to be high in the electrical
machinery sectors. Moreover, the ratio is relatively low in other
sectors such as automobiles and precision machinery.
5) We found that the bias caused by the import proportionality
assumption is quite large in some sectors. For example, in animal oils and fats, ordnance, aircraft, liquid crystal elements,
methane derivatives, organic fertilizers not elsewhere classiﬁed, video recording and playback equipment, thermo-setting
resins, salt, bicycles, turbines, glass ﬁber and glass ﬁber products not elsewhere classiﬁed, integrated circuits, and processed
meat products, the negative bias of intermediate input growth
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caused by the import proportionality assumption is more than
2.6 percent, and the positive offshoring bias of TFP growth is
more than 1.7 percent.
6) On the other hand, in cellular phones, radio and television sets,
coal products, other nonferrous metal products, repair of aircraft, and photographic and optical instruments, the positive
offshoring bias of intermediate input growth is more than 3.2
percent, and the negative offshoring bias of TFP growth is more
than 1.9 percent.
7) Next, we estimated offshoring biases caused by the price gap
between domestically produced inputs and imported inputs and
the substitution of intermediate inputs from expensive domestic products to cheap foreign products. In the case of price gaps
between domestically produced inputs and inputs imported
from developing economies, imported inputs are cheaper than
domestically produced inputs in most sectors. Moreover, in
both 2000 and 2008, the price gap was relatively large not only
in the case of most light industry products, such as apparel and
other textile products, timber and wooden products, and fur
skins and miscellaneous leather products, but also in the case
of most machinery products.
8) In the 2000s, Japan’s imports of machinery from developing
economies increased not only in the case of ﬁnal goods but also
in the case of many types of parts and components. As a result
of the rapid increase of imported inputs at prevailing price gaps,
in many sectors, especially in machinery sectors, a substantial
offshoring bias arose that cannot be ignored. For example, the
TFP growth rates for the liquid crystal elements and personal
computers sectors are overestimated by 5.92 percent and 5.34
percent, respectively. (The annual rates in log value were 0.74
percent and 0.67 percent.)
9) Reﬂecting the fact that Japan’s imports of cheap electrical parts
and components from developing economies increased substantially, the 50 sectors in which the underestimation of intermediate input growth is largest include many electrical machinery sectors such as liquid crystal elements, personal computers,
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electronic computing equipment (except personal computers),
and electric measuring instruments.
10) Biases caused by the import proportionality assumption have
zero-sum characteristics. In some sectors, the imports-total
demand ratio is higher than the economy-wide average, while
in others, the ratio is lower. Therefore, these biases will tend
to cancel each other out when we calculate macro-level TFP
growth. In contrast, offshoring biases do not have such zerosum characteristics. If most sectors shifted their sourcing from
high-cost domestic suppliers to low-cost foreign suppliers, then
the TFP growth of these sectors would be overestimated. In this
case, the TFP growth of the economy as a whole would also
be overestimated. We found that during the period 2000–2008
TFP growth was overestimated as a result of offshoring bias in
179 out of the 208 mining and manufacturing sectors we examined. Consequently, Japan’s TFP growth at macro-level during
this period may also be overestimated.
One of the key ﬁndings is that there are relatively large biases due to
offshoring in a substantial number of manufacturing sectors, including
important machinery sectors. This means that the issue of biases from
offshoring should be taken into account in future productivity analyses at the sectoral and ﬁrm levels. Moreover, since offshoring activities
are likely to continue increasing, data collection by statistical ofﬁces
to grapple with such offshoring biases will be of growing importance.

Notes
This research was conducted as part of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and
Industry’s (RIETI’s) East Asian Industrial Productivity Project. We would also like to
express our thanks for ﬁnancial support from the Global Centers of Excellence program
Research Unit for Statistical and Empirical Analysis in Social Sciences (G-COE HiStat), Hitotsubashi University.
1. A good discussion of these types of biases is provided in the next chapter, Chapter 8.
2. For ease of presentation, it is assumed here that each sector produces one product,
so subscript i is used to refer to both sectors and products.
3. Our quantity indexes are based on the Laspeyres formula for years after the base
year T and on the Paasche formula for years before T.
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4. In 2013, this survey became one of Japan’s General Statistics and is now called the
Survey on Input-Output Structure (Survey on Sale Destination of Import Goods).
5. The online appendix, containing Appendix Tables 7A.1, 7A.2, and 7A.3
and Appendix Figures 7A.1 and 7A.2, can be found at http://www.upjohn
.org/MEG/Ch7appendix.pdf.
6. In the case of the 2000 survey, the survey investigates absolute price levels in each
country’s currency during the period September–November 2000 and converts
these prices into prices in Japanese yen using average market exchange rates during the survey period. The exchange rates were 108.00 yen to the U.S. dollar and
13.05 yen to the Chinese yuan. In the case of the 2008 survey, the survey period
was July–September 2008, and the exchange rates were 107.60 yen to the U.S.
dollar and 15.74 yen to the Chinese yuan.
7. As already explained, we obtain deﬂators for imports and domestic output separately for each sector i from the 1995-2000-2005 Linked Input-Output Tables published by the Statistics Bureau, MIAC, and the 2008 Updated Input-Output Tables.
In these I-O tables, the major original sources for deﬂators for commodities are the
Domestic Corporate Goods Price Index (DCGPI) and the Import Price Index (IPI),
both taken from the Corporate Goods Price Index, published by the Bank of Japan.
When the Bank of Japan compiles the IPI, it speciﬁes each commodity in great
detail and tracks price changes of the same commodity from the same country of
origin. Therefore, a shift of imports from high-price countries to low-price countries will not affect the IPI and the deﬂators of the I-O tables. However, in the case
of some imported raw materials and manufactured products, for which IPI data are
not available, the I-O tables use the unit price of imports as deﬂators. In the case of
these products, a shift of imports from high-price countries to low-price countries
will reduce the deﬂators in the I-O tables. Therefore, the decline in relative import
prices in Figure 7.1 reﬂects not only the decline of output prices in countries of
origin but also the increase in Japan’s imports of low-priced products from Asian
countries. We should also note that in the case of these products, for which unit
prices from the trade statistics are used as import deﬂators, Equation (7.10) does
not strictly hold. When the unit prices of imports decline because of a shift from
high-cost exporters to low-cost exporters, there is a risk that Equations (7.11) and
(7.12) will overestimate the price decline in exporting countries.
8. The reason that we focus on the period up to 2005 and not up to 2008 here is that
we had to estimate the table on imports for 2008; we therefore think that the table
on imports for 2005 is more reliable.
9. The reason that we are focusing only on 208 and not 285 industries is as follows:
As explained in Section Three, titled “Data Used,” the endogenous table we use
is not symmetric. The table for each year has 514 rows and 401 columns. Out of
the 514 rows, 285 are for mining and manufacturing sectors other than food processing. We prepared our special data on prices and imported intermediate inputs
by country of origin and other categories for these 285 row sectors. Out of the
401 columns, 208 are for mining and the manufacturing sectors other than food
processing. We calculated biases of intermediate inputs and TFP growth for these
208 column sectors.
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The increased role of international trade in U.S. economic activity is evident in the headline gross domestic product (GDP) statistics.
Between 1948 and 1965, the value of imports of goods and services
relative to gross domestic product held steady at about 4 percent. By
the end of the 1970s this ratio had grown to close to 10 percent, and it
remained at about 10 percent through the end of the 1980s. Between
1990 and 2000, imports relative to GDP increased to nearly 15 percent,
and they peaked at 17.9 percent of GDP in 2008. During the events
surrounding the ﬁnancial crisis in 2009 and 2010, imports fell relative
to GDP, but the value of imported goods and services relative to GDP
bounced back to 17.6 percent of GDP in 2011.
While the trend of increased reliance on imports within the U.S.
economy is clear, the uses of these imports within the economy are
subsumed in the aggregate data. Given the published level of detail in
the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs), which measure
GDP from the expenditure side, it is difﬁcult to analyze major questions about the economic impact of increased imports on the economy.
More importantly, it is not possible to quantify how imports are used
by industries in their production processes, and how these substitutions affect the economy as a whole. The most-often-studied economic
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impacts are the effects of increased globalization on U.S. labor markets
and industry competitiveness.
The economic impact of imports depends on how the imports are
used. For example, a particular import could be made for any of three
purposes: 1) for direct consumption by households, 2) for a select group
of industries as an intermediate input, or 3) for a broad set of industries
as a substitute for goods that are already produced domestically. While
each of these scenarios has ramiﬁcations for the production and labormarket decisions of U.S. producers, as well as for U.S. industry competitiveness, the implications across the economy may be signiﬁcantly
different. In one case, an import may be a close substitute for a good that
is used by only one industry. In this case, not only are the U.S.-based
suppliers of the competitive good affected, but the suppliers to the original domestic producers are affected as well, through reduced demand
for their production of intermediate goods. In another case, an import
may be a substitute for a good that is produced by only one industry. In
this case, the production of the industry itself is affected, as are all of
the suppliers that sell to the producing industry, and all of the industries
that produce similar products and face new competition. Thus, analyzing the overall impact of imports on the U.S. economy requires a set of
transaction data that accounts for interindustry linkages.
Empirical research on the effects of increasing imports on the U.S.
economy has focused both on the broad economic impact of increased
trade and on the industry-speciﬁc effects. A large body of research has
examined the impact of increased trade on wages in the United States.
For example, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) argue that, depending on
the speciﬁcation, outsourcing accounted for between 15 and 40 percent of the increase in the nonproduction-to-production relative wage
rate between 1979 and 1990. Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) argue that
international trade did not play a major role in the slow growth of real
hourly compensation in the United States between 1973 and 1991, but
Haskel et al. (2012) conclude that the effects of globalization on the
labor market became more important in the early 1990s. Eldridge and
Harper (2012) econometrically estimate the impact of imports on production processes in the manufacturing sector, while Kurz and Lengermann (2008) and Yuskavage, Strassner, and Medeiros (2008) analyze
the contribution of offshoring to economic growth in the United States.
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Analyzing the effects of imports across industries on the economy requires data on the use of imports by industry and by type of
import. Houseman et al. (2011) argue that measurement issues related
to imports result in an overstatement of growth in the ofﬁcial statistics
on value-added and productivity growth in the manufacturing sector, a
conclusion that may also have implications for economic research that
relies on this type of data.
Two major issues related to assembling the data necessary to analyze the effects of increasing imports on the U.S. economy are that
1) imports used by industry and categorized by detailed type of import
are not available at the necessary level of detail in the source data, and
2) shifts to lower-cost suppliers of imports are not captured in the price
data, according to Houseman et al. (2011).
These two data issues are directly related to a primary objective of
the Industry Directorate at the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Two major functions of the directorate are the production of estimates
of 1) value-added growth by industry and 2) industry value-added contributions to aggregate growth; the directorate also estimates price and
quantity inputs used by industry. When an import, at the level of detail
in which the accounts are constructed, cannot be treated as a perfect
substitute for the domestically produced good, either because of a lower
price for the same good or because of quality or compositional differences, the estimation of real value-added at the industry level requires
estimates of the value of imports used by industry by type of import, as
well as estimates of each import’s respective price.
As the body of research on the economic impact of globalization
grows, these measurement issues have come to the forefront. Feenstra
and Romalis (2012) construct a trade model that incorporates product
quality and produces a quality-adjusted set of import and export prices
to be used in the new generation of the Penn World Table. In Chapter 4
of this volume, Bridgman analyzes how to adjust import prices for quality differences in the presence of ﬁxed market entry costs. Motivated by
Houseman et al. (2011), Inklaar, in Chapter 6 of this volume, estimates
the impact of import sourcing bias on 38 major economies over the
1995–2008 period.
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the role of imports in
current measurement practices at the BEA in constructing estimates of
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value-added growth by industry. We compare these baseline accounts to
alternative estimates that differ in their approach to estimating imported
goods purchased as intermediate inputs. In particular, using broad economic categories (BEC), we employ a two-step approach to produce an
alternative industry import-use matrix that underlies the estimates of the
quantity index of intermediate inputs used across industries in the U.S.
economy between 1998 and 2011. We also examine the import price
data and, based on Inklaar (see Chapter 6), analyze an alternative price
covering 2002–2011 that treats switches in sourcing between exporting countries as switches to goods with different prices, as opposed to
switches to a heterogeneous good. In contrast to Inklaar, we present
results at the industry level.
Overall, we frame the analysis in the context of an industry-level
production account that provides the sources of U.S. economic growth
across industries, factors of production, and multifactor productivity.
Our approach focuses on the measurement of imported goods, but it
also analyzes the impact on all industries within the economy that purchase these goods. We use the industry production account and growth
accounting techniques to compare the baseline case of current practice
to three alternatives: 1) an alternative import-use matrix for 1998–2011,
2) an alternative set of import prices for 2002–2011, and 3) both the
alternative import-use matrix and the alternative set of import prices for
2002–2011.
Our major ﬁndings are as follows:
•

Compared to the standard import proportionality assumption, the use of broad economic categories to allocate imports
to intermediate inputs produces noticeably different distributions for many commodities, but this does not translate to signiﬁcantly different import shares of intermediate inputs across
most industries.

•

The alternative assumptions we consider on import use and
import prices have only a small impact on measures of aggregate real value-added and multifactor productivity growth.
Over the 1998–2011 period, value-added grew by 1.87 percent
a year in the baseline and by 1.87 percent a year based on the
alternative import allocation. For the 2002–2011 period, aggregate value-added increased by 1.38 percent a year in the base-
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line compared with a range of between 1.34 and 1.37 percent
under the alternatives. Over the same period, multifactor productivity (MFP) increased by 0.42 percent a year in the baseline compared with a range of between 0.38 and 0.41 percent a
year under the alternatives.
•

The impact on real value-added and MFP for the manufacturing sector is also small: over the 2002–2011 period, manufacturing contributed 0.22 percentage points a year to aggregate
value-added growth in the baseline, compared with a range
of between 0.20 and 0.21 percentage points a year under the
alternatives.

•

For manufacturing excluding “Computer and electronic products,” value-added growth was −0.13 percent a year between
2002 and 2011 in the baseline and ranged from −0.21 to −0.16
percent a year under the alternatives.

The chapter proceeds along the following outline: In Section Two,
“The BEA Industry Accounts and the Role of Imports,” we provide
an overview of the current measurement practices in the BEA industry accounts, including the approach to accounting for imports across
industries and their prices. In Section Three, “Alternative Import Allocation Using Broad Economic Catagories,” we discuss our alternative
import-use matrix, while in Section Four, “Import Prices and CountryPooled Import Prices,” we discuss the alternative set of import prices.
Section Five, “Value-Added and Productivity under Alternative Import
Assumptions,” gives our results for the sources of U.S. economic
growth under the baseline and alternative assumptions, and Section Six
presents the conclusion.

THE BEA INDUSTRY ACCOUNTS AND THE ROLE
OF IMPORTS
A major objective of the Industry Directorate at the Bureau of Economic Analysis is the production both of estimates of gross domestic
product by industry and of estimates of contributions of industry GDP
to aggregate GDP growth.1 These measures of value-added by indus-
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try, which are published at the 65-sector level, require nominal values,
prices, and quantities of industry output and intermediate input over
time that are consistent with GDP measured from the expenditure side
as part of the NIPAs. Real value-added is calculated using the double deﬂation method, so that real value-added growth is the difference
between the growth rate of industry output, deﬂated by the appropriate output deﬂator, and the growth rate of industry input, deﬂated by
an industry input deﬂator that reﬂects the heterogeneity of the input
use of the industry. Mayerhauser and Strassner (2010) provide a complete description of the methodology used to construct the time series
of industry accounts.
The starting point for the published time series of industry accounts
is the benchmark input-output account produced approximately every
ﬁve years. The most recent published version covers the year 2002 and
is described by Stewart, Stone, and Streitwieser (2007). This account,
while published at about the 550-industry level, is constructed at about
the 900-industry level and the 5,000 “item,” or product, level, and relies
heavily on data tabulated by the Census Bureau from the quinquennial
Economic Census.
As imports to the U.S. economy continue to grow, the treatment
of import measurement in the GDP by industry accounts has garnered
attention. For example, Houseman et al. (2011) argue that the current
treatment of import prices may lead to an offshoring bias in estimates
of industry value-added, especially for industries concentrated in the
manufacturing sector.
Conceptually, imports are treated as heterogeneous items and distinct from domestically produced items in order to allow for price differences between foreign and domestically produced goods that are purchased as intermediate inputs. That is, at the item level, the import and
the domestic commodity are treated as differentiated goods, whether
because of the cost of the item, the quality of the item, or the composition of goods within the item category; thus, imports are allowed to have
prices that differ from the domestically produced item. An important
measurement difﬁculty is that the value of imports by item by industry
is not measured directly.
The BEA uses the import proportionality, or comparability, assumption to allocate the value of imports by item by industry. This approach
is discussed in Mayerhauser and Strassner (2010); Moyer, Reinsdorf,
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and Yuskavage (2006); Strassner, Yuskavage, and Lee (2010); and
Yuskavage, Strassner, and Medeiros (2008, 2009). The proportionality
method assumes that each industry that purchases an item for intermediate use purchases an amount from a foreign supplier that is in the
same proportion as the ratio of imports to domestic supply for that item.
In other words, the imported portion of intermediate inputs by industry
is homogenous at the item level for each industry that purchases that
particular item. This homogeneity is imposed only at the 900-industryby-5,000-item level, not at higher levels of aggregation.
It is worth noting a couple of aspects of the treatment of imports in
calculating GDP by industry. First, the import proportionality assumption does not affect the estimates of nominal value-added by industry.
This is because the import proportionality assumption does not determine the level of use of an item by an industry; it only determines the
share of an item used by an industry that belongs to imported intermediate use, for the purpose of deﬂating intermediate use by the appropriate
price index in constructing real value-added. Second, if at the item level
domestically produced and imported goods are assumed to be homogeneous, or perfect substitutes, import and domestic prices change at the
same rate, and there is no need for a separate treatment of imports in
calculating real value-added growth.
The allocation of intermediate inputs to domestic versus foreign
sources allows the BEA to incorporate the full suite of price statistics
available within the U.S. economic statistical system. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics’ (BLS) producer price indexes are the primary source
used to deﬂate the domestic portion of intermediate inputs. These prices
are the same as those used to deﬂate the commodity composition of
gross output by industry. In other words, each industry that purchases a
domestic item pays the same price for that item. Table F in Washington
et al. (2012) provides the principal sources of data used to deﬂate gross
output by industry and the domestic portion of intermediate inputs by
item. BLS import price indexes (MPI) are used to deﬂate the imported
portion of intermediate inputs by item, also with the assumption that
each industry that purchases imported inputs pays the same price for the
imported intermediate input. Both the Producer Price Indexes (PPIs)
and the MPIs are used at their most detailed levels available: PPIs range
mostly from four- to seven-digit detail; NAICS MPIs are more aggregated—typically these indexes are available only for two- to four-digit
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detail. To deﬂate a small subset of items, the BEA uses prices from the
National Income and Wealth Division at the BEA.

ALTERNATIVE IMPORT ALLOCATION USING BROAD
ECONOMIC CATEGORIES
Our alternative approach to allocating commodity imports across
industries is motivated by the World Input-Output Database (WIOD)
method of Timmer (2012). The WIOD approach deviates from the
import proportionality assumption by ﬁrst assigning imports to one of
three BECs: 1) intermediates, 2) ﬁnal consumption, or 3) investment.
The second step is to proportionally allocate imported intermediate
inputs across industries after this initial split has been applied. It is
worth noting that this approach is purely an alternative allocation, and
no new data are used to give additional detail on actual use of different
types of imports by industry.2
For the ﬁrst step in this exercise, our objective is to construct a
share for each imported item in the BEA industry accounts that reﬂects
its broad economic classiﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, for each imported item
in the BEA industry accounts and each year, we estimate the share of the
item that is sold to intermediates, consumption, and investment based
on a concordance between harmonization codes and BEC categories.
Our objective is not to construct new estimates of trade ﬂows but to
reallocate current estimates of trade ﬂows. This preserves consistency
with the NIPA trade data. Once we have item-level BEC shares, we
apply these shares to estimate the value of each item sold to intermediate input. The second step is to allocate this total value of imported
intermediate input across industries.
We use the concordance between the harmonized trade data and
broad economic categories that is published by the United Nations
to do the initial allocation of imports to the three broad groups.3 The
harmonized trade data are at the 10-digit level, while the harmonization code for BEC concordance is at the six-digit level. Because of the
different levels of detail, we ﬁrst assume that for each of the six-digit
commodities in the harmonization code to BEC mapping, the 10-digit
components have the same broad economic category.4 This gives us
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the value of imported goods by broad economic classiﬁcation at the
10-digit level for all of the components of the harmonized trade data.5
To go from the 10-digit harmonized data by broad economic classiﬁcation to the BEA’s item-level detail, we apply the Industry Directorate’s
mapping between harmonization codes and items to get the value of
items by broad economic classiﬁcation, based on the harmonized trade
data.6 We use these import values by item and broad economic category to construct the share, by BEA item, that was sold to intermediate input. We apply this value share to the current estimates of imports
by item in the BEA industry accounts to derive an alternative value of
imports that were sold to intermediate use. Finally, we allocate this total
imported intermediate proportionally by item across industries to yield
the import-use matrix. Because the harmonized trade data cover mostly
goods, we exclude any adjustments to nongoods items. We apply the
above methodology for years 1998–2011 so that the results are consistent with the GDP-by-industry estimates published in November 2012.
For the sake of clarity, the following nine steps enumerate how we construct our alternative import-use table:
1) Compile concordances between the six-digit harmonization
code trade data and the United Nations–based broad economic
categories covering 1998–2011.
2) Construct a map from 10-digit harmonization data to six-digit
harmonization codes.
3) Aggregate the 10-digit harmonization trade data on imports to
the six-digit level.
4) Apply the six-digit harmonization code to the BEC concordance to get estimates at the six-digit level of the values sold
in the intermediate, ﬁnal consumption, investment, or undetermined categories.7
5) Assume that the allocation for the 10-digit components of the
harmonization code data is the same as for the 6-digit allocation to obtain values sold in the intermediate, ﬁnal consumption, investment, or undetermined categories at the 10-digit
harmonization level.
6) Allocate the 10-digit values to BEA item codes using the existing internal BEA mapping. Note that a 10-digit code may apply
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to multiple items, and a single item may be made up of multiple
10-digit coded values.
7) Based on the results from Step 6, construct the share of each
BEA item that was sold to intermediate input.
8) Use the baseline item-level import data as a control and distribute the value that was sold to intermediate input using the
shares of values calculated in Step 7.
9) Allocate imports across industries.
•

For items that have a portion that goes to intermediate input
according to UN Comtrade, allocate items across industries
using the proportionality assumption. This is the two-step
approach of Timmer (2012).

•

For items that have an undetermined allocation, revert to
the standard proportionality assumption.

•

For items that have a BEC coding of “capital good,” revert
to the standard proportionality assumption.8

The impact of the BEC allocation of imports on estimates of GDP
by industry depends on three basic elements. The ﬁrst is that the value
of trade by item that belongs to intermediate input based on the BEC
allocation must be different from that based on the baseline import proportionality assumption. A different allocation of imports translates to a
different nominal value of imported goods used by industries that buy
a particular item. Second, the price of imported items must differ from
prices paid for domestic goods. And third, the value share of imports
used in production within an industry must be signiﬁcantly different
under the BEC allocation. The third condition is important, because
while the BEC allocation may produce a different allocation of inputs
for a particular item, if the value share of total imports in a particular
industry’s production is relatively unchanged as a result of the new allocation across all commodities used by the industry, the BEC-based allocation will have very little impact on estimates of value-added growth
by industry.
Table 8.1 compares the share of imports allocated to intermediate
input by commodity based on the alternative import allocation to the
baseline approach of applying the import proportionality assumption.
The level of aggregation corresponds to that published in the annual
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input-output accounts, although, as described above, the import allocations are estimated at the item level. Differences in estimated allocations have the potential to affect estimates of value-added growth for
any industry that purchases that particular commodity. The difference
in allocations between the baseline and BEC-based allocation reﬂects
the binary assignment of an import to either an intermediate or ﬁnal
demand in the BEC mapping; it also reﬂects the item-level component
allocations from the import proportionality assumption. For example,
Table 8.1 Share of Imports Allocated to Intermediate Inputs by
Commodity, 2007
Difference
BEC-based (absolute
Baseline allocation
value)
Forestry, ﬁshing, and related activities
0.85
0.24
0.61
Utilities
0.45
1.00
0.55
Food and beverage and tobacco products
0.48
0.13
0.35
Textile mills and textile product mills
0.53
0.37
0.16
Publishing industries (includes software)
0.15
0.02
0.14
Chemical products
0.51
0.64
0.14
Miscellaneous manufacturing
0.16
0.28
0.12
Plastics and rubber products
0.72
0.83
0.11
Printing and related support activities
0.82
0.72
0.11
Farms
0.56
0.48
0.08
Apparel and leather and allied products
0.10
0.02
0.08
Electrical equipment, appliances, and
0.55
0.61
0.06
components
Machinery
0.42
0.48
0.06
Furniture and related products
0.15
0.10
0.04
Computer and electronic products
0.36
0.39
0.03
Fabricated metal products
0.82
0.84
0.03
Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers,
0.31
0.33
0.02
and parts
Other transportation equipment
0.51
0.52
0.01
Paper products
0.93
0.92
0.01
Mining, except oil and gas
0.99
1.00
0.01
Wood products
0.92
0.93
0.01
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and authors’ calculations.
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within the “Forestry, ﬁshing, and related activities” commodity, the
BEC-based approach allocated 98 percent of commercial ﬁshing to
ﬁnal demand, while the baseline allocated 20 percent.
The largest differences in import allocation are for the “Forestry,
ﬁshing, and related activities” commodity and the “Utilities” commodity, for each of which the share of imports allocated to intermediate inputs differs by more than 50 percentage points. The next largest
difference is for “Food and beverage products,” where the item-level
import proportionality assumption allocated 48 percent to intermediate purchases, while the BEC approach allocated only 13 percent, a
difference of 35 percentage points. Next, there are differences in allocations of between 10 and 16 percentage points for the following categories: “Textile mills and textile product mills,” “Publishing industries
(includes software),” “Chemical products,” “Petroleum and coal products,” “Miscellaneous manufacturing,” “Plastics and rubber products,”
and “Printing and related support activities.” Allocation differences of
between 5 and 10 percentage points exist for “Farms,” “Apparel and
leather and allied products,” “Electrical equipment appliances and components,” and “Machinery.” The remainder of the commodities show
minor differences or none at all in import allocation. Recall that we
restrict our alternative import data to only goods.
While there are some large differences in import allocations across
intermediate and ﬁnal use, the impact of the alternative allocations
depends on the particular imports by an industry and on the value of
imported goods relative to the use of goods produced domestically. For
example, if an industry relies heavily on chemical products relative to
all other inputs, a change in the estimated share of imported goods used
in production has the potential to have a signiﬁcant impact on estimates
of the growth of that industry’s intermediate input, and thus on that
industry’s value-added growth. Table 8.2 gives the share of imported
intermediate inputs relative to total intermediate inputs based on the
baseline and the BEC allocations. Based on the baseline allocation, 15
percent of the inputs in “Miscellaneous manufacturing” are imported,
while according to the BEC mapping, 26 percent are imported. The
“Food services and drinking places” category differs by 5 percentage points across allocations, and “Ambulatory health care services,”
“Food and beverage and tobacco products,” and “Nonmetallic mineral
products” all differ by 4 percentage points. The alternative allocation
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Table 8.2 Share of Imports in Total Industry Intermediate Use, 2007
Difference
BEC-based (absolute
Baseline allocation value)
Miscellaneous manufacturing
0.15
0.26
0.11
Food services and drinking places
0.09
0.04
0.05
Ambulatory health care services
0.08
0.12
0.04
Food and beverage and tobacco products
0.10
0.06
0.04
Nonmetallic mineral products
0.10
0.14
0.04
Computer and electronic products
0.23
0.26
0.03
Furniture and related products
0.19
0.17
0.03
Social assistance
0.06
0.04
0.02
Printing and related support activities
0.12
0.10
0.02
Other transportation equipment
0.19
0.21
0.02
Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts
0.23
0.25
0.02
Mining, except oil and gas
0.09
0.11
0.02
Federal general government
0.14
0.15
0.01
Amusements, gambling, and recreation industries
0.06
0.05
0.01
Wholesale trade
0.08
0.09
0.01
Accommodation
0.06
0.05
0.01
Textile mills and textile product mills
0.17
0.16
0.01
Machinery
0.19
0.19
0.01
State and local general government
0.08
0.08
0.01
Educational services
0.05
0.04
0.01
Electrical equipment, appliances, and components
0.20
0.21
0.01
Forestry, ﬁshing, and related activities
0.12
0.13
0.01
State and local government enterprises
0.07
0.08
0.01
Chemical products
0.15
0.16
0.01
Hospitals and nursing and residential care facilities
0.06
0.07
0.01
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and authors’ calculations.

made very little or no difference for the remainder of the industries at
the published level.
As mentioned above, for the allocation of imports based on BECs
to produce different estimates of value-added growth by industry,
the price of imported goods must be different from the price used to
deﬂate purchases from U.S suppliers. Figure 8.1 plots the item-level
price growth of imported versus domestically produced goods, excluding “Mining except oil and gas” and “Petroleum and coal products,”
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Figure 8.1 Item-Level Price Growth (%), 1998–2011
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NOTE: This ﬁgure plots import price growth by item between 1998 and 2011 versus
domestic price growth for prices used in the industry accounts. Area of marker determined by value of imports in 2007.
SOURCE: BEA GDP by Industry accounts.

weighted by the import values of the individual items relative to other
items in the same aggregated commodity. The ﬁgure indicates that, in
general, there are item-level price differences between imported and
domestic goods. Thus, the allocation of intermediate input between
domestic and foreign is a potentially important element in estimating
value-added growth by industry.
Comparing import and domestic prices at the detailed level limits
compositional effects at higher levels of aggregation. For example, the
price indexes for total imported intermediate materials and total domestic intermediate materials reﬂect the compositional differences in types
of materials that are imported versus purchased from domestic sources.
At the item level, skewness above the 45-degree line would indicate a
disproportionate number of cases where import prices increased rela-
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tive to domestic prices. The data indicate that, at the item level, about
62 percent of the items are assigned import prices that fell relative to
their domestic counterparts over the 1998–2011 period.
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 indicate that the allocation of imports between
ﬁnal demand and intermediate input is noticeably different based on the
BEC coding, but that the import share of inputs is not signiﬁcantly different for most industries under the BEC coding. To estimate the effect
of the BEC allocation on measured value-added growth at the industry
level requires taking into account these effects, in addition to the price
differences between domestic and foreign goods. We do this analysis
below in the context of an industry-level production account covering
1998–2011.

IMPORT PRICES AND COUNTRY-POOLED IMPORT PRICES
Recent literature has argued that the prices used in estimating GDP
by industry may be biased. Speciﬁcally, Houseman et al. (2011) contend
that switches to low-cost providers are excluded from the index number
estimate of the intermediate input price at the time of the switch, leading to an overstatement of the growth in value-added quantity indexes
in manufacturing industries. Inklaar, in Chapter 6 of this volume, argues
that a portion of the bias can be analyzed by assuming that imports
across countries are perfect substitutes. It is worth noting that in our
exercise below, we do not consider the index number problems that
occur when product sourcing is switched between domestic and foreign sources, which is a major focus of Houseman et al. We focus on
switches between foreign suppliers.
We follow the basic approach used in Inklaar (see Chapter 6) to
construct alternative import prices that we refer to as country-pooled
import prices. The rationale for this adjustment is that import source
switches between high-priced and low-priced exporting countries may
not be captured in the ofﬁcial import price data because the same good
from different countries has the potential to be treated as a different
good. Thus, the import price index for an item needs to “link in” the
switch to the new provider, instead of treating the new lower price paid
in the initial year of the switch as a lower price paid for the same good.
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For example, if a low-cost Chinese semiconductor producer enters the
market and an importer switches from Japan to China, treating the semiconductors as homogenous would result in a price index that declines
to reﬂect the price discount. On the other hand, if the semiconductor
from China was treated as heterogeneous, there would be no period
t – 1 price to use to calculate the price decline in the semiconductor
from China, so this observation would, effectively, be dropped from the
estimation of the import price.
We use data from UN Comtrade that include the value ( Vic ) and
quantity ( Qic ) of imports of type by six-digit harmonization codes
from 2002 to 2011 into the United States from Country c.9 Unfortunately, while data exist for earlier years, the relationship between the
Comtrade-based and ofﬁcial prices deteriorates in years prior to 2002.10
We map imports by country by year to the level of detail for which
the BEA has import price information from the BLS and construct two
alternative price indexes for item i.11 The ﬁrst is

 ln pfi   wic  ln pfic ,
c

where pf i is the item-speciﬁc import price, c indexes country, and wic
is the average value share of imports of type i from Country c in periods
t and t − 1, so that pf i is a Törnqvist price index. Assuming that items
are perfect substitutes across countries yields an alternative price for
item i :

 ln pf alt ,i

  Vic 

  ln  c
.
Q
  ic 

 c

The annual adjustment, which we refer to as country-pool adjustment, is deﬁned as  ln Bi   ln pf i   ln pf alt ,i for each imported
item and captures the difference in item-level prices under the two alternative assumptions. We apply this bias adjustment to the baseline import
prices used in the construction of GDP by industry at the item level. The
approach of adding the bias to the baseline prices used in the construction of GDP by industry allows the import prices to maintain the existing adjustments to hold quality ﬁxed. This is particularly important for
information technology goods, which exhibit rapidly changing product characteristics. The relationship between the UN Comtrade–based
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prices and the import prices used in the industry accounts is given in
Figure 8.2.

VALUE-ADDED AND PRODUCTIVITY UNDER
ALTERNATIVE IMPORT ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we analyze how the alternative approaches to imports
affect measured value-added and productivity growth at the industry
and aggregate level. We use an industry-level production account that
includes nominal values, along with prices and quantities for industry
output and inputs. The account used here covers 1998–2011 and is an
updated version of Fleck et al. (2012), which covers the 63 industries
Figure 8.2 Item-Level Price Comparison: Price Growth (%), 2002–2011
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NOTE: This ﬁgure plots growth of the Törnqvist index of UN Comtrade–based prices
by item versus import prices used in the industry accounts. Area of marker determined
by value of imports between 2002 and 2011.
SOURCE: Author calculations, based on BLS import prices and Comtrade data, as
described in text.
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that are published in the BEA’s GDP-by-industry data.12 This section
discusses the pertinent accounting details, but we refer the reader to
Fleck et al. (2012) for detail on the data sources and methods.
Industry-Level Production Account
The fundamental equation for analyzing the industry sources of
growth is the equation deﬁning multifactor productivity (MFP) as the
residual after subtracting from industry output growth (  ln Q j ) the
weighted growth rates of industry capital (  ln QKj ), labor (  ln QLj ),
and intermediate inputs (  ln QXj ):
(8.1)

 ln MFPj   ln Q j  wKj  ln QKj  wLj  ln QLj  wXj  ln QXj

where the weights are the average of period t and t − 1 value shares of
each of the inputs in the value of output, which is the typically used
Törnqvist index of MFP.
To analyze the industry contributions to aggregate value-added
growth, we appeal to the translog production possibility frontier analyzed in Jorgenson et al. (2007):
(8.2)

 lnV   w j  lnV j ,
j

so that aggregate value-added growth  lnV is a translog index over
industry value-added growth rates  lnV j . Because the quantity index
of industry value-added  lnV j is not directly observable, we appeal
to the nominal accounting identity that says the value of gross output
equals nominal value-added plus nominal intermediate input. Differentiating this accounting identity with respect to time and taking a discrete time approximation yields a Törnqvist index for the growth rate
of industry gross output:
(8.3)

 ln Q j  wVj  lnV j  wXj  ln QXj ,

which, solving for  lnV j , yields an estimate of industry value-added
growth. This approach to estimating value-added growth is typically
referred to as the double deﬂation method because it allows for separate
price deﬂators for output and intermediate input.
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To analyze the industry sources of growth at the aggregate level, we
combine Equations (8.1), (8.2), and (8.3) to yield a decomposition of
aggregate value-added growth:
(8.4)

 lnV   w j
j

wK , j
wV , j

 ln QKj  w j

wL, j
wV , j

 ln QLj  w j

1
 ln MFPj
wV , j

which gives aggregate economy value-added growth as the weighted
industry contributions of capital, labor, and MFP to industry output
growth. We deﬁne
(8.5)

 ln MFPAgg   w j
j

1
 ln MFPj
wV , j

and refer to this as aggregate MFP growth.13 We call w j

1
 ln MFPj
wV , j

the industry contribution to aggregate MFP, or Domar-weighted MFP
growth.14 The industry production account framework allows us to analyze contributions of industries and sectors to aggregate growth and
productivity. The aggregate sector classiﬁcation scheme that we use is
based on the classiﬁcation scheme in Jorgenson and Schreyer (2013).
Import Measurement and Growth Accounting
Our analysis of the treatment of imports in the industry accounts
reduces to alternative estimates of QXj , which is the quantity index of
intermediate inputs used by industry. Intuitively, the three reasons why
QXj differs under the alternatives are as follows:
1) With an alternative allocation of imports by broad economic
category, the share of intermediate use by industry by item
that is imported now reﬂects the information available in the
BEC mapping; this division of use by industry by item across
domestically produced and imported items then is deﬂated by
either the domestic or the import price. In other words, under
the alternative, the share of imports is different, and this new
share is deﬂated by the import price index.
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2) The value of imports is deﬂated by an alternative price index,
thus yielding a different quantity.
3) Both an alternative estimate of the value of imports by item by
industry (Reason 1) and an alternative price index (Reason 2)
contribute to yielding a different quantity.
The three treatments of imports lead us to deﬁne alternative estimates of QXj that feed through our exercise by means of Equation (8.1);
the ﬁrst uses the BEC-based allocation, the second uses the countrypooled import prices, and the third uses both the BEC allocation and
the country-pooled price. Based on Equations (8.1) through (8.5), we
deﬁne the alternative estimates of value-added growth and its sources.
Equation (8.3) yields three alternative estimates of value-added growth
by industry:  lnV j , Alt1  lnV j , Alt 3 . Equation (8.1) gives alternative
estimates of MFP growth by industry:  ln MFPj , Alt1  ln MFPj , Alt 3 .
Based on Equation (8.2), there are three alternative estimates of aggregate value-added growth:  lnVAlt1  lnVAlt 3 , while based on Equation (8.5) each alternative estimate of aggregate MFP is due to alternative estimates at the industry level.
Import Treatment and Value-Added Growth Estimates
In this section, we compare the baseline estimates of industry
value-added growth in the United States to estimates based on the alternative treatments of imports.15 Figure 8.3 shows that the BEC allocation of imports produces minor differences in the estimates of valueadded growth by industry over the 1998–2011 period. The effects are
detailed across industries in Table 8.3. As discussed above, the differences between the baseline estimate of value-added growth and the
alternatives are due to alternative estimates of the growth of intermediate inputs by industry. This difference takes into account the alternative
value of imported commodities within an industry and the price difference between domestic and foreign purchases. Between 1998 and 2011,
value-added in “Miscellaneous manufacturing” would have grown 0.3
percentage points a year faster (3.22 percent a year versus 2.89 percent a
year) if estimated with the BEC allocation, while “Food and beverages”
would have grown about 0.2 percentage points a year slower (0.85 percent a year versus 1.06 percent). “Nonmetallic minerals” would be esti-
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Figure 8.3 Measured Value-Added Growth, 1998–2011: Alt1 Less Baseline
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NOTE: Difference in value-added growth under Alt1. See text.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on BEA and BLS data.
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Value-added growth
1998−2011
2002–2011
Baseline Alt1 Baseline Alt1 Alt2
2.12 2.12
1.34 1.34 1.34
3.34 3.33
2.84 2.81 2.83
−3.74
−2.92
6.31
1.36
−2.24
0.22
−3.15
−3.13
−1.18
0.22
17.51
0.80

−3.75
−2.93
6.30
1.36
−2.24
0.22
−3.04
−3.13
−1.18
0.21
17.47
0.79

0.28

−2.45
−4.29
4.75
1.57
−3.54
0.28
−4.11
−4.53
−0.49
2.84
15.41
−0.13

−2.45
−4.30
4.74
1.57
−3.54
0.28
−3.97
−4.52
−0.49
2.82
15.36
−0.14

−2.46
−4.36
4.67
1.57
−3.58
0.27
−4.09
−4.65
−0.50
2.53
15.08
−0.20

Alt3
1.34
2.83

1998–2011
Baseline Alt1
0.95 0.95
2.05 2.03

MFP Growth
2002–2011
Baseline Alt1 Alt2
0.57 0.57 0.57
1.43 1.40 1.42
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Table 8.3 Growth in Industry Value-Added and MFP under Alternatives (%)

Alt3
0.57
1.42

−2.46
−4.38
4.65
1.56
−3.58
0.26
−4.01
−4.64
−0.51
2.51
15.02
−0.23

−2.84
−1.38
1.81
0.28
−1.15
1.21
−0.73
−0.12
−0.06
0.64
8.15
0.96

−2.84
−1.38
1.81
0.28
−1.15
1.20
−0.69
−0.12
−0.06
0.64
8.13
0.95

−3.02
−2.85
−0.15
0.15
−1.28
1.36
−0.76
−0.80
0.11
1.30
8.07
0.43

−3.02
−2.85
−0.16
0.15
−1.28
1.36
−0.71
−0.79
0.11
1.30
8.04
0.42

−3.03
−2.88
−0.19
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0.40
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−0.19
0.14
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−0.82
0.10
1.18
7.88
0.39

0.17

−1.02 −1.15 −1.55 −1.70

0.70

0.68

0.64

0.62

0.55

0.52

0.95 0.92
−2.76 −2.74
2.89 3.22

1.55 1.53 0.93 0.95
−3.37 −3.37 −3.38 −3.38
2.48 3.00 2.48 2.91

0.57
0.08
1.46

0.56
0.09
1.63

0.35
0.37
1.22

0.34
0.37
1.47

0.12
0.36
1.21

0.13
0.36
1.43
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1.06

0.85

1.26

0.90

1.33

0.98

0.19

0.14

0.29

0.20

0.33

0.23

−4.26 −4.26

−4.40 −4.41 −4.62 −4.63

1.33

1.33

1.78

1.78

1.70

1.70

−4.83 −4.77

−4.30 −4.29 −4.39 −4.37

3.37

3.39

4.35

4.35

4.30

4.31

−2.87 −2.87
−0.96 -0.98

−2.58 −2.58 −2.58 −2.58
−1.35 −1.39 −1.39 −1.45

−0.09 −0.09
1.11 1.11

0.05
0.98

0.05
0.97

0.05
0.97

0.05
0.95

1.44 1.44
1.03 1.00
−0.68 −0.69
2.19 2.20
1.41 1.42
3.03 3.03
0.10 0.10
9.00 9.00
1.74 1.74
1.25 1.25

2.24 2.24 2.35 2.34
0.36 0.33 0.51 0.43
−1.00 −1.01 −0.84 −0.84
1.21 1.23 1.20 1.21
0.60 0.61 0.59 0.60
3.42 3.42 3.42 3.42
0.27 0.27 0.23 0.23
17.17 17.17 17.17 17.17
2.20 2.20 2.18 2.18
0.62 0.63 0.62 0.62

0.20 0.20
0.42 0.41
0.24 0.23
0.67 0.68
0.15 0.15
2.18 2.18
0.54 0.54
2.73 2.73
0.68 0.68
−0.71 −0.71

0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38
0.28 0.27 0.33 0.31
0.26 0.26 0.32 0.32
0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13
0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
2.57 2.57 2.57 2.58
0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05
5.21 5.21 5.21 5.21
1.03 1.02 1.02 1.01
−0.89 −0.89 −0.90 −0.90

6.62
1.77

6.63
1.77

5.03
1.92

5.03
1.91

5.05
1.91

5.05
1.91

2.20
1.39

2.20
1.39

1.68
1.67

1.68
1.67

1.69
1.67

1.69
1.67

3.69
2.62

3.69
2.62

4.95
2.30

4.95
2.30

4.94
2.29

4.94
2.29

0.76
0.28

0.76
0.28

1.64
0.91

1.64
0.91

1.64
0.90

1.64
0.90
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Food and beverage and tobacco
products
Textile mills and textile product
mills
Apparel and leather and allied
products
Paper products
Printing and related support
activities
Petroleum and coal products
Chemical products
Plastics and rubber products
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Air transportation
Rail transportation
Water transportation
Truck transportation
Transit and ground passenger
transportation
Pipeline transportation
Other transportation and support
activities
Warehousing and storage
Publishing industries (includes
software)
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Value-added growth
1998−2011
2002–2011
Baseline Alt1 Baseline Alt1 Alt2 Alt3
Motion picture and sound recording 1.18 1.18
0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14
industries
Broadcasting and
5.79 5.79
5.04 5.04 5.01 5.00
telecommunications
Information and data processing
7.16 7.16
4.69 4.69 4.67 4.67
services
Federal Reserve banks, credit
2.99 2.99
0.68 0.68 0.67 0.67
intermediation, and related
activities
Securities, commodity contracts,
5.59 5.59
−0.83 −0.83 −0.83 −0.83
and investments
Insurance carriers and related
1.41 1.41
2.57 2.57 2.57 2.57
activities
Funds, trusts, and other ﬁnancial
4.48 4.48
3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24
vehicles
Real estate
2.28 2.28
2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05
Rental and leasing services and
1.89 1.89
0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
lessors of intangible assets
Legal services
−0.35 −0.35
−1.51 −1.51 −1.51 −1.51
Computer systems design and
6.91 6.91
8.08 8.08 8.05 8.05
related services
Miscellaneous professional
3.11 3.11
2.96 2.96 2.95 2.95
scientiﬁc and technical services

1998–2011
Baseline Alt1
0.59 0.59
1.85

1.85

−0.17 −0.17

MFP Growth
2002–2011
Baseline Alt1 Alt2
0.37 0.37 0.37
2.73

2.72

2.70
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Table 8.3 (continued)

Alt3
0.37
2.70

−0.40 −0.40 −0.41 −0.41

0.45

0.45

−0.23 −0.23 −0.24 −0.24

1.02

1.02

−1.47 −1.47 −1.47 −1.47

−0.51 −0.51
0.04

0.04

0.25 0.25
−1.08 −1.08
−2.28 −2.28
2.02 2.02
0.13

0.13

0.50

0.51

0.51

0.51

−0.29 −0.29 −0.29 −0.29
0.28
0.41

0.28
0.41

0.28
0.41

0.28
0.41

−2.69 −2.69 −2.70 −2.70
3.09 3.09 3.07 3.07
0.22

0.22

0.22

0.21
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Management of companies and
0.27 0.26
enterprises
Administrative and support services 3.06 3.06
Waste management and remediation 2.56 2.56
services
Educational services
1.15 1.15
Ambulatory health care services
3.52 3.47
Hospitals, nursing and residential
1.89 1.85
care facilities
Social assistance
2.99 2.99
Performing arts, spectator sports,
2.28 2.28
museums, and related activities
Amusements, gambling, and
1.25 1.26
recreation industries
Accommodations
1.77 1.76
Food services and drinking places
2.04 2.02
Other services, except government −1.00 −0.99
Federal government
1.03 1.03
State and local government
0.85 0.85

−0.75 −0.77 −0.78 −0.79

−2.28 −2.29

3.23
2.34

3.23
2.33

3.23
2.32

3.23
2.32

0.82
3.35
2.00

0.81
3.28
1.94

0.80
3.30
1.96

0.80
3.14
1.85

2.58
1.53

2.57
1.52

2.58
1.53

2.57
1.53

0.62
0.27

0.61
0.27

2.16

2.17

2.14

2.17

0.10

0.11

1.53 1.52 1.53 1.52
1.57 1.52 1.56 1.51
−0.82 −0.82 −0.82 −0.82
1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34
0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35

1.23
0.90

1.23
0.90

−1.26 −1.25
0.36 0.32
−0.17 −0.19

0.19 0.19
0.64 0.63
−1.15 −1.14
0.20 0.20
−0.38 −0.38

−3.58 −3.59 −3.60 −3.61
1.83
0.80

1.83
0.80

1.83
0.79

1.83
0.79

−1.11 −1.11 −1.12 −1.12
0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.11
0.00 −0.04 −0.02 −0.09
0.90 0.89 0.90 0.89
−0.24 −0.24 −0.24 −0.24
1.39

1.40

1.38

1.40

0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05
0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50
−0.73 −0.73 −0.73 −0.73
0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
−0.35 −0.35 −0.35 −0.35

NOTE: Alt.1 uses the alternative import allocation based on the BEC. Alt. 2 uses the alternative set of import prices. Alt. 3 uses both the
alternative allocation and the alternative import prices.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on BEA and BLS data.
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mated to decline by 3.04 percent a year instead of 3.15 percent a year,
while “Motor vehicles” would have grown at 0.17 percent a year versus
0.28 percent. The other of the 63 industries all exhibited percentagepoint differences of less than 0.1 percentage points a year.
To understand the impact of the BEC allocations (summarized in
Table 8.1) on the value-added growth estimates, we trace the effect of
the BEC-based distribution of “Forestry, ﬁshing, and related activities.”
Table 8.1 indicates that a signiﬁcantly smaller share of imported “Forestry, ﬁshing, and related activities” was purchased as an intermediate
input under the BEC mapping. The implication of this alternative allocation for value-added growth depends on which industries purchase
“Forestry, ﬁshing, and related activities” items, and the value of the
imported items relative to the value of other intermediate inputs used
by the industries. Furthermore, the impact depends on the item-level
allocations within each commodity. For example, as discussed above,
the major difference between the BEC-based and the baseline treatment
of “Forestry, ﬁshing, and related activities” is the treatment of commercial ﬁshing. Because the commercial ﬁshing item is sold mainly to
a subset of the industries that purchases forestry and ﬁshing items, the
BEC-based allocation affects only this set of industries. In particular,
the largest purchaser of “Forestry, ﬁshing, and related activities” is the
“Wood products” industry, yet the BEC-based and baseline estimates of
imports of “Forestry, ﬁshing, and related activities” purchased by the
“Wood products” industry are equivalent because the wood industry
does not purchase commercial ﬁshing.16
On the other hand, the treatment of commercial ﬁshing has a large
impact on the estimates of imports purchased by the “Food services and
drinking places” industry. In this “Food services and drinking places”
industry, however, purchases of forestry and ﬁshing items were about
2 percent of total intermediate purchases, while the difference in price
growth between domestic and imported items was about 8 percentage
points. This implies a value-added growth rate for the “Food services
and drinking places” industry that differs by about 0.1 percentage
points in 2007, and no difference in value-added growth in the “Wood
products” industry. Over the 1998–2011 period, value-added estimates
for the “Food services and drinking places” industry differed by 0.02
percentage points when the baseline was compared to the BEC-based
import allocation. This difference reﬂects the treatment of commercial
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ﬁshing, other items in the “Forestry, ﬁshing, and related activities”
commodity, and the effects on value-added growth for the other years
in the sample.
The differences in value-added by industry estimates that incorporate the country-pooled adjusted import prices are given in Figure
8.4. In 49 out of the 63 industries, estimated value-added growth was
slower during the 2002–2011 period (the details are given in Table 8.3).
The largest difference (in absolute value) was for “Other transportation equipment”; it is estimated that that category would have grown
about 0.6 percentage points a year more slowly using the country-pooladjusted import price. “Motor vehicle bodies and trailers and parts,”
“Computer and electronic products,” “Machinery,” “Textile mills and
textile product mills,” “Primary metals,” “Plastics and rubber products,” and “Chemical products” were the industries where estimated
value-added growth differed by more than 0.1 percentage points a year,
with the differences for plastics and chemicals being of opposite sign.
Table 8.3 and Figure 8.5 show the combined effects for the 2002–
2011 period of the BEC-based allocation and alternative import prices.
“Motor vehicle bodies and trailers and parts” would have been estimated to grow more slowly, by about 0.7 percentage points a year;
“Other transportation equipment” also more slowly, by 0.6 percentage
points a year; “Computer and electronic products” more slowly by 0.4
percentage points a year; and “Machinery” and “Food and beverage
and tobacco products” more slowly by about 0.3 percentage points a
year. “Miscellaneous manufacturing” would have been estimated to
grow about 0.4 percentage points a year faster. Table 8.3 indicates that,
in general, differences in growth estimates due to the alternative treatments were small in comparison to the baseline estimates of valueadded growth.
Import Treatment and MFP Growth Estimates by Industry
Because MFP growth accounts for about 30 percent of growth in
aggregate value-added between 1998 and 2010, according to Fleck et
al. (2012), small changes in estimates of MFP growth at the industry
level may have important ramiﬁcations for the sources of aggregate
MFP growth.
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Figure 8.4 Measured Value-Added Growth, 2002–2011: Alt2 Less Baseline
Plastics and rubber products
Chemical products
Petroleum and coal products
Food and beverage and tobacco products
Nonmetallic mineral products
Pipeline transportation
Motion picture and sound recording industries
Air transportation
Water transportation
Paper products
Insurance carriers and related activities
Securities, commodity contracts, and investments
Performing arts, spectator sports, museums, and related…
Farms
Other services except government
Federal government
Real estate
Social assistance
Rental and leasing services and lessors of intangible assets
State and local government
Other transportation and support activities
Utilities
Administrative and support services
Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles
Accommodation
Food services and drinking places
Legal services
Warehousing and storage
Miscellaneous professional scientific and technical…
Transit and ground passenger transportation
Miscellaneous manufacturing
Wholesale trade
Oil and gas extraction
Forestry, fishing, and related activities
Waste management and remediation services
Educational services
Retail trade
Furniture and related products
Fabricated metal products
credit intermediation
intermediation, and related…
Federal Reserve banks,
banks credit
Publishing industries (includes software)
Amusements, gambling, and recreation industries
Wood products
Truck transportation
Information and data processing services
Computer systems design and related services
Management of companies and enterprises
Hospitals, nursing, and residential care facilities
Rail transportation
Broadcasting and telecommunications
Construction
Printing and related support activities
Ambulatory health care services
Mining, except oil and gas
Electrical equipment, appliances, and components
Support activities for mining
Apparel and leather and allied products
Primary metals
Textile mills and textile product mills
Machinery
Computer and electronic products
Motor vehicles bodies and trailers and parts
Other transportation equipment
-0.70 -0.60 -0.50 -0.40 -0.30 -0.20 -0.10 0.00 0.10 0.20

per year
Percentage points
point per

NOTE: Difference in value-added growth under Alt2. See text.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on BEA and BLS data.
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Figure 8.5 Measured Value-Added Growth, 2002–2011: Alt3 Less Baseline
Miscellaneous manufacturing
Plastics and rubber products
Petroleum and coal products
Nonmetallic mineral products
Chemical products
Pipeline transportation
Amusements, gambling, and recreation industries
Air transportation
Motion picture and sound recording industries
Water transportation
Wholesale trade
Insurance carriers and related activities
Securities commodity contracts and investments
Performing arts, spectator sports, museums, and related…
Farms
Other services except government
Federal government
Paper products
State and local government
Real estate
Rental and leasing services and lessors of intangible assets
Administrative and support services
Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles
Other transportation and support activities
Legal services
Forestry, fishing, and related activities
Social assistance
Warehousing and storage
Utilities
Transit and ground passenger transportation
Furniture and related products
Retail trade
Miscellaneous professional scientific and technical…
Oil and gas extraction
Waste management and remediation services
Educational services
Fabricated metal products
credit intermediation
intermediation, and related…
Federal Reserve banks,
banks credit
Accommodation
Publishing industries (includes software)
Information and data processing services
Wood products
Truck transportation
Computer systems design and related services
Rail transportation
Management of companies and enterprises
Broadcasting and telecommunications
Construction
Food services and drinking places
Apparel and leather and allied products
Mining, except oil and gas
Electrical equipment, appliances, and components
Support activities for mining
Printing and related support activities
Primary metals
Hospitals, nursing, and residential care facilities
Ambulatory health care services
Textile mills and textile product mills
Food and beverage and tobacco products
Machinery
Computer and electronic products
Other transportation equipment
Motor vehicles bodies and trailers and parts
-0.80

-0.60

-0.40

-0.20

0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

per year
year
Percentage points
point per

NOTE: Difference in value-added growth under Alt3. See text.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on BEA and BLS data.
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Table 8.3 compares MFP growth rates across the baseline and
alternative treatments for imports. The table shows that the BEC-based
import allocation produces both marginally faster and slower MFP
growth rates across industries. The largest difference was for “Miscellaneous manufacturing,” where MFP would have grown about 0.17
percentage points a year faster under the BEC mapping (1.63 percent
versus 1.46 percent). “Food and beverages and tobacco products” MFP
grew 0.05 percentage points a year slower based on the BEC, while all
of the other industries’ MFP growth differed by less than 0.05 percentage points a year.
Table 8.3 shows the effect of the alternative import prices (Alt2)
and the combination of the alternative import prices and BEC allocation
(Alt3) on MFP estimates. With the alternative import prices, measured
MFP growth in “Other transportation equipment” would have been 0.22
percentage points a year slower compared to the baseline, while that for
“Computer and electronic products” would have been about 0.1 percentage points a year slower. Both “Machinery” and “Motor vehicle
bodies and trailers and parts” would have exhibited slower MFP growth
by about 0.1 percentage points a year. “Plastics and rubber products”
would have been estimated to have higher MFP growth for the period
by about 0.05 percentage points a year. Table 8.3 shows that the differences in MFP under the alternatives are, in general, small compared
to the baseline estimates. Finally, Table 8.3 indicates that combining
the alternative import allocation and alternative import prices leads to
relatively minor differences in MFP estimates across industries. The
industries with the largest differences are “Other transportation equipment,” “Computer and electronic products,” “Ambulatory health care
services,” and “Miscellaneous manufacturing.”
Houseman et al. (2011) argue that the measurement bias from
offshoring as a percentage of growth in real value-added and MFP is
particularly high for manufacturing excluding computers. Table 8.4
presents the effects of the alternative import assumptions on estimated
value-added and MFP in this sector of the economy. For the 1998–2011
period, under the BEC allocation of imports, value-added would have
decreased by 0.15 percent a year compared to 0.13 percent a year, while
MFP growth would have been unchanged under the alternative. In comparison, under the alternative import prices between 2002 and 2011,
valued-added fell by 0.16 percent a year compared to a decrease of
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Table 8.4 Value-Added and MFP: Manufacturing Excluding Computers and Electronic Products (%)

Value-added growth
Contribution to aggregate VA growth
MFP growth
Contribution to aggregate MFP growth

1998–2011
Baseline
Alt1
−0.13
−0.15
0.00
−0.01
0.37
0.36
0.11
0.11

Baseline
−0.13
0.00
0.33
0.10

2002–2011
Alt1
Alt2
−0.16
−0.16
0.00
0.00
0.32
0.32
0.09
0.09

Alt3
−0.21
−0.01
0.31
0.09

NOTE: All ﬁgures are average annual percentages. Sector aggregation is discussed in the text. Alt. 1 uses the alternative import allocation
based on the BEC. Alt. 2 uses the alternative set of import prices. Alt. 3 uses both the alternative allocation and the alternative import
prices.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on BEA and BLS data.
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0.13 percent a year in the baseline. Again, MFP growth was basically
unchanged. Combining the alternative import allocation and prices
yields a value-added decline of 0.21 percent a year compared to a 0.13
percent decline in the baseline, and MFP growth of 0.09 percent a year
compared to 0.10 percent a year without the adjustments.
The Sources of Growth under the Alternatives
In this section, we compare the sources of aggregate value-added
and MFP growth by industry across the alternative treatments. Table
8.5, which presents the sector contributions to aggregate value-added
growth, indicates that there are very few signiﬁcant differences based
on the alternative import measurement approaches. For the BEC-based
allocation over the 1998–2011 period, the contributions by major sector were observationally equivalent at 1.87 percent a year. Over the
2002–2011 period, for which we consider both the BEC-based import
allocation and the alternative import prices, there were some minor differences in sector contributions to growth. Speciﬁcally, in the baseline
aggregate, value-added grew by 1.38 percent a year, while it grew by
1.34 percent a year under the alternative using the BEC allocation and
alternative import price. This difference was due to minor differences in
“Construction,” “Manufacturing,” “Information,” and “Other services.”
Across each of the cases that we consider, MFP growth accounts
for between 25 and 30 percent of aggregate value-added growth. Table
8.6 shows that for the broad economic sectors, the sources of aggregate
MFP growth exhibit a similar pattern across the treatments of imports
that we analyze. For the 1998–2011 period, the BEC-based allocation
produces a sectoral decomposition of aggregate MFP that is almost identical to the baseline. For the 2002–2011 period, there are minor differences in “Transportation, warehousing, and utilities,” “Durable goods,”
and “Other services.” Overall, the fundamental sources of aggregate
MFP are very similar across the different treatments of imports for this
sector classiﬁcation.
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Table 8.5 Sector Contributions to Aggregate Value-Added Growth (%)
1998–2011
Baseline
Alt1
Value-added
1.87
1.87
Agriculture, forestry, ﬁshing, hunting, and mining
0.02
0.02
Transportation, warehousing, utilities
0.10
0.10
Construction
−0.10
−0.10
Manufacturing
0.25
0.25
Durable goods
0.25
0.25
Nondurable goods
0.00
0.00
Trade
0.23
0.23
Information
0.21
0.21
Finance, insurance, real estate, rental and leasing
0.51
0.51
Other services
0.54
0.54
Government
0.11
0.11

Baseline
1.38
0.01
0.11
−0.15
0.22
0.22
0.00
0.11
0.18
0.33
0.52
0.06

2002–2011
Alt1
Alt2
1.37
1.36
0.01
0.01
0.11
0.11
−0.15 −0.16
0.21
0.21
0.22
0.21
−0.01
0.00
0.11
0.11
0.18
0.17
0.33
0.33
0.51
0.51
0.06
0.06

Alt3
1.34
0.01
0.11
−0.16
0.20
0.21
0.00
0.11
0.17
0.33
0.50
0.06

NOTE: All ﬁgures are average annual percentages. Sector aggregation is discussed in the text. Alt. 1 uses the alternative import allocation
based on the BEC. Alt. 2 uses the alternative set of import prices. Alt. 3 uses both the alternative allocation and the alternative import
prices.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on BEA and BLS data.
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Baseline
0.42
−0.04
0.09
−0.13
0.33
0.30
0.03
0.01
0.14
0.01
−0.01
0.02

2002–2011
Alt1
Alt2
0.41
0.40
−0.04 −0.04
0.09
0.08
−0.13 −0.13
0.33
0.32
0.30
0.28
0.03
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.14
0.14
0.01
0.01
−0.02 −0.02
0.02
0.02
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Table 8.6 Sector Contributions to Aggregate MFP Growth (%)
1998–2011
Baseline
Alt1
Aggregate MFP
0.49
0.48
Agriculture, forestry, ﬁshing, hunting, and mining
−0.01
−0.01
Transportation, warehousing, utilities
0.07
0.07
Construction
−0.11
−0.11
Manufacturing
0.39
0.39
Durable goods
0.35
0.35
Nondurable goods
0.04
0.04
Trade
0.07
0.07
Information
0.09
0.09
Finance, insurance, real estate, rental and leasing
0.06
0.06
Other services
−0.03
−0.04
Government
−0.04
−0.04

Alt3
0.38
−0.04
0.08
−0.13
0.31
0.28
0.03
0.01
0.14
0.01
−0.03
0.02

NOTE: All ﬁgures are average annual percentages. Sector aggregation is discussed in the text. Alt. 1 uses the alternative import allocation
based on the BEC. Alt. 2 uses the alternative set of import prices. Alt. 3 uses both the alternative allocation and the alternative import
prices.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on BEA and BLS data.
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CONCLUSION
Estimated GDP from the expenditure side demonstrates the increasing role of imports in U.S. economic activity. In this chapter, we have
examined a narrow set of issues related to import measurement and the
effects on estimates of the sources of GDP growth from an industry perspective. Between 1998 and 2011, the value of imports relative to GDP
increased from 12.7 percent to 17.7 percent. Over the same period, based
on the value-added approach to measuring GDP, the share of imported
intermediates used in domestic production increased from about 9 percent in 1998 to 13 percent in 2011 for the economy as a whole, and from
16 percent in 1998 to 25 percent in 2011 in manufacturing. Because of
interest in how these imports are treated in the measurement of GDP
by industry, we have documented the current approach to capturing the
role of imports on measures of growth and productivity at the industry
level and have shown how import measurement at the industry level is
related to aggregate measures of growth and productivity. The industry
production account that we analyze in this chapter is an important element of quantifying the impact of imports on the U.S. economy.
Because a basic requirement in assembling industry estimates of
real value-added and MFP growth is knowing the values of imports by
type that are used by all industries in the economy, we have discussed
the application of the import proportionality assumption in the BEA
industry accounts and compared this to an approach that relies on the
broad economic classiﬁcations published by the United Nations. We
ﬁnd that estimates of GDP and MFP growth by industry show no major
differences based on the BEC allocation. We attribute this to the level
of detail at which the BEA applies the import comparability assumption, which is much ﬁner than the 63-sector level at which the annual
accounts are published.
Another component of the accounts that affects measures of GDP
and MFP by industry is made up of the prices that serve to deﬂate
imports used across industries. We compare the current practice, which
relies heavily on published BLS import price indexes, to an import price
that pools goods across countries. This approach allows us to capture
import switches from a new, lower-priced entrant into the export market, which Houseman et al. (2011) have argued may be missing from
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the ofﬁcial import prices. Again, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant impacts on
the industry growth rates, or on the sectoral growth decomposition at
the aggregate level.
The industry production account approach that we make use of
in our analysis reinforces the notion that the economy-wide impact of
increasing imports depends on industry measures of import use. While
there is some evidence that the alternative methodologies that we consider have some minor industry-speciﬁc measurement effects, across
industries these effects often cancel each other out. Thus, at higher levels of aggregation there are very few observable differences across the
methodologies that we analyze. It is worth recalling that our analysis
focuses solely on different treatments of imported goods in the accounts.
Surely, measurement issues related to the growth in globalization
will not dissipate. This study was based on the 2002 benchmark inputoutput table, which forms the basis of the annual industry accounts. The
2007 benchmark input-output table, which became available in December 2013, incorporates updated information on the structure of interindustry purchases, and the annual industry accounts will be revised
to reﬂect this new information. Looking further ahead, the treatment
of factoryless goods production is a measurement area that is gaining
attention. Methodologists for the GDP-by-industry account are actively
involved in discussing methods to treat factoryless goods and how to
incorporate these concepts into their estimates.

Notes
The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and not necessarily
those of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis or the U.S. Department of Commerce.
We are grateful to Peter Kuhbach, Amanda Lyndaker, and Sarah Osborne for their help
in constructing the labor data, Greg Linder for his help with the trade data, and Gabriel
Medeiros for his help in assembling the alternative intermediate input estimates. We
thank Robert Inklaar, Jiemin Guo, Susan Houseman, Peter Kuhbach, Wendy Li, Carol
Moylan, Sarah Osborne, Rachel Soloveichik, and Sally Thompson for their very helpful comments and suggestions, as well as the organizers and participants in the conference on “Measuring the Effects of Globalization.”
1. The vintage of data used in this project is consistent with the GDP by industry
and annual Input-Output accounts, released in December 2012. The latest data are
updated here: http://www.bea.gov/industry/index.htm.
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2. Strassner, Yuskavage, and Lee (2010) use data from multinational companies
(MNC) and compare reported use of imports by broad type to the import proportionality assumption. They ﬁnd broadly consistent results between current practice
and the MNC data and attribute some of the differences to the difference between
establishment and company concepts.
3. Because our analysis covers 1998–2011, we use the 1996 concordance for 1998–2001,
the 2002 concordance for 2002–2006, and the 2007 concordance for 2007–2011.
Concordances are available here: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/conversions/
HS%20Correlation%20and%20Conversion%20tables.htm.
4. There are limited cases where the BEC code for a given six-digit commodity is
ambiguous in the published concordance. For example, the six-digit harmonization code can be listed multiple times and assigned to BEC codes that do not give
a unique map to intermediate input, consumption, or investment. In these cases,
we default to the import proportionality assumption for the proportion of this item
included in this six-digit harmonization code.
5. In constructing the “GDP by Industry” accounts, typically reexports are netted
out from the value of imports, but in constructing the value to be used to allocate
imports across broad economic categories, we do not net out reexports.
6. The foundation for this mapping is made up of the census guidelines on appropriate
NAICS codes for each harmonization code (when this information is available).
7. An import is assigned to “undetermined” if the six-digit harmonization code to the
BEC map is ambiguous.
8. An alternative is to assume that capital goods get sold only to ﬁnal demand, but
this leads to all of the capital goods that typically get embedded in other goods
being allocated to ﬁnal demand.
9. UN Comtrade provides quantity data in units recommended by the World Customs Organization. We construct prices for each of the 13 quantity types and construct value-share-weighted growth rates for each item (across quantity type). We
use the value and quantity to deﬁne the implicit price. A previous version of this
research used only data that was reported in kilograms.
10. In a regression with observations weighted by import values of UN Comtrade
Törnqvist prices on BEA prices, the coefﬁcient on the BEA prices is about 0.7 for
the 2002–2011 period but declines to −0.1 over the 1997–2002 period.
11. The BEA has details on about 150 import prices from the BLS.
12. Industry output and intermediate input for the baseline case is taken from the
1998–2011 annual revision of the GDP-by-industry data (http://www.bea.gov/
industry/gdpbyind_data.htm). Capital and labor services are extrapolated through
2011 using internal estimates and include a labor and capital composition adjustment based on the approach of Jorgenson, Ho, and Samuels (2011).
13. This decomposition is the direct-aggregation-across-industries approach of
Jorgenson et al. (2007).
14. Note that this differs from the concept of aggregate TFP used in Jorgenson et al.
(2007) by their reallocation terms.
15. Because of differences in index number methodology, there are small differences
between published estimates and estimates given here.
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16. This excludes the purchases by the “Forestry, ﬁshing, and related activities” industry itself. It is based on the 2007 annual input-output table.
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The Impact of
Globalization on Prices
A Test of Hedonic Price Indexes for Imports
Mina Kim
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Marshall B. Reinsdorf
International Monetary Fund

Sourcing patterns for many types of imported products have
changed dramatically over the past two decades as emerging economies
have become major producers of the manufactured products consumed
in the United States. In addition, goods with regular quality improvements due to new or improved technology have also increased their representation in U.S. imports. The U.S. export and import price indexes
are constructed using a “matched-model” approach that is likely to
miss price reductions for imports that occur when sourcing shifts from
high-cost countries to low-cost countries of origin. The matched-model
approach is also likely to miss changes in quality-adjusted prices that
occur when new models that embody improved technology enter the
market. Hedonic methods for quality adjustment could help to resolve
these problems. This chapter demonstrates the feasibility of applying
these methods to import price index data by estimating hedonic indexes
for two products that have experienced changes in sourcing and technological progress: televisions and consumer cameras. The hedonic
indexes imply that signiﬁcant upward bias in matched-model import
indexes for these products arises both from changes in sourcing and
from new technologies.

293

Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb 293

2/16/2015 8:35:28 AM

294 Kim and Reinsdorf

WHY STUDY HEDONIC INDEXES FOR IMPORTS?
An important element of globalization is the growth of exportoriented manufacturing industries in emerging economies, bringing
with it expanded opportunities to source imports from new locations
where costs are lower. Since the mid-1990s, shifts in sourcing to emerging economies have become more common for a wide variety of consumer products and intermediate inputs, including electronic goods,
textiles, and apparel. Such shifts in sourcing create measurement challenges for price statisticians since direct price comparisons of the items
from the new and previous source countries are usually not possible.
Another element of globalization has been the rapid growth in
imports by countries like the United States of products for which technological improvements are an important phenomenon, such as electronic goods. For products with evolving technologies, comparisons
of new models to previous models may again be impossible without a
way to do a quality adjustment, but omitting new and existing models
will cause bias if the new models tend to enter with lower- (or higher-)
quality-adjusted prices.
Changes in source country and changes in technological characteristics both present a risk of bias for the U.S. import price index
(MPI) because the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) International Price
Program (IPP) constructs its indexes as matched-model indexes. In a
matched-model index, only continuing items (models that match) are
used in the index calculation. Changes in sample composition resulting
from item replacements or sample rotations are handled by linking the
incoming items into the index. Linking means that any item that is not
present in both the initial and the comparison period is excluded from
the calculation of the change in the index. Linking therefore prevents the
MPI from capturing any cost savings that an importer enjoys by switching suppliers. Any remaining gap that exists between the inﬂationadjusted price of the old supplier and the price of the new supplier is, in
effect, attributed to quality change. The bias in the MPI from failing to
capture price reductions caused by shifts in sourcing resembles the phenomenon of outlet substitution bias in the consumer price index from
consumers switching to low-priced outlets like Walmart (Reinsdorf
1993).1
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A matched-model index avoids making possibly specious comparisons of items that may be of differing quality. Rather than omitting
price changes that occur during item replacements, as the matchedmodel method does, hedonic price indexes adjust for quality differences in a way that allows these price changes to be taken into account.
Hedonic methods therefore offer a potential solution to the biases created by globalization. Indeed, by using other kinds of data as a proxy
for U.S. import data, hedonic techniques have already been applied to
these or related problems. In particular, Grimm (1998) uses proprietary
data on worldwide markets for semiconductors to construct hedonically
adjusted deﬂators for exports and imports of semiconductors in the U.S.
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs) for the years 1981 to
1997. To our knowledge, however, no one has yet applied hedonic
regression techniques to trade data directly.

LITERATURE ON BIAS IN IMPORT PRICE INDEXES
Changes in sample composition can also occur in the import index
for reasons other than sourcing changes and technological progress.
Recent research ﬁnds that an important part of overall price change for
exports and imports occurs at times of product entry and exit. Nakamura
and Steinsson (2012) analyze a sample of the microdata that the BLS
used to compile the import and export price indexes. They ﬁnd that
items in the sample tend to be subject to frequent replacement and tend
to have rigid prices during their lifespan in the sample (44.3 percent
of the items in import price samples never have a price change). They
conclude that a high proportion of price changes must therefore occur
at the time of item replacements.
In Nakamura and Steinsson (2012), the sign of the bias in the
matched-model index depends on whether the index has an upward or
downward trend: If the price index is trending downward, excessive
ﬂatness of the matched-model index means that it has an upward bias.
With the matched-model index, there is an assumption that changes in
quality-adjusted prices at times of item replacements are, on average, the
same as the observed price changes for continuing items. This assumption implies corrections to estimated changes in the index for nonoil
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imports that raise the standard deviation of quarterly log changes from
1.1 percent to 1.6 percent. This in turn would imply that the matchedmodel index for imports is signiﬁcantly ﬂatter than it should be.2
The assumption that quality-adjusted price changes associated with
item replacements have the same mean as price changes for continuing
items may, however, be unrealistic for products undergoing rapid technological progress or for entry by new producers in low-wage countries
that have cost advantages. For these kinds of goods, even a matchedmodel index that is trending downward might have an upward bias
because the changes in quality-adjusted prices at times of item replacements are smaller than the average price change of continuing items.
Erickson and Pakes (2011) provide evidence that unmeasured price
changes associated with item replacements tend to be systematically
lower than the measured price changes when a product is undergoing
improvement as a result of technological progress.3
The lower prices that import buyers obtain by sourcing from China
and other emerging economies have also been topics of several papers.
Thomas, Marquez, and Fahle (2008) infer the size of the price reductions that U.S. importers realize by switching to sources from emerging
economies on the basis of purchasing-power parity data from the Penn
World Tables. More recently, Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) have
directly looked at prices from traditional sources of semiconductors and
from new sources in China and ﬁnd that the China price is 17 percent
lower for an identical semiconductor. Finally, Reinsdorf and Yuskavage
(2013, Table 1) show that changes in import sourcing to countries like
China could plausibly have resulted in an upward bias in the MPIs for
consumer durable goods, including computers but excluding motor
vehicles, of up to almost 1 percent per year.4
An indirect method for estimating the bias in a matched-model
import price index from new and disappearing varieties was introduced
by Feenstra (1994). In applying the method, varieties are usually distinguished on the basis of source countries. The model underlying this
method implies that a variety may be bought in limited quantities just
because it is different, but that because market shares are inversely proportional to quality-adjusted prices, for a variety to sell well it must
have a low quality-adjusted price. If the post-entry share of the entering
varieties is greater than the pre-exit share of the exiting varieties, the
estimated bias in the matched-model index will be positive. Feenstra
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et al. (2013) use this method to estimate the bias associated with variety entry and exit in the deﬂator for nonpetroleum imports in the U.S.
national accounts, with new countries of origin treated as new varieties. They ﬁnd an average bias of about 0.6 percent per year, indicating
substantial net gains in market share by new supplying countries. This
estimate reﬂects a combination of several factors, including entry of
low-priced producers in emerging low-cost locations, lower qualityadjusted prices made possible by technological progress, and a general
broadening of the available range of varieties as markets thicken.
Finally, Houseman et al. (2011) and Mandel (2007, 2009) focus on
price effects that are due to the offshoring of production from the United
States to lower-cost locations. Offshoring substantially reduces the price
paid by buyers of intermediate inputs, yet this price reduction cannot be
captured either in the MPI or in the producer price index. Alterman
(2009 and Chapter 10 of this volume) proposes a buyer’s price index
for intermediate inputs as a way of capturing the effects of substitution
from local to offshore production. Note, however, that if the buyer’s
price index relies exclusively on the matched-model approach to handle
quality change, it may miss some of the price changes associated with
changes in where the intermediate inputs are produced because the offshored version of the product may not be matched with the previous
local version of the product. Hedonic methods are likely to be needed
to enable the buyer’s price to fully measure the effects of changes in
source countries.

HEDONIC PRICE INDEXES FOR IMPORTS
Hedonic price indexes do not exclude from the index calculation
observations that are only present in one time period. They are based
on hedonic regressions that model the effects of items’ characteristics
on the price.
The history of hedonic price index research extends back for more
than 80 years, and in the years since the Stigler Commission report
included Griliches’s (1961) chapter applying this method to autos,
there have been innumerable empirical applications of this technique
to the consumer or producer price indexes. Aizcorbe, Corrado, and
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Doms (2003) explore conditions under which matched-model and timedummy hedonic quality-adjustment techniques lead to comparable
measures of prices. They ﬁnd that the two approaches give numerically
similar estimates when rates of entry and exit are low, or when observations are at high frequency and changes in characteristics occur gradually over time.
One traditional speciﬁcation of a hedonic regression model includes
dummy variables for time periods along with a set of characteristics
variables. If the dependent variable is log price, the coefﬁcient on a time
period’s dummy variable is the logarithm of its price index. Another
common approach employs ﬁtted coefﬁcients from a regression using
data from time period s to predict the price that an observation from the
other time period, say time period t, would have had, had it been present in period s. An analogous regression run for period t is then used to
predict the prices of items that only existed in period s. The predicted
prices can then be included in the calculation of the index.
Recently, Erickson and Pakes (2011) have developed a modiﬁcation
of this hedonic technique that accounts for the selection bias caused
by exiting goods being supplanted by more technologically advanced
goods. Their technique accounts for unobserved price-determining
characteristics by making use of the information in the residuals from
the standard hedonic regression. In principle, the method should work
well for handling the data limitations faced by the IPP, as it does not
require that a large number of characteristics be observed. Unfortunately, a key assumption is not met: Erickson and Pakes assume that
for a given set of characteristics, the marginal cost is the same across
sellers. This assumption does not hold true in our data.
Despite the high degree of interest in the questions that hedonic
methods might help to answer, to our knowledge this chapter is the
ﬁrst to estimate a hedonic import price index using data collected from
importers by a statistical agency. Data limitations are probably the main
reason for the lack of research on hedonic indexes for import prices.
Many countries construct most of their export and import indexes as
unit value indexes from customs data values and volumes for detailed
classes of items, such as the 10-digit categories of the Harmonized System (which is an internationally agreed-upon classiﬁcation scheme for
traded commodities). A unit value in these indexes will typically cover
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a variety of items whose characteristics vary, so no particular set of
characteristics can be ascribed to an observation.
The United States no longer uses unit values for its export and
import indexes except in special cases: The BLS began to produce
complete sets of speciﬁcation-based price indexes for goods imports in
1982 (Alterman 1991, p. 113). This means that the observations in the
U.S. import index sample have well-deﬁned characteristics. Nevertheless, detailed characteristics information can be difﬁcult to collect from
respondents in IPP surveys, so the import price index database often
lacks full information.
We found that for items that have a make and model number, the
problem of missing characteristics information could be largely overcome by performing Internet searches on the make and model number of the sampled items. Except for the items that exited before the
Internet became pervasive, we were generally able to ﬁnd good product
description information using this method from owner’s manuals or
other product literature.

DATA DESCRIPTION
To construct experimental hedonic indexes and benchmark matchedmodel indexes for imports, we use three subsets of the import price
data from the International Price Program (IPP) Research Database
(Blackburn, Kim, and Ulics 2012). In particular, we use the description
ﬁeld in the IPP database to assemble data sets on imports of consumer
televisions, consumer cameras, and bananas.5 Bananas are intended as
a kind of control group. Unlike televisions and cameras, they are relatively homogeneous (though besides the main Cavendish variety, the
sample also contains some specialty varieties).
The description ﬁeld in the IPP database is also the basis for the
quality variables that we construct for each product type. The variables
used in the hedonic models cover the characteristics that are well documented in the description portion of the IPP database, although even for
these variables blanks sometimes have to be ﬁlled in through Internet
searches on make and model number. (See Appendix Table 9A.1 for
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the list and description of quality characteristics that we are able to pull
from the database.)
The data set for televisions and bananas covers the months between
January 2000 and December 2010. Unfortunately, for cameras the data
on quality and monthly prices become too sparse after March 2006, so
our camera indexes end at that point.
The IPP database contains two types of prices: reported prices and
net prices. To derive the net price, the BLS adjusts the reported price
as needed for discounts, duties, freight charges, and the exchange rate.
The net prices are estimates of actual transaction prices in dollars and
are used for the ofﬁcial import and export price indexes. Thus, we also
use the net prices. In addition, for certain commodities, the BLS allows
reporters to give “index” prices.6 These types of prices, which were
reported for some of our banana items, are excluded from our analysis.
We include intraﬁrm “transfer” prices in our study to keep sample
sizes from becoming too small. We do, however, include a dummy variable for intraﬁrm prices in our hedonic regressions because these prices
behave differently from arm’s length prices; they are characterized by
less stickiness, less synchronization, and greater exchange rate passthrough, as found in Neiman (2010). For tractability, we assume that the
intraﬁrm pricing strategy is the same across ﬁrms and time throughout
this study. As shown in Table 9.1, the share of intraﬁrm prices is high
for cameras and bananas.
Table 9.1 Share of Prices That Are Intraﬁrm in Each Month
Televisions
Cameras
Bananas
Mean
0.41
0.89
0.85
Min.
0.15
0.72
0.62
Max.
0.64
1.00
1.00
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

In the IPP database, many items are repriced less often than every
month, so monthly prices are often temporarily missing. Temporarily
missing prices can also occur because the respondent fails to report a
price one month.7 We experimented with two ways of imputing temporarily missing prices. The simple method of carrying forward the last
observation to ﬁll in the missing prices is a standard practice in research
using IPP data. (See, for instance, Nakamura and Steinsson [2012] and
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Gagnon, Mandel, and Vigfusson [2012].) Given that for many products
in the IPP long periods of price rigidity are common, this method is a
reasonable approximation.
On the other hand, for ofﬁcial price indexes, the BLS generally
imputes missing values by adjusting the last observation to reﬂect an
estimate of the subsequent price change using either “cell-relative”
imputation or “class-mean” imputation.8 We found that our results were
insensitive to whether we used cell-relative imputation or the simple
carry-forward method favored by researchers, so below we will focus
on indexes that include carry-forward imputations. Table 9.2 reports
the share of missing values that are imputed for each subset considered.
Table 9.2 Share of Prices That Are Imputed in Each Month
Televisions
Cameras
Bananas
Mean
0.03
0.04
0.00
Min.
0.00
0.00
0.00
Max.
0.32
0.50
0.12
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

Both televisions and cameras exhibit a great deal of cross-sectional
variation in price levels. Television prices vary 300-fold, while camera
prices vary 500-fold. Television prices are much less sticky than camera
prices. In the television sample, items change price an average of 6.4
times during their time in the sample, while in our camera sample items
on average have only 1.6 price changes between entering and exiting.9
Source countries shifted for both televisions and cameras over our
sample periods; televisions shifted from Mexican imports to Chinese
imports (see Figure 9.1), while cameras moved away from Japanese
imports to imports from China and Thailand (Figure 9.2). The growth
in television screen sizes over our sample period is also noteworthy
(Figure 9.3).
Televisions experience slightly more sample entry than sample
exit throughout the period that we study. Cameras, on the other hand,
experience almost one and a half times more exits than entries of items
into the sample. On average about 4.7 percent of televisions in a given
month are no longer present in the next month, while for cameras the
hazard rate for sample attrition is 5.6 percent per month (see Table 9.3
for a summary of exit reasons). The mean duration of a television in the
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Figure 9.1 Change in Share for the Source Country for Television
Imports, 2000–2010
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Figure 9.2 Change in Share for the Source Country for Camera Imports,
2000–2005
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Figure 9.3 Change in Share for Imported Television Sizes, 2000–2010
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sample is 18.1 months (with a standard deviation of 12.9 months). This
is slightly shorter than the 21 months that would occur if the hazard rate
for exit were constant. On the other hand, mean duration of an item in
the camera sample, at 17.8 months (with a standard deviation of 11.6
months), is consistent with a constant hazard rate for sample exit.
Bananas behave very differently from televisions and cameras.
Prices for bananas only vary sixfold, reﬂecting their greater homogeneity. Moreover, bananas change prices very frequently compared to
Table 9.3 Mean Share of Items Experiencing Permanent Exit in Each
Month, by Reason (mean)
Refusal
Out of business
Out of scope
Out of scope, replaced

Televisions
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.01

Cameras
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.01

Bananas
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01

NOTE: “Out of scope” items are items that are no longer traded. Reporters sometimes
are able to give a quote for a replacement item. At other times, there is no replacement.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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televisions and cameras; on average, a banana quote changes price 19.3
times during the time that it is in our sample. Bananas in our data set
primarily are imported from Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Colombia, and Ecuador. Colombia, Ecuador, and Guatemala have increased
their representation in the import price index sample, while the share of
the sample from Honduras has fallen and the one from Costa Rica has
remained about the same (Figure 9.4). On average, about 1.9 percent
of bananas in each period are no longer present in the next period. The
mean duration of an item in the banana sample is substantially longer
than those of televisions or cameras, at 32.2 months (with a standard
deviation of 23.9 months).

BASELINE NONHEDONIC MEASURES OF PRICE CHANGE
Before calculating sets of hedonic price indexes, we calculate two
baseline measures of price change. The ﬁrst of these simply tracks the
change in the geometric average price of the sample. The average price
index should exhibit similar behavior to a unit value index: Like a unit
Figure 9.4 Change in Share for Source Country for Bananas, 2000–2010
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value index, it does not hold the sample composition constant when
comparing time periods. (We cannot calculate true unit-value indexes
because we do not have the necessary data on quantities.) Changes in
sample composition are likely to alter the average quality level represented in the sample, so the behavior over time of the average price
reﬂects both price and quality developments. Deﬂating the average
price index by a price index that holds quality constant yields an index
of quality change.
Second, we construct matched-model indexes to use as benchmarks
to compare to our hedonic price indexes. The matched-model indexes
of the MPI include item weights in a Laspeyres-like index formula.10
We do not have the item weight information needed to replicate these
Laspeyres matched-model indexes, so our matched-model indexes are
calculated as modiﬁed Jevons indexes of the prices of the continuing
items, for which less detailed weights based on customs data are used.11
A matched-model Laspeyres index is calculated as a share-weighted
arithmetic average of price relatives of continuing items, while the
logarithm of our weighted, matched-model Jevons index is a shareweighted average of logarithms of these same price relatives. We also
include our calculated weights for observations in all of the indexes that
we calculate so that the overall weight for each source country is proportional to its importance in the trade data for the product in question.
BLS policies on disclosure of nonpublic data allow us to report only
publication-level indexes. We are unable to report indexes at the level
of the individual products that make up a publication-level index, nor
can we report coefﬁcient estimates that would allow someone to reproduce one of these unpublished indexes. Therefore, besides calculating
matched-model indexes for the three products of interest, we calculate
matched-model Jevons indexes for the other products contained in the
published index and then aggregate up to the level of the published
index. For example, for bananas, we simulate the relevant published
index for “edible fruits and nuts” (Harmonized System Code 08, or HS
08) by combining our index for bananas with an index for other edible fruits and nuts with weights based on the number of items in each
category.
Despite these limitations, we can use the difference between the
aggregated matched-model indexes and the aggregated hedonically
adjusted indexes to infer the effects of the quality adjustment on the
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products of interest. In particular, we divide the change in the logarithm
of the more aggregate index by the weight of televisions or cameras in
that index to ﬁnd the implied change in the logarithm of the index for
televisions or cameras.

HEDONIC INDEXES
Sample size limitations affect what kinds of hedonic models we can
investigate. The simplest speciﬁcation we try is the pooled time dummy
hedonic regression, which assumes that the effect of quality characteristics on the log price is constant over the whole span of time covered
by the sample. The general form of the pooled time dummy regression
equation is
(9.1)

pit = αt + Xit β + εit ,

where pit is the log price of item i at time t, and Xit is a vector of quality
characteristics such as the television’s screen size and screen type. The
price index comparing time t to t −1 is then just the exponential difference between αt and αt −1.
As a more ﬂexible alternative to the pooled hedonic regression, we
also estimate a set of overlapping hedonic regressions that use a moving
window of just 24 months for their sample. The time periods covered
by these regressions have 12-month overlaps so that a cumulative price
index from the beginning of the overall sample can be constructed from
a sequence of transitive comparisons. Ideally, we would have run these
regressions on monthly data, but, in practice, to get around sample size
problems, we had to pool the observations for each quarter. The movingwindow approach has the advantage of allowing the coefﬁcients on
characteristics to change over time if evolving technologies and market
conditions alter the hedonic relationships.12
We ﬁt these models by both including and excluding country dummies from the set of variables in Xit in Equation (9.1). The speciﬁcation
that includes country dummies assumes that price differences between
countries of origin are due to quality differences between these countries, while the speciﬁcation that omits the country dummies assumes
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that price-level differences between countries of origin are real. The
truth probably lies between these alternatives—ease of doing business
and quality assurance may vary by country, but on the other hand, the
large gains made by countries offering lower prices suggest that the
value of the quality differences is small in comparison with the price
differentials.
Rather than leaving the country dummies out of the hedonic regression, a hedonic index that includes price changes due to changes in
source country can instead be calculated by adding back the part of
the hedonic index’s quality adjustment coming from changes in source
countries. Using the pooled hedonic index as an example, let ât be the
ﬁtted coefﬁcient on the time dummy for period t (with the time dummy
omitted in the base period), Δp– be the change in the average log price,
and ΔX be the change in the average characteristics including the country dummies. The log hedonic index with country dummies included
equals the raw price change minus a quality adjustment equal to the
predicted effect of the average characteristics change:
(9.2)

– − (ΔX)β̂ .
ât = Δp

Now break X into a physical attributes part and a country mix part:
(9.3)

– − (ΔX )β̂ − (ΔX )β̂ .
ât = Δp
PA PA
CM CM

The index that includes the effect of source country changes in the measure of price change is
(9.4)

ãt = ât + (ΔXCM)β̂CM .

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
HS 8528 and Televisions
The ﬁrst set of hedonic indexes that we estimate are for imported
televisions. As explained above, BLS disclosure policies prevent us
from showing research indexes that would correspond to an unpub-
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lished level of detail, so we show indexes at the lowest published level
that includes televisions, HS code 8528. HS 8528 covers televisions
and other video devices.13
Comparisons of the ofﬁcial index with our hedonic indexes would
be affected by more than just the differences in compilation methods
that we want to investigate, so we construct a matched-model import
index of our own for use in these comparisons. The key feature of
the ofﬁcial import index is its use of the matched-model index. Our
matched-model index replicates that feature, but it differs in the choice
of aggregation formula. Whereas the ofﬁcial index has a modiﬁed
Laspeyres formula, we use a Jevons (geometric means) index formula to
combine the matched-model indexes for televisions with that for other
video devices. Also, whereas the usual Jevons index is an unweighted
geometric mean of price relatives, our Jevons indexes include country
weights that reﬂect the relative importance of different source countries in the trade data. Note, however, that our weights do not precisely
match the weights used for the ofﬁcial index.
Our matched-model Jevons index with country weights closely
tracks the ofﬁcial matched-model index for HS 8528 most of the time
(Figure 9.5). It also has a similar long-run trend. Over the whole period
of January 2000 to December 2010, our matched-model index falls
at an average rate of 5.7 percent per year, close to the ofﬁcial index’s
6 percent per year rate of decline. On a few occasions the indexes
diverge, however. In May of 2001, August–September of 2005, and
April of 2008, our index has a higher rate of change than the ofﬁcial
index, while in August–September of 2008 and April–May of 2009 our
index measures lower inﬂation.
Televisions and video devices experienced rapid increases in quality over the period covered by the sample, including the displacement
of CRT screens by superior ﬂat-screen technologies (plasma, LCD, and,
ﬁnally, LED) and an increase in the average screen size. These quality improvements substantially affected the average price of a television. The difference between the growth rate of the average price and
the growth rate of the matched-model index reﬂects the value of the
quality improvements. In contrast to the rapidly falling matched-model
indexes, the weighted average price rises at an average rate of 5.6 percent per year. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the matchedmodel Jevons index correctly measures the pure price change, we can
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Figure 9.5 Matched-Model and Average Import Price Indexes for HS
8528: Televisions and Other Video Devices
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SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors’ calculations.

infer that quality improvements added more than 11 percent per year
to the annual growth rate of the average price of televisions and other
video devices over the period that we study.
Next, we check the accuracy of the matched-model index by comparing it to hedonic indexes. To estimate the effects of the entry of new
source countries whose prices may be lower, one alternative is to control for physical characteristics of televisions, but not source countries,
in the hedonic model. Including dummy variables for country of origin in the hedonic regression would cause the hedonic index to include
country effects in its quality adjustments.
A weakness of this approach is, however, that it is vulnerable to
omitted variable bias. If characteristics and countries are correlated,
some of the effects of the omitted country variables could be reﬂected
in the coefﬁcients on the physical characteristics. This may then cause
effects of changes in country mix to be embedded in the coefﬁcients on
the physical characteristics.
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Including country dummies in the hedonic regression makes the
coefﬁcients on the physical characteristics less likely to include effects
of changes in source countries that are correlated with changes in physical characteristics. The coefﬁcients on the country dummies can be
used to adjust the hedonic index so that it includes the price effects of
changes in country mix, as shown in Equation (9.4). (Note, however,
that a problem of collinearity between countries and characteristics
may not be completely solved by this technique, because if the sample
size is not large enough, such collinearity would likely lead to high
variances for the coefﬁcient estimates.) The difference between the
adjusted hedonic index and the matched-model index will then include
the price effects of changing source countries that are missed by the
matched-model index. If the adjustment is not made, the difference
between the raw hedonic index that includes country dummies and the
matched-model index will estimate the amount of quality change from
improvements in physical attributes due to technological advances that
is missed by the matched-model index.
Of the two types of hedonic indexes that we estimate for televisions, the moving-window hedonic index is likely to be more reliable
than the pooled hedonic index. In the pooled hedonic regression, a single set of coefﬁcients on the quality characteristics and country dummies (if included) is estimated for the entire time interval covered by
the sample, so a characteristic’s effect on the logarithm of a TV price is
constrained to be constant over a long interval. On the other hand, the
moving-window approach allows the slope coefﬁcients to evolve over
time by estimating separate sets of hedonic coefﬁcients for overlapping pairs of years. Over longer time intervals, technological progress
signiﬁcantly alters the shadow value of at least some television characteristics, and changes in prices and income could change the demand
for characteristics in ways that affect their shadow values. Suppose,
for example, that the price differential for large screens declines over
the course of the period covered by the sample, and that near the end
of the sample period imports from China start to grow rapidly, with a
specialization in smaller screen sizes. The pooled hedonic regression
would then tend to underestimate the relative quality of the Chinese
televisions in the period when they are growing, and hence tend to overestimate the quality-adjusted price level of televisions from China.
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Another advantage of the moving-window regression approach is
that one can see what the estimate of the bias would have been if the
analysis had stopped earlier than December 2010. Differences between
the matched-model index for HS 8528 and indexes for HS 8528 that
incorporate moving-window hedonic price indexes for televisions are
shown in Figure 9.6. The growth-rate gap between the matched-model
index and the adjusted moving-window hedonic index is not uniform
over time; some earlier stopping points would have implied larger estimates of the bias in the matched-model index. Adjusting the hedonic
index for the changes in source countries lowers its growth rate by
0.016 index points and brings the estimate of the bias in December 2010
of the matched-model index up to 0.042 index points. The unadjusted
moving-window hedonic index for HS 8528 is about 0.026 index points
Figure 9.6 Differences between Weighted Matched-Model and Weighted
Overlapping Hedonic Indexes for HS 8528: Televisions and
Other Video Devices
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lower than the matched-model index in December of 2010, suggesting
that incomplete measurement of the gains from improved technology
adds about 0.026 to the matched-model index.
Omitting the country dummies implies a slightly smaller estimate of
the bias in the matched-model index of 0.032 index points in December
2010. This implies that the bias in the matched-model index due to the
failure to capture price declines from changing source countries is only
about 0.006 index points in December 2010. The difference between
the hedonic index that includes country dummies and the hedonic index
from the regression with no country dummies may underestimate the
country mix effect because of omitted variable bias. The differences
between the weighted matched-model index and the various hedonic
indexes, stated in terms of differences in average annual growth rates,
are shown in Table 9.4.
Table 9.4 Amounts by Which Matched-Model Index Growth Rate
Exceeds Moving-Window Hedonic Growth Rates for HS 8528
(% per year, 2000–2010)
Country dummies included
0.44
Country dummies excluded
0.53
Adjusted for changing country mix
0.72
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

We also estimate pooled hedonic indexes as a kind of robustness
check on the moving-window hedonic results. Figure 9.7 shows the differences between the pure matched-model index for HS 8528 and the
indexes that incorporate pooled hedonic price indexes for televisions.
Like the moving-window hedonic indexes, the pooled hedonic indexes all
imply positive estimates for the ending bias in the matched-model index.
Indeed, the pooled version of the unadjusted hedonic index that includes
country dummies implies the same estimate of bias owing to underestimation of gains from improvements in technology as the movingwindow version, 0.026 index points.
On the other hand, the pooled speciﬁcation produces a lower hedonic
index than the moving-window speciﬁcation in the case where country
dummies are omitted from the model, and a slightly higher hedonic
index in the case where country dummies are included and an adjustment is made for the effects of changing country mix. Under the pooled
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Figure 9.7 Differences between Weighted Matched-Model and Weighted
Hedonic Indexes for HS 8528: Televisions and Other Video
Devices
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speciﬁcation, the no-country-dummies index is 0.064 index points
below the matched-model index in December 2010, while the adjusted
hedonic index is just 0.034 index points lower than the matched-model
index. Under the pooled speciﬁcation, the adjusted hedonic index
implies a bias in the matched-model index from changing sourcing
of 0.008 index points, while the no-country-dummies hedonic index
implies that this bias is 0.038 index points. These differences in average annual growth rates between the pooled hedonic indexes and the
matched-model index are shown in Table 9.5.
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Table 9.5 Amounts by Which Matched-Model Index Growth Rate
Exceeds Pooled Hedonic Growth Rates for HS 8528 (% per
year, 2000–2010)
Country dummies included
0.43
Country dummies excluded
1.11
Adjusted for changing country mix
0.58
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

Television Component of HS 8528
Even though we cannot show the television component of HS 8528
as a separate index, we can calculate how sensitive the television index
is to the choice of method. To ﬁnd the difference between a matchedmodel index and a hedonic index for televisions, we divide the difference between the logarithmic matched-model and hedonic indexes for
HS 8528 by the weight of the television component of HS 8528, which
is 0.343. The implied difference for televisions in the ﬁnal period can
then be converted into an average annual growth rate over the 11 years
covered by the sample.
The growth rate of the matched-model index for televisions is 2.2
percent per year above that of the adjusted moving-window hedonic
index (Table 9.6). Subtracting the 1.3 percentage points coming from
unmeasured technological improvements (measured by the unadjusted
hedonic index) leaves 0.9 percentage points of the bias in the matchedmodel index growth rate to be attributed to changing source countries.
To gauge the robustness of the results to the estimation method, we
show in Table 9.6 some alternative estimates of the bias in the matchedmodel index. Omitting the country dummies rather than adjusting for
the predicted effect of changing country mix reduces the estimate of the
total bias implied by a moving-window hedonic index to 1.6 percent
per year. Pooling all the years rather than running overlapping regressions on pairs of years reduces the estimate of the total bias based on the
model with country dummies to 1.8 percent per year but increases the
estimate based on the model with no country dummies to 3.4 percent
per year. Subtracting the estimate of the bias from technology-related
quality change from each of the alternative estimates of the total gives a
range of estimates of 0.5 to 2.1 percent per year for the effect of changing source countries.
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Table 9.6 Estimates of Bias in a Matched-Model Index for Televisions
Implied by Different Speciﬁcations of the Weighted Hedonic
Regression
From hedonic
regression with
country dummies,
From hedonic
From using country’s undermeasurement
regression excluding coefﬁcients to adjust of technology-related
Type of hedonic
country dummies for change in country
quality change
regression
(% per year)
mix (% per year)
(% per year)
Moving window
1.6
2.2
1.3
3.4
1.8
1.3
All years pooled
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

HS 90 and Cameras
Besides televisions, we investigate differences between hedonic
and matched-model indexes for cameras. Cameras are a component of
the published import index for HS 90, “Optical, photographic, measuring, and medical instruments,” so we show indexes for HS 90 that
incorporate matched-model and hedonic indexes for cameras. Even
though fewer than 4 percent of the observations classiﬁed in HS 90 are
for cameras during the period we examine (January 2000–March 2006),
the HS 90 index is sufﬁciently sensitive to the choice of method for its
cameras component to produce interesting results.
The baseline for the comparisons with hedonic indexes is again a
matched-model index meant to simulate the ofﬁcial methodology. Most
of the time our weighted matched-model Jevons index has virtually the
same rate of change as the ofﬁcial index for HS 90, and it exhibits
similar turning points (Figure 9.8). However, there are two episodes
where our matched-model index is ﬂat or slowly rising at the same time
that the ofﬁcial indexes are falling. The ﬁrst episode occurs in June–
September of 2001, and the second occurs in January–March of 2006.
An index of the weighted average price is also shown in Figure 9.8.
A notable decline in the average price relative to the matched-model
index occurs between June 2001 and April 2002. The growing gap
between the matched-model and average-price indexes implies that the
average quality of imported cameras was declining over that time interval. An alternative explanation could, of course, be that the matched-
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Figure 9.8 Matched-Model and Average Import Price lndexes for HS 90:
Cameras and Other Photographic, Measuring, and Medical
Instruments
Published
index
Ofﬁcial BLS
index
average-price
index (with carry-forward imputations)
Weighted average
price index

1.01

Weighted matched
model inde
x (with carry-forward imputations)
matched-model
index

1.00

Index (Jan. 2000 = 1)

0.99
0.98
0.97
0.96
0.95
0.94

2006-01

2005-10

2005-07

2005-04

2005-01

2004-10

2004-07

2004-04

2004-01

2003-10

2003-07

2003-04

2003-01

2002-10

2002-07

2002-04

2002-01

2001-10

2001-07

2001-04

2001-01

2000-10

2000-07

2000-04

2000-01

0.93

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors’ calculations.

model index is upwardly biased. Part of the relative decline in average price comes from the emergence of inexpensive digital cameras
as a popular camera type, and another part of the decline seems to be
due to changes in source countries. Such collinearity between physical changes in characteristics and changes in source countries tends
to reduce the precision with which independent slope coefﬁcients for
these two kinds of effects can be identiﬁed in a hedonic regression.
The moving-window hedonic index with country dummies assumes
that price differentials between countries reﬂect quality differences.
According to this index, the matched-model index has a cumulative bias
of zero up to January 2004 (Figure 9.9). In other words, the adjustments
for declining quality that are implicit in the matched-model procedure
are deemed to be correct, on average, up to 2004. Over the subsequent
two years, however, changes in physical characteristics embodied in
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new camera models do appear to cause declines in quality-adjusted
prices that are missed by the matched-model index.
Adjusting the moving-window hedonic index so it includes effects
of country-sourcing changes gives a different picture. In fact, this
adjusted hedonic index behaves much like the index of the average
price up to 2004. Figure 9.8 shows that in early 2002, the average price
index dropped precipitously relative to the matched-model index; as a
result, the matched-model index considerably overstates price change
in early 2002, according to the adjusted moving-window hedonic index.
Thereafter, the cumulative bias in the matched-model index implied by
the adjusted hedonic index rises slowly but consistently until the end of
the sample period.
Figure 9.9 Difference between Matched-Model Index and Hedonic
Indexes for HS 90: Cameras and Other Photographic,
Measuring, and Medical Instruments
Matched-model index—two-year overlapping hedonics index
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The implication that physical changes in cameras between 2000
and 2004 did not affect their average quality level seems questionable.
The low slope coefﬁcients on physical characteristics in the model with
country dummies could reﬂect the imprecision caused by collinearity
and small sample sizes. In fact, the hedonic index with no country dummies implies that roughly half of the large decline in the average price
index relative to the matched-model index is caused by falling quality
that is due to changes in physical characteristics. This quality adjustment results in a smaller estimate of the total bias in the matched-model
index than is produced by the adjusted hedonic index.
The pooled approach to ﬁtting the hedonic regression may also help
with the problem of collinearity and small sample size. The magnitude
of the adjustment for country mix is markedly smaller using the pooled
regression model, and the behavior of all three hedonic indexes is plausible (Figure 9.10).
The growth rate differences between the matched-model index
and the various moving-window approaches and the pooled hedonic
indexes are summarized in Table 9.7. The two approaches agree on the
total size of the bias in the matched-model indexes, but the movingwindow hedonic implies that a larger portion of this bias comes from
changing source countries.
Table 9.7 Differences in Average Growth Rate between the MatchedModel Index and Hedonic Indexes for HS 90
Moving-window
hedonic
Pooled hedonic
Country dummies included
0.21
0.31
Country dummies excluded
0.29
0.33
Adjusted for changing country mix
0.36
0.36
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

Camera Component of HS 90
The weight of cameras within the HS 90 aggregate is about onethirtieth, so we infer the effects of hedonic adjustment on the cameras
index by scaling up the effects on the logarithmic HS90 index by a
factor of 30. Table 9.8 shows the implied differences in average annual
growth rates. The ﬁrst two rows are based on the last date available for
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Figure 9.10 Difference between Matched-Model Index and Hedonic
Indexes for HS 90: Cameras and Other Photographic,
Measuring, and Medical Instruments
Matched-model index— pooled hedonics index
Matched-model index— pooled hedonics index, no country dummies
Matched-model index— pooled hedonics index, adjusted for country mix
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each individual time series, while the third row of Table 9.8 uses the
ending date for the pooled hedonic indexes that is used for the movingwindow hedonic indexes. (The pooled hedonic indexes in Figure 9.10
end three months later than the moving-window hedonic indexes
in Figure 9.9.) If the same ending date is used, the moving-window
and pooled approaches imply similar estimates of the total bias in the
matched-model index of about 11.5 percent per year. On the other hand,
if a longer period is used for the pooled hedonic regression, the pooled
indexes are all 0.9 percentage points below the comparable movingwindow hedonic index.
According to the moving-window indexes, the bias in the matchedmodel index caused by declines in quality-adjusted prices associated
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Table 9.8 Estimates of Bias in the Matched-Model Index for Cameras
Implied by Different Speciﬁcations of the Weighted Hedonic
Regression
Estimated
unmeasured
technology-related
Estimate from
Estimate from quality change from
hedonic regression adjusting for change hedonic regression
excluding country in countries using
with country
Type of hedonic
dummies
country coefﬁcients
dummies
regression
(% per year)
(% per year)
(% per year)
Moving window
9.0
11.4
6.7
All years pooled
8.1
10.5
5.8
All years pooled, same
10.1
11.6
9.3
ending month as for
moving window
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

with new technology amounts to 6.7 percent per year, whereas based
on the pooled hedonic indexes this bias amounts to just 5.8 percent
per year. The latter ﬁgure is consistent with prior literature: movingwindow estimates from an earlier study by Manninen (2005) also imply
a bias of 5.8 percent per year in a matched-model index for digital cameras from Q4 of 1999 to Q4 of 2002. (Manninen used consumer prices,
so the matched-model index in that study may have captured the price
declines caused by changing source countries.)
The adjustment for the price effect of changing country mix is 4.7
percent per year both for the moving-window hedonic regressions and
for the full-sample pooled hedonic regression. On the other hand, using
the shorter time period, the pooled hedonic regression attributes just
2.3 percent per year of the total bias to changes in source country. The
hedonic regressions with no country dummies (using either the moving
window or the full sample for the pooled index) also imply a bias of 2.3
percent per year from changes in source country.
The sample period for the camera indexes is only about six years
long, and the variances of the moving-window coefﬁcient estimates
tend to be high because of problems of small sample size and collinearity between changes in physical characteristics and changes in source
country. Imposing additional restrictions can be a way of reducing the
variances of regression coefﬁcient estimates, and holding the coefﬁ-
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cients constant over our relatively short panel data set on cameras does
not seem highly restrictive. Thus, in this case, the pooled approach may
produce more reliable estimates of the hedonic model than the more
ﬂexible moving-window approach.
Bananas
As a check on whether our hedonic indexes for televisions and cameras could be producing spurious measures of the effects of evolving
technology, we calculate the same sort of hedonic indexes for bananas.
We would not expect to ﬁnd evidence of unmeasured gains from technological progress for this product, nor is there a reason to expect that
large cost savings have been realized by changing source countries for
this product. However, as noted above, bananas have had changes in
source country, so price effects from changes in source country may not
equal zero.
Bananas have a weight of about one-ﬁfth in the publication-level
import index for HS 08, the category “edible fruits and nuts.” After
excluding “index prices” (which are reference prices reported by
respondents who prefer not to provide an actual transaction price), our
matched-model index for HS 08, edible fruits and nuts, usually tracks
the shorter-term movements of the ofﬁcial index for HS 08, and over
the longer run it shows very similar growth to the ofﬁcial index (Figure
9.11). Its average growth rate over the whole sample period is 0.73
percent, compared with 0.65 percent per year for the ofﬁcial index. The
average price index, on the other hand, has a long-run growth rate of
1.18 percent per year.
The hedonic indexes for bananas behave very differently from
those for televisions and cameras. In contrast to the estimates of upward
bias in matched-model import indexes for televisions and cameras, they
imply that some price increases are missed by the matched-model index
(Figure 9.12). Thus, in this case there is no evidence of unmeasured
price declines from factors such as technological progress. However,
this difference in the sign of the matched-model index’s bias is consistent with the hypothesis that matched-model indexes tend to be too ﬂat,
missing increases when prices are generally rising and decreases when
prices are generally falling. The indexes for televisions and cameras
have a downward trend, while banana prices have an upward trend.
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Figure 9.11 Matched-Model and Average Import Price Indexes for HS
08: Edible Fruits and Nuts
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SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors’ calculations.

Furthermore, comparing the unadjusted hedonic index that includes
country dummies to either 1) the index with no country dummies or
2) the index that was adjusted to treat price differential between countries as true price differences rather than quality differences shows that
sourcing for bananas has a slight tendency to migrate to more expensive
countries. The unadjusted hedonic index that includes country dummies
grows on average 1.28 percent per year, whereas the adjusted index
grows 1.19 percent per year. In contrast, for televisions and cameras,
sourcing had a strong tendency to migrate to less expensive countries.

CONCLUSION
The import and export price indexes are constructed as matchedmodel indexes. If new entrants have lower quality-adjusted prices than
incumbents, and incumbents either exit or fail to adjust their prices to
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Figure 9.12 Difference between Matched-Model Index and Hedonic
Indexes for HS 08: Edible Fruits and Nuts
Matched-model index—weighted pooled hedonics index, no country dummies
Matched-model index—weighted pooled hedonics index, adjusted for country mix
Matched-model index—average price index
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match those of the entrants, the matched-model index will be upwardly
biased, other things being equal. Thus, when technological progress
leads to frequent entry of new models with lower quality-adjusted
prices, matched-model indexes can easily suffer upward bias. Furthermore, the movement of production to lower-cost foreign locations can
also lead to price reductions that would not be measured by a matchedmodel import index, because sourcing an item from a new country usually results in that item being treated as a new item. Hedonic index
methods are a possible way to address these concerns. Yet they have
not been viewed as feasible for import price indexes because of the limited collection of information on product characteristics and, in some
cases, small sample sizes for purposes of estimating a hedonic regression model.
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One goal of this chapter is to disprove the view that hedonic indexes
are not feasible for imports. Our results show that hedonic methods
indeed are a realistic alternative for at least some of the imported
products that have experienced technological progress and changes in
sourcing. Our results also provide evidence on the existence and size
of the biases in a matched-model-type import index for two of these
products, televisions and cameras. They support the hypothesis that
technological progress and changes in source countries have led to
reductions in quality-adjusted prices that are incompletely reﬂected in
the matched-model import price index. In the case of televisions, our
preferred adjusted moving-window hedonic regression implies a bias
in the matched-model index of 2.2 percent per year, of which 1.3 percentage points come from undermeasured gains from new technology
and 0.9 percentage points come from unmeasured price savings from
country substitution. For cameras, our preferred pooled hedonic regression speciﬁcation implies a total bias in the matched-model index of
10.5 percent per year, of which 5.8 percentage points come from undermeasured gains from new technology and 4.7 percentage points come
from country sourcing changes.

Notes
The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and should not be attributed
to the IMF, its management, or its executive directors; nor do they reﬂect the views of
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
1. For a recent study with estimates of outlet substitution bias, see Greenlees and
McClelland (2011).
2. Gagnon, Mandel, and Vigfusson (2012) prefer different assumptions and ﬁnd
smaller effects of omitted price changes for exiting and entering items than those
found by Nakamura and Steinsson (2012).
3. For example, Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) show that new producers in
China supply identical-quality semiconductors at lower prices than established
producers in other countries. Thomas, Marquez, and Fahle (2008) attempt to measure price reductions from substitution to low-cost countries for a wider range of
products.
4. For motor vehicles, the upper-bound estimate for the bias from import sourcing
changes is a bit smaller, at about 0.7 percent per year, while for apparel it is about
0.25 percent per year.
5. We focus on color televisions sized 13 inches or larger and exclude television/
VCR combinations. We do not include plantains in the analysis of bananas.
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6. When respondents are worried about disclosure of their transaction price, they can
give an index price that approximates the behavior of the actual price instead of an
actual transaction price.
7. Almost 12 percent of the televisions experience these temporary exits, as opposed
to about 6 percent for bananas.
8. When using the cell-relative method, the missing value is determined by the
change in the index value for the nonmissing values in a particular class. When
using the class-mean method, the missing value is determined by the mean of
the nonmissing values for a particular class. The International Price Program also
sometimes uses linear interpolation to impute prices.
9. In calculating these average durations and price change frequencies, we included
items for which the observable life span was truncated because they entered before
January 2000 or exited after the end of our sample (December 2010 for televisions
or March 2006 for cameras). Correcting for truncation bias will raise our estimates
slightly.
10. The Laspeyres indexes used by the BLS are more precisely described as Lowe
indexes because their weights are based on values from a previous year; these
values have subsequently been updated for price change. From 1997 to 2001 the
weights in the MPI came from 1995. After 2001 the weights began to be updated
annually, with a lag of two years.
11. The standard deﬁnition of a Jevons index is an unweighted geometric mean of
price relatives. Within any given classiﬁcation group our Jevons indexes are,
indeed, unweighted, but weights are applied when we aggregate over the classiﬁcation groups that make up a Jevons index. These weights come from the same
year used for the ofﬁcial index and reﬂect trade values in that year.
12. In future research we plan to test the method of full hedonic imputation. This
method uses the estimated coefﬁcients from the comparison period regression to
predict prices of items that were present in the base period, and it uses the estimated coefﬁcients from the base period to predict prices of items present in the
comparison period.
13. For national accounts purposes it would be helpful to have separate data on values and prices of imported televisions and video monitors. Televisions are mostly
used for ﬁnal consumption, but video monitors have signiﬁcant uses as investment
goods. Because of the way investment is measured in the U.S. national accounts,
an inaccurate split between imports of ﬁnal consumption goods and imports of
investment goods could affect the measurement of GDP.

Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb 325

2/16/2015 8:35:55 AM

Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb 326

2/16/2015 8:35:56 AM

Appendix 9A
Table 9A.1 Quality Characteristics Used in Hedonic Regressions
Product
Characteristics
Televisions
Type
Plasma, CRT, LCD, projection, LED
Size
Brand
Premium (Sony, Sharp, LG, Samsung, Panasonic) or other
Intraﬁrm
Country of origin
Cameras
Type
Point-and-shoot, Polaroid, SLR
Format
Digital, ﬁlm
Focus
Autofocus, ﬁxed focus, manual focus
Brand
Canon, Nikon, or other
Intraﬁrm
Country of origin
Bananas
Type
Cavendish or other
Grade
Grade 1 or 2
Crate size
Intraﬁrm
Country of origin
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
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10
Producing an Input Price Index
William Alterman
formerly of the Bureau of Labor Statistics

This chapter is designed to address the need—and especially the
feasibility—of producing what is referred to as an input price index
(IPI) at the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).1 The current interest
in this set of proposed price indexes grew out of concerns that the BLS
does not directly measure price decreases associated with the dramatic
rise in offshoring (or its corollary, onshoring) in its industrial price programs.2 These new price indexes would help alleviate unease that current estimates of several key indicators of the U.S. economy—including gross domestic product (GDP), productivity, and inﬂation—may be
inadequate.
Currently, the BLS has three price indexes that cover the production
(or supply) of goods: 1) the U.S. Import Price Index (MPI), 2) the U.S.
Export Price Index (XPI), and 3) the Producer Price Index (PPI). The
MPI only covers goods that are being imported, the XPI only covers
the export of goods, and the PPI only covers goods and services that
are produced domestically. Thus, a good that is domestically produced
and repriced by the PPI, and subsequently has its production sent overseas, will no longer be tracked in the PPI. Correspondingly, the MPI
will not begin to price that particular item until after it has become an
import. Therefore, neither program will directly show the price change
that occurs when the item goes from domestic production to foreign (or
vice versa).
In order to address this limitation, the BLS would need to develop
an entirely new set of “input” price indexes, which would directly price
goods and services that are inputs into the production function of a
domestic company. Indeed, the BLS itself recognized the need for this
type of series over 30 years ago when the old “wholesale price index”
was transformed into the more comprehensive and systematic outputbased producer price indexes. At that time, the BLS actually piloted a
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“buyers’” index, but, primarily because of budget limitations, this earlier effort at an input price index was never extended.
This chapter will detail the problem in the current methodology for
price indexes that an import price index would be designed to overcome, as well as review some of the evidence on the need for these data.
Finally, the chapter will discuss the practical aspects and limitations of
attempting to produce such an index. These include surveying the data
sources necessary for drawing a sample of establishments and items to
reprice, evaluating possible sources for appropriate weights in an input
price index, determining a proper index estimation formula, and verifying the publication structure necessary to support the different uses of
these series.

THE PROBLEM
An example of how the BLS constructs an import price index and
a producer price index will help to illuminate the problem described
above. Let us look at how both indexes would reﬂect price changes in
the manufacturing of furniture. Table 10.1 contains prices for four different chairs. All chairs that are being produced domestically sell for $10,
while all imported chairs sell for $5. Chair A is only produced domestically, while Chair D is only imported. During the year, the remaining
two chairs shift from domestic production to being imported—Chair B
in March and Chair C in May.
The PPI tracks only Chair A for the entire period, and Chairs B
and C for the months that they are domestically produced. The MPI
tracks only chair D for the entire period, and chairs B and C only for the
months they are imported. Thus, both the PPI and the MPI for chairs
would reﬂect no change during the entire reference period.3
Is there a way to combine the two indexes to reﬂect the impact
of a switch from domestic production to importing the same chairs?
Since the indexes are always unchanged, no amount of recombining or reweighting will produce anything other than a series showing
unchanged prices. The only way to construct a price index that would
show the price decline resulting from the offshoring of chairs B and C
would be to directly track the price changes of items as they move from
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Table 10.1 Tracking Prices When Sourcing Shifts
Jan. ’09 Feb. ’09 Mar. ’09 Apr. ’09 May ’09 June ’09
Chair A Domestic ($)
10
10
10
10
10
10
Chair B Domestic ($)
10
10
Chair B Imported ($)
5
5
5
5
Chair C Domestic ($)
10
10
10
10
Chair C Imported ($)
5
5
Chair D Imported ($)
5
5
5
5
5
5
PPI (%)
MPI (%)
Combined index (%)
Input index (%)

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

100.0
100.0
100.0
85.7

100.0
100.0
100.0
85.7

100.0
100.0
100.0
71.4

100.0
100.0
100.0
71.4

SOURCE: Author’s construction.

domestic to foreign and vice versa. This is not possible under the methodology (and concepts) currently in use in the bureau’s two industrial
price programs.4

WHY AN INPUT PRICE INDEX IS IMPORTANT
Although the BLS was aware of the potential data gaps between
XPI, MPI, and PPI, the shifts over time between domestic and foreign
production may have been gradual enough that it was not evident that
the limitation of the indexes could be introducing biases into the nation’s
economic data. This potential gap in BLS data, however, became more
serious as the proportion of the U.S. economy tied to the global economy expanded, and especially in conjunction with the growing perception that U.S. jobs were being lost to foreign competition and foreign
workers.
The potential shortcomings in the BLS indexes were highlighted in
an article in BusinessWeek (Mandel 2007) and subsequently in a study
funded by the Sloan Foundation and the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA).5 As the article and the study point out, an accurate estimate of the
trend in prices paid by domestic U.S. establishments for inputs of both
goods and services is crucial to a number of broad and critical measures
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of the economy, such as GDP and productivity. For example, in order
to properly estimate GDP by industry (as constructed by the BEA) and
by industry productivity estimates (as constructed by the BLS), the producers of these economic data must subtract input costs. Although these
data are usually readily available on a current dollar basis, in order to
convert these nominal values to a constant dollar basis—that is, to an
inﬂation-adjusted basis, also referred to as a real (as opposed to a nominal) basis—they must be adjusted by changes in price levels. However,
the appropriate price measures paralleling these input values are not
currently being produced by the BLS. Consequently, the BEA and BLS
must make use of whatever price data are available. Generally, this has
required the agencies to make use of the PPI price indexes or the import
price indexes.
The argument has been made that using these next-best sources may
lead to signiﬁcant mismeasurements in the economy. For example, the
BusinessWeek story estimated that the increase in real GDP from 2003
to mid-2007 may have been overestimated by $66 billion.
As evidence of this, the article’s author, Mandel, points out the
apparently contradictory behavior of consumer prices for furniture—
which had been falling—at the same time that the indexes for domestic
producer prices as well as import prices for this category had both been
moving higher. Conversely, the article also infers that the lack of an
input price index may lead to a signiﬁcant overestimate of productivity in U.S. industry. A rise in a nation’s productivity is considered the
key factor in an economy’s ability to improve that nation’s standard of
living, as it is presumed that increases in real hourly earnings should
move in conjunction with gains in productivity. If, in fact, GDP and
productivity are being overestimated, this implies that the gains from
trade (i.e., the terms of trade) are being underestimated and that, in real
terms, the value of imports is greater than currently measured.
A growing body of literature—much of it in conjunction with the
original 2009 conference and a second conference in 2013—has looked
into the increasing role of imports in intermediate inputs in the U.S.
economy, the current price index methodology used in the BLS, and
their implications in U.S. estimates of GDP and productivity. For example, Kurz and Lengermann (2008) note that foreign inputs accounted
for one-third of growth in the manufacturing sector between 1997 and
2005. Houseman et al. (2011) further explore the subject and ﬁnd that
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as a result of the mismeasurement of the shift from domestic to lowcost foreign suppliers, the growth in real value-added in manufacturing
may have been overstated by between 0.2 and 0.5 percentage points
from 1997 to 2007. Along similar lines, Feenstra et al. (2009) attribute a substantial portion of the apparent acceleration in productivity gains after 1995 to gains in the terms of trade and to tariff reductions. Additional work on this topic has been conducted by Houseman,
Bartik, and Sturgeon (Chapter 5, this volume), who raise concerns over
potential overestimates of productivity in the computer sector. In looking at Japanese data, Fukao and Arai (Chapter 7, this volume) conclude
Japan also has “a relatively large offshoring bias.” Using data from
38 economies, Inklaar (Chapter 6, this volume) ﬁnds evidence of systematic bias as a result of offshoring for the advanced economies. In
related work, Nakamura and Steinsson (2009) ﬁnd limitations in the
import and export price indexes associated with “product replacement
bias.” Finally, Nakamura et al. (Chapter 2, this volume) see the need
for a large increase in data collection by statistical agencies as well as
changes in their price index methodology that would allow for more
direct comparisons of closely related items from different sources.
In order to provide additional evidence of the growing need for a set
of input price indexes that incorporate both domestic and foreign sourcing, I analyzed the most recent available data on the role of imports
in domestic supply. In 1975, imports, as measured in current dollars,
represented less than 7 percent of inputs into manufacturing. By 2007
the ﬁgure had climbed to almost 28 percent (see Figure 10.1). Equally
important is that between 1997 and 2007 the percentage of imports
in inputs increased by an average of more than 0.40 percent a year,
whereas in the previous decade the percentage had increased by less
than 0.25 percent a year. This point is interesting because it implies
that there is an acceleration in companies’ shifting their products from
domestic sourcing to foreign sourcing, making the need for additional
data more critical.6
Indeed, globalization may be happening so quickly that the ability
of traditional measures to capture these shifts has become increasingly
problematic. For example, the household wood furniture manufacturing industry—the industry highlighted in the BusinessWeek article—
recorded a dramatic increase during the past decade in the value of
imports, which jumped from $13.2 billion in 1999 to $27.0 billion in
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Figure 10.1 Imports as a Percentage of Domestic Supply Manufacturing
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NOTE: There is a break in the series in 1998. Data prior to 1998 are based on the
Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) code for manufacturing. More recent data are
based on the North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS).
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis.

2007. The article also points out that, according to ofﬁcial statistics,
productivity went up 23 percent and output rose 3 percent between
2000 and 2005 (Mandel 2007). Interestingly, in 2006 the preliminary
estimate from the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) for the
household wood furniture sector recorded an increase in the value of
domestic production, up from $13.0 billion in 1999 to $13.5 billion
in 2006 (U.S. Census Bureau 2013). However, when the ﬁnal ﬁgures
were revised the following year, the number was adjusted substantially
downward, to only $8.6 billion. This may be due in part to the difﬁculty
of properly (and in a timely manner) coding companies to the correct
North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) number when
they shift from being a manufacturer to being essentially a wholesaler.
The key point is that economic data tasked with reﬂecting current trends
must be ﬂexible enough to allow for continual changes in the composition of the economy.7 Ideally, an input price index will facilitate this
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ﬂexibility, as it allows for rapid capturing of changes in suppliers (and
prices) of inputs.

EARLIER ATTEMPTS TO CONSTRUCT INPUT OR BUYERS’
PRICE INDEXES
The seminal 1961 report of the NBER Price Statistics Review Committee, the so-called Stigler Report (Stigler 1961), made a number of
recommendations surrounding the wholesale price indexes—the name
given to the industrial price series then being produced by the BLS. One
of the recommendations called for the creation of a set of conceptually
rigorous input and output price indexes. A second recommendation was
that the bureau should rely on buyers’ prices and not on sellers’ prices.
The report included a study that suggested that buyers’ prices were
more likely than list prices to reﬂect the prices of actual transactions.
Using Buyers’ Prices
In response to the Stigler Report and subsequent studies, the thenBLS commissioner as well as others expressed concerns that the cost of
collecting buyers’ prices would outweigh the potential beneﬁts because
of potential problems such as buyers’ prices from an invoice sometimes
not reﬂecting real transaction prices, difﬁculties capturing retroactive
price adjustments based on cumulative volume, and ﬁnancial assistance
given by sellers to buyers for advertising and other expenses.8 The BLS
did, however, agree that the project had merit on a case-by-case basis
in order to facilitate analysis of price trends in industries where transaction pricing was especially problematic.
A more detailed study looking into the advantages of buyers’ prices
was subsequently published in Stigler and Kindahl (1970), which
pointed out the differences in price trends between buyers’ and sellers’ prices. Because much of the concern with the then-named BLS
wholesale price index (WPI) focused on the use (or potential misuse)
of so-called list prices, BLS economists began working with the sellers
who were participating in the price survey to encourage the reporting of
actual transaction prices. In doing so, they made substantial progress in
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some industries in improving the quality of the received prices. In addition, the bureau also began the process of evaluating speciﬁc products
where buyers’ prices should be collected because of the unavailability
of transaction prices from sellers. As a result of this study, in January 1972 the newly renamed PPI began publishing a commodity index
for aluminum ingots using buyers’ prices from a selected sample of
reporters.
Building on this work, in 1974 the bureau attempted a systematic
sampling approach to obtaining buyers’ prices. This project was undertaken with the goal of determining the feasibility and cost of collecting
prices directly from buyers in order to either calculate price indexes or
evaluate the quality of the transaction prices being reported by sellers.
The project identiﬁed product areas where sellers refused to provide
transaction data, or the quality of current transaction data was questionable, and where there were homogeneous products frequently purchased
by buyers in consistent quantities. The project focused on titanium forgings instead of aluminum ingots because the PPI was able to create a
sampling frame and document the typical transaction characteristics of
buyers in this product area. Even after signiﬁcant resources had been
spent on this project, pricing issues remained, and an effective process
had not been identiﬁed to reﬁne and systematically sample from the
frame. As a result, the project was dropped, and the program switched
its focus back to obtaining good transaction prices from sellers even in
these more difﬁcult cases. No further work was done on buyers’ prices,
and in 1980, the BLS introduced indexes calculated using sellers’ transaction prices from the systematic sample for the primary aluminum
industry output index. When this occurred, the buyers’ price commodity index for aluminum ingots was dropped.
Input/Output (and Other) Price Indexes
Also in response to the Stigler Report, the BLS began examining a
more systematic approach to creating input and output price indexes (as
well as other indexes) for industries. For example, in the early 1960s the
PPI built output industry-sector price indexes (ISPI) for some industries
by combining the judgmentally sampled data collected for the commodity indexes using different classiﬁcation structures and weighting.
Finally, in the mid-1970s, the PPI began a comprehensive revision in
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order to plan and implement many improvements that had been recommended over the years, including in the Stigler Report. The longterm goal of the revision was to expand the PPI’s coverage to include
every industry in the private economy and to publish a system of price
indexes that included the following:
• Industry output indexes
• Industry input indexes
• Detailed commodity indexes
• Industry-based stage-of-processing indexes
In the late 1970s the Bureau began systematically sampling industries,
and starting in 1980 it began introducing industry output indexes on a
regular basis. Throughout the years, the PPI continued expanding the
number of industry output indexes, and as of 2013 it covered 98 percent
of domestic goods manufacturers and 72 percent of in-scope domestic
service industries.
While the practical work focused on an output price index, work
did proceed on the theory of an input price index, culminating in a BLS
working paper by Archibald (1975). Furthermore, as an attempt to fulﬁll the recommendations of the Stigler report, and as a component of
the stage of processing indexes, the bureau did publish a set of input
price indexes from 1988 to 2003. These indexes were calculated by
reweighting output prices using input weights. This allowed the use of
output price indexes at a great level of detail. However, these indexes
did not include imports, nor did they directly account for substitution
from a buyer’s perspective. Thus they assumed that sellers’ prices are a
good proxy for buyers’ prices and that prices for imports and domestic
production move similarly. The BLS discontinued these series in 2003,
but the method is still used in the BEA and BLS for constructing input
price indexes where necessary.9

CURRENT USES AND USERS OF THE DATA
The fundamental question facing the BLS, of course, is, “Can the
Bureau produce an input price series that will meet the needs of its
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primary users?” In order to answer this question, one must ﬁrst delve
into the intricacies of the construction of the outputs of the two primary
potential users of these data, the Ofﬁce of Productivity and Technology
(OPT) at the BLS, and the Industry Sector Division (ISD) of the BEA.
The Ofﬁce of Productivity and Technology at the Bureau of
Labor Statistics
We will start with the OPT, which produces three sets of estimates of
multifactor productivity (MFP), or output per unit of combined inputs.
First, OPT publishes multifactor productivity estimates for the broad
private business and private nonfarm business sectors of the economy.
These sectors represent 74 percent of U.S. GDP. In calculating these
series, outputs are measured on a value-added basis, and consequently
the multifactor productivity measure only shows the returns to labor and
capital.10 The value of material inputs does not enter into these calculations. However, staff does use detailed price indexes to deﬂate inputs
of capital expenditures. Physical capital, as measured by the OPT, consists of 42 types of equipment and software, 21 types of nonresidential
structures, nine types of residential capital, inventories (manufacturing
available for three stages of fabrication), and land. Deﬂation of each
capital expenditure category is actually done at the detailed ﬁve- or sixdigit input-output (I-O) level.
Second, the OPT also publishes annual multifactor productivity
measures for total manufacturing and 18 broad three-digit NAICS manufacturing industries, comparing sectoral output (total output excluding
intraindustry or intrasector transactions) to a broad set of inputs, including capital, labor, energy, materials, and business services (KLEMS)
inputs. Consequently, MFP measures in this set of manufacturing industries reﬂect the return on each of these inputs to production. (Note that
on a value-added basis, manufacturing represented 12 percent of GDP
in 2012.) In the manufacturing sector of the economy and in individual
industries, intermediate purchases constitute the largest component of
inputs. The nominal dollar and constant dollar values of energy, materials, and services used by the OPT are obtained from the BEA.
Finally, the OPT publishes more detailed annual multifactor productivity measures for 86 four-digit NAICS manufacturing industries,
plus air transportation and line-haul railroads. These productivity mea-
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sures also compare industry sectoral output to a broad set of combined
inputs. The OPT publishes estimates of intermediate purchases, capital,
and labor for each of the detailed manufacturing industries. The index
of intermediate purchases for each industry is constructed by combining separate quantities (or constant dollar costs) of electricity, fuels,
materials, and purchased services. In order to deﬂate nominal dollar cost inputs for each industry, weighted deﬂators for materials and
for services are calculated by combining detailed price indexes using
weights derived from the cost of commodities consumed by each industry, as shown in the detailed benchmark I-O tables produced by the
BEA. I-O commodities from the benchmark I-O tables generally relate
to the primary products of six-digit NAICS industries, or occasionally
a combination of industries. For materials commodities that are heavily
imported, the OPT’s Division of Industry Productivity Studies (DIPS)
combines PPIs and import price indexes using weights from the BEA’s
import matrix. DIPS also uses PPIs in creating weighted deﬂators for
deﬂating the annual fuel purchases of each industry.
The OPT also uses PPIs to deﬂate capital expenditures. Price deﬂators for each equipment asset category are constructed by combining
detailed PPIs with weights from the BEA capital ﬂow tables at roughly
the six-digit level. For the DIPS detailed manufacturing industry measures, physical capital consists of 25 categories of equipment, two categories of structures, three categories of inventories, and land.11 Since
industry MFP calculations are based on annual data, the nominal input
values are adjusted by annual PPIs (representing the average of 12
monthly price indexes).
The Industry Sector Division at the Bureau of Economic Analysis
The Industry Sector Division at the BEA is responsible for producing the annual industry accounts and the benchmark input-output
accounts. These accounts, which shed critical light on the relationships
between U.S. industries, take a value-added approach to, and are consistent with, the BEA’s ﬂagship GDP estimates. Although the BEA does
not publish detailed annual real I-O estimates, it does publish annual
price and quantity indexes for 65 detailed industries, including 19 manufacturing industries, which do require data on the real value of inputs.
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As the BLS does in its work, the BEA attempts to make its adjustments at the most detailed level possible. For example, at the BEA, the
effort to construct updated values for intermediate inputs of goods and
services entails making adjustments to approximately 3,500 different
items, of which roughly 2,300 represent categories of goods. Ideally,
like the BLS, the BEA would like to have a level of detail that lists
input price indexes by industry for each of the 1,179 six-digit NAICS
categories. In practice, however, since the cost of producing that many
separate price indexes could prove prohibitive, like the BLS, the BEA
would accept a set of product-based input price indexes. In addition,
at a minimum, category deﬁnitions should be consistent with the 12
expense categories recently added to the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) forms (most of which are services inputs).
While the BEA currently only produces annual estimates of GDP by
industry, there has been growing interest in providing these estimates
on a quarterly basis.
In sum, although superﬁcially the level of publication required to
produce the currently published set of economic data is comparatively
high, in actuality the detail necessary to properly support these estimates may be considerably more disaggregated.
Limitations
It is important to point out that the construction of an input price
index by itself may not directly alleviate the potential mismeasurement issues associated with the problem noted. This is worthy of note
because GDP can be estimated using two different methods: It can be
constructed by measuring ﬁnal sales (Method 1) or it can be estimated
using a value-added approach (Method 2).12 The current methodology
in the United States focuses on the former of these two approaches,
illustrated in the following equations:
(10.1) Y= C + I + G + (X – M) (Expenditures/Final Sales Approach)
(10.2) Y = Σ (Si – Ci) (Production, or Value-Added, Approach),
where Si represents total sales for industry i, and Ci represents the input
costs for the same industry.
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As mentioned earlier, in order to calculate real—or constant dollar—GDP, all of these values must be adjusted for inﬂation using appropriate price indexes. Under Method 1, the adjustments for inﬂation do
not take into account adjustment for inﬂation that is due to offshoring.
This is because an input price index does not play a role in the computation, since the formula still relies on the current import price index, with
its associated potential limitations. Fixing the potential problem could
entail shifting the construction of GDP to Method 2.13
In order to further illuminate why the BLS cannot construct an
import price index that directly registers these price changes, it helps
to review the current methodology. The procedure for producing import
price indexes starts out with a very robust frame from which to draw a
sample. It includes nearly the entire set of transactions of all merchandise brought through U.S. Customs and Border Protection and into the
United States. It breaks transactions out by individual shipments, product categories, and of course, companies. A sample of speciﬁc companies and the items they imported is then drawn from this frame, and the
BLS attempts to collect prices on a monthly basis for these items. Note,
however, that the sample only consists of goods that are already being
imported. It is not practical to ascertain from an importer (who in many
cases may only be an intermediary) whether in the past he sourced
an item domestically. It would also be hard to get information in the
reverse situation, asking an importer who no longer imports whether
the sampled good is now produced domestically and, if so, what the
price is. Presumably, constructing an input price index may potentially
provide some indication of the magnitude of any differences in price
trends being missed by import prices or producer prices as sourcing
shifts from one to the other. This might be possible if, as the pricing data
is being collected, the respondent is able to report whether the item was
bought domestically or from a foreign source. From a practical standpoint, however, it is not clear how this information could be properly
and effectively incorporated into the producer or import price index
production process.
It should also be pointed out that an input price index will not alleviate problems arising when goods and services that had been previously
produced in-house are now shifted to being outsourced (either domestically or to a foreign source). This, too, is considered a growing phenomenon, but unless data on prices associated with the in-house cost of
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producing an item can be directly compared with the outsourced price,
it is not clear how the BLS could evaluate shifts in prices associated
with this phenomenon.

STEPS TO PRODUCE AN INPUT PRICE INDEX
While there is little dispute over the potential advantages of adding
an input price index to the family of price indexes produced by the BLS,
there are the fundamental questions of both the feasibility and the cost
of producing a usable and comprehensive set of indexes.
Developing a Sample
From a practical standpoint, the ﬁrst and perhaps the biggest hurdle
in developing an input price index is developing a frame from which
to draw a sample of establishments. While U.S. manufacturing only
accounts for approximately one-seventh of the value-added output of
the U.S. economy, I determined that, in part because of data availability, this would be the ﬁrst sector where I would attempt to develop a
sample. An earlier work (Alterman 2009) cited the Economic Census
produced by the U.S. Census Bureau, which that agency conducts every
ﬁve years (in years ending in “2” and “7”). In that survey, all U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms are asked to include detailed data on their cost of materials, parts, and supplies consumed in the reference year.
In addition, the less comprehensive but timelier ASM, which is
based on a sample of 50,000 manufacturing establishments, includes a
limited amount of data on purchases, providing one category for total
cost of materials, parts, containers, packaging, and other expenses.
One shortcoming of these surveys is that, while data on capital
expenditures are also collected, they are only split three ways: into
expenditures on 1) motor vehicles, 2) computers, and 3) other. Another
potential shortcoming is the timeliness, or lack thereof, of these sources
of data. Since the detailed data are only collected once every ﬁve years,
it may be that by the time the BLS is able to draw a sample and initiate these establishments into a market basket, the establishments or the

Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb 344

2/16/2015 8:36:07 AM

Producing an Input Price Index 345

products that they buy may be out of date and no longer reﬂective of
their current market.
Although much of the focus has been on the manufacturing sector,
the service sector represents nearly two-thirds of GDP. Unfortunately,
currently the amount of detailed cost data collected by census for the
service industry surveys is more limited. In general, the collection forms
include some detailed data on purchased services, but only limited data
on purchased equipment and materials.14 Interestingly, while the census collects very little detailed data on material costs in the noncensus
years for manufacturing industries, the level of detailed data collected
on the cost of business services, though limited, is roughly the same,
whether it is for the Service Annual Survey or the quinquennial Census
of Service Industries. In general, the surveys break out the purchases
of business services into ﬁve categories: 1) computer services, 2) communication services, 3) advertising and related services, 4) professional
and technical services, and 5) repair and maintenance services.
Until recently, BLS staff have only been able to access the manufacturing data from the Economic Census while on-site at the Research
Data Center at Census Bureau headquarters in Suitland, Maryland. In
April 2012, however, the BLS and the Census Bureau signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that allowed the BLS to bring these
data in-house, thus allowing the bureau to more readily determine
whether these data can be used to develop an appropriate sample.15 The
ﬁrst data sets were transmitted to the BLS in mid-December 2012 and
included information on the detailed cost of materials for over 67,000
individual establishments (primarily manufacturers but also including
some mining and agricultural companies) that reported information as
part of the 2007 Economic Census. The data set represented a subset
of the roughly 328,000 U.S. establishments that are coded by the census as manufacturing establishments and included breakouts of the cost
of materials for approximately 1,340 individual eight-digit material
codes.16
The ﬁrst question that needs to be addressed in drawing a sample
is, of course, “What do you want to publish?” Presumably one could
construct an input price index either by including all inputs for a given
industry, or by including only inputs of a speciﬁc material. After discussions with staff from the BEA as well as the OPT, it was determined
that from a practical standpoint it would be best to, at least initially,
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construct input price indexes that were product-speciﬁc. In the 2009
paper, I stated that a full set of input material price indexes covering
material inputs to manufacturers would require sampling and pricing
roughly 15,000 individual items and calculating and publishing indexes
for 600 six-digit categories.17 Subsequently, these numbers have been
further reﬁned for this exercise.
In attempting to draw a sample, the program would start off with
several assumptions:
• The sample would, if possible, use the standard BLS methodology, involving a multistage stratiﬁed probability-proportionateto-size (PPS) method.
• A published price index should contain a minimum of 25 repriceable items.
• Because of refusals, out-of-scopes, nonresponses, and deterioration rates, the bureau would need to oversample.
• A cap would be placed on the maximum number of price quotes
requested from any individual establishment.
• The sample would only include establishments coded as manufacturers. However, data requested would also include materials
produced by mining and agricultural industries, including a large
value for crude petroleum purchases by the petroleum reﬁnery
industry.
• Purchases of capital expenditures were beyond the scope of this
project.
• The sampling process also would set minimum dollar criteria for
a given establishment’s annual expenditure on cost of materials.
In accessing the detailed census data, it was apparent that there were
some complications with the underlying data. For example, although
the census collects the cost of materials by eight-digit material codes,
which are roughly based on an NAICS structure, these eight-digit codes
do not necessarily aggregate to a speciﬁc six-digit NAICS. In fact, of
the 473 six-digit NAICS codes in manufacturing, only about one-half
had eight-digit material codes mapped to them. In the other cases, the
eight-digit material codes were apparently sufﬁciently broad that they
cut across six-digit NAICS industries.18 This creates a number of prob-
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lems. For example, it would be difﬁcult to construct a set of indexes at
higher levels of aggregation. Also, it would be hard to match up input
data with the corresponding domestic output or import data, which
would be useful for data veriﬁcation. Another potential problem with
the data stems from the high proportion of the reported values for a
given establishment that are not coded to any speciﬁc materials category. Approximately one-quarter of the reported value is coded to a
“not elsewhere speciﬁed” type code.
The strategy used to construct a sampling algorithm for an input
price index draws heavily on the algorithms used in the bureau’s Producer Price Program and especially on the methodology from the
bureau’s International Price Program (IPP), which in addition to the
import price indexes also produces a set of export price indexes. Like
the detailed data collected in the Economic Census, the U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (formerly the U.S. Customs Service) database
provides a very detailed breakout (through a 10-digit Harmonized System code) of the value of imports by establishment. The customs data
are also broken out by month, which permits the BLS not only to sample by detailed product areas but also to sample only those imports of
a given company that are consistently traded over time. Unfortunately,
the Economic Census data only reﬂect annual ﬁgures, so in using these
data there is no way to assess the consistency of a company’s purchases
over the course of a year.19
Although many of the basic methodological challenges associated
with producing these new indexes are similar to the issues successfully addressed in the Bureau’s current price index programs, there are
additional questions that must be addressed. For example, given the
once-every-ﬁve-years time frame for the Economic Census, are the data
too far outdated for reliable use by the time any sample drawn from
this census is used to initiate establishments and items into a survey?
One possible alternative would be to rely upon the somewhat smaller
ASM, which is conducted in every noncensus year. However, while this
survey does collect information on an establishment’s cost of materials, the ASM does not collect data by eight-digit material categories.20
Thus, any establishment-speciﬁc information on the value of their individual purchases would have to be collected as part of the process of
initiating those potential respondents into the program. Of course, the
current procedure in drawing an item sample for the producer price
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indexes already relies heavily on using data supplied by establishments.
However, it is unclear whether establishments would have available the
same level of detail for their purchases as they have for their sales.
In any event, we did attempt to draw a sample using the data from
the 2007 Census of Manufactures. The algorithm relied primarily on
the sampling criteria and sample rotation developed for the import price
indexes. As did that algorithm, the formula for the proposed input price
index made several assumptions:
• A sample would be drawn—and establishments and their selected
items initiated into the program—every two years.
• Prices collected from each sample would be collected for four
years.
• Each index would consist of data drawn from two samples. (For
example, a sample would be drawn in Year One and a separate
sample would be drawn in Year Three. The index for Year Four
would include data from both the samples drawn in Year One
and those drawn in Year Three.)
• In order to draw a sample large enough to support publishing
an index, a given product area would need to be sampled for 30
quotes. (Since an index consists of two overlapping samples, this
would imply that a given published index would consist of the
remaining data available from what had been 60 potential items.)
• Establishments with a cost-of-materials value (for a speciﬁc category) of more than $1 million would be treated as being consistent with a maximum burden of six for that category. Where an
establishment/category did not meet this threshold, the category
would have a maximum quote burden of two.
• Each sample would consist of approximately 2,500 establishments and approximately 15,000 quotes. (Note that the sample
could also be staged, which would result in 1,250 establishments
being initiated every year.)
• The samples would be drawn to support the publication of any
six-digit category with a value of over $3 billion. All product
areas, however, would be sampled and would be used in higher
stages of aggregation.
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Although the eight-digit cost-of-materials codes do not fully nest
to six-digit categories, the sample was drawn as if they did. There were
a total of 373 six-digit groupings, of which about 100 would be potentially publishable. These 100 six-digit cost-of-materials groups each
had a minimum dollar value of $3 billion in 2007. Publication assumptions could, of course, be adjusted depending on the exact requirements
of the end users of these data at the BEA and the OPT.
The selection of the actual item that the Bureau would need to reprice
on a periodic basis would normally be done by a BLS ﬁeld economist
during a so-called initiation visit to the establishment. This procedure is
one that is already done by staffers when collecting data for the bureau’s
PPI and IPP programs, and it involves a number of trade-offs. Ideally,
the selection would be based on a probability proportionate to the value
of a given item a company purchases within the selected category. In
theory, if a company buys a certain amount of various types of steel, the
ﬁeld economist, using data supplied by the respondent, would be able
to select a speciﬁc steel product that the BLS would attempt to collect
data on. In practice, however, these procedures would likely have to
take into account the fact that the selected item may not be purchased
on a regular basis, or the respondent may not have any data available
on how much of each different type of steel the company purchased in
a given period. Since the BLS already has experience in dealing with
these types of issues in its current programs, developing an appropriate
fallback procedure does not necessarily present a problem. However, it
does lead to what is perhaps the key issue to be faced, which is the ability of the program to reprice the same item month after month, quarter
after quarter, or year after year, from the same source.
Pricing
Maintaining a constant set of items to reprice over time may prove
the most intractable barrier to constructing a comprehensive set of input
price indexes. Whereas on the output side companies tend to ship their
goods (or offer their services) every month, it is not clear whether they
buy the same item on a regular basis, especially for capital equipment
such as computers. This may place a heavier burden on the imputation
method chosen for valuing prices in missing periods.21 Alternatively,
the BLS may have to use an altogether different approach, such as com-

Houseman and Mandel Vol1.indb 349

2/16/2015 8:36:10 AM

350 Alterman

bining prices from different respondents (in cases where the item speciﬁcations are identical). A related question is how to handle changes in
the pricing speciﬁcations. Here are some factors to consider:
• What is our general approach toward quality adjustment when a
buyer switches products or suppliers? That is, in an ideal situation where we can get the exact information that we desire, what
would we ask for?
• What are the acceptable fallbacks if we can’t obtain the desired
information?
• What if, in fact, the buyer uses multiple suppliers? Do we select
a speciﬁc supplier or use some sort of average?
• If we select one, how and when do we switch to a price from a
different supplier?
• Should the price include or exclude transportation costs?
• If other services are bundled with the product (e.g., installation),
how do we handle those situations?
• Do we want to include government purchases?
• If so, how would we sample for them, since they wouldn’t be
included in data at the Census Bureau?
• How do we coordinate requests for buyers’ prices with requests
for sellers’ prices within the same ﬁrm?
Eventually, though, the bureau will need to attempt to collect information from a sample of representative companies. A ﬁnal decision on
some of these issues will probably entail balancing the requirements of
a price index with the reality of the bureau’s sometimes limited ability
to collect data from private industry through voluntary surveys.
The BLS determined that a critical ﬁrst step in this process would
be to get feedback from a representative group of establishments on
their buying practices, their ability and willingness to voluntarily supply data to the BLS, and their receptivity to, and interest in, the bureau’s
effort to produce these price index series.22 To that end, in May 2012,
staff at the BLS set up a focus group with members of the Institute
for Supply Management (ISM) in conjunction with that organization’s annual meeting. Founded in 1915 as the National Association
of Purchasing Agents, ISM is considered one of the largest and most
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respected supply management associations in the world and boasts
a total membership of nearly 40,000. Prior to the meeting, the focus
group members were sent a set of questions designed to elicit input on
the feasibility of the bureau’s effort to produce a new set of indexes. In
general, the focus group participants indicated that their establishments
would almost certainly have the data available that the BLS would need
to construct these indexes, and they did not believe cooperation issues
would be any different from what the bureau currently experiences with
establishments.
Estimation Formula
With one exception, as opposed to the questions associated with
sampling and repricing, the issues surrounding the estimation formula
are comparatively easy. Weights can either be derived from the sampling frame, from the respondents themselves, or from some combination thereof. One concern with using the weights derived from the sampling frame is the age of the data. Since the detailed data are collected
only once every ﬁve years, the data may be out of date by the time they
are actually used in the calculation of the indexes. A comparison of
these values from one census to the next may shed light on the volatility
of these ﬁgures.
There are various considerations involved in what actual formula to
use, such as choosing between arithmetic and geometric mean formulas, but these do not present intractable barriers. One interesting aspect
of the formula relates to theoretical differences between the price index
formula for the output from a production function and the price index
formula for inputs into a production function. The theory assumes that
a ﬁrm will attempt to maximize proﬁts by minimizing costs while maximizing revenue. On the output side, theory tells us that an establishment
will attempt to shift sales to its goods or services that over time are
becoming relatively more expensive compared to its other outputs. On
the input side, the ﬁrm would attempt to shift costs toward its expense
categories that are becoming relatively cheaper. Consequently, all else
being equal, the price index of ﬁrms’ outputs would tend to show at
least no decline in the relative quantity of the more expensive goods
being sold, while on the cost side, the index should in theory reﬂect
at least no increase in the purchase of goods or services that are more
expensive. What is interesting, however, is that these assumptions are
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based on partial equilibrium models where the model is only looking
at one side of the equation. But of course one establishment’s sales are
another establishment’s purchases, and in a general equilibrium model,
there is no a priori theory of exactly what constitutes the correct direction of substitution.23
One notable issue in estimating these indexes relates to how one
goes about constructing industry-speciﬁc price indexes. Note that in
calculating GDP, Method 2 relies on collecting data for both outputs
and inputs by industry. While a product-based input price index would
use every establishment’s purchases of a speciﬁc good (or service), an
industry-speciﬁc input price index would only use goods or services
purchased by establishments in that speciﬁc industry. For example, presumably all establishments must purchase energy, be it electricity, gas,
petroleum products, or other forms. Would the BLS attempt to calculate a separate energy index for each industry, or would it combine all
energy data into one generic input energy index? For now the approach
is based on practical consideration—i.e., do we have enough data for
separate energy series, or does each of the different energy series trend
nearly the same? Of course, a proxy for an industry-speciﬁc input price
index could be constructed using individual product-level price indexes
but aggregating them using the proportions appropriate for a particular
industry’s purchasing patterns.
Developing a Pilot
A longer-term effort to produce input price indexes can be broken down into four phases, based on availability of data. This effort
will require additional approvals and funding as well. The four phases
include
1) Input indexes covering manufacturers’ material costs,
2) Input indexes covering manufacturers’ capital equipment costs,
3) Input indexes covering manufacturers’ business services costs,
and
4) Input indexes covering service industries’ material, capital
equipment, and business services costs.
Ideally, each phase would start with a pilot prior to going into production. For each pilot, the BLS would conduct research and develop
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the methodology, procedures, and systems associated with each of the
following steps:
• Obtain permission from the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget.
• Select a set of industries for the pilot.
• Evaluate the data sources that are available for a sampling frame.
Because of the availability of detailed cost data from the quinquennial Census of Manufactures, the ﬁrst phase would focus on
input indexes of cost of materials for manufacturing industries.
• Develop the collection materials and procedures and train staff.
• Select a sample of establishments for the pilot.
• Conduct the pilot test and evaluate the results.
• Based on the results of the pilot, ﬁnalize resource and data requirements for developing and maintaining an input price index,
including publication goals, required sample size, expected burden, and estimated time frame for publication.

SUMMARY
There has been a long-standing interest in both producing an input
price index and obtaining prices from buyers. The dramatic growth in
imports as a source of domestic supplies has also served to underscore
the increasing need for these data. There would be, however, a signiﬁcant cost to developing these new series data, and it would take some
time to put them into production. As resources permit, the bureau will
continue its research on this topic.
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Notes
1. This paper was the result of combining works from two related conferences.
The ﬁrst conference was called “Measurement Issues Arising from the Growth
of Globalization” and was held November 6–7, 2009, in Washington, D.C. The
second conference was “Measuring the Effects of Globalization,” held February 28–March 1, 2013, also in Washington, D.C. I would like to thank Mike
Horrigan, John Greenlees, Steve Paben, Maureen Doherty, Ted To, Mina Kim,
Jenny FitzGerald, and David Friedman for their contributions and comments. I
would also like to thank Shawn Klimek and Lynn Riggs at the U.S. Census Bureau
for their assistance in gaining access to census data. All views expressed in this
paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reﬂect the views or policies of
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics or the U.S. Census Bureau.
2. Note that the Consumer Price Index is designed to pick up these price changes but
is only used to adjust estimates of domestic consumption.
3. This assumes that the prices of chairs A, C, and D do not decrease in response to
the change in the price of Chair B resulting from the switch from domestic production to being imported. The bureau, however, has conducted an analysis of PPI
data that provides some evidence that prices from domestic producers are inﬂuenced by the degree of import penetration in their industry. See Doherty (2012).
4. Note that the PPI does currently construct output price indexes for wholesalers
and retailers; these indexes presumably include data on both imported and domestically produced goods. However, these indexes are only gross margin indexes,
and as such they only represent the difference between their selling price of a good
and the acquisition price for that same item. In addition, the data collected do not
delineate between import goods and domestic goods.
5. Information on the Sloan Foundation study, and the subsequent conference, can be
found here: http://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context
=externalpapers. A summary of the conference was included in the February 2011
issue of the Survey of Current Business.
6. If the rate of change was consistent over time, it might have been easier to model
a “discount” factor to apply to import prices in order to adjust for this shift.
7. Price indexes, for example, must take into account ongoing shifts in the market
basket of items being priced, as some products are discontinued and new items
enter into consumption.
8. Actually, prior to the Stigler Report, the PPI had done some work in evaluating
the use of buyers’ prices. In 1942, the PPI did a study of buyers’ prices for eight
selected items of steel mill products for six time periods and compared them to list
prices. The results of the study showed that the buyers’ prices moved differently
from list prices for short periods of time but that longer-term list and invoice prices
were comparable.
9. Note that the bureau does have extensive experience with constructing price
indexes that, in theory, are input price indexes, since both the import price indexes
and the Consumer Price Index are constructed from buyers’ prices.
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10. Labor input for private business and private nonfarm business estimates include
labor composition effects. These labor composition effects reﬂect the fact that the
hours worked are adjusted for changes in the composition of workers over time.
11. Note that the BLS makes use of product-speciﬁc data in constructing deﬂators for
a set of input price indexes for a given industry’s material costs. Ideally, an input
price index would be industry-speciﬁc, but that may prove cost-prohibitive.
12. There is also a third approach, commonly referred to as the Income Approach,
which is not directly relevant to this discussion.
13. In practice, Method 1 is actually more effective at measuring total domestic consumption. Indeed, the deﬂator for “C” uses the CPI, which does include imported
consumer goods. However, Method 1 is not as effective in estimating domestic
production. Note, however, that even if the BLS had a complete set of input price
indexes, Method 2 might still have some data problems, as information currently
collected on purchases by industry and related information may not be as timely
or as detailed as the data currently collected for Method 1.
14. For example, in contrast to the forms for the furniture manufacturing industry,
the collection form for the parallel furniture wholesale sector does not provide
the same level of detail on material costs, while the collection form for the retail
furniture industry does not collect any information on the cost of materials.
15. “Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and
the U.S. Census Bureau 61-12-MOU-06,” signed on April 12, 2012. Under the
terms of the agreement, the BLS does not have access to ﬁrms consisting of only
one establishment, as their information is considered to fall under the purview of
Title 26 of the United States Code, comprising federal tax regulations, and cannot
be made available to the BLS.
16. Note that a company can consist of more than one establishment and that the data
set analyzed at the BLS only included data from approximately 19,000 multiestablishment manufacturers (referred to as “enterprises”). However, these multiestablishment enterprises were estimated to account for roughly 93 percent of materials
that were purchased by all manufacturers in 2007. The published data from the
census Web site puts the total cost of “materials, parts, containers, packaging, etc.,
used” in 2007 at approximately $2.63 trillion (U.S. Census Bureau 2013). For
comparison purposes, in 2007 the United States exported goods valued at $1.15
trillion and imported goods worth $1.97 trillion. In 2007 domestic manufacturers
shipped products with a gross value of $5.34 trillion.
17. For comparison purposes, the BLS’s International Price Program collects prices
for approximately 25,000 items and publishes 1,050 series, whereas the BLS’s
Producer Price Program includes approximately 100,000 quotes and publishes
9,500 series.
18. It should be noted that in the new 2012 NAICS manual, the number of six-digit
NAICS industries has been reduced to 364. One follow-up project would be to
attempt to revise the eight-digit material codes so they accord more readily to sixdigit NAICS codes.
19. The BLS price indexes come out monthly, which enables researchers to know how
sporadic trade is. This helps in developing a repriceable market basket of items.
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20. As part of the MOU signed by the Census Bureau, the BLS also requested access
to the detailed multiestablishment data from the Annual Survey of Manufactures.
These data were delivered during the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2013 and are
being analyzed by the BLS in order to assess the survey’s utility in drawing a
sample for an input price index.
21. In constructing a sample for the import price index, the International Price Program has the advantage of accessing the universe of import transactions from the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency, which allows for drawing a sample
only of those items and importers who trade consistently over the course of a year.
22. Data collection for all BLS price programs is conducted on a voluntary basis.
23. For further elucidation, see Kim and To (2009).
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Electronics sector, 16
computers in, 11–12, 15, 73n48
growth rates in, 155–156, 156f, 158f,
159f, 182nn5–6, 294
import price–domestic price ratio of,
233, 235, 246
intermediate input growth in Japan of,
235, 238t, 247–248, 249n9
share of imported devices to total
inputs in Japan, 235, 236f, 237f,
249n8
televisions in, 11, 198–201, 198t
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Emerging economies, 294
as central and eastern EU12 members,
206, 207t, 215n14
import sourcing bias of, and
manufacturing MFP growth, 212,
213f
import sourcing bias of, vs. advanced
economies, 197, 206, 207t
other, as non-EU countries, 206, 207t,
208f
Employment, 12
relationship of, to real output growth,
154, 155, 174–177, 176t,
183nn14–15
EPC (Electronic Product Code) usage,
72n37
Estonia, 206
import sourcing bias of, and
manufacturing MFP growth, 212,
213f
materials sourcing from, 207t, 215n14
Europe, 105
global capacity of semiconductor
production in, 167–168, 168f, 169t
price measurement of industry output
across, 205, 215n13
UN Economic Commission for, 29,
69n11
Western, and import sourcing bias,
197, 212
See also speciﬁc countries within,
e.g., Germany
European Union
advanced/developed economies
(EU15) in, 206, 207t, 215n15
emerging/developing economies
(EU12) in, 206, 207–208, 207t,
208f, 215n14
Eurostat data of, countries, 204–205,
215n13
import sourcing bias in manufacturing
within, vs. U.S., 9–10, 197
regular prices only for CPI used by,
75–76, 75t, 76nn1–4
Exchange rates, price quotes and, 232,
233f, 246, 249n6
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Export Price Index (XPI), 73n50, 331
Stigler report and, 51
Fabrication plants (“fabs”), foundries vs.,
and semiconductor wafer
production, 166–172
Factoryless goods producers (FGPs), 3,
286
associated publication on, in U.S.,
15–16, 184n19
fabless ﬁrms as, 105, 183n11
proposed change in NAICS for, 179–
180, 184n19
Farm Index, BLS and, 51, 72n34
FGPs. See Factoryless goods producers
(FGPs)
Finland, 206
import sourcing bias and
manufacturing MFP growth in,
210, 211t, 215nn20–21
materials sourcing from, 207t, 215n15
Fisher indexes
basic formula for, 28, 30, 35, 40, 41,
70n18
basket of products and, 26, 69n8,
77–78, 78t
bias of basic formula for, 37–42
hybrid formula for, 34–35, 70nn15–
17
import sourcing bias with, vs.
Törnqvist formula, 200–201,
214n7
Food and beverages, 240f
measured value-added growth, 270,
271f, 273f, 277, 278f, 279f
MFP growth, 273f, 280
See also speciﬁcs, e.g., Edible fruits
and nuts
Forestry and ﬁshing, 272t
imports allocated to intermediate
inputs by, 261t, 262, 265
measured value-added growth, 271f,
276–277, 278f, 279f, 288n16
Formula bias, prices over time and,
31–32
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Foundries
fabrication plants (“fabs”) vs., and
semiconductor wafer production,
166–172
logic chip production in, 167, 169t
semiconductor wafer, in Asia, 91,
105–107, 107f, 117n1, 119n16
Foundries, GSA wafers and, 106,
118n14, 154
Foxconn (ﬁrm), Taiwan-based
manufacturer contracts and, 165,
166
France, 206
import sourcing bias and
manufacturing MFP growth in,
210, 211t, 215nn20–21
materials sourcing from, 207t, 215n15
Georgia, manufacturing growth in, 161t
Germany, 197, 206
customer delivery prices in, 220, 227
import sourcing bias and
manufacturing MFP growth in,
210, 211t, 215nn20–21
materials sourcing from, 207t, 215n15
Global Standards One (GS1), product
UPC registration by, 59, 72n40
Globalization
growth of, and measurement issues,
286, 335–337, 354n1, 354n7
impacts of, 1, 2, 3, 251–252, 293, 294
outsourcing and, 9, 195, 214n1
technological progress and, 1, 10–11,
13, 15, 16, 71n26, 152–153
Greece, 206
import sourcing bias and
manufacturing MFP growth in,
210, 211t, 215nn20–21
materials sourcing from, 207t, 215n15
Grocery supply chains, 72n49
U.S. Supermarket Ad Hoc Committee
of, and UPC adoption, 58–59,
72n38
Gross domestic product (GDP), 215n18
accuracy of, and bias effect across
industries, 7, 333–334
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aggregate growth and, 53, 156–157,
182nn6–7, 255, 286n1
biases in, 2, 155, 265, 266
by industry, 255–257, 259, 260, 266,
285–286, 287n5, 287n12
methods of estimating, 342–343,
355nn12–13
real, 121, 257
real vs. aggregate growth of, 11, 14,
62–63
state-level employment growth and,
176–177, 183n17, 184n18
U.S., and international trade, 251,
255–257, 286n1, 287n5, 287n12,
325n13
U.S., and manufacturing, 151, 152f,
154–157, 156f, 174–175, 182n2,
183nn15–16
GS1 (Global Standards One), 59, 72n40
GSA (Global Semiconductor Alliance),
106, 118n14
GTIN (Global Trade Item Number)
System, 59
Guatemala, bananas imported from, 304,
304f
Hedonic indexes, 306–307, 325n12
baseline nonhedonic measures of
price change, 304–306, 325nn10–
11
data used in constructing
experimental, for imports, 299–
304, 327
domestic products and, 2, 11
empirical results of, on bananas
compared to televisions and
cameras, 321–322
empirical results of, on imported
cameras with matched-model
comparison, 315–321, 316f, 317f,
318t, 319f, 320t
empirical results of, on imported
televisions with matched-model
comparison, 307–314, 309f, 311f,
312t, 313f, 314t, 315t, 325n13
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moving-window vs. pooled types of,
310–314, 314t, 316–321, 318t,
319f, 320t, 324
prices for imports and, 10–12, 13–15,
293–295, 297–299, 306–307, 324,
327
quality adjustments with, 293, 295,
324
sourcing substitution bias in, and
Alterman, 14, 24, 48–49, 71n30,
71nn32–33, 185–186
technological change and, 10–11,
73n48, 324
Hewlett-Packard (ﬁrm), 165, 183n12
Honduras, bananas imported from, 304,
304f
Hong Kong, 227, 302f
customer delivery price in, and price
gap estimates, 220, 242
Hungary, 206
import sourcing bias of, and
manufacturing MFP growth, 212,
213f
materials sourcing from, 207–208,
207t, 215n14
Hybrid indexes
as alternative to conventional price
indexes, 21–22 (see also speciﬁcs,
i.e., Fisher indexes; Laspeyres
indexes; Paasche indexes)
formulas for, 24, 33–34, 37–42,
70n15
terms used in, with examples, 22–24,
68n2, 77–78, 78t
IBM (ﬁrm), 58–59, 117n4
Idaho, manufacturing growth in, 158,
160, 161t, 182n9
IDM. See Integrated device
manufacturing
ILO (International Labour Organization),
22
Import allocation, 251–288
alternative, assumptions re valueadded and productivity, 267–284
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alternative (country-pooled) import
prices and, 265–267
alternative using BEC, 254, 258–265,
261t, 263t, 287nn2–8
BEA accounts by industry and role of,
253, 255–258
conclusion, 285–286
increasing, and effects on U.S.
economy, 253–255
international trade and U.S. GDP in,
251, 255–257, 286n1, 287n5,
287n12
item-level BEC shares and, across
industries, 258, 260, 285–286
sources of growth under alternative
treatments, 282–284
statistical bias and, 6–7, 12
Import Price Index (IPI, Japan), deﬂators
for commodities in, 226, 249n7
Import Price Index (MPI), 4, 305, 331,
354n9
bias in, and literature, 295–297
changes in product attributes and, 5–6
as deﬂator of imported portion in
intermediate inputs, 257–258, 269
as inﬂation measure, 28, 62, 201
IPP and sampling for, 349–350,
356n21
price gap between, and PPI, 48–49
sourcing substitution bias to, for
manufactured goods, 7–9, 15, 24,
45–48, 52, 62, 69n4, 71nn27–29,
72n42, 196, 247, 294
technological change and, 10–11,
71n26, 294
Import proportionality assumption
BEC usage and, 258, 260, 285,
287n2, 287n8
national statistics and, 7, 12, 219,
248n1, 255–256
Import sourcing bias, 195–215, 196, 197
comparison across national
possibilities with, contrasted with
offshoring bias, 195–196, 198,
210–211
conclusion, 197–198, 212–214
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Import sourcing bias, cont.
country and product groups for
which, is most relevant, 208–210,
209t, 215n19
data sources and implementation,
203–206, 214nn9–13
materials sourcing from lower-cost
countries and, 206, 207f, 324n4
methodology of study, 197, 198–203,
214nn6–7, 215n8
responsibility for, and statistical
agencies, 196, 214n4
study results, 197, 206–212, 207f,
208f, 210t, 211f, 215nn14–21
Imports, 166, 227, 253
costs, quality, and prices of, 121–144
destination of, within countries, 222–
223
hedonic price indexes for, 10–12,
13–15, 293–295, 297–299, 306–
307, 324, 327
industrial, and their effect on
employment and income, 12, 174
intermediate inputs of, 221, 224–225,
235, 238t, 239, 240t, 334
role of, in domestic supply, 335, 336f,
353, 354n6
shifts in sourcing of, 9–10, 45–49,
71n31, 205, 293–294, 324
use of, and biases, 219–220, 248n1,
252, 286
value of, 203, 228–229, 230, 285
Income
industrial imports affect economic
impact analyses on, 12
national, data collection, 258 (see
also National Income and Product
Accounts [NIPAs])
real average, of American majority, 63
India
among “other” emerging economies,
206, 207t
import prices for, and unit values,
205, 215n13
Indiana, manufacturing growth in, 8,
161t, 189
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Indonesia
among “other” emerging economies,
206, 207t
import sourcing bias of, and
manufacturing MFP growth, 212,
213f
Industrial sectors
classiﬁcation systems for, 204, 336f
(see also North American Industry
Classiﬁcation System [NAICS])
imports by, affect analyses on
employment and income, 12, 174
Inﬂation, 53
measurement effects of, on national
output, 61–63, 73n47
measurement problems for, 49–50,
55–56
MPI as measure of, 28, 62
similar but distinguishable products
and, 25–26
Input-Output (I-O) price indexes, 338–
339, 354n9
Input-Output (I-O) tables
deﬂators for commodities in, 226,
229–230, 249n7
Japan, and price indexes, 220, 221–
225, 226, 228, 246, 248n3, 249n4
METI, 222, 226, 229, 249n7
MIAC, with separate domestic and
imported inputs, 220, 222, 226,
229.249n7
U.S., 232, 239, 256, 286, 341
WIOD and, 197, 203–204, 215n10
Input Price Index (IPI, Alterman
proposal), 14, 49, 72n42, 181,
213–214, 297, 331–353
addressing feasibility of overcoming
limitations in current BLS data,
331–332, 354n1
current uses and users of BLS data,
339–344
earlier attempts at construction of,
337–339
estimation formula for, 351–352,
356n23
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importance of, 333–337, 336f, 353,
354nn5–7
problem description, 332–333, 333t,
354nn3–4
steps to produce a new IPI, 344–353
(see also under Bureau of Labor
Statistics, sampling process for;
Bureau of Labor Statistics, price
index construction by)
Inputs
domestically produced, 239, 241,
244–245, 257
I-O tables for, and MIAC, 220, 222,
226
I-O tables for, in WIOD, 197, 203–
204, 215n10
intermediate, and METI surveys,
220, 225, 226–229, 231–232, 246,
249nn4–5
intermediate, of imports, 221, 224–
225, 232, 239–245, 240t, 243t,
244f, 257
produced by developed countries,
239, 241, 244–245
produced by developing countries,
239, 241–242, 244f, 247
Integrated device manufacturing (IDM)
global capacity of, products, 170,
171f, 171t
semiconductors and, 166–167, 170–
171, 172
Intel (ﬁrm), 168
IDM plants of, 166, 170, 183n13
International data
competitiveness measures and, 15,
151–153
Comtrade as, 9, 260
International Labour Organization (ILO),
price index manuals of, 22
International Price Program (IPP)
BLS and, 73n50, 119n19, 126, 294
data limitations of, 298–299, 323
research database subsets of, to
construct experimental hedonic
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and matched-model indexes,
299–304
sampling process for, 126–128,
144n3, 295, 323, 347, 355n19,
356nn21–22
types of prices in, 300–301, 325n6,
325n9
International Standard Industrial
Classiﬁcation (ISIC) system,
concordance to, 204
International trade, 14, 142, 196
freight in, 134, 203, 228–229, 230
global supply chains in, and statistics,
1, 3, 16, 67, 71n26, 73n49, 212
harmonizing data for, 258–260, 266,
287nn3–9, 298 (see also InputOutput [I-O] tables)
intermittent traded products in, 122,
127, 130, 143
role of, in U.S. GDP, 251–252
unit values and prices in, 134, 136–
138, 144n5, 144n7, 196, 199, 203,
212–213, 215n9
See also Imports
I-O tables. See Input-Output (I-O) tables.
Iowa, manufacturing growth in, 161t
IPI (Import Price Index, Japan), 226,
249n7
IPI (Input Price Index). See Input Price
Index (IPI, Alterman proposal)
Ireland, 183n13, 206
import sourcing bias and
manufacturing MFP growth in,
210, 211t, 215nn20–21
materials sourcing from, 207t, 215n15
ISIC (International Standard Industrial
Classiﬁcation) system, 204
Israel, location of Intel logic fab in,
183n13
Italy, 206
import sourcing bias and
manufacturing MFP growth in,
210, 211t, 215nn20–21
materials sourcing from, 207t, 215n15
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Japan, 12, 166, 183n13
among “other” advanced/developed
economies, 206, 207t, 215n18
cameras imported from, 301, 302f
customer delivery price in, and price
gap estimates, 220, 239, 241–245
global capacity of semiconductor
production in, 168f, 169t, 170
I-O tables for, and price indexes,
220, 221–225, 226, 228, 246,
248n3, 249n4
import sourcing bias and
manufacturing MFP growth in,
210, 211t, 215nn20–21
as low-cost foreign supplier, 5–6
price data collected by, 8, 12, 239, 241
sale prices absent in, CPI, 70–71n23,
75–76, 75t, 76nn1–4
See also Offshoring bias, evidence
from Japan
Japan. Ministry of Economy, Trade, and
Industry (METI)
each industry’s procurements and
price gap data surveyed by, 220,
226–229, 231–232, 249nn4–5
Updated I-O Tables published by,
222, 226, 229, 249n7
Japan. Ministry of Finance, Trade
Statistics of Japan published by,
230
Japan. Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications (MIAC)
Input-Output (I-O) Tables for Japan
published by, 220, 226
Statistics Bureau in, publishes Linked
I-O Tables, 222, 226, 229, 249n7
Japan-U.S. price differences, 227, 228–
229, 230, 241, 249n6
Jevons index, 315
combining matched-model for
televisions and video devices,
308–309
Laspeyres compared to, 305,
325nn10–11
Job losses
offshoring and, 173, 183n11
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U.S. manufacturing and, 151–152,
154, 157, 158, 177, 182nn2–3,
184n18
Kentucky
manufacturing in, 158, 159f
sourcing substitution bias and
manufacturing in, 8, 189
Korea
among “other” advanced economies,
206, 207t, 215n18
import sourcing bias and
manufacturing MFP growth in,
210, 211t, 215nn20–21
See also South Korea
Laspeyres indexes, 73n49
basic formula for, 3, 27, 28–30, 35,
40, 41, 69n9, 69nn11–12, 70n18,
128, 248
basket of products and, 77, 78t
bias of basic formula for, 37–41, 42
hybrid formula for, 33–34, 35,
70nn15–17
modiﬁcations of, 305, 308, 325n10
Latvia, 206
import sourcing bias of, and
manufacturing MFP growth, 212,
213f
materials sourcing from, 207–208,
207t, 215n14
Laurer, George J., bar-code design and,
58–59
Law of one price, 4, 10
assumptions for, 6, 181
Lawsuits, product introduction and, 55
Lenovo (ﬁrm), 165, 183n12
Linking, 127
import source switches and, to the
new provider, 265–266
weak, between price and quality,
129–130, 143, 294
Lithuania, 206
import sourcing bias of, and
manufacturing MFP growth, 212,
213f
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Lithuania, cont.
materials sourcing from, 207–208,
207t, 215n14
Louisiana, manufacturing growth in, 161t
Lowe indexes, BLS and, 325n10
Luxembourg, 206
import sourcing bias and
manufacturing MFP growth in,
210, 211t, 215nn20–21
materials sourcing from, 207t, 215n15
Malaysia, 302f
global capacity of semiconductor
production in, 167, 168f, 169t
Malta, 206
excluded from MFP growth bias
calculation, 197, 214n6
materials sourcing from, 207–208,
207t, 215n14
Manufacturing sector, 3
American, and help from Congress,
151–152, 182n1
growth rates in, at state level, 157–
161, 159f, 161t, 174–177,
183nn14–17, 184n18
low-cost foreign suppliers in, 3, 5–6,
13, 185–186, 245, 335–337
measuring competitiveness in, 15–16,
151–152
MFP growth in, 212, 213f, 272f, 280
miscellaneous, and measured valueadded growth, 270, 271f, 272f,
277, 278f, 279f
national growth rates for, 155–156,
156f
plant closures in, and productivity
growth, 180–181, 184n21
price of goods from, differ by
production country, 8, 9–11, 198–
201, 198t, 215n8, 231
production in, 3, 15, 16
top subsectors in, 238t, 239, 240t,
243t, 246–247, 249n9
value-added growth rates under
alternative treatments, 282, 283t
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See also Computer-related industries,
inﬂuence on manufacturing
Maryland, manufacturing growth in, 161t
Massachusetts, manufacturing growth in,
160–161, 161t, 182n9
Matched-model indexes
accounting for quality of newly
measured goods by, 121–123, 293,
295, 298
based on the QHFT model, 123–126,
143n2
construction of, as benchmark, 305–
306, 325nn10–11
empirical evidence for, 134–143,
144nn5–6
empirical results of, on imported
cameras compared to hedonic
indexes, 315–321
empirical results of, on imported
televisions compared to hedonic
indexes, 307–314
index for edible fruits and nuts, 322f,
323f
sampling international prices in,
126–128, 130–133, 141–143,
144n3
sizable biases of, price indexes,
13, 293, 296–297, 321, 323, 324,
324nn2–3
theoretical difﬁculties in results of,
128–133, 144n4
METI. See Japan. Ministry of Economy,
Trade, and Industry
Mexico, 134, 155
among “other” emerging economies,
206, 207t
import sourcing bias of, and
manufacturing MFP growth, 212,
213f
as PC and server producer/exporter,
164, 166
televisions imported from, 301, 302f
MFP growth. See Multifactor
productivity growth
MIAC. See Japan. Ministry of Internal
Affairs and Communications
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Michigan, manufacturing growth in, 8,
161t, 189
Micron Semiconductor (ﬁrm), 170
Mining sector
price gap calculations from METI
surveys for, 231–232
TFP growth in, 242, 243t, 245, 249n9
Mississippi, manufacturing growth in,
161t
Monopolies
ﬁrms as competitors in, 125–126, 143n2
as problem in price assessment
models, 99–100, 118n8
Montana, manufacturing growth in, 161t
Montgomery Ward (ﬁrm), catalog prices
of, 51, 72n34
Motor vehicles, 297, 324n4
automobile prices and product quality,
51, 212
MPI. See Import Price Index (MPI)
Multifactor productivity (MFP) growth
bias calculation of, in manufacturing,
197, 203, 210–212, 211f, 214n6
compared in many nations, 9–10, 12
estimates of, 272f–275f, 277–282
OPT estimates of, 340–341, 349,
355n10
rates under alternative treatments of,
280, 281t, 282, 284t
SEA and computation of, in
manufacturing, 204, 215n11
value-added and, in U.S.
manufacturing, 195, 215n20,
268–270, 287nn13–14
NAICS. See North American Industry
Classiﬁcation System
National banks
India, 205
Japan, 226, 229, 249n7
National economy types. See Advanced
economies; Emerging economies;
Newly industrializing economies
(NIE)
National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPAs)
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BEC usage consistent with trade data
from, 258, 325n13
deﬂators for international trade in,
295, 297
measure GDP from expenditures, 251,
256, 285
National Income and Wealth Division,
BEA, 258
National statistics, 53
associated publication on biases of, 3,
15–16
barriers to adopting unit values for,
50–60
biases of, and price index solutions,
13–16, 293–353
biases of, as conference subject, 1–2,
7, 16n1
data collection changes needed for,
57–60, 72nn37–41, 248
economic impact analyses using, 12,
154–155
import comparability/proportionality
assumptions of, 7, 12, 219, 248n1
Netherlands, 206
import sourcing bias and
manufacturing MFP growth in,
210, 211t, 215nn20–21
materials sourcing from, 207t, 215n15
Nevada, manufacturing growth in, 158
New Hampshire, manufacturing growth
in, 159f, 161t, 182n9
New Jersey, manufacturing in, 158, 159f
New Mexico, manufacturing growth in,
159f, 160, 161t, 182n9
New Zealand Bureau of Statistics,
scanner data and, 67, 73n49
Newly industrializing economies (NIE),
METI survey of, 227–228
NIPAs. See National Income and Product
Accounts
North American Industry Classiﬁcation
System (NAICS)
digital identiﬁcation of manufacturers
in, 155, 156f, 182nn5–6, 257–258,
336, 340–341, 342, 346, 355n18
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North American Industry Classiﬁcation
System (NAICS), cont.
offshoring bias computed at threedigit, level, 186, 189t–190t
proposed change in, for FGPs, 179–
180, 184n19
Obama, Pres. Barack, U.S.
manufacturing policy ofﬁce
created by, 151
OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), 195,
214n1
Ofﬁce of Manufacturing Policy, U.S.,
151
Ofﬁce of Productivity and Technology
(OPT), estimates of MFP by BLS,
340–341, 349, 355nn10–11
Offshoring, 197
nonmeasured price changes upon,
331, 332–333, 354n2
outsourcing and, 9, 195, 214n1, 297
semicomputer industry and, 173,
183n13
Offshoring bias, 183n15, 220
across product and country groups,
209t, 214, 227, 335
computed at three-digit NAICS level,
186, 189t–190t
cost-savings assumptions and, 195–
196, 214n3
GDP growth in state-level
manufacturing and, 155, 174–175,
183nn14–15, 185–190
types of, 219–220
Offshoring bias, evidence from Japan,
219–249
conclusion on, 245–248
data used, 225–232, 249nn4–6
intermediate input growth as result of,
239, 241–245, 243t
measuring Type 1, 221–224, 248nn2–
3
measuring Type 2, 224–225
METI surveys of each industry’s
procurements and price-gap data,
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220, 226–229, 231–232, 249nn4–5
MIAC’s I-O tables with separate
domestic and imported inputs,
220, 226
results of estimating causes of Type
1, 232–239, 233f, 234ff, 236f,
237f, 238t, 240t, 246–247, 248,
249nn7–9
results of estimating causes of Type 2,
239–245, 243t, 244f, 247, 248
Type 1 with import comparability/
proportionality assumption, 219,
220, 248n1
Type 2 with price gap from shift
sourcing between high- and lowcost suppliers, 220, 245, 335
See also Total factor productivity
(TFP)
Ohio, manufacturing growth in, 8, 159f,
190
Oklahoma, manufacturing growth in,
161t
OPT (Ofﬁce of Productivity and
Technology), BLS, 340–341, 349,
355nn10–11
Oregon, manufacturing growth in, 160–
161, 161t, 182n9
Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD),
emerging economies and
globalization, 195, 214n1
Outlet substitution bias, 71n29, 214n3
CPI and, 4, 13, 24, 42–44, 62,
70nn20–21, 72n42
deﬁnition, 4, 69n3
shift from high- to low-cost domestic
suppliers, 185, 188n1, 294, 324n1
Output. See Input-Ouput (I-O) tables;
Input-Output (I-O) price indexes;
Real ouput
Outsourcing, 3
measurement problems due to, 49–50,
219
offshoring as, 9, 195
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Paasche indexes
basic formula for, 28, 30, 35, 40, 41,
69n9, 70n18, 248n3
bias of basic formula for, 37–41
hybrid formula for, 33, 34–35,
70nn15–17
Pennsylvania, manufacturing in, 158,
159f
Philippines, camera imports from,
302f
Poland, 206
import sourcing bias of, and
manufacturing MFP growth, 212,
213f
materials sourcing from, 207–208,
207t, 215n14
Portugal, 206
import sourcing bias and
manufacturing MFP growth in,
210, 211t, 215nn20–21
materials sourcing from, 207t, 215n15
PPI. See Producer Price Index (PPI)
Price changes, 13
baseline nonhedonic measures of,
304–306, 325nn10–11
effects on welfare, 128, 144n6
import, data in METI survey
publication, 227, 229, 231–232
index for value-added, and Törnqvist
formula, 202, 268
product quality and, 10, 15, 52,
72n36, 116–117, 187–188, 196,
293
tracking, from domestic to foreign
production and vice versa, 331–
333, 333t, 335, 354nn3–4, 354n6
Price growth
domestic vs. foreign industrial sectors
and, 263–265, 264f
technological change and, in product
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1
Introduction
Michael Mandel
Progressive Policy Institute
Why should economists care about correctly measuring globalization? Obviously having a better picture of the global economy is a
desirable end in itself. But more important is the relationship between
good data and good policy: An accurate description of the global links
among nations, businesses, and individuals is essential to optimal decision making by policymakers. Without such knowledge, policymakers
are essentially ﬂying blind.
Consider policy toward manufacturing enterprises. The federal,
state, and local tax codes contain quite a few explicit beneﬁcial provisions for manufacturing, in addition to direct and indirect subsidies.
Moreover, there’s an intense debate about whether manufacturing in
countries such as the United States has been hollowed out or remains
robust.
From this perspective, policymakers at every level of government
would ﬁnd it helpful to have direct information about the sorts of jobs
that are created when manufacturers outsource production but keep
the highly paid research and development (R&D), product development, and marketing jobs at home. Yet very little such data has existed
heretofore.
This volume covers three topics where current statistical methodologies for tracking trade don’t provide enough information for
policymakers. These areas are “factoryless manufacturing,” value-added
trade in supply chains, and trade in services, intangibles, and data.
These areas are connected by a common thread: Rapid changes in
the global economy have outstripped the traditional statistical presentation of export and import data by commodity and industry, as published
by national and international statistical agencies. This has meant that
such agencies no longer provide enough information for policymakers
and researchers. The traditional presentation of trade statistics does not

1
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allow economists to trace out the implications of global supply chains,
which disaggregate production among countries in new and unexpected
ways. Moreover, economists have very little data on cross-border ﬂows
of intangibles and data, which are poorly reported in the conventional
trade statistics and yet increasingly important.
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 describe a way of augmenting the conventional
industrial classiﬁcations by creating a new category called “factoryless goods producers” (FGP). Such a change—and the data collection
changes that would accompany it—would have the effect of providing
policymakers with a new source of information about the impacts of
global supply chains in manufacturing.
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 examine the measurement of value-added trade.
In a world of global supply chains, policymakers need to know more
than straightforward gross exports and imports for each commodity.
An export may contain large amounts of imported components, while a
particular imported commodity may be an essential part of high-value
exports. As a result, trade negotiators would greatly beneﬁt from having access to value-added trade statistics so they can determine which
categories of exports are most beneﬁcial to the domestic economy.
Similarly, value-added trade statistics would be invaluable for state
and local economic development policy. Governments often offer tax
and training incentives to companies without being able to correctly
measure the true spillover beneﬁts to the local economy.
Even domestic macroeconomic policy relies heavily on a good understanding of globalization. As we saw during the ﬁnancial crisis, the
credit contraction leapt across national borders in unanticipated ways.
Today, U.S. consumption, investment, and production are heavily dependent on global supply chains. A credit or political shock in China,
for example, could plausibly have large effects on inﬂation or consumption in the United States and other countries.
Finally, Chapters 8 and 9 address the difﬁcult issues of measuring
cross-border ﬂows of intangibles and data. Like value-added trade, getting better measurements of these increasingly important components
of the global economy could signiﬁcantly affect trade policy, tax policy,
economic development policy, and even macro policy.
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FACTORYLESS GOODS PRODUCTION
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 deal with correctly measuring the increasingly
important phenomenon of factoryless goods production and contract
manufacturing services (CMS). Companies such as Apple and Nike—
which do research in new technology, design new products, market
the products, and receive the proﬁts from the sale of the products—are
subcontracting out most or all of their actual production to other companies, either in the United States or globally. The issue is whether the
ﬁrst type of company—which may own no factories but may perform
all the high-end functions of manufacturers—should be classiﬁed in the
manufacturing industry.
On one level, this is a straightforward classiﬁcation question. Under
the North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) currently
used in the United States, a company that outsources production could
be classiﬁed in either manufacturing, wholesaling, or some other industry altogether. What’s needed is a consistent way of identifying such
ﬁrms that the main statistical agencies—the U.S. Census Bureau, the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)—can agree on. Then the FGPs would buy manufacturing
services from other companies (providers of CMS), which would do the
actual factory production.
But the topic of FGPs turns out to raise some profound theoretical, practical, and policy issues as well, going beyond the narrow
sphere of economic statistics. Manufacturing is important as a source
of high-paying jobs and innovation for the economy. By separating out
the production aspect of manufacturing from the product development
and marketing aspect, FGPs make it possible to understand where the
value-added and high-paying jobs are created in the research/product
development/production/marketing chain.
In turn, if FGPs are buying manufacturing services from overseas
contract manufacturers, the statistical agencies have to explicitly measure the quantity and price of purchased manufacturing services as part
of imports.
At the time of the conference that these volumes grew out of, “Measuring the Effects of Globalization,” held February 28–March 1, 2013,
in Washington, D.C., U.S. statistical agencies were operating under a
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2011 mandate from the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget (OMB) to
integrate the concept of FGPs into the sprawling U.S. system of economic statistics. As a result, agencies began planning and researching
how to best track FGPs, and the three chapters in this volume reﬂect
that effort.
However, since then, the OMB has relaxed its mandate. An August
8, 2014, OMB directive in the Federal Register notes the following:
The Economic Classiﬁcation Policy Committee (ECPC), which
advises OMB on periodic revisions to NAICS, recently reported
to OMB that results of preliminary research on the effectiveness
of survey questions designed to identify Factoryless Goods Producers (FGPs) [show] inconsistent results. These results indicate
that questions tested in the 2012 Economic Census fail to yield responses that provide accurate and reliable identiﬁcation and classiﬁcation of FGPs. The ECPC has advised that additional research,
testing, and evaluation are required to ﬁnd a method for accurate
identiﬁcation and classiﬁcation of FGPs, and that this process
could take several years. Given these initial research results and
the large number of public comments submitted on the topic of
FGPs, OMB here announces that the FGP recommendation will
not be implemented in 2017. (Federal Register 2014, p. 46558)

The Federal Register note goes on to say this:
Without the deadline imposed by the 2017 NAICS revisions, the
relevant statistical agencies will now have the opportunity to complete the additional research, testing, and evaluation needed to determine the feasibility of developing methods for the consistent
identiﬁcation and classiﬁcation of FGPs that are accurate and reliable. (Ibid.)

From this perspective, the chapters in this volume stand as a road
map for future research. In Chapter 2, “Reﬂecting Factoryless Goods
Production in the U.S. Statistical System,” Maureen Doherty gives a
brief history and overview of the rationale behind creating the category of factoryless goods production. She shows how the United States
chose a somewhat different approach from international statistical
organizations.
In Chapter 3, “Measuring ‘Factoryless’ Manufacturing: Evidence
from U.S. Surveys,” Fariha Kamal, Brent R. Moulton, and Jennifer Ribarsky identify data that the BEA and the Census Bureau are already
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collecting on both producers and users of CMS. Using this data, the
chapter provides a snapshot of companies that are engaged in these
activities.
Chapter 4, “The Scope of U.S. ‘Factoryless Manufacturing,’” by
Kimberly Bayard, David Byrne, and Dominic Smith, estimates the extent of U.S. factoryless manufacturing using corporate ﬁnancial reports
and Economic Census microdata. The authors calculate that manufacturing value-added would have been 5 to 20 percent greater for 2007
if all FGPs were reclassiﬁed to manufacturing, and that value-added
would have been 20 to 30 percent greater for 2007 for semiconductor
manufacturing if FGPs were included.

VALUE-ADDED TRADE
Factoryless goods producers make up only one aspect of global supply chains, however. The next three chapters take a more general look
at value-added measures of trade. Value-added measures of trade acknowledge that exports of many goods and services are actually heavily
dependent on imported intermediates. For example, a smartphone exported from China may contain chips originally made in Japan or South
Korea (Kraemer, Linden, and Dedrick 2011). Similarly, exports of ﬁnancial services from New York investment banks may in theory rely
on intermediate services generated in the London ofﬁces of these banks.
Value-added measures of trade, rather than reporting gross exports,
account for these imported intermediates by subtracting them out. Thus,
value-added trade in theory represents the actual domestic value generated by exports.
Value-added trade measures are a very useful conceptual step forward. They are not a full solution, however. First, most countries do
not have the right surveys in place to directly track usage of imported
intermediates by industry. Second, value-added trade measures do not
solve the import price bias issues raised in the ﬁrst volume. For example, consider a piece of electronics assembled in China from imported
components, and then exported to the United States. China’s share of
the ﬁnal sales price might be quite low in this calculation. However,
that assumes Chinese wages for the cost of assembly. If assembly was
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shifted to the United States, then the cost of assembly at U.S. wages
would be a much bigger share of the ﬁnal sales price.
Nevertheless, major steps have been made in assessing value-added
trade, as described in the chapters in this volume. In Chapter 5, “Incomes and Jobs in Global Production of Manufactures: New Measures
of Competitiveness Based on the World Input-Output Database,” Marcel P. Timmer, Bart Los, and Gaaitzen J. de Vries analyze global value
chain income (“GVC income”) for 20 countries, including the United
States, Japan, Brazil, China, India, Russia, and the major economies of
Europe. The authors deﬁne GVC income as the income generated in a
country by participating in global manufacturing production, including
the large contribution of nonmanufacturing industries.
The authors show that in advanced countries, GVC income generated by capital and high-skilled labor is rising. This ﬁts the common
story that global shifts in manufacturing have beneﬁted workers with
more education. Some of these gains are coming in service jobs, since
the authors demonstrate that the manufacturing sector is the direct
source of only half of the GVC income. On the downside, the same
analysis shows that high-skilled-job opportunities have declined in the
United States since 1995, while rising in Europe and Japan.
The methodology described in the chapter relies on tracing out
cross-border ﬂows of intermediates, as described in the World InputOutput Database (WIOD), an effort funded in part by the European
Commission (Timmer 2012). A similar effort, funded by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the
World Trade Organization (WTO), is described in Chapter 6, “Measuring Trade in Value-Added and Beyond,” by Nadim Ahmad. This
chapter describes the methodology behind the Trade in Value-Added
(TiVA) database, the assumptions behind the methodology, and the initiatives launched to improve the quality of those assumptions and the
underlying data.
An August 2013 report that draws on the TiVA database, published
subsequent to the 2013 globalization conference, estimates that between 30 and 60 percent of the value of the exports of G20 countries
are either composed of imported inputs or are intermediate inputs for
other countries (OECD, WTO, and UNCTAD 2013). In addition, 42
percent of the value-added of exports for G20 economies are made up
of services, which closely matches the estimate in the previous chapter.
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Finally, there’s a broader policy point that often escapes policymakers—succeeding in international markets requires an ability to import
high-quality intermediate inputs, as countries such as China have done.
From both a political and economic framework, China represents
one particularly important application of the value-added framework.
In Chapter 7, “Import Uses and Domestic Value-Added in Chinese
Exports: What Can We Learn from Chinese Microdata?,” Shunli Yao,
Hong Ma, and Jiansuo Pei estimate China’s domestic value-added share
in exports by combining two enterprise-level sources of microdata. The
chapter provides an excellent background for the types of data that the
Chinese statistical authorities are collecting, as well as upper and lower
bounds for domestic value-added shares.

INTANGIBLES AND DATA
The next two chapters address the difﬁcult questions of measuring
cross-border ﬂows of intangibles and data. Chapter 8, “A Formulary
Approach for Attributing Measured Production to Foreign Afﬁliates of
U.S. Parents,” by Dylan G. Rassier and Jennifer Koncz-Bruner, focuses
on the proper geographical attribution of the income generated by intangible capital such as patents, software, and other intellectual property.
The problem is that the knowledge embodied in intangible capital is
a “shared input” across an entire enterprise. The return on intangible
capital could in theory be attributed to the country where the capital
was created, the country where the intangible capital was used for production, the country where the product that incorporates the intangible
capital is sold, or the country where the intangible capital is nominally
located for legal or tax purposes.
The BEA publishes data on income and assets by country for foreign
afﬁliates of U.S. multinationals. The current methodology is to attribute
the income generated by intangible capital owned by a multinational
to the country where the capital resides for legal or tax purposes. That
results in apparent anomalies where certain countries such as Bermuda
and Ireland show relatively high levels of assets and income for the foreign afﬁliates of U.S multinationals, apparently out of proportion with
the actual economic signiﬁcance of those countries.
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Rassier and Koncz-Bruner propose using proxy measures such as
compensation, net physical assets, and sales in order to provide a better estimate of the location of income and economic activity of foreign
afﬁliates of U.S multinationals. The proposed methodology results in
only a small shift of income, in the aggregate, between foreign afﬁliates
and U.S. parents. But the global location of income outside the United
States shifts signiﬁcantly. In particular, the proposed methodology shifts
income across global regions including Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin
America, and the Middle East by more than 10 percent of value-added.
The proposed methodology, however, does not actually deal with
some of the conceptual problems raised by shared inputs. It would be
better, in some sense, to be able to measure the creation and use of intangible capital separately, and provide some theoretical guidance for
how the data can be used
In the ﬁnal chapter, “Data, Trade, and Growth,” Michael Mandel
examines a topic that is rarely considered—how to measure crossborder ﬂows of data. These days no international commerce can be
conducted without an associated ﬂow of data. That includes ﬁnancial
data, entertainment, the data that accompanies back-ofﬁce functions
such as human resources, sales data, and production data. Estimates
from TeleGeography suggest that cross-border data ﬂows rose at an average annual rate of 49 percent between 2008 and 2012.
The problem is that these cross-border ﬂows of data, while clearly
economically valuable, are often not picked up by the trade statistics.
In the current methodology used by the BEA and most other statistical
agencies globally, data is classed as a service—and a service export by
deﬁnition occurs when a foreign person pays a domestic person for a
service. Similarly, an import of services by deﬁnition occurs when a
domestic person pays a foreign person for services.
However, the global architecture of the Internet allows and even
encourages data to cross national borders without leaving a signiﬁcant
monetary footprint. In particular, major Internet providers exchange
data without exchanging money, opening up the possibility of a packet
of data traveling around the world without leaving a single monetary
trace.
As a result, Chapter 9 offers evidence that economically important
cross-border data ﬂows are simply not being counted by current inter-
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national economic statistics. It is likely that both the level and the rate
of growth of data trade are being signiﬁcantly understated.
This mismeasurement issue has several important policy implications. First, it seems likely that the data sector, and the companies
making up the data sector, are bigger contributors to domestic and
global growth than policymakers realize. That in turn leads to the second implication: To the degree that trade negotiators for the United
States (and for other countries) prioritize their negotiation objectives
according to the relative economic importance of different sectors of
the economy, the undermeasurement of the data sector will adversely
affect policy. To put it a different way, if wheat exports are easier to
measure than trade in data, then U.S. trade policy will place too much
emphasis on reducing barriers to agriculture exports and not enough on
maintaining the free ﬂow of data.
The second policy implication is that international tax policy may
be distorted by undermeasurement of cross-border data ﬂows. Tax policy is, at base, a balancing act between revenue raised and distortions to
market outcomes. But it requires good information about the economy
in order to make good choices.
And third, attempts by various countries to implement barriers to
the free ﬂow of data may do considerably more economic damage than
the current trade statistics show.
Taken together, these two volumes show that progress is being
made in the difﬁcult problems of measuring globalization. However,
there’s a long way to go before global trade statistics truly provide policymakers with the information that they need.
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Factoryless Manufacturing
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2
Reﬂecting Factoryless
Goods Production in the
U.S. Statistical System
Maureen Doherty
Bureau of Labor Statistics

BACKGROUND
The goal of a country’s national statistical agencies is to provide
relevant, timely, and accurate information on that country’s economy.1
Over time, as technology changes and organizations mature and change
the way they operate, there can be changes in both the mix of outputs
produced in an economy and in the way ﬁrms operate to achieve their
goals. One of the biggest challenges faced by producers of national economic statistics is to adapt to these structural changes in the economy in
order to continue to provide relevant data. Usually, structural economic
alterations occur gradually over time; however, with the continual rapid
technological advances of the past 20 years, there have been signiﬁcant shifts in the way ﬁrms operate. Two of the biggest changes are the
growth of global value chains and the fragmentation of production.
Global value chains and production fragmentation are interrelated
phenomena. A value chain is the set of interrelated economic activities
that contribute to the provision of a good or service, starting with product development and ending with customer service. When some of the
economic activities occur in different countries, the chain is considered
a global value chain (Center on Globalization, Governance, and Competitiveness 2006). A production chain is the set of economic activities
within or among ﬁrms in a global value chain that are required to produce speciﬁc products. A production chain is typically controlled by a
lead ﬁrm and is considered to be global when the production activities

13
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are dispersed across countries (Chang, Bayhaqi, and Yuhua 2012). The
relationship between production chains and global value chains is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Traditionally, product development and at least some transformation activities of the production chain for manufactured products were
performed by establishments classiﬁed as manufacturers. Over the past
two decades, vast improvements in technology, communications, and
transportation have allowed ﬁrms to share intellectual property and
closely control all steps of the transformation process without directly
performing any of the transformation steps. This allowed ﬁrms to
improve proﬁtability by focusing on innovation and product and marketing decisions instead of on the generic services and volume production portions of the value chain, which were then outsourced (Gerefﬁ,
Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005). As a result, some establishments revolutionized their business processes even further and began to perform
all of the functions typically associated with manufacturing except for
the transformation steps.
These changes have introduced complexities into the production
of economic statistics, forcing a reexamination of traditional economic
measurement concepts related to industry classiﬁcation for establishments and to the value of a country’s outputs, exports, and imports
by both the U.S. and international statistical communities. Economic
activity classiﬁcation systems did not address how to handle the output of establishments that outsourced certain production tasks. In addition, to the extent that production tasks were outsourced internationally,
questions were raised concerning how the outsourced activities were
handled in national accounts and balance of trade statistics.
This chapter will ﬁrst look at the response of international statistical
organizations to these phenomena and then turn its attention to the U.S.
response, highlighting how the latter differed in some aspects from the
international response. The chapter will then review implementation
planning and issues within the U.S. statistical system.
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Figure 2.1 Global Value/Supply/Production Chains
End-tier supplier

Second-tier supplier

First-tier supplier

Lead ﬁrm

Retail outlets

Consumers

Conception, design, and product developmenta
Sourcing raw material
Marketing, distribution, sales, after-sales support

Production

Disposal and recycling
Raw material network



Component network
Global production chainb

Final product

Marketing network

Global supply / value chainsb

Traditionally, conception, design, and product development are controlled by the lead ﬁrm; nowadays, however, some of these activities
are outsourced to other ﬁrms, as is indicated by the dashed line. Arrows on both ends of a line indicate that a process can go in either
direction.
b
The players in the global production/supply/value chain include domestic and foreign ﬁrms.
SOURCE: Chang, Bayhaqi, and Yuhua (2012) of the Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC) Policy Support Unit.
a
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INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
The United Nations Statistics Division and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Statistics Department set standards and produce manuals and guidelines for a number of different international economic
statistics. These groups routinely evaluate their standards and make
periodic updates in order to stay current as businesses change the way
they operate over time. In the past decade, each undertook an extensive
multiyear evaluation and update of their processes, at least in part to
reﬂect the impact of globalization. There were some differences in the
timing of these efforts, but there was a great deal of collaboration across
projects, and each project included widespread outreach to both gather
input and obtain comments on drafts.
One of the standards that the United Nations Statistics Division is
responsible for is the International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation of
All Economic Activities (ISIC). As the name implies, this classiﬁcation
is the international standard for the classiﬁcation of productive economic activities. The main purpose is to provide a standard set of economic activities so that entities can be classiﬁed according to the activity they carry out. The United Nations Statistics Division, along with
the Technical Subgroup of the Expert Group on International Economic
and Social Classiﬁcations, began planning a regularly scheduled update
of ISIC in 2001. A draft of ISIC Revision 4 was approved in 2006 by the
United Nations Statistics Division and released in 2008 (United Nations
Statistical Commission 2006).
Clariﬁcation of the classiﬁcation of an establishment that outsources
its principle economic activity was one of the many issues addressed in
this revision of the ISIC. With respect to outsourcing, it was determined
that if any establishment outsources part but not all of its production
activities, it should be classiﬁed as if it were carrying out the complete process. If an establishment outsources its complete production
process, it is also classiﬁed as if it were carrying out the complete production process, as long as the output of the production process is not
goods. Goods producers that outsource their entire production process
are classiﬁed as if they were carrying out the complete process only if
they are the economic owner of the output. Under these rules, an establishment is the economic owner of an output only if they are the legal
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owner of the physical input materials (Becker and Havinga 2007). If an
establishment engaged in a goods-producing activity has all the production done by others and does not legally own the material inputs, it is
considered to be buying the completed goods from the contractor with
the intent to sell them and would usually be classiﬁed in the appropriate
trade activity (European Commission et al. 2009).2
The System of National Accounts (SNA) is the internationally
agreed-upon standard set of recommendations on how to compile measures of economic activity and is produced by the National Accounts
section of the United Nations Statistics Division. It describes a coherent, consistent, and integrated set of macroeconomic accounts in the
context of a set of internationally agreed-upon concepts, deﬁnitions,
classiﬁcations, and accounting rules. In 2003, the United Nations Statistical Commission identiﬁed the need for a comprehensive update of
the 1993 System of National Accounts manual based, at least in part, on
the impact of globalization.
The main issue related to globalization was the treatment of goods
that are sent from one country to another without a change in economic
ownership. Under the 1993 SNA, when goods are sent abroad for processing and the processed goods are later returned, a change in ownership is imputed in each case, even when there is none, and the values of imports and exports reﬂect this imputed ownership change. The
2008 SNA recommended that imports and exports should be recorded
on a strict change-of-ownership basis, with imputed changes no longer assumed. Economic ownership is the criterion that is used to determine whether a change in ownership takes place. For establishments
involved in goods production activities, the SNA uses the ISIC criteria
that an establishment must be the legal owner of input materials for the
material used in the production process in order to be considered the
economic owner of the output of that process.
According to the 2008 SNA, when goods are transferred from the
economic owner in one country to an establishment in another country
for further processing and the processed goods are then returned to the
economic owner, the goods sent for processing should not be recorded
as an export from the economic owner or an import to the processor in
national accounts treatment. In addition, the returned processed goods
should not be recorded as an export of the processor or as an import to
the economic owner. Instead, the fee paid to the processing unit should
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be recorded as the import of processing services by the country owning
the goods and an export of processing services by the country providing
it (European Commission et al. 2009).
The IMF Statistics Department produces standards for concepts,
deﬁnitions, classiﬁcations, and conventions for the compilation of balance of payments and international investment position statistics. As
the international standard, its Balance of Payments Manual serves as a
guide for IMF member countries that regularly report balance of payments data to the IMF. In 2003, the IMF Statistics Department also began
working on an update to its Balance of Payments Manual in response to
changes in the economic and ﬁnancial environment. The ﬁnal Balance
of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, Sixth Revision (BPM6), was adopted in November 2008 (IMF 2009, p. 4).
Because BPM6 (IMF 2009) and SNA2008 (European Commission et al. 2009) were updated simultaneously, BPM6 reﬂects the same
changes in the treatment of goods sent for processing and completed
processed goods as described in the national accounts discussion above.
BPM6, however, is not entirely consistent with SNA2008 in that it
explicitly includes some additional guidelines related to the ownership
of materials to be processed and to the location of the buyer of the
goods after processing—these are not mentioned in SNA2008. As long
as the economic owner of the processed goods is also the economic
owner of the material inputs to be processed, that owner may obtain
the materials from the owner’s economy, the economy of the processor,
or a third economy. Additionally, the fee charged by a processor to the
owner of a processed good may cover the cost of materials purchased
by the processor. When the goods for processing are obtained from a
different economy than that of the economic owner, the value of those
goods should be recorded as an import to the economic owner. Furthermore, the economic owner of the processed goods does not need
to physically take possession of them before ownership is transferred
to a buyer. If ownership of the goods is transferred to a buyer in a different economy than that of the economic owner, the sale should be
recorded as an export from the economic owner’s country (IMF 2009,
pp. 161–163).
The International Merchandise Trade Statistics (IMTS), produced
by the United Nations Statistics Division, is a set of ofﬁcial statistics that
provides data on the movement of goods between countries and serves
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many different users with a wide variety of needs. In 2007, the need for
a revision of these statistics was recognized because of many factors,
including the impacts of globalization and the changes in related statistical frameworks like the System of National Accounts Manual and the
Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual.
As a result of these efforts, IMTS2010 was adopted in February 2010.
The need for compatibility with SNA2008 and BPM6 was one of
the goals of the IMTS revision; however, when the needs of all data
users were considered, priority was given to the need for statistics that
reﬂect the physical cross-border movement of goods. As a result, IMTS
differs conceptually from BPM6 and SNA2008 with respect to goods
for processing and the return of processed goods. Speciﬁcally, IMTS
recommends that goods for processing be recorded when they enter
or leave the economic territory, irrespective of whether a change in
ownership takes place. Because of these differences, it was recognized
that adjustments to IMTS data would be necessary prior to use in the
compilation of other statistics. In order to support the need to make
such adjustments, IMTS2010 encourages the identiﬁcation (preferably by special coding) of goods for processing and goods resulting
from such processing in trade statistics. IMTS2010 also encourages the
identiﬁcation and special coding of goods that cross borders as a result
of transactions between related parties (United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs 2011).

U.S. RESPONSE
The North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) is
the standard used by U.S. statistical agencies in classifying business
establishments for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing
statistical data related to the U.S. business economy. It was developed
jointly by the U.S. Economic Classiﬁcation Policy Committee (ECPC
2010),3 Statistics Canada, and Mexico’s Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geograﬁa to allow for a high level of comparability in business
statistics among the North American countries, and it was adopted in
1997. NAICS did not explicitly include guidance for the classiﬁcation
of establishments that owned the design and controlled the produc-
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tion and sale of goods but outsourced all the production. From 1997
through 2007, the NAICS manual indicated that establishments that
were engaged in the mechanical, physical, or chemical transformation
of materials, substances, or components into new products should be
classiﬁed in the manufacturing sector. Furthermore, it suggested that
manufacturing establishments may process materials or may contract
with other establishments to process their materials for them (OMB
2007, p. 197).4 NAICS has historically classiﬁed as belonging to the
manufacturing sector apparel jobbers who perform entrepreneurial
functions involved in other apparel and accessory manufacture; however, the manual did not deﬁne exactly what was meant by entrepreneurial functions, nor did it differentiate between establishments that
contract out some versus all of the transformation activities (p. 246).
By the late 1990s, individual U.S. statistical programs were beginning to adapt in response to the changes in the economy, but there was
no consistent approach—particularly with respect to establishments
that perform entrepreneurial functions related to production but don’t
perform transformation activities. Some programs interpreted the
NAICS manual’s statement related to contracting with other establishments as applying only to the speciﬁcally mentioned apparel jobbers
and classiﬁed other such establishments in wholesale trade or management of corporations. Others interpreted this statement more broadly
but provided their own interpretation of what was meant by “performing entrepreneurial functions.” This led to inconsistent NAICS classiﬁcation decisions across statistical programs for some establishments,
making it difﬁcult to draw conclusions when analyzing NAICS data
across programs.
In response to these inconsistencies, the ECPC formed the Manufacturing Transformation Outsourcing Subcommittee in July 2008 and
charged its members with deﬁning manufacturing transformation outsourcing and identifying characteristics of establishments that outsource
manufacturing transformation activities. The team was also responsible
for researching international classiﬁcation efforts and developing classiﬁcation options for both establishments that outsource transformation
activities and those that perform transformation activities for others.
The group identiﬁed three different types of establishments that could
be involved in the production of goods: 1) the traditional integrated
manufacturer (IM), 2) the manufacturing service provider (MSP), and
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3) the factoryless goods producer (FGP). The characteristics of each
type of goods-producing establishment are depicted in Table 2.1.
The team’s report also described a wide variety of classiﬁcation options along with the strengths and weaknesses of each, based
on the appropriateness of product valuations and whether the option
would support analysis. The team focused on ﬁve basic classiﬁcation
options, with variations for some of them. The classiﬁcation options are
described in detail below.
1) Classiﬁcation in manufacturing
Under the assumption that outsourcing the transformation steps of
the manufacturing process is no different than outsourcing other steps,
all FGPs could be classiﬁed in the manufacturing sector, along with
IMs and MSPs. This allows the full value of all goods, including returns
to intellectual property, to be included in the manufacturing sector,
whether produced by an IM or an FGP.
Within the manufacturing sector, several potential options for classifying establishments were described. All three types of establishments
could be included in the appropriate manufacturing industry, with or
without breakouts by type of establishment. Breakouts by establishment
by type, where possible, would facilitate data analysis of the same types
of products but would require the collection of some new data. To the
extent that special aggregations excluding FGP activity could be calculated, this option would also allow continuous series to be created in
industries with signiﬁcant amounts of FGP activity. Other possibilities
were to create a new manufacturing subsector for all FGPs that would
include breakouts for industries that had a signiﬁcant number of FGP
Table 2.1 Characteristics of Types of Manufacturing Establishments
Integrated
manufacturer
Yes
Yes
Yes

Manufacturing
service provider
No
May or may not
Yes

Factoryless
goods producer
Yes
May or may not
No

Yes

No

Yes

Owns intellectual property
Owns inputs
Performs transformation
activities
Owns and sells or transfers
ﬁnished product
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.
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establishments or add six-digit NAICS codes into the current manufacturing structure where warranted. If separate industries were created, it
would be important that the new FGP industry product details be collected at the seven-digit product level of the manufacturing numerical
list to allow for data analysis. This option would allow for the creation
of continuous data series for currently existing manufacturing industries. To the extent that the creation of separate FGP industries might
result in unpublishable data, it would not be a very useful distinction
for data users.
2) Classiﬁcation in wholesale trade
All FGP establishments could be classiﬁed in the wholesale trade
sector, since the composition of labor and capital expenses for FGPs is
similar to that in wholesale trade. This classiﬁcation option would also
be consistent with the concept that the primary economic activity of an
FGP is the selling aspect of the production process. On the other hand,
wholesale trade margin is for the service of goods distribution only.
The margin for an FGP would include the value of the services related
to design and those related to overseeing transformation in addition to
goods distribution. Two possibilities were also considered within the
wholesale trade classiﬁcation option.
In the ﬁrst possibility, FGP establishments could be classiﬁed in
the appropriate merchant wholesale industry with or without separate
data below that level for own-brand importers, own-brand marketers,
and domestic FGPs in addition to the current breakouts for wholesale
distributors. Including this additional detail supports calculations and
analysis by allowing FGPs to be identiﬁed separately from traditional
wholesalers; however, data may be unpublishable for some of the
breakouts, which would hinder usefulness. It is unlikely that the wholesale trade detail could be expanded to match the current manufacturing detail, making comparisons between FGP and manufacturing data
difﬁcult.
A second possibility would be to classify FGP establishments in
wholesale trade either in one industry or in three separate industries:
1) own-brand importers (those that arrange transformation by overseas
contractor and import and distribute the ﬁnal good), 2) own-brand marketers (those that arrange transformation by overseas contractor and that
drop-ship the output to customers), and 3) domestic FGPs (those that
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arrange transformation by domestic contractors). This second possibility
supports calculations and analysis by allowing FGPs to be identiﬁed separately from traditional wholesalers. The potential beneﬁt of this method
is offset by the fact that it is unlikely that the wholesale trade detail could
be expanded to match the current manufacturing detail, making comparisons between FGP data and manufacturing data difﬁcult.
3) Split classiﬁcation between manufacturing and wholesale trade
This option would classify establishments according to whether
they outsource overseas in wholesale trade or whether they outsource
domestically in manufacturing. This option prevents goods transformed
by foreign contractors from being included in domestic manufacturing when it is possible that the only domestic input was the intangible
capital owned or leased by a domestic entity; however, it does not handle the situation where both domestic and international contractors are
used. The production process for FGPs is exactly the same whether
the transformation is contracted out domestically or internationally, so
having different classiﬁcations based on the location of the contract
manufacturer is inconsistent with a NAICS classiﬁcation system based
on production processes. In addition, switches between domestic and
foreign contractors would result in classiﬁcation changes that would
lessen the stability of the classiﬁcation system.
4) Classiﬁcation in professional, scientiﬁc, and technical services
This option would classify FGPs in research and development, since
this is the ﬁrst step in the production process. If research and development is determined to be the primary activity of FGPs, they should be
classiﬁed in this sector. However, if an FGP acquires the design of the
product from another company, no research and design (R&D) activity
would be performed at the establishment. Since FGPs are responsible
for the sale of products, this option would require an expansion of the
deﬁnition of this sector to include the selling process, and FGPs would
report the value of the good as well as the value of the R&D.
5) Classiﬁcation in management of companies and enterprises
This option would create a new three-digit industry code (deﬁned
as “managing the production process”) within the “Management of
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Companies and Enterprises” sector. Input costs for FGPs are probably
similar to those associated with other establishments in this sector. If
management of production is determined to be the primary activity of
FGPs, they should be classiﬁed in this sector. On the other hand, this
option focuses only on the management of the production process, not
on the design or selling of the product. The amount of product detail
would be signiﬁcantly less than would be available in manufacturing,
limiting its usefulness for analysis purposes.

ECPC RECOMMENDATION
The ECPC evaluated the report and used it as a basis for a January 2009 Federal Register notice that outlined the issues surrounding
offshoring and described some of the available classiﬁcation options.
The ECPC used the Manufacturing Transformation Outsourcing Subcommittee’s paper, the Federal Register responses, and an examination
of international classiﬁcation guidance to aid its members in forming a
ﬁnal classiﬁcation decision.
The ECPC decided that all factoryless goods producers should be
classiﬁed in manufacturing with the speciﬁc industry classiﬁcation that
is based on the transformation production process used by the contractor.
Furthermore, the committee encouraged programs to provide breakouts
for IMs, FGPs, and MSPs within each industry to support data analysis
needs. The ECPC carefully considered the ISIC4 classiﬁcation recommendation to base classiﬁcation solely on legal ownership of material
inputs, but it decided that control of the entrepreneurial aspects of the
production process, including economic ownership of material inputs,
was more appropriate. In doing so, it put forth the following argument:
A strict adherence to the international recommendation to classify FGPs based solely on ownership of materials was considered
and rejected as impractical. If the deﬁnition of ownership required
physical possession, the ability to substitute between input sources
in different countries to obtain the lowest cost could change sector classiﬁcation in NAICS if the inputs were sent directly from
the producer in country B to a manufacturing service provider in
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country C. The establishment that arranged for the production in
country A would never take physical possession of the materials.
If the deﬁnition of ownership were based on separate transactions,
problems would still arise. Contracts between FGPs and their manufacturing partners change with market conditions. Payment terms
and the allocation of risk can shift based on variations in the availability of credit and the market power or capacity of the individual
parties. Classiﬁcation of an establishment should not change simply because [that establishment has] the market power to shift the
timing of payment for the inputs from the front of the process to
the end of the process or because critical shortages of transformation capacity provide outsized negotiating power to a manufacturing service provider. By focusing on the entrepreneurial aspects of
the process (and therefore ownership of the goods being produced)
rather than ownership of materials, the ECPC eliminates the aforementioned ownership of materials issues. (ECPC 2010)

IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING
Both the U.S. and international statistical communities realized that
even after all of the extensive research, outreach, and guideline update
efforts had been completed, there was still a signiﬁcant amount of work
to do in order to implement the decisions that had been made and to
continue analyzing the best methods to measure national and international transactions in a global economy. In response, implementation
groups were formed both internationally and in the United States.
In 2007, the Conference of European Statisticians (CES) created
an Expert Group on the Impact of Globalization on National Accounts.
Speciﬁcally, the goal of this group was to analyze the impact of the
updated guidelines on existing statistical measures, with a particular focus on national accounts, and to identify and propose solutions
for problem areas. The group completed an extensive review of the
topic and produced a detailed guide, “The Impact of Globalization on
National Accounts,” which was ﬁnalized in June 2011 (United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe 2011). The guide documented a wide
variety of issues and offered solutions to many problems; however, the
authors recognized that there was still a need for additional research
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and included a chapter at the end outlining work still to be done. As a
follow-up to this effort, the CES requested that Statistics Netherlands
elaborate on the remaining issues, and this work resulted in the paper
“In-Depth Review on Global Manufacturing” (Statistics Netherlands
2011). It also led to the formation by the CES of a Task Force on Global
Production, which is responsible for developing guidance on unresolved issues related to SNA2008 and BPM6 and on aspects related to
implementing these standards.
In early 2012, this Task Force on Global Production developed and
prioritized a list of conceptual and measurement issues that needed to
be addressed. In October 2012, the task force prepared an interim report
that focused on the top-priority issues and presented a draft report on all
issues to the Group of Experts on National Accounts in April 2012. The
task force received feedback from the Group of Experts on National
Accounts that there was a need for more emphasis on speciﬁc guidance
and practicality, so the output will be ﬁnalized in the form of a practical
guide to be used in the preparation of statistics on global-productionrelated activities (ECE 2013). The task force also produced a report
on factoryless goods production that questioned whether ownership
of material inputs is an appropriate criterion for classifying an FGP in
manufacturing (Task Force on Global Production 2013). That report
was presented to the Expert Group on International Statistical Classiﬁcations in May 2013.
In the United States, the ECPC recognized that the NAICS classiﬁcation decisions the committee adopted would affect multiple U.S.
agencies, as well as programs within those agencies. Furthermore, the
ECPC realized that, as with any new concept, there would likely be
some differences in interpretation across agencies during the implementation process, and that these differences might lead to data inconsistencies. As a result, the ECPC sponsored a multiagency task force
to ensure consistent implementation of the inclusion of FGPs in the
manufacturing sector in the 2012 NAICS. The team is composed of representatives from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS), the Census Bureau, the Federal Reserve, and
the International Trade Commission.
The FGP Implementation Planning Group began meeting in late
June 2010, with the goal of deﬁning a set of rules that agencies could
use to implement the ECPC recommendation for classiﬁcation of FGPs
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in the 2012 NAICS. The group’s analysis of the issues relating to
implementation of this concept indicated that these changes must ﬁrst
be implemented in conjunction with a quinquennial economic census
in order to survey establishments in the appropriate sector. Given the
complexity of the changes and the timing within the planning for the
2012 Economic Census, the group determined that it did not seem feasible to implement in 2012. The team considered partial or sequential
implementation on a pilot basis by applying the new rules to only some
establishments or industries or by applying only some of the rules, but
it determined that this approach would be problematic since it would
result in multiple series breaks over time, especially at aggregate levels.
As a result, the planning group recommended that full implementation
of the outsourcing redeﬁnitions should be delayed, the new goal being
to implement them for the 2017 Economic Census.
This recommendation was accepted by the ECPC and the OMB in
November 2010. Implementation was deferred, and the interagency
group was asked by the ECPC to continue the work of coordinating
the implementation of this change. Then, in a further delay, the OMB
announced in August 2014 that it was rescinding its earlier decision
requiring that statistical agencies implement the classiﬁcation change
of assigning FGPs to the manufacturing sector by 2017, because the
agencies “need an opportunity to perform additional research, testing,
and evaluation.” The remainder of this chapter will discuss the work of
the FGP Implementation Planning Group.

U.S. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Internationally, the concept of economic ownership was integral to
many of the decisions made relating to the handling of transactions. The
ECPC decision to classify FGPs in manufacturing did not explicitly
mention the concept of economic ownership, but it did focus on control
of the entrepreneurial aspects of production, which is in essence the
acceptance of the risks and rewards of the production process. To be the
economic owner of a product, an establishment must control the intellectual property (IP) or design, control the production process, control
the sale of the product and assume entrepreneurial risk. A more detailed
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description of each of those four criteria, however, is required for an
in-depth understanding of the concept.
Control of the IP or design means that the establishment either has
developed it internally, has purchased it from another ﬁrm, or has negotiated to lease it from another ﬁrm. For a domestic establishment with
a foreign afﬁliate, it is possible that the U.S. establishment could be
leasing the IP or design from its afﬁliate. It is also possible that it could
be leased to more than one economic owner. From a business-function
standpoint, an establishment is the economic owner of the IP or design
if it has the right to use it in its products, redistribute it, and can independently change the design of the ﬁnal product.
There are many aspects to controlling the production process,
including controlling inputs, product quality, and production levels.
With respect to inputs, the economic owner can control inputs for the
ﬁnal product in a number of different ways. The owner could purchase
the inputs and ship them to the MSP, arrange to have them shipped to
the MSP from another domestic or foreign location, or merely approve
the selection of input providers and the quality of the inputs. The economic owner also makes decisions about which products to produce
and controls production levels and product quality. An economic owner
can decide whether to add or delete product lines, expand his or her
business, move into a different business, or leave the business entirely.
Finally, the economic owner must also be able to report the cost of
manufacturing service.
The economic owner of a product arranges to sell (or transfer in
the case of an afﬁliate) the product to buyers (consumers, government,
wholesalers, retailers, or other types of businesses, including manufacturers) and sets the price associated with the transaction. The economic owner does not need to take physical possession of the product
or arrange the details of shipments to purchasers, but the owner must be
able to report the value of those shipments.
There are a number of indicators that an establishment has taken
on the entrepreneurial risk related to a product. The economic owner
absorbs the loss for any unsold ﬁnal products. It is also responsible for
losses due to ﬁnal products that fail to meet the customer’s satisfaction,
for which an unsatisﬁed customer would return the product to the economic owner (or a representative of the economic owner) for a refund,
rather than to the establishment that performed the transformation.
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Finally, it is legally responsible for legal problems related to defects or
other problems in the ﬁnal product.
The criteria for determining economic ownership apply in the same
way whether the relationship is between a U.S. establishment and a foreign establishment that performs transformation activities or between a
foreign establishment and a U.S. establishment performing transformation activities.
Deﬁning Decision Rules
The FGP Implementation Planning Group determined that the best
way to ensure a consistent understanding of how the classiﬁcation
decision-making process that is related to outsourcing should be implemented was to consider various scenarios and determine the appropriate
classiﬁcation for each. Based on these discussions of potential scenarios, the team reached conceptual agreement on classiﬁcation outcomes
and created an outsourcing decision tree that reﬂected the implementation of those concepts. In creating the scenarios, it became clear that a
single establishment might perform both integrated manufacturing and
manufacturing service–providing activities and at the same time have
a factoryless goods production relationship with an unafﬁliated transforming establishment. As a result, those possibilities are found in the
decision tree. The decision tree reﬂects what the team considered would
be the “ideal” implementation from a conceptual standpoint and is displayed in Figure 2.2.
There may be practical difﬁculties in implementing this ideal scenario because of external factors such as the differences between international and U.S. recommendations or issues reporting establishments
might have in providing the information required to support classiﬁcation decision making. There could also be internal limitations to implementation procedures related to the availability of resources within statistical agencies.
Several different agencies or programs currently make independent
classiﬁcation decisions for establishments. As long as a potential FGP
and an MSP don’t belong to the same enterprise, decision making using
the decision tree is fairly straightforward and would routinely result
in consistent decision making across agencies and programs. Multi-
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Figure 2.2 Outsourcing Decision Tree—Ideal Deﬁnitions
1. Does this
establishment perform
transformation activities
for any products?

2. Does this establishment
No

Yes
5. Does this
establishment assume the
entrepreneurial risk and
control the IP or design,
production and sale for
all of the products
transformed at
transformed
at this
thislocation?

Yes

No

9. Does this establishment assume the
entrepreneurial risk and control the IP
or design, production and sale for
some of the products transformed at
this location?

assume the entrepreneurial
risk and control the IP or
design, production and sale
of products and contract with
unaffiliated1 establishments
to perform transformation
activities?

6. Does this establishment also
assume the entrepreneurial risk
and control the IP or design,
production and sale of the same
or different products and
contract with unaffiliated1
establishments to perform
transformation activities?

No

3. This establishment is not
in manufacturing. Classify
based on economic activity.

No

4. Classify this establishment
as an FGP.2

Yes

No

Yes

7. Classify this
establishment as an
IM.2
8. This establishment
performs a mixture of
IM/FGP activities.2

10. Classify this establishment

as an MSP.2


Yes

11. Does this establishment also assume
the entrepreneurial risk and control the IP
or design, production and sale of the same
or different products and contract with
unaffiliated1 establishments to perform
transformation activities?



No

12. This establishment performs a
mixture of IM/MSP activities.2

Yes

13. This establishment performs a
mixture of IM/FGP/MSP activities.2

All foreign establishments should be treated as unafﬁliated.
If an establishment performs a mixture of integrated manufacturer (IM), manufacturing service provider (MSP), and factoryless goods producer (FGP) activities, it should
be classiﬁed into one of the three unique subindustries, IM, MSP, or FGP, based on
where most of its activity occurs.
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.
1
2

establishment enterprises in manufacturing industries generally include
establishments that perform transformation activities and establishments that control or provide support to the production activities. When
all of the establishments of an enterprise are in the United States,
the decision-making process is still fairly straightforward, since an
establishment can only have FGP activity if it assumes the entrepreneurial risk and controls the IP or design, the production, and the sale of
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products, and if it contracts with unafﬁliated establishments to perform
transformation activities.
The ideal deﬁnitions, however, specify that all foreign establishments should be treated as unafﬁliated. Thus, there is a potential FGP/
MSP relationship whenever a product is transformed by a foreign afﬁliate. In recent years, multinational enterprises (MNEs) have responded
to improved communications and a need to manage global operations
by unbundling management functions in the same way they have
unbundled production functions. Global enterprises may spread typical headquarters functions across locations, even in different countries,
based on local regulations and proximity to labor sources, customers,
and suppliers. This can result in different locations for the ﬁnancial,
legal, and decision-making functions of an enterprise (Desai 2009).
As a result, assigning economic ownership to a speciﬁc establishment is particularly difﬁcult when analyzing the relationship between
headquarters-type and transforming-type establishments of the enterprise. Within an enterprise, an establishment that doesn’t perform
transformation may meet all the criteria for economic ownership of a
product, but the transaction may be recorded on another establishment’s
books for reasons such as tax purposes. In addition, it is possible that
some of the decision-making tasks that are included in the economic
ownership criteria may be split across more than one headquarters-type
establishment.
The U.S. interagency group has expressed concern that the complexity of classiﬁcation decisions when MNEs are involved will result
in an inefﬁcient allocation of resources if each agency or program works
independently to resolve these issues, and that will make it difﬁcult for
agencies or programs to make consistent decisions about the establishments of individual enterprises, as well as to make consistent decisions
across enterprises. Some of the countries in the European Union (EU)
have begun to form groups to work together to ensure that the transactions of MNEs are treated consistently across national accounts and
national economic statistics. The U.S. interagency group has proposed
a similar approach as part of the plan for the implementation of the FGP
concept, with the formation of a standing cross-agency group to make
classiﬁcation recommendations for the major multinational enterprises
that operate in the United States. The Census Bureau, the BEA, and the
BLS each collect a different set of detailed statistical data from enter-
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prises and establishments. Analysis of the combination of those data
would likely result in the best decisions related to the classiﬁcation of
the establishments of these enterprises and the amount of revenue that
should be attributed to each. Given the organization of U.S. statistical programs, the formation of such a group would require new datasharing agreements and potentially new funding sources, and thus this
proposal might be very difﬁcult to implement. In the meantime, efforts
to develop other approaches for handling these challenges will continue.
Understanding Data Needs
There are many data interdependencies among U.S. statistical agencies and the programs within them. In order to successfully implement
the manufacturing redeﬁnition clariﬁcation, statistical agencies have
some special needs related to the data inputs that they receive from one
another so they can accurately calculate statistics that reﬂect the inclusion of factoryless goods manufacturers in manufacturing.
Integrated manufacturers, manufacturing service providers, and
factoryless goods producers each have a different mix of inputs and
operating constraints. As a result, it may be necessary to produce separate data for each type of operation in many statistical series, either as
unpublished components of published aggregate data or as published
series. In order to support these data analysis needs, statistical programs
will need values for inputs and outputs broken out by type of operation.
Some statistical agencies use the customs data provided by the
IMTS in the production of statistics related to imports and exports.
Since IMTS2010 gave priority to the need for statistics that reﬂect
physical border-crossing of goods, customs data provided by the IMTS
differ conceptually from the ECPC deﬁnition of FGP with respect to
goods for processing and the return of processed goods. In order to use
customs data in compiling other statistics that follow the ECPC deﬁnition, data will need to be obtained from other sources to adjust customs
data to reﬂect the ECPC concept.
It is important both to statistical agencies and to other data users to
be able to distinguish between deﬁnitional and economic changes so
that these users of the data can create continuous time series and analyze data changes over time. As a result, individual statistical programs
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will need access to conversion, or bridge data, for various data series in
order to produce historically consistent time series.
Statistical agencies rely on businesses to provide the data required
to calculate economic statistics. For this reason, the interagency group
also recognized the importance of understanding the types of data that
establishments involved in outsourcing would likely be able to supply.
In order to obtain this information, the group met with associations and
companies and analyzed publicly available company data (particularly
Form 10-Ks) to determine how companies manage and record their outsourcing activities. Another method used to determine data availability was the inclusion of “special inquiry” questions on current survey
forms for some statistical programs. These questions serve the dual purpose of testing potential questions and identifying establishments that
would likely be classiﬁed as FGPs when the manufacturing redeﬁnition
is implemented. The results of this research will be used as input to the
creation of updated data collection instruments.

EXPECTED IMPACT ON ECONOMIC STATISTICS
The classiﬁcation of factoryless goods producers in manufacturing
is expected to have an impact on a number of different statistical programs, some of which are listed below:
•

U.S. Census Bureau—Economic Census, annual and monthly
wholesale trade surveys, Annual Survey of Manufacturers, several other NAICS-based series.

•

Bureau of Economic Analysis—industry accounts, international accounts, National Income and Product Accounts,
regional accounts.

•

Bureau of Labor Statistics—Current Employment Statistics program, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages,
Producer Price Index program, International Price Program,
Major Sector Productivity program, and Industry Productivity
program.
Federal Reserve—industrial production.

•
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General Expectations by Type of Measure
The exact impact of these changes will depend on the classiﬁcation decisions that are made for individual establishments when the
new rules are applied, as well as on the size of those establishments at
the time the rules take effect, whenever that may be. As a result, there
is currently not enough information to quantify the exact impact, and
there won’t be until that information becomes available. We do have
enough information, however, to describe the types of changes that are
expected for a number of different economic measures. These expectations are described in Table 2.2.
Impact on Speciﬁc Manufacturing Industries
Although exact impact measures cannot currently be calculated,
existing data can be analyzed in an attempt to identify which industries are most likely to be affected by these changes and to make some
estimates related to the size of some of the changes. The data expectations described above indicate that changes within manufacturing will
be centered on speciﬁc industries. For planning purposes, it would be
helpful to economic programs to identify which industries will likely
be most affected by the inclusion of FGPs in manufacturing in order to
support any required decision making.
In order to develop measurement statistics, I make the following
four assumptions related to manufacturing industries:
1) Manufacturing industries that currently purchase a relatively
large amount of contract work have a production process that
is consistent with the outsourcing of transformation tasks.
2) Under current procedures, if a manufacturing establishment
outsources all of the transformation for its products, the sales
of those products are coded as resales. Therefore, manufacturing industries with relatively high levels of resales are likely to
have FGP activity under the new rules.
3) The ratio of production employees to total employees will be
lower for manufacturing industries that outsource transformation activities.
4) Manufacturing industries with relatively high levels of imports
for their products are likely to be involved in outsourcing.
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Based on these assumptions, data from the 2007 Economic Census
and the 2002 benchmark I-O tables were examined to ﬁnd measures
that might help identify industries that currently have characteristics
that could be indicative of FGP activity. No single measure was identiﬁed that could reﬂect the criteria in all four assumptions. As a result,
ﬁve different measures were identiﬁed, and analysis focused on the
full set of measures rather than on any individual measure. For each
measure, values were calculated for each six-digit NAICS manufacturing industry along with weighted average values for all manufacturing
industries. For most of the measures, values higher than the average
were considered indicative of potential FGP activity. For the number of
production workers divided by total employment, values lower than the
averages were considered indicative of potential FGP activity. In order
to further support analysis, a level was judgmentally selected for each
measure to indicate a value that was signiﬁcantly higher or lower than
the average, so that about half of the above- or below-average industries were considered to be signiﬁcantly above or below. The formulas
for each measure are displayed in Table 2.3, along with the percentage
level signiﬁcantly above or below.
The goal of the analysis was two-pronged. At a high level, the goal
was to provide a big picture of the impact of this change on the manufacturing sector. At an industry level, the goal was to provide early support for agency planning processes by systematically identifying those
speciﬁc industries that are most likely to be affected by the inclusion of
FGPs in manufacturing and thus may need special processing. Industries were assigned to one of three categories based on the number of
measures above average and signiﬁcantly above average (or, as noted
earlier, below average, in the case of number of production employees divided by total employment). Although the ﬁve measures were
selected because of their expected relationship to potential FGP activity, the level of each of the measures for a particular industry could be
affected by other factors as well. As a result, criteria were set for the
three categories, assuming that an industry with fewer than ﬁve measures above average could have a high likelihood of being affected by
the inclusion of FGPs in manufacturing, while those industries with
only one measure above average would be unlikely to be affected. Table
2.4 displays the exact criteria that were used to assign industries to categories, as well as statistics for each of the three categories.
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Measure

Expected change

Total U.S. employment
and wages

U.S. totals will not change.

Sector U.S. employment Values will shift across sectors, with manufacturing growing and other sectors, primarily wholesale trade,
and wages
shrinking. Increases in manufacturing are expected to be centered on speciﬁc industries. This will result in
regional shifts within sectors, including manufacturing.
Production employees

U.S. totals will not change. Sector total changes will be minimal, since FGPs would have few, if any, production employees.

Total U.S. revenue
values

The total will likely change, but the direction and amount of the change are unknown.
1. FGPs may report revenues from products that would have previously been treated as imports.
2. For an FGP manufacturing establishment previously classiﬁed in wholesale trade, revenues will
increase by the difference between the wholesale trade margin and the full value of the products for
some statistical measures.
3. For manufacturing establishments that are determined to be MSPs rather than IMs, revenues will
decrease by the difference between the full value of the product and the value of the manufacturing
service they provided.

Sector U.S. revenue
values

Sector totals will change, with increases expected in manufacturing and decreases in other sectors. The
manufacturing changes will likely be in speciﬁc industries.

Value of U.S. imports

The total will likely change, but the direction and amount of the change are unknown. The mix between
goods and services will also change. The changes will be centered in speciﬁc product areas.
For products transformed by foreign MSPs for domestic FGPs:
1. The full value of the products that the foreign MSPs transformed and returned to the U.S. FGPs will
be excluded from imports.
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2. The value of the manufacturing service that they performed and any inputs they provided will be
included in imports.
For products transformed by U.S. MSPs for foreign FGPs:
1. The full value of the products that they transformed that remain in the U.S. are included in imports.
2. The value of any inputs that they received from the foreign FGP will be excluded from imports.
Value of U.S. exports

The total will likely change, but the direction and amount of the change are unknown. The mix between
goods and services will also change. The changes will be centered on speciﬁc product areas.
For products transformed by foreign MSPs for domestic FGPs:
1. The value of products that have remained in a foreign MSP’s country or that were shipped by a
foreign MSP to another country will be added to exports.
2. The value of the inputs that the domestic FGP provided to the MSP will be excluded from exports.
For products transformed by U.S. MSPs for foreign FGPs:
1. The full value of any product that they transformed and returned to the foreign FGP will be excluded
from exports.

2. The value of the manufacturing service that they performed and any inputs they provided will be
included in exports.
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.
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Table 2.3 Industry Impact Analysis Measures
Average for all Signiﬁcantly
manufacturing above/below
Measure
industries (%) average level (%)
2007 Economic Census
15
9.7
(Cost of contract work) / (payroll)
10
5.9
(Cost of contract work) / (cost of
materials and parts)
5
2.3
(Cost of resales) / (total cost of materials)
60
70.1
(Number of production workers) /
(total employment)
2002 benchmark I-O tables
(Imports) / (domestic production +
23.2
30
imports − exports)
SOURCE: 2007 Economic Census and 2002 benchmark input-output (I-O) tables.

In order to summarize the industry results, the industry categorization was further analyzed by aggregating the industries by subsector
and calculating the percentage of each subsector’s value of shipments
(VOS) that is attributable to industries in each of the three categories.
These percentages are displayed in the Table 2.5, along with a count of
the number of industries in the category. The analysis indicates that the
apparel manufacturing and computer and electronic product manufacturing subsectors had the highest portion of their VOS from industries
in the highest-likelihood category. This is consistent with the generally
accepted assumption that these two subsectors will be strongly affected
by the manufacturing redeﬁnition.
Analysis of Wholesale Trade for Own-Brand Importer-Marketers
The wholesale trade survey forms for the Economic Census include
a question related to the type of operation. One of the operation types is,
“own-brand importer-marketer.” Own-brand importers-marketers deal
primarily or exclusively in the parent company’s own branded products manufactured outside the United States. The products are either
imported into the United States and then sold, or they are sold and then
drop-shipped directly from a foreign location to the U.S. customer. It is
expected that many of the wholesale trade establishments categorized
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Table 2.4 Results of Manufacturing Industry Impact Analysis

Category
Criteria
Highest
4 or 5 measures
likelihood above average, or
3 above average
with more than one
signiﬁcantly above
average
Medium
3 measures above
likelihood average with fewer
than 2 signiﬁcantly
above, or 2 above
average
Lowest
0 or 1 measure
likelihood
above average

% of total % of total
Number manufactur- manufactur- % of total
of
ing estab- ing employ- manufacturindustries lishments
ment
ing VOS
150
33
30
25

160

40

34

39

161

27

36

36

NOTE: “VOS” stands for value of shipments.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on 2007 Economic Census and 2002 benchmark
input-output (I-O) tables.

in this operation type will be classiﬁed in manufacturing using the new
classiﬁcation rules. In the 2007 Economic Census, about 3 percent of all
wholesale trade establishments were own brand importer-marketers.5
Those establishments accounted for about 4 percent of wholesale trade
sales and employment. If all those establishments had been classiﬁed
in manufacturing, the number of manufacturing establishments would
have increased by about 3 percent, sales would have increased by about
4 percent, and employment would have increased by about 2 percent.
The wholesale trade industry groups that have the largest proportion of
their sales from own-brand importer-marketers are ofﬁcially known as
“Apparel, piece goods, and notions merchant wholesalers” and “Electrical and electronic goods merchant wholesalers.”
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% of subsector VOS from
industries by likelihood of impact
Sector Title
High
Medium Unlikely
311
Food manufacturing
3.0
20.0
76.9
312
Beverage and tobacco product manufacturing
0.0
52.1
47.9
313
Textile mills
25.2
41.7
33.1
314
Textile product mills
47.9
48.4
3.7
315
Apparel manufacturing
86.8
11.7
1.5
316
Leather and allied product manufacturing
43.6
56.4
0.0
321
Wood product manufacturing
4.1
8.3
87.6
322
Paper manufacturing
0.5
5.5
94.0
323
Printing and related support activities
21.1
65.7
13.2
324
Petroleum and coal product manufacturing
0.0
96.2
3.8
325
Chemical manufacturing
30.7
48.8
20.5
326
Plastics and rubber product manufacturing
0.0
13.3
86.7
327
Nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing
17.3
28.0
54.6
331
Primary metal manufacturing
40.6
24.2
35.2
332
Fabricated metal product manufacturing
33.1
51.4
15.5
333
Machinery manufacturing
46.9
38.6
14.5
334
Computer and electronic product manufacturing
77.4
20.3
2.3
335
Electrical equipment, appliance, and component manufacturing 25.1
35.9
39.0
336
Transportation equipment manufacturing
23.3
22.2
54.5
337
Furniture and related product manufacturing
17.0
35.6
47.4
339
Miscellaneous manufacturing
75.6
23.9
0.5

No. of subsector industries
by likelihood of impact
High Medium Unlikely
2
8
37
0
5
4
4
4
4
5
2
1
17
5
2
5
4
0
1
2
11
1
3
16
4
5
3
0
2
3
4
19
11
0
4
13
7
10
7
2
11
13
17
19
7
27
17
5
21
7
2
5
9
8
5
12
13
4
5
4
14
8
1
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NOTE: “VOS” stands for value of shipments.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on 2007 Economic Census and 2002 benchmark input-output (I-O) tables.
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IMPORTANCE OF CHANGES FOR DATA USERS
Over the past 20 years, U.S. economic statistical programs recognized that there have been major changes in the way businesses operate,
particularly with respect to production fragmentation and globalization,
but individual agencies and programs in those agencies made different methodological decisions in response to those changes. There was
not an integrated comprehensive examination of how these economic
changes should be reﬂected in the entire set of economic statistics.
Business and governmental decision makers use a wide variety of
U.S. economic statistics from different agencies and programs on a
daily basis. To the extent that these statistics are inconsistent with one
another or have not kept pace with changes in the economy, they may
make it difﬁcult for data users to make sound decisions. This problem
has been recognized by both government and business data users and
has been characterized as “using a 1950s dashboard to operate a 21stcentury machine” (Karabell 2013, p. G1).
The collaborative effort of U.S. statistical agencies to reach agreement on how to identify and handle factoryless goods producers and
manufacturing service providers will result in more data consistency
across agencies. In addition, it will allow statistical agencies to provide
data about the three different types of manufacturing establishments,
at least at an aggregate level, allowing data users to see changes over
time and to analyze differences across the three types of establishments.
These beneﬁts will support the need of business and government leaders to make informed decisions.
Notes
1. All views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily
reﬂect the views or policies of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2. For a detailed description of the usual classiﬁcation rules, refer to United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2008).
3. More information about the ECPC can be found at http://www.census.gov/eos/
www/naics/ecpc/ecpc.html (accessed November 12, 2013).
4. The following link includes links to various sectors of the manual: http://www
.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?chart=2007 (accessed April 21, 2014).
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5. Detailed data on wholesale trade by type of operation can be found at U.S. Census
Bureau (2007).
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Globalization has created new opportunities and competitive challenges, forcing producers to seek more efﬁcient ways to make their
products. It has become increasingly common for producers seeking
more efﬁcient means of production to divide the traditional vertically
integrated production model into stages or tasks (known as fragments),
thus allowing them to outsource part of their production process. When
the resulting production arrangement is interlinked across different
countries, the measurement challenges facing national economic statistics programs increase dramatically.
Many economic forces are driving the fragmentation of production
to specialized establishments, both foreign and domestic. Improvements in information technology have allowed ﬁrms to relocate production to new and often distant locations. International cost differences
(such as lower relative wage costs and lower trade and transport costs),
improved logistics, and improved intellectual property rights protection and contract enforcement have facilitated the use of global supply chains and global value chains, or GVCs (U.S. International Trade
Commission 2011).
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A supply chain is a system of organization, technology, activities,
information, and resources involved in moving a good or service from
supplier to customer. It can be within an enterprise, between enterprises
in a local economy, or among a group of countries. The supply chain is
a network where the activities involved can be grouped using the traditional broad stages of production—from upstream research and development (R&D) and design, through manufacturing, to downstream
logistics, marketing, and sales. The complexity of the supply chain and
the business relationship between the various stages can vary by industry and by enterprise. A global supply chain consists of a worldwide
network of these activities.
A value chain refers to the value-added activities required to bring
a good or service from its conception, design, production, marketing,
distribution, and support to ﬁnal customers.2 It is the value added to
the good or service at each stage of the network. Similar to the supply chain, the complexity of the value chain and the business relationship between the various stages can vary by industry and by enterprise.
A value chain can be between enterprises in a local economy or span
enterprises across a group of countries.
The fragmentation of production through the use of GVCs raises
many issues for economic measurement, including classifying the
ﬁrms within these chains, measuring and classifying trade in goods and
services, and measuring and classifying trade in intermediate inputs.
The recently updated international guidelines for compiling national
and international accounts include new guidelines to better capture the
impacts of GVCs on the economy.3 The U.S. Census Bureau, the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA), and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
have been studying ways to classify and collect data from entities that
are part of GVCs. A key element in identifying the relationship between
ﬁrms that outsource the fabrication of products—while still controlling
the production process—and ﬁrms that perform the processing is contract manufacturing services (CMS).
This chapter focuses on efforts to collect data on CMS and the
challenges with identifying and collecting data on entities that are part
of GVCs. In particular, it identiﬁes data that the BEA and the Census
Bureau are already collecting on both producers and users of CMS. In
this way, the chapter not only demonstrates that it is feasible to identify and collect data on these activities but also provides a snapshot of
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companies that are engaged in these activities. Although the descriptive
data presented in this chapter do not provide the full accounting of these
activities that is recommended by the latest U.S. and international statistical guidelines, they do provide an indication of the potential scope
and magnitude of the measurement task before us. The statistical agencies will use this and other information to guide their efforts to improve
the measurement of these activities in order to implement the latest statistical guidelines and provide more useful data on manufacturing value
chains. This will enable them to cover both the ﬁrms that outsource
fabrication services and the CMS producers that provide these services.
The chapter’s remaining sections describe new U.S. and international guidelines and relevant data on CMS activities. Section Two,
“Classifying ‘Factoryless’ Manufacturers,” looks at U.S. and international recommendations on the industry classiﬁcation of “factoryless”
manufacturers—units that entirely outsource the fabrication of their
products. Section Three, “Data Collection on Contract Manufacturing
Services,” describes the BEA and Census Bureau surveys and discusses
data collection efforts on CMS. Section Four, “Analysis of Contract
Manufacturing Services on the BEA’s BE-10 Survey,” discusses the
BEA’s analysis of the CMS data reported in its surveys. Section Five,
“Analysis of Contract Manufacturing Services on Census Bureau 2011
COS,” treats the Census Bureau’s analysis of the CMS data reported in
the Report of Organization Survey. Section Six, “Future Work,” concludes with a discussion of future data collection endeavors.

CLASSIFYING “FACTORYLESS” MANUFACTURERS
The North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) is
an industry classiﬁcation system for establishments based on a production-oriented conceptual framework in which establishments are
grouped together by common production processes. A production process describes any activity in which inputs, including types of labor and
related skills, capital equipment, raw and intermediate materials, and, in
many cases, intangible inputs such as intellectual property, are used to
fabricate a material good or to render a service.4 Establishments are the
smallest operating entity for which records provide information on the
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cost of resources—materials, labor, and capital—employed to produce
the units of output (OMB 2007, p. 19).
With the rise of global competition, economies are becoming more
integrated, and the use of global supply chains is rapidly increasing.
This has complicated the application of the production function classiﬁcation principle to units that control intellectual property and perform
underlying entrepreneurial components of arranging the factors of production, but outsource all of the actual transformation activities to other
specialized units. The Ofﬁce of Management and Budget (OMB) calls
these units “factoryless” goods producers, or FGPs (OMB 2010).
Units in the manufacturing sector arrange for and bring together
the factors of production necessary to produce a good. They accept the
entrepreneurial risk of producing and bringing goods to market. As the
Economic Classiﬁcation Policy Committee (ECPC) states in the 2012
NAICS manual’s supporting documents,
when individual steps in the complete process are outsourced, an
establishment should remain classiﬁed in the manufacturing sector.
For example: 1) a decision to produce or purchase raw materials
does not change the classiﬁcation; 2) a decision to use contractors
or a professional employer organization (PEO) rather than a traditional employment contract does not change classiﬁcation; and
3) a decision to outsource marketing and distribution to a wholesaler does not change classiﬁcation. In each case, the decision to
perform or outsource a function changes the establishment production function but does not change the classiﬁcation. (ECPC 2010,
p. 6)

The ECPC deﬁnes the characteristics of FGPs to include the following (OMB 2010, p. 4):5
• Owns rights to the intellectual property or design (whether independently developed or otherwise acquired) of the ﬁnal manufactured product.
• May or may not own the input materials.
• Does not own production facilities.
• Does not perform transformation activities.
• Owns the ﬁnal product produced by manufacturing service provider partners.
• Sells the ﬁnal product.
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International Recommendations
The NAICS classiﬁcation, employed in the United States, does
not use ownership of material inputs as a basis for industry classiﬁcation. However, the International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation of
All Economic Activities (ISIC), Revision 4, which is promulgated by
the United Nations and forms the basis for industrial classiﬁcation systems used by many other countries, bases classiﬁcation of units that
outsource transformation solely on ownership of material inputs. “A
principal who completely outsources the transformation process should
be classiﬁed into manufacturing if and only if it owns the input materials to the production process—and therefore owns the ﬁnal output,” the
ISIC says (United Nations Statistics Division 2008, p. 30). According
to the ISIC, a unit that outsources transformation but owns the material
inputs is a manufacturer; a unit that outsources transformation and does
not own the material inputs is engaged in wholesale or retail trade.
The ECPC considers a strict adherence to the ownership of materials as impractical because a slight change in how the materials were
acquired would change the industry classiﬁcation. For example, the
principal could purchase the inputs and do one of two things: 1) take
physical possession of the inputs and ship them to the contract manufacturer or 2) arrange to have the inputs shipped directly to the contract
manufacturer from another domestic or foreign location. Under ISIC
rules, the contractual arrangement of the case in which the principal
purchases the materials directly would result in the principal being
classiﬁed in the manufacturing sector even if the principal did not take
physical possession of the materials. However, rather than purchasing
the inputs, the principal may simply approve the input providers from
whom the contract manufacturer must buy and monitor the quality of
the inputs acquired by the contract manufacturer. Under ISIC rules, this
contractual arrangement would most likely result in the principal being
classiﬁed in a trade sector because the principal did not directly purchase the material inputs. The ECPC considers controlling the production process a more important criterion than owning the material inputs.
The ISIC classiﬁcation based on ownership of the material inputs
is consistent with the treatment recommended in both the System of
National Accounts 2008 (referred to in this chapter as SNA 2008) and
the sixth edition of the Balance of Payments and International Invest-
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ment Position Manual (referred to in this chapter as BPM6) for goods
sent abroad for processing (European Commission et al. 2009; IMF
2009).6 According to this treatment, goods sent abroad for processing
without a change in ownership should be excluded from goods trade;
the processing fee charged by the manufacturing service provider
should be recorded as services trade. The fee for this service is related
to the difference between the value of the goods exported for processing
and the value of the goods returned (imported) after processing.7 When
goods are shipped abroad for processing and subsequently sold abroad,
the processed goods should be recorded as U.S. merchandise exports at
the time they are sold, and any inputs purchased abroad by the U.S. ﬁrm
and processed abroad should be recorded as U.S. merchandise imports.8
The new international guidelines state that the recording of imports and
exports of goods should be based on the transfer of economic ownership. For example, if a U.S. shoe company sent soles and leather to a
contract manufacturer in another country for assembly of its athletic
shoe, the U.S. shoe company—the principal—is importing manufacturing services from the contract manufacturer. Because the U.S. shoe
company owns the soles, leather, and assembled athletic shoe, there is
no international transaction; therefore, the soles and leather should not
be recorded as U.S. exports and the assembled athletic shoe should not
be recorded as a U.S. import.
It is important to note that although the NAICS does not base its
classiﬁcation of “factoryless” goods producers strictly on change in
ownership, the change-in-ownership principle is still the most relevant
criterion for measuring international transactions. It is desirable to
deﬁne international transactions as transactions between residents and
nonresidents, thus focusing on the change in ownership, regardless of
whether the establishments engaged in the transactions are classiﬁed
in manufacturing or in another industry. Thus, adoption of the NAICS
recommendation for FGP does not preclude the adoption of the SNA
2008/BPM6 recommendation for the treatment of goods sent abroad
for processing.
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DATA COLLECTION ON CONTRACT
MANUFACTURING SERVICES
Identifying CMS is a key element in identifying the relationship
between ﬁrms that outsource the fabrication of products—while still
controlling the production process—and ﬁrms that perform the processing. Through preliminary outreach conducted by the Census Bureau,
respondents appear to understand the concept of CMS and the need for
U.S. statistical agencies to collect the data. Collecting data, however,
could be challenging. Some respondents indicated that they were generally unable to provide CMS data because either accounting or production management systems did not include a searchable characteristic
that would distinguish these services.
To determine whether data collection can be robust, the Census
Bureau and the BEA have added questions to their respective surveys
to determine whether U.S. businesses can accurately report purchases
and sales of CMS. See Table 3.1 for a list of all surveys conducted by
these two agencies that contain CMS-related questions. This section
describes three surveys that include questions about CMS.
Bureau of Economic Analysis Surveys
The ﬁrst two surveys we cover are conducted by the Bureau of Economic Analysis; the third is done by the Census Bureau.
Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad
Every ﬁve years, the BEA conducts the Benchmark Survey of U.S.
Direct Investment Abroad (BE-10) to track the economic activity of
U.S. multinational companies and their foreign afﬁliates.9 The BE-10
benchmark survey covers the entire universe of U.S. direct investment
abroad in terms of value and is the BEA’s most comprehensive survey of such investment in terms of subject matter. The survey collects
detailed information on the ﬁnancial structure and operations of U.S.
parent companies and their foreign afﬁliates and on the transactions and
positions between the parents and their afﬁliates.
Any U.S. person that had a foreign afﬁliate is required to report.10 If
the respondent is a U.S. corporation, the respondent reports transactions
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Form number
BE-10A
BE-120

NC-99001
MC31101–MC33975a
WH42101–WH42237a

Survey name
Year
Sponsoring organization
Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct
2009
Bureau of
Investment Abroad for U.S. Parents
Economic Analysis
Benchmark Survey of Transactions
2011
Bureau of
in Selected Services and Intellectual
Economic Analysis
Property Products with Foreign Persons
Company Organization Survey
2011
Census Bureau
Census of Manufactures
2007, 2012
Census Bureau
Census of Wholesale Trade
2007, 2012
Census Bureau

Only industries where the CMS question is applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.

a
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for the fully consolidated U.S. domestic enterprise, which excludes foreign branches and other foreign afﬁliates. The BEA deﬁnes an entity as
a foreign afﬁliate if it meets the following criteria:
• If it is incorporated abroad, it is always considered a foreign afﬁliate. Most afﬁliates meet this criterion.
• If the entity is not incorporated, it is a foreign afﬁliate if it
- is subject to a foreign income tax, has a substantial physical
presence abroad as evidenced by employees permanently located abroad, etc.;
- has separate ﬁnancial records that would allow the preparation of ﬁnancial statements; or
- takes title to the goods it sells and receives revenues from the
sale, or receives funds from customers for its own account for
services it performs.
To understand the activity of U.S. multinationals with respect to
manufacturing services, the BEA added questions on purchases and performance of contract manufacturing to the 2009 Benchmark Survey of
U.S. Direct Investment Abroad for U.S. parents that are not banks (BE10A).11 The questions were added to identify a group of ﬁrms engaged
in manufacturing services that could be used either as a sample frame
for a special survey on that topic or as a way to identify ﬁrms engaged
in CMS that may be linked to data collected by the Census Bureau.
A data link is performed when company identiﬁcation codes from the
BEA ﬁles are matched to the corresponding companies in the Census
Bureau ﬁles. A data link project provides access to additional data items
that the BEA did not collect.
The BE-10 survey deﬁnes contract manufacturing as “contracting
with a ﬁrm to process materials and components, including payments
for fabricating, assembling, labeling, and packaging materials and components.” Because the BEA was trying to identify a group of ﬁrms that
engaged in contract manufacturing, only yes/no questions were added
to the survey. The BE-10 CMS deﬁnition was broader than the international guidelines’ deﬁnition of “manufacturing services” as constituting
the processing of materials and components owned by others. However,
the BEA requested respondents to answer the question of whether they
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owned some or all of the materials used by the contract manufacturers
or whether they did not own the materials.
Benchmark Survey of Transactions in Selected Services and
Intellectual Property Products with Foreign Persons
The BEA conducts the Benchmark Survey of Transactions in
Selected Services and Intellectual Property Products with Foreign
Persons (BE-120) to track U.S. imports and exports of services and
intellectual property products. The BE-120 benchmark survey collects
information on U.S. international trade in all types of services and intellectual property for which information is not collected on other BEA
surveys and is not available to the BEA from other sources. The major
types of services transactions not covered by the BE-120 survey are
travel, transportation, insurance (except for payments for primary insurance), ﬁnancial services (except for payments by nonﬁnancial ﬁrms),
and expenditures by students and medical patients that are studying or
seeking treatment in a country different from their country of residence.
The survey covers U.S. persons that have engaged in services or
intellectual property transactions with foreign persons. As with the U.S.
direct investment abroad reporting unit, the respondent is required to
report transactions for the fully consolidated U.S. domestic enterprise.
Questions separately identifying receipts and payments for CMS were
added to the 2011 BE-120 survey.12 Contract manufacturing services,
as deﬁned in the BE-120, are “manufacturing services on materials and
components owned by others and covers processing, assembly, labeling, packing and so forth undertaken by businesses that do not own the
goods concerned.”
The BEA is in the process of collecting these data to determine
whether respondents can separately identify the costs of the manufacturing service as well as the destination of the goods after processing.
Reporting by companies on the contract manufacturing questions is
voluntary, and initial review of these questions indicates a low response
rate.
Census Bureau Surveys
To date, there are three data sources that cover explicit questions
about CMS. Jarmin, Krizan, and Tang (2011) analyze the CMS-speciﬁc
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questions in the 2007 economic censuses, which include both the Census of Manufactures and the Census of Wholesale Trade. Fort (2013)
utilizes the CMS question in the 2007 Census of Manufactures to study
the role of communication technology on a ﬁrm’s decision to fragment
its production process within and outside national boundaries. Bayard,
Byrne, and Smith (Chapter 4, this volume) present a case study of “factoryless” goods–producing ﬁrms in the semiconductor industry using
the 2002 and 2007 Census of Wholesale Trade. A third survey, the 2011
Report of Organization Survey (Form NC-99001, called the Company
Organization Survey, or COS), has heretofore been unexplored by
researchers. This chapter will focus on analyzing the 2011 COS, which
asks detailed questions about both providing and purchasing CMS.13
2011 Company Organization Survey
The COS covers all multiunit companies with 250 or more employees and a selection of smaller companies to support other Census
Bureau surveys. Companies with fewer than 250 employees are only
selected for the COS when administrative records indicate that the
company may be undergoing organizational change and is adding or
dropping establishments. The COS is conducted annually in the four
years between economic censuses.14 The COS is designed primarily
to maintain the Business Register, a current list of business establishments in the United States that is used to conduct establishment-level
economic surveys every ﬁve years.15 Therefore, it has heretofore not
directly been used to conduct economic research. However, the 2011
COS included a section that asked ﬁrms about their activities pertaining to purchasing and providing CMS.16 These questions are some of
the most detailed questions pertaining to the CMS activities of a ﬁrm
from any survey currently in use. Although not nationally representative, analyzing responses to these questions furthers our understanding
of the characteristics of ﬁrms engaged in CMS activities.
The survey unit in the COS is the company, which is linked to a ﬁrm
identiﬁcation code.17 However, the unique identiﬁer is the survey unit
identiﬁer. It would be useful to create a ﬁrm-level data set that can be
linked to other Census Bureau data sets for further analysis. It is not possible to achieve this simply by aggregating the data by ﬁrm identiﬁers,
since CMS activities are indicated by categorical variables. Therefore,
“Y” is assigned to a ﬁrm in response to a question (that requires “Y” or
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“N”—”yes” or “no”) where multiple survey units under that ﬁrm identiﬁer responded differently to the question. For example, if survey unit
A responds “Y” to question 2 in the 2011 COS under Section 3D while
survey unit B responds “N” (or does not respond), then “Y” is assigned
to the ﬁrm to which both units belong. After the preceding adjustments
have been made, the COS contains records for 34,228 unique ﬁrms.
Using the ﬁrm identiﬁer, the ﬁrm-level data set is then linked to the
2010 Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) to identify three key ﬁrm
characteristics: 1) ﬁrm age, 2) total employment, and 3) sector. The
LBD is a longitudinally linked data set of all business establishments
that operate in the United States except for farms, government-owned
or government-operated entities, and private households (Jarmin and
Miranda 2002). For multiunits or ﬁrms with multiple plants, age is calculated as the difference between the year of interest and the year of
establishment of its oldest plant. Since multiunit ﬁrms may operate in
several sectors of the economy, the ﬁrm is considered to be operating in
the sector where the largest share of its employment is housed.18 Since
the LBD is an establishment-level data set, employment is ﬁrst aggregated up to the ﬁrm level by sector. The ﬁrm is then assigned its “predominant” sector, and its employment is aggregated to the ﬁrm level.19
Finally, the ﬁrm-level data, which now include information about ﬁrm
age, total employment, and sector, are linked to the 2011 COS. Of
34,228 ﬁrms in the COS data set, 34,191 ﬁrms are linked to the LBD.
The ﬁnal analysis data set is a ﬁrm-level data set that includes
information about the ﬁrm’s age, total employment, the sector in which
it operates, and several indicator variables based on responses to the
CMS-related questions.20 The ﬁrms are categorized into four mutually
exclusive categories: 1) provides CMS only, 2) purchases CMS only, 3)
both provides and purchases CMS, and 4) does none of the aforementioned. Within the category of ﬁrms that purchase CMS, the analysis
further distinguishes among those that purchase CMS in three ways: 1)
within the United States only, 2) outside the United States only, and 3)
both within and outside the United States. Among ﬁrms that purchase
CMS outside the United States, it is possible to further identify whether
a ﬁrm does so from its foreign afﬁliates. Analysis of the responses to
the second part of Question 2 and Question 3d is done only for survey
units that belong to a unique ﬁrm identiﬁer, because there is no straightforward yes-or-no rule that can be implemented in this instance. There
are 33,865 such observations.
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The 2011 COS is further linked to the 2007 Census of Manufactures (CM) and the 2009 Linked/Longitudinal Foreign Trade Transactions Database (LFTTD) to create two separate data sets: the COS-CM
and the COS-LFTTD.21 The COS-CM provides data on the total value
added and the total value of shipments of each ﬁrm in the COS that
belongs to the manufacturing sector. These ﬁrms represent about 27
percent of ﬁrms in the ﬁnal COS analysis data set. The COS-LFTTD
provides data on the total value of exports and the total value of imports
of each ﬁrm in the COS because the LFFTD links the universe of export
and import transactions to ﬁrms and considers all 10-digit Harmonized
Commodity Description and Coding System (commonly called Harmonized System, or HS) products. The Harmonized System is an internationally standardized system of names and numbers for classifying
traded products. Approximately 33 percent of the ﬁrms in the ﬁnal COS
analysis data set exported in 2009, and 24 percent imported that year.

ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT MANUFACTURING SERVICES
ON THE BEA’s BE-10 SURVEY
The results presented in this chapter are based on reported data for
3,830 U.S. parent companies. CMS questions were only included on the
parent’s survey form, and no corresponding questions were included on
the foreign afﬁliate’s form. Speciﬁc examples of a ﬁrm’s purchase or
performance of CMS cannot be described, because the data are conﬁdential. However, hypothetical examples of purchases of CMS include
the manufacturing of Company A’s computer based on speciﬁcations of
the design of the computer provided by Company A, and the assembly
of Company B’s semiconductor chips by a foundry. In each case, a ﬁrm
is contracting with another unit to process materials and components
based on speciﬁcations supplied by the purchasing ﬁrm.
Each U.S. parent is classiﬁed by industry using the International
Survey Industry (ISI) classiﬁcation system. For the most part, the ISI
classiﬁcations are equivalent to NAICS four-digit industries; at its most
detailed level, the NAICS classiﬁes industries at a six-digit level. The
ISI system is less detailed than the NAICS because it is designed for
classifying enterprises rather than establishments (or plants). Each U.S.
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parent is classiﬁed in a sector that accounted for the largest percentage of its sales. The sector classiﬁcation is chosen ﬁrst because many
direct investment enterprises are active in several industries; it is not
meaningful to classify all their data in a single industry if that industry
is deﬁned too narrowly.22
The ﬁrst step in the analysis was to analyze how U.S. parents
responded to the question of whether they purchased or provided CMS.
The respondents were asked to consider CMS activity performed by
their foreign afﬁliates as purchasing CMS from others. As shown in
Table 3.2, approximately a quarter of U.S. parents reported purchases
of CMS from foreign or domestic contract manufacturers, while threefourths reported no purchases of CMS. Only 8 percent of U.S. parents
reported performing CMS for nonresidents. Not surprisingly, the majority, or 72 percent, of U.S. parents that reported purchases of CMS are
classiﬁed in the manufacturing sector. As shown in Table 3.3, the other
two sectors with signiﬁcant purchases of CMS are wholesale (13 percent) and information (5 percent).
Table 3.4 presents the characteristics of U.S. parents who are classiﬁed within the manufacturing sector by three-digit NAICS-based ISI
industry classiﬁcation and by ﬁrm size (measured as total domestic
employment of the U.S. parent). Table 3.4 shows that U.S. parents that
purchased CMS were large ﬁrms with more than 250 employees and
Table 3.2 U.S. Parents Who Purchased or Performed Contract
Manufacturing Services (CMS), 2009
No. of respondents
% of respondents
Parents who purchased CMS:
Yes
888
23
No
2,860
75
No response
82
2
Parents who performed CMS:
Yes
No
No response

324
3,423
83

8
89
2

NOTE: Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
SOURCE: BEA’s 2009 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, http://
www.bea.gov/surveys/pdf/2009be10i_web.pdf.
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Table 3.3 U.S. Parents Who Purchased Contract Manufacturing
Services (CMS), by Sector, 2009 (%)
Professional,
scientiﬁc, techManufacturing Wholesale
Information nical services
Other
72
13
5
1
9
NOTE: “Manufacturing” includes all two-digit NAICS industries in sectors 31–33;
“Wholesale” includes NAICS industries in sector 42; “Professional, scientiﬁc, and
technical services” includes NAICS industries in sector 54; “Other” includes all other
industries.
SOURCE: BEA’s 2009 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad.

Table 3.4 U.S. Parents Who Purchased Contract Manufacturing Services
(CMS), by Manufacturing Subsectors, 2009
Total Small Med. Large
All manufacturing industries (NAICS sectors 642
93
104
445
31–33)
Computer and electronic product mfg. (334) 153
30
32
91
Machinery mfg. (333)
82
17
14
51
Chemical mfg. (325)
80
9
13
58
Miscellaneous mfg. (339)
61
10
15
36
Transportation equipment mfg. (336)
54
2
4
48
Food mfg. (311)
36
6
3
27
Electrical equipment, appliance, and
33
2
6
25
component mfg. (335)
Fabricated metal product mfg. (332)
31
7
4
20
Plastics and rubber products mfg. (326)
28
2
3
23
Primary metal mfg. (331)
22
2
1
19
NOTE: “Large” includes ﬁrms with 250 or more employees, “Medium” includes ﬁrms
of between 100 and 249 employees, and “Small” includes ﬁrms of between 1 and 99
employees.
SOURCE: BEA’s 2009 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad.

were concentrated in industries that are known for outsourcing transformation activities to contract manufacturers. Examples of these industries include computer and electronic product manufacturing, machinery manufacturing, chemical manufacturing (includes pharmaceutical
manufacturing), and transportation equipment manufacturing.
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Because the international guidelines consider ownership of the
materials used by the contract manufacturer in determining whether
the contract manufacturer is selling manufacturing services or selling a
good, questions were added to the BE-10 survey to determine whether
U.S. parents could separately identify such transactions. U.S. parents
who purchased CMS were asked to indicate whether they owned the
materials used by contract manufacturers and whether the services
were purchased from businesses inside or outside the United States.
A respondent could answer “yes” to more than one type of arrangement; about 10 percent of U.S. parents that purchased CMS responded
“yes” to all four types of arrangements, indicating that they used contract manufacturers located both in the United States and abroad and
that they both owned the materials and did not own the materials used
by the contract manufacturer. As shown in Table 3.5, U.S. parents were
more likely to purchase CMS from U.S. contract manufacturers and to
provide the material inputs to them (65 percent) than to purchase CMS
from foreigners (about 37 percent). Interestingly, U.S. parents were just
as likely to own the material inputs as to not own them when purchasing CMS from foreigners. Of the approximately 325 U.S. parents that
reported purchasing CMS from outside the United States, nearly half
of the respondents answered “yes” to both owning the material inputs
and not owning the material inputs used by the contract manufacturer.
This suggests that separately identifying purchases of CMS based on
the ownership of the materials used by the contract manufacturer may
be difﬁcult to collect on an enterprise survey.
Table 3.5 U.S. Parents Who Purchased CMS, 2009
Category
U.S. parents who purchased CMS
U.S. parents who owned materials used by contract manufacturers
located inside U.S.
U.S. parents who owned materials used by contract manufacturers
located outside U.S.
U.S. parents who did not own materials used by contract manufacturers
located inside U.S.
U.S. parents who did not own materials used by contract manufacturers
located outside U.S.

N
888
579
330
369
323

SOURCE: BEA’s 2009 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad.
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Table 3.6 Selected Statistics for U.S. Parents and for All U.S. Companies,
by Sector, 2009
Value-added Employees Value-added
(in
(in
per employee
$ millions)a thousands)b
($)
U.S. parents who purchased CMSc
All industries
585,366
4,112
142,366
Manufacturing
400,369
2,413
165,910
Wholesale trade
44,286
307
144,240
Information
33,338
141
236,555
Other industries
107,374
1,251
85,859
c
All U.S. parents
All industries
2,595,776
22,933
113,191
Manufacturing
1,034,139
6,864
150,655
Wholesale trade
124,433
1,065
116,795
Information
287,628
1,712
168,056
Other industries
1,149,576
13,292
86,490
All U.S. companies
All private industries
12,018,095
112,139
107,171
Manufacturing
1,540,226
11,856
129,911
Wholesale trade
768,548
5,620
136,752
Information
615,445
2,814
218,708
Other industries
9,093,876
91,849
99,009
NOTE: Figures may not sum to total because of rounding.
a
Statistics on value-added for all U.S. companies are from the BEA’s GDP by Industry
series, as published in Table 3, p. 55 of Barefoot (2012).
b
Statistics on employees for all U.S. companies are from the BEA’s National Income
and Product Accounts (NIPA) Table 6.4D, “Full-Time and Part-Time Employees by
Industry,” http://www.econstats.com/nipa/NIPA6_6_4D_.htm.
c
Statistics for U.S. parents are from the BEA’s 2009 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct
Investment Abroad, as published in Table 3, p. 55 of Barefoot (2012).
SOURCE: See table notes a, b, and c.

Table 3.6 compares selected statistics of U.S. parents who purchased CMS with those of all U.S. parents and all U.S. companies.
Table 3.6 shows that U.S. parents classiﬁed in manufacturing, wholesale trade, and information that purchased CMS had a higher valueadded per employee compared to the value-added per employee of all
U.S. parents and of all U.S. companies. This ﬁnding suggests that ﬁrms
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Table 3.7 U.S. Trade in Goods (in $ millions) Associated with U.S.
Parents, 2009
U.S. parents who
All U.S.
purchased CMS
parents
Exports of goods to all foreigners
204,467
535,409
To foreign afﬁliates
102,768
207,479
For further manufacture
63,747
117,624
For resale without further manufacture
31,027
66,632
Other
7,993
23,223
To other foreigners
101,699
327,930
Imports of goods from all foreigners
194,879
679,521
From foreign afﬁliates
97,659
233,578
From other foreigners
97,220
445,943
SOURCE: BEA’s 2009 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad.

that use contract manufacturers to make their products may be more
productive than ﬁrms that do not use contract manufacturers, though
it is also possible that ﬁrms that use contract manufacturers have high
value-added per employee by contracting out low value-added tasks,
without any difference in output per quality-adjusted unit of inputs.
As was stated earlier, no corresponding CMS questions were
included on the foreign afﬁliate’s survey forms. Thus, a direct linkage
cannot be made as to whether the U.S. parent purchased CMS from
its foreign afﬁliate or from an unafﬁliated foreigner. Table 3.7 shows
that U.S. parents that purchased CMS exported a higher share of their
total exports to their foreign afﬁliates (50 percent) than did all U.S.
parents to their foreign afﬁliates (39 percent). In addition, U.S. parents
that purchased CMS had a slightly higher share of export of goods sent
for further processing to foreign afﬁliates (62 percent) than did all U.S.
parents (57 percent).

ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT MANUFACTURING SERVICES
ON CENSUS BUREAU 2011 COS
Table 3.8 presents the distribution of ﬁrms by various CMS activity
categories in the linked COS-LBD data set. Panel A of Table 3.8 shows
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Table 3.8 Percentage Distribution of Firms by CMS Activity
Panel A: All ﬁrms
No CMS activity
Provide CMS only
Purchase CMS only
Provide and purchase CMS

92
3
4
1

Panel B: Firms that purchase CMS
Inside U.S. only
Outside U.S. only
Inside and outside U.S.

39
20
37

Panel C: Firms that purchase CMS outside U.S.
From afﬁliates

53

NOTE: This table provides the percentage share of the count of ﬁrms within each CMS
activity category. Panel A is computed as a share of the total number of unique ﬁrms in
the data; Panel B is computed as a share of the total number of unique ﬁrms that purchase CMS (the rows “Purchase CMS only” and “Provide and purchase CMS” from
Panel A); and Panel C is computed as a share of the total number of unique ﬁrms that
purchase CMS outside the United States (the rows “Outside U.S. only” and “Inside
and outside U.S.” from Panel B). Panel B does not add up to 100 percent because
some ﬁrms did not respond and so could not be categorized.
SOURCE: Linked COS-LBD data set.

that 92 percent of the ﬁrms in the survey do not engage in any CMS
activity. Among the remaining ﬁrms, there is an almost even share that
either provide or purchase CMS, and only 1 percent that both provide
and purchase CMS. Panel B shows that within the group of ﬁrms that
purchase CMS, about 39 percent do so within the United States only, 20
percent do so outside the United States only, and 37 percent purchase
CMS both inside and outside the United States. Finally, Panel C shows
that of the ﬁrms that purchase CMS outside the United States, more
than half of these ﬁrms do so from their foreign afﬁliates. Overall, a
small share of ﬁrms engage in CMS activities, and among those that
purchase CMS, a larger share purchase domestically. These observations are consistent with those made in Fort (2013) using the 2007 Census of Manufactures.
Table 3.9 presents two key ﬁrm characteristics associated with ﬁrms
engaged in various CMS activities: size (measured as total employ-
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Table 3.9 Average Firm Size and Age by CMS Activity
Employment
Panel A: All ﬁrms
No CMS activity
1,366
Provide CMS only
761
Purchase CMS only
1,871
Provide and purchase CMS
4,315

Age
23
26
25
25

Panel B: Firms that purchase CMS
Inside U.S. only
Outside U.S. only
Inside and outside U.S.

1,065
1,817
4,427

25
25
24

Panel C: Firms that purchase CMS outside U.S.
From afﬁliates

5, 054

25

NOTE: This table provides the average employment and age of ﬁrms within each CMS
activity category; Panel A is computed for the total number of unique ﬁrms in the
data; Panel B is computed for the ﬁrms that purchase CMS (the rows “Purchase CMS
only” and “Provide and purchase CMS” from Panel A); and Panel C is computed for
ﬁrms that purchase CMS outside the United States (the rows “Outside U.S. only” and
“Inside and outside U.S.” from Panel B).
SOURCE: Linked COS-LBD data set.

ment) and age. Panel A of Table 3.9 reports the average employment
and age at ﬁrms within each CMS category. Firms that both provide and
purchase CMS are the largest in terms of average employment, while
those that provide CMS only are the smallest. Panel B shows that ﬁrms
that purchase CMS both inside and outside the United States are much
larger than those that purchase CMS either inside or outside the United
States only. Finally, Panel C shows that ﬁrms that purchase CMS from
their afﬁliates located abroad are the largest. An average ﬁrm in the survey is about 24 years old, and the average ﬁrm age does not vary greatly
by CMS activity. The overwhelming majority of ﬁrms in the COS have
been in existence for 10 or more years.
Table 3.10 provides further detail on the size distribution of ﬁrms in
the survey by CMS activity. Firms with 250 or more employees are considered to be large, those with 100 to 249 employees to be medium, and
those with one to 99 employees to be small. Since the COS primarily
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Table 3.10 Distribution of Firm Size by CMS Activity
Large Medium
Panel A: All ﬁrms
60
18
No CMS activity
61
18
Provide CMS only
41
34
Purchase CMS only
58
22
Provide and purchase CMS
55
24

Small
22
22
25
20
21

Panel B: Firms that purchase CMS
Inside U.S. only
Outside U.S. only
Inside and outside U.S.

45
64
66

27
19
20

28
17
14

Panel C: Firms that purchase CMS outside U.S.
From afﬁliates

74

17

9

NOTE: This table provides the percentage share of ﬁrms in three size categories within
each CMS activity category. “Large” includes ﬁrms with 250 or more employees,
“Medium” includes ﬁrms of between 100 and 249 employees, and “Small” includes
ﬁrms of between 1 and 99 employees.
SOURCE: Linked COS-LBD data set.

surveys large ﬁrms, the results in this table are not directly comparable
to those in Table 3.4 and should be interpreted with the COS survey
frame in mind. Within the group of ﬁrms that do not engage in any
CMS activity, well over half the ﬁrms are large, and the remainder can
be almost evenly divided between small and medium-sized ﬁrms. This
pattern also holds for those that purchase CMS only or both provide and
purchase CMS. Three-quarters of ﬁrms that provide CMS only are large
or medium, and a quarter are small. Among ﬁrms that purchase CMS,
those that do so outside the United States only and those that purchase
CMS both outside and inside the United States exhibit similar ﬁrm-size
distributions. As shown in Table 3.9, an overwhelming share of ﬁrms
that purchase CMS from their foreign afﬁliates are large. However, of
the ﬁrms that provide CMS only, about 40 percent are large and 30
percent are medium-sized. Firms that purchase CMS inside the United
States only have a similar size distribution.
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 show the sectoral distribution of ﬁrms engaged
in various CMS activities. The COS asked ﬁrms whether they operated
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Table 3.11 Distribution of Firm Response to Operating a Manufacturing
Facility, by CMS Activity
% that answered “Yes”
Panel A: All ﬁrms
No CMS activity
22
Provide CMS only
97
Purchase CMS only
77
Provide and purchase CMS
97
Panel B: Firms that purchase CMS
Inside U.S. only
Outside U.S. only
Inside and outside U.S.

85
77
81

Panel C: Firms that purchase CMS outside U.S.
From afﬁliates

85

NOTE: This table provides the percentage share of ﬁrms that responded “Yes” to Question 1 under Section 3D of the 2011 Company Organization Survey (COS) within
each CMS activity category. The left-out category is “No,” except for under “No CMS
activity.” Four percent of the responses are missing.
SOURCE: Linked COS-LBD data set.

a manufacturing facility where products are completed or partially produced. Table 3.11 reports the share of ﬁrms within various categories
that responded “Y” or “N” or had missing data. Table 3.12 shows the
distribution of ﬁrms within one of three broad sectors: 1) manufacturing, 2) wholesale and retail, or 3) all remaining sectors of the economy.
Panel A in Table 3.11 and Panel A in Table 3.12 show that an overwhelming majority of ﬁrms that report engaging in some CMS activity
also operate a manufacturing facility. Seventy-four percent of the ﬁrms
that do not engage in any CMS activity report not operating a manufacturing facility; this ﬁnding is corroborated by the ﬁnding that 76 percent
of these ﬁrms operate in sectors other than manufacturing, wholesale,
or retail. In addition, 97 percent of the ﬁrms that provide CMS only
or both provide and purchase CMS reported operating a manufacturing facility, and over 80 percent of them operate in the manufacturing, wholesale, or retail sectors. However, within the group of ﬁrms
that purchase CMS only, 77 percent report operating a manufacturing
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Table 3.12 Distribution of Sectors by CMS Activity
Manu- Wholesale/
facturing
retail
Panel A: All ﬁrms
No CMS activity
18
16
Provide CMS only
76
7
Purchase CMS only
58
16
Provide and purchase CMS
75
7

Other
76
17
16
18

Panel B: Firms that purchase CMS
Inside U.S. only
Outside U.S. only
Inside and outside U.S.

66
56
62

10
22
15

24
22
23

Panel C: Firms that purchase CMS
outside U.S.
From afﬁliates

64

15

21

NOTE: This table provides the percentage share of ﬁrms in three broad sectors of the
economy within each CMS activity category. “Manufacturing” includes all twodigit NAICS industries in sectors 31–33; “Wholesale/retail” includes two-digit
NAICS industries in sectors 42, 44, and 45; and “Other” includes all other industries.
SOURCE: Linked COS-LBD data set.

facility and operate in the manufacturing, wholesale, or retail sectors;
the share is smaller compared with ﬁrms only providing CMS or both
providing and purchasing CMS.
Table 3.13 is based only on responses of survey units that have a
one-to-one link to a ﬁrm identiﬁer.23 It shows the percentage share of
revenues (costs) generated (incurred) from providing (purchasing) CMS
as a share of total revenues and net sales (cost of sales from expenses).
Three-quarters of the ﬁrms providing CMS report less than a quarter of
total revenues and net sales originating from providing CMS. A little
over three-quarters of ﬁrms purchasing CMS also report less than a
quarter of the total cost of sales from expenses originating from purchasing CMS. This suggests that for most ﬁrms engaged in some CMS
activity, the activity constitutes a relatively small share of total revenues
or total costs.

Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb 67

2/16/2015 8:39:05 AM

68 Kamal, Moulton, and Ribarsky
Table 3.13 Distribution of Percentage Share of Revenue and Costs by
CMS Activity
% of operating revenues and net sales (cost
Provide
Purchase
of sales from expenses) from (for) CMS
CMS
CMS
Less than 25
75
79
25 to 49
5
9
50 to 74
4
5
75 to 99
8
5
100
8
2
NOTE: This table provides the percentage share of ﬁrms in ﬁve mutually exclusive
categories in response to Questions 2 and 3d from the 2011 COS form (see Appendix 3A, Illustration 3A.1). The second column shows the percentage share of ﬁrms
that receive x percent of operating revenues and sales from providing CMS; the third
column shows the percentage share of ﬁrms that incur x percent of cost of sales from
expenses for purchasing CMS.
SOURCE: Linked COS-LBD data set.

Finally, Table 3.14 shows the average output per employee as well
as export and import values of ﬁrms by various CMS activities. The ﬁrst
column shows the log of value-added per employee (VA/L), and the
second column shows the log of total value of shipments per employee
(TVS/L). Firms that engage in some type of CMS activity exhibit both
higher (VA/L) and (TVS/L) than those that do not. Among ﬁrms that
purchase CMS, those that purchase both inside and outside the United
States exhibit the highest average output per employee, using both
measures.
The last two columns show the average export and import values,
in millions of dollars, respectively. Focusing on the third column, ﬁrms
that both provide and purchase CMS have higher average export value
compared to all other ﬁrms in the sample. Firms that do not engage in
any CMS activity and ﬁrms that provide only CMS have very similar
average export values. Firms that purchase CMS inside and outside the
United States have the highest average export values among ﬁrms that
purchase CMS. Focusing on the last column, ﬁrms engaged in some
CMS activity display much higher average ﬁrm import values compared
to those that do not, and, of these, ﬁrms that both purchase and provide CMS have the highest value. Firms that purchase CMS inside and
outside the United States have the highest average import value among
ﬁrms that purchase CMS. Among ﬁrms that purchase CMS outside the
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Table 3.14 Output per Employee and Trade Value by CMS Activity
Log
Log (total value
(value added/
of shipments/
employment)
employment)
Panel A: All ﬁrms
No CMS activity
4.23
4.98
Provide CMS only
4.45
5.19
Purchase CMS only
4.63
5.31
Provide and purchase CMS
4.61
5.30

Export value
(in $ millions)

Import value
(in $ millions)

29
30
113
241

82
232
190
289

Panel B: Firms that purchase CMS
Inside U.S. only
Outside U.S. only
Inside and outside U.S.

4.58
4.53
4.73

5.27
5.22
5.40

32
68
284

104
144
327

Panel C: Firms that purchase CMS outside U.S.
From afﬁliates

4.75

5.44

334

417

NOTE: The above statistics are calculated for manufacturing ﬁrms only.
SOURCE: Linked COS-CM and COS-LFTTD data sets.
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United States, those that do so from their afﬁliates are larger traders and
have higher value-added per employee than those that do not.

FUTURE WORK
This chapter analyzes existing data on ﬁrms’ activities relating to
providing or purchasing CMS as a means to measure “factoryless”
manufacturing, where the manufacturer undertakes the entrepreneurial
steps in the global supply chain but does not transform any of the material inputs. Our primary goal was to analyze the characteristics of ﬁrms
that report engaging in various CMS activities to provide a preliminary
glimpse into factoryless goods producers. However, comprehensive
work is needed, and indeed is underway, as described below, to do three
things: 1) quantify the scope of FGP activity, 2) look at how the CMS
data discussed in this chapter compare to CMS data in other existing
surveys, and 3) evaluate the feasibility of the proposed changes in the
deﬁnitions to the manufacturing sector and import and export ﬂows.
The recently updated international guidelines for services on physical inputs owned by others (goods for processing) are designed to better
capture the impacts of GVCs on the economy. The BEA is evaluating
whether implementation of the new guidelines is feasible. Successful
implementation of this recommendation requires detailed information
on not only the processing fees received and paid by U.S. ﬁrms for
CMS but also the underlying goods transactions. Data for these transactions are currently either not available in the U.S. statistical system
or not separately identiﬁable. Despite these data challenges, the BEA
continues to investigate options for implementing this new treatment of
manufacturing services.
The results from the BEA BE-120 survey will be available soon.
Once the results are available, the BEA can evaluate whether the value
of receipts and payments for CMS can be reported along with the destination of the goods after processing. To determine the feasibility of
adjusting the merchandise trade statistics to remove goods that cross
the border without a change in ownership, the BEA is also continuing
to work with the Census Bureau to explore options for identifying the
merchandise trade transactions of U.S. ﬁrms that purchased manufac-
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turing services from overseas contractors or that provided manufacturing services to foreigners.
The CMS questions on the enterprise-level COS discussed in this
chapter represent initial steps in determining whether further data collection is likely to be robust and whether the Census Bureau can identify
“factoryless” manufacturers in its surveys. As a next step, the Census
Bureau added special inquiries to the 2012 Economic Census to collect
information at the establishment level that will better identify “factoryless” manufacturers and assess whether sufﬁcient data can be collected
on the value of the manufacturing service and the associated revenue on
sales of products produced by contract manufacturers.24
An interagency effort across the Census Bureau, the BEA, and the
BLS is underway to analyze census microdata in support of consistent
and accurate implementation of the decision to classify FGPs in the
manufacturing sector as soon as the agencies can perform the research,
testing, and evaluation necessary to do so. One of the main goals of
this effort is to estimate the number of establishments, the total value
of shipments, and the total employment that will be moved across various sectors with the eventual implementation of the FGP concept in
the Economic Census. Furthermore, comparisons will be made between
the results from the special inquiry questions in the economic censuses
and the COS in order to reﬁne the questions that will be used by agencies and programs to identify FGPs on data collection instruments. The
agencies must take care that as changes are made in the measurement
of manufacturing activities, whether in the production of services or in
the shipments of goods, these changes are implemented in a way that
consistently and correctly allocates manufacturing value-added to the
domestic and nonresident producers, in order to avoid overstating or
understating U.S. gross domestic product.
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Notes
Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not
necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau or the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. All results have been reviewed to ensure that no conﬁdential information is
disclosed. We thank Susan Houseman for helpful comments on an earlier version. We
also thank Mai-Chi Hoang for preparing the BEA data tables and providing valuable
feedback, Raymond Mataloni for providing guidance on the BEA data, and Anthony
Caruso, C.J. Krizan, Shawn Klimek, and William Powers for helpful comments.
1. The research in this chapter was undertaken while this author was at the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
2. For more information on GVCs, see APEC Policy Support Unit (2012).
3. The System of National Accounts 2008 (European Commission et al. 2009) provides recommendations for compiling the national accounts, and the sixth edition
of the Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (IMF
2009) provides recommendations for compiling the international accounts.
4. For more information, see the Economic Classiﬁcation Policy Committee’s “Issue
Paper No. 1” (ECPC 1993).
5. See Doherty (Chapter 2 of this volume) for a discussion of identifying FGPs in the
U.S. Statistical System.
6. The System of National Accounts 2008, published by ﬁve international organizations, is the international guideline for compilation of gross domestic product
and other national accounts statistics (European Commission et al. 2009), and the
Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, published by
the International Monetary Fund, is the international guideline for compilation of
balance of payments and international investment position statistics (IMF 2009).
7. In practice, this may not hold. Maurer and Degain (2010) state that, for most cases,
the value of the manufacturing service or the processing fee is not simply the
difference between the value of the goods before processing and the value after
processing.
8. For more information, see BPM6, Chapter 10, Sections 10.65–10.66 (IMF 2009,
p. 162). For a discussion of the measurement issues related to goods for processing, see United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2011), pp. 71–84.
9. The term “afﬁliated” refers to a direct investment relationship, which exists when
a U.S. person has ownership or control, directly or indirectly, of 10 percent or
more of a foreign business enterprise’s voting securities or the equivalent, or when
a foreign person has a similar interest in a U.S. business enterprise.
10. A U.S. “person” includes companies.
11. See questions 28–30 on the 2009 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment
Abroad for U.S. parents that are not banks (BE-10A) at http://www.bea.gov/
surveys/pdf/be10a_web.pdf.
12. See Schedule D on the 2011 Benchmark Survey of Transactions in Selected Services and Intellectual Property with Foreign Persons (BE-120), at http://www.bea

Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb 72

2/16/2015 8:39:07 AM

Measuring “Factoryless” Manufacturing 73

13.

14.
15.
16.
17.

18.
19.
20.

21.
22.
23.
24.

.gov/surveys/pdf/be120.pdf, p. 12. Prior versions of the survey recorded receipts
and payments for contract manufacturing services within the “other services”
category.
The 2012 Economic Census includes a similar set of questions to those in the 2011
COS. It will provide the richest set of information at the establishment level once
the data collection process is completed.
See http://www.bea.gov/surveys/pdf/be120.pdf. for further details.
The COS data are unedited and have had no adjustments for survey nonresponse.
Form NC-99001, Section 3D, Questions 1–3; see https://www.census.gov/econ/
overview/mu0700.html for a description of the survey. Also see Appendix 3A.
A company is an economic unit comprising one or more establishments under
common ownership or control. The COS may survey different subsidiaries of the
same company, so several survey units may belong to one ﬁrm identiﬁcation code.
Industry assignments remain qualitatively unchanged if payroll information is
used instead to assign sectors.
Sales data are not readily available for all ﬁrms in the sample. Therefore, employment is used to assign a sector.
The LBD contains information on employment within the United States only;
therefore, ﬁgures on employment at foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parent companies
are not available in the linked LBD-COS data set.
The 2007 CM and 2009 LFTTD are the most recent available years. See Bernard,
Jensen, and Schott (2009) for an overview of LFTTD, including match rates.
For more on the BE-10 U.S. Direct Investment Abroad methodology, see http://
www.bea.gov/international/pdf/usdia_2004f/Text%20sections/methodology.pdf.
See the subsection of this chapter titled “Census Bureau Surveys,” pp. 54–55, for
details.
See Question 26 on the 2012 Economic Census manufacturing sample forms,
located at http://bhs.econ.census.gov/ec12/php/census-form.php. An example of
such a form is found at https://bhs.econ.census.gov/2012forms/MC31101.pdf.
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Appendix 3A
Excerpts from Three Survey
Forms Used in This Chapter
Questions on contract manufacturing services activities included these from
the 2011 Report of Organization Survey (Form NC-99001):
Illustration 3A.1 Excerpt from Form NC-99001
 COMPANY ACTIVITIES - continued
D. MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES
In 2011, did your company do any of the following activities related to manufacturing?
1. Operate manufacturing facilities (such as a factory, plant, or mill) where products are completed or partially produced?
 Yes - Go to line 2
 No - Go to line 3
Provide contract manufacturing services to other companies incorporating their
patents, trade secrets, or proprietary technology?
9709
9710

2.

 Yes
 No - Go to line 3
Estimate the percent of operating revenues and net sales, as reported in B,
from contract manufacturing services.
9711

9712

9713
9714
9715

 Less than 25%
 25 to 49%
 50 to 74%

 75 to 99%
 100%
Purchase contract manufacturing services from other companies or foreign
subsidiaries of your company incorporating your company’s patents, trade
secrets, or proprietary technology?
9718  Yes
9716
9717

3.

9719

 No - Go to , CERTIFICATION
a. Use 3rd party contract manufacturing services inside the U.S.?
9720  Yes
9721  No
b. Use 3rd party contract manufacturing services outside the U.S.?
9722
9723

 Yes
 No
(continued)
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Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb 75

2/16/2015 8:39:08 AM

76 Kamal, Moulton, and Ribarsky
Illustration 3A.1 (continued)
c. Use your company’s foreign subsidiaries’ or afﬁliates’ contract manufacturing services at locations outside the U.S.?
 Yes
 No
d. Estimate the percent of the cost of sales from expenses for contract
manufacturing services.
9724
9725

9726
9727
9728
9729
9730

 Less than 25%
 25 to 49%
 50 to 74%
 75 to 99%
 100%

Questions on purchases of contract manufacturing services included these
from the 2009 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad for U.S.
parents (Form BE-10A):
Illustration 3A.2 Excerpts from Form BE-10A
1.
2.

3.

Did this U.S. reporter purchase contract manufacturing services from others
(including foreign afﬁliates)? (Yes/No)
The U.S. reporter owned some or all of the materials used by the contract
manufacturers and the companies providing the manufacturing services
were:
a. Located inside the U.S. (Yes/No)
b. Located outside the U.S. (Yes/No)
The U.S. reporter did not own the materials used by the contract manufacturers and the companies providing the manufacturing services were:
a. Located inside the U.S. (Yes/No)
b. Located outside the U.S. (Yes/No)

This survey also included a question on performance of contract manufacturing services for others:
1.

Did this U.S. reporter perform contract manufacturing services for others
(including foreign afﬁliates) outside the U.S.? (Yes/No)
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Questions on purchases of contract manufacturing services included these
from the 2011 Benchmark Survey of Transactions in Selected Services and
Intellectual Property Products with Foreign Persons (Form BE-120):
Illustration 3A.3 Excerpts from Form BE-120
1. Did you purchase contract manufacturing services from foreign persons in Fiscal Year 2011?
2. Are you able to report the fee you paid for contract manufacturing services?
• If yes—enter the amount you paid foreign persons for contract manufacturing services.
3. The payments for manufacturing services in Question 2 were (check the appropriate box):
 Based on accounting records.
 Estimated by persons knowledgeable regarding these transactions.
4. Destination of goods produced after you purchased contract manufacturing
(check the appropriate box):
 Goods do not enter United States.
 Goods are imported into the United States.
 A portion of the goods remain abroad and a portion are imported into the
United States.
 Destination is unknown.

Questions on receipts for contract manufacturing services include the
following:
1. Did you perform contract manufacturing services for foreign persons in Fiscal
Year 2011?
2. Are you able to report the fee you received for performing contract manufacturing services?
• NOTE: This may include the cost of the materials you purchased to perform this service.
• If yes—enter the amount received from foreign persons for contract manufacturing services you performed on goods owned by foreign persons
and go to Questions 3 and 4.
3. The receipts for manufacturing in Question 2 were (check the appropriate box):
 Based on accounting records.
 Estimated by persons knowledgeable regarding these transactions.
4. Destination of goods produced after you performed contract manufacturing
(check appropriate box):
 Goods remain in the United States.
 Goods are exported from the United States.
 A portion of the goods remain in the United States and a portion are
exported from the United States.
 Destination is unknown.
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The “factoryless manufacturing” (FM) business model is employed
by a rising share of U.S. ﬁrms. Factoryless manufacturers outsource the
fabrication of products but maintain control of the production process,
own the associated intellectual property, and bear the entrepreneurial
risk. FM is an important component in the role of U.S. ﬁrms in global
manufacturing value chains. Currently, U.S. Census Bureau programs
assign establishments engaged in factoryless manufacturing, known as
factoryless goods producers (FGPs), to the wholesale trade sector. U.S.
statistical agencies are considering classiﬁcation of FGPs in the manufacturing sector in the future, if collecting data on FM is shown to be
feasible.
This chapter estimates the scope of U.S. factoryless manufacturing using three approaches. First, we use ﬁnancial reports for S&P 500
companies to show that FM is prevalent and increasing in the United
States and that FM, once only common in the production of apparel,
electronics, toys, and pharmaceuticals, has spread to a broader array of
products. Second, we use Economic Census microdata to estimate that
manufacturing value-added would have been 5 to 20 percent greater for
2007 if all FGPs were reclassiﬁed to manufacturing. Third, using a list
of FM semiconductor companies matched to Economic Census microdata, we estimate that value-added would be 20 to 30 percent greater
for semiconductor manufacturing, an industry where FM is especially
prevalent, if FGPs were included. These results suggest that outsourc-
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ing and offshoring of product fabrication by U.S. ﬁrms is coupled
with signiﬁcant domestic production management. Thus, identifying
FGPs in economic data is important for the study of fragmentation and
globalization.
In the next section, “Deﬁning and Measuring Factoryless Manufacturing and Factoryless Goods Producers,” we deﬁne factoryless manufacturing (a company concept) and discuss the treatment of factoryless
goods producers (an establishment concept) in U.S. economic statistics.
In the third section, “The Extent of U.S. Factoryless Goods Production,”
we look at the extent of FM using company reports, and we examine the
prevalence of FGPs using Economic Census establishment data. The
fourth section, “The Structure of Factoryless Manufacturing Firms in
the Semiconductor Industry,” presents a close look at the establishment
structure of FM ﬁrms in the semiconductor industry. Alternative estimates of the size of the manufacturing sector when FGPs are included
are found in the ﬁfth section, “U.S. Manufacturing with Factoryless
Goods Producers Included,” with a particular focus on semiconductor
manufacturing. In Section Six, “Selected Effects of Reclassiﬁcation
and Relevance for Economic Analysis,” we speculate on the effects of
reclassifying FGPs for selected economic measures, and we discuss the
role that better data on factoryless manufacturing may play in the study
of economic issues. Section Seven offers a conclusion.

DEFINING AND MEASURING FACTORYLESS
MANUFACTURING AND FACTORYLESS
GOODS PRODUCERS
In 1997, the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget (OMB) introduced the North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS),
an approach to classifying establishments into industries “according to
similarity in the processes used to produce goods or services” (OMB
1998, p. 13).1 NAICS deﬁnes the manufacturing sector to be the set
of establishments “engaged in the mechanical, physical, or chemical
transformation of materials, substances, or components into new products.” Yet NAICS acknowledges that the relevant transformation may
happen outside the establishment: “Manufacturing establishments may
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process materials or may contract with other establishments to process
their materials for them. Both types of establishments are included in
manufacturing” (OMB 1998, p. 105)
Since the introduction of NAICS in 1997, the outsourcing of processing materials into products—hereafter, “fabrication” for convenience—has risen dramatically, elevating the importance of consistent
treatment of this practice across statistical programs. The Economic
Classiﬁcation Policy Committee (ECPC) of the OMB studied the issue
and deﬁned three types of establishments:
1) Integrated manufacturers (IMs)
2) Manufacturing service providers (MSPs)
3) Factoryless goods producers (FGPs)
FGPs have the following characteristics (OMB 2009): They
• own the rights to the intellectual property or design (whether independently developed or otherwise acquired) of the ﬁnal manufactured product,
• may or may not own the input materials,
• do not own production facilities,
• do not perform transformation activities,
• own the ﬁnal product produced by MSP partners, and
• sell the ﬁnal product.
In contrast, IMs and MSPs own production facilities and perform
transformation activities, and MSPs do not own the intellectual property or the ﬁnal product.
In the absence of clear guidance from NAICS, the approach used
to classify FGPs has differed across statistical agencies. U.S. Census
Bureau practice has been to classify such establishments in the “Wholesale trade” sector.2 In contrast, the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS)
Producer Price Index (PPI) program collects prices from FGPs for use
in some manufacturing PPIs, and the BLS’s Current Employment Statistics (CES) program classiﬁes some reporting FGP establishments in
the “Management of companies and enterprises” sector.3 In 2011, the
OMB adopted the ECPC’s proposal to classify FGP establishments in
the manufacturing sector “beginning no later than 2017” (OMB 2011);
however, in August 2014 the OMB backed off from that decision, say-

Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb 83

2/16/2015 8:39:11 AM

84 Bayard, Byrne, and Smith

ing that “agencies need an opportunity to perform additional research,
testing, and evaluation.” U.S. statistical agencies are currently studying
the feasibility of this proposal.4
As noted above, the NAICS deﬁnition of the manufacturing sector is ﬂexible enough to allow for a manufacturing establishment to be
“engaged” in fabrication even if the fabrication takes place at another
establishment. But the notion that an establishment can be in manufacturing if no fabrication takes place on-site is somewhat controversial
(OMB 2011).5 The BLS’s Business Processes and Business Functions
(BPBF) classiﬁcation system provides a helpful framework for considering the characteristics that distinguish manufacturing establishments
from those in other sectors. The manufacturing “operations” business
process includes the tasks of producing goods, assembling products,
and fabricating components, as well as those of managing production and conducting quality assurance (Brown 2008).6 In this scheme,
FGPs perform the production management and quality assurance portions of manufacturing operations. In addition, other business processes
may be performed by the FGPs as well, such as product design and
development.7
For the purpose of characterizing companies (groups of establishments under common ownership), we deﬁne the term “factoryless manufacturing” (FM) to be the use of contract manufacturing to produce
some or all of the ﬁnal products sold by a company, provided the company controls the intellectual property or design. We expect that at least
one of the establishments of an FM company will be an FGP.
Factoryless manufacturing emerged in the U.S. apparel sector in the
1950s when U.S. companies shifted fabrication to Japan (Gerefﬁ 2002).
In the 1970s, FM became common for consumer goods, especially toys
(Steiner 1995).8 The role of contract manufacturing in the production
of ﬁnal goods in electronics has risen dramatically over time as well—
in particular, the revenue of major offshore ﬁnal electronics MSPs has
risen markedly over the past 10 years (Figure 4.1).9 Finally, the use of
factoryless manufacturing has surged for semiconductors: The share of
semiconductor sales accounted for by FM ﬁrms, predominantly U.S.
companies, climbed from 3 percent in 1993 to 25 percent in 2012 (Figure 4.2).
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Figure 4.1 Sales of Selected Taiwanese Contract Electronics
Manufacturers
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on public ﬁnancial reports. Companies included
are contract electronics ﬁrms traded on the Taiwan Stock Exchange: Hon Hai (Foxconn), Quanta, Compal, HTC, Inventec, WNC, and ASUS.

THE EXTENT OF U.S. FACTORYLESS
GOODS PRODUCTION
Evidence from Company Financial Reports
In ﬁnancial reports ﬁled with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), manufacturing companies often indicate that they use
factoryless manufacturing for some or all of their production.10 For
example, the 2012 annual report for Nike Inc. notes, “Our principal
business activity is the design, development, and worldwide marketing and selling of high quality footwear, apparel, equipment, accessories, and services” and that “virtually all of our footwear is produced
by factories we contract with outside of the United States.” Similarly,
the 2012 annual report for electronics manufacturer Juniper Networks
Inc. states, “Our manufacturing is primarily conducted through contract
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Figure 4.2 Share of Global Industry Shipments for Factoryless
Manufacturing of Semiconductors
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SOURCE: Global Semiconductor Alliance.

manufacturers,” and goes on to say that Juniper employees “manage
relationships with contract manufacturers, manage our supply chain,
and monitor and manage product testing and quality.” These companies report that they outsource some or all of their fabrication activity,
but that they manage production and perform product design in-house.
Other examples are shown in Table 4.1.
To get a sense of the breadth of factoryless manufacturing by U.S.
companies, we searched for evidence of FM activity in the annual
reports of all ﬁrms in the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 for both 2002
and 2012.11 Speciﬁcally, we reviewed the reports for references to the
use of contract manufacturing for fabrication of the companies’ ﬁnal
products.12 Table 4.2 summarizes the results of our review of the annual
reports. For 2012, we ﬁnd that about half (46 percent) of ﬁrms reporting
manufacturing of any kind use FM. This is substantially higher than the
31 percent share observed for 2002. About four-ﬁfths of the FM companies use MSPs for only a portion of their output, and approximately
one-ﬁfth rely exclusively on MSPs for fabrication.
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Table 4.1 Selected S&P 500 Companies Reporting Factoryless Goods
Production, by Primary Product Grouping, 2012
Toys and games
Hasbro Inc.
Mattel Inc.
Apparel
Abercrombie & Fitch Co.a
Nike Inc.a
Electronics
Advanced Micro Devices Inc. (semiconductors) a
Qualcomm Inc. (semiconductors) a
Amazon.com Inc. (electronic readers) a
Apple Inc. (computing, communications, consumer)
Cisco Systems Inc. (communications) a
Pharmaceuticals
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
Eli Lilly and Co.
Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals
Clorox Co.
Colgate-Palmolive Co.
Food, beverage, and tobacco
Campbell Soup Co. (food)
Monster Beverage Corp. (beverage) a
Philip Morris International (tobacco)
Paper, plastic, and wood products
Avery Dennison Corp. (paper products)
Newell Rubbermaid Inc. (plastics products)
Electrical equipment
General Electric Co.
Machinery
Applied Materials Inc.
Transportation equipment
Delphi Automotive
Medical supplies excluding pharmaceuticals
Boston Scientiﬁc Corp.
a

Company using FGP exclusively—i.e., a company with no integrated manufacturing
activity.
SOURCE: Classiﬁcation based on authors’ analysis of 2012 annual reports ﬁled with
the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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Table 4.2 Prevalence of Factoryless Manufacturing among Companies in
the S&P 500 Index with Manufacturing Activity
2002
2012
Count Share (%)
Count Share (%)
No factoryless manufacturing
172
70
120
54
Any factoryless manufacturing
74
30
104
46
Exclusively factoryless
12
16
21
20
manufacturing
Mixed factoryless and integrated
62
84
83
80
manufacturing
n = 246
n = 224
SOURCE: Classiﬁcation based on authors’ analysis of annual reports ﬁled with the
Securities and Exchange Commission.

As we expected from the evidence reviewed at the end of Section
Two, in both 2002 and 2012, factoryless manufacturing was used by a
very high share of ﬁrms manufacturing toys, apparel, and most electronic products (Table 4.3). For example, in both 2002 and 2012, all
companies in the “Toys and games” category of the S&P 500 employed
FM practices. Firms in the “Toys and games” sector represented 2 percent of all manufacturing companies in the index in both years. The FM
business practice is also quite common among ﬁrms producing pharmaceuticals and medicine.
Also of note is the degree to which factoryless manufacturing spread
to a broader array of goods from 2002 to 2012. For example, only 9 percent of large cap ﬁrms in the “Food, beverage, and tobacco” sector used
FM in 2002, but the share had soared to 52 percent by 2012. Several
other industries also experienced strong growth in the share of ﬁrms
using FM over the past decade: notable gains were recorded for the sectors “Paper, plastic, and wood products,” “Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals,” “Transportation equipment,” and “Electrical equipment.”
Evidence from Economic Census Data
The Economic Census collects extensive information on U.S.
establishments every ﬁve years, and questions on the 2002 and 2007
Economic Censuses shed light on the prevalence of FGPs. Wholesale
trade establishments were asked whether they sold products manufac-
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Table 4.3 S&P 500 Sector Distribution and Share of Companies Using
Factoryless Manufacturing (%)
Share of companies Sector share of
using factoryless
total S&P
manufacturinga
manufacturing
Sector
2002
2012
2002
2012
100
2
2
100
Toys and games
100
3
4
86
Apparel
94
9
7
77
Electronic components (including
semiconductors)
82
11
8
70
Computers and communications
equipment
70
10
9
48
Pharmaceuticals and medicine
52
10
14
9
Food, beverage, and tobacco products
45
7
5
6
Paper, plastic, and wood products
37
8
8
15
Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals
37
5
8
15
Other ﬁnal electronics (industrial,
defense, aerospace, etc.)
23
4
6
10
Medical excluding pharmaceuticals
(including electromedical
equipment)
22
7
4
0
Transportation equipment
17
3
3
0
Electrical equipment
17
8
11
6
Machinery
0
7
8
6
Metal, nonmetallic mineral, and
petroleum products
33
6
3
43
Unclassiﬁed (conglomerates,
miscellaneous production)
a

Includes companies employing a mix of factoryless manufacturing and integrated
manufacturing.
SOURCE: Authors’ classiﬁcation based on company reports ﬁled with the Securities
and Exchange Commission.

tured for them by contract manufacturers and whether they engaged in
product design.13 We consider an afﬁrmative answer to either question
to be supporting evidence for classifying the establishment as an FGP,
though the questions are not deﬁnitive.14 More than 30 percent of establishments answered “yes” to at least one of these questions in a majority
of wholesale industries in 2002 (Tables 4.4 and 4.5).
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Table 4.4 Performance of Product Design/Engineering and Use of Contract Manufacturing Services Share of
Merchant Wholesale Establishments, 2002 (%)
Purchase
Design/
contract
NAICS
engineer
manufacturing
Code
Industry description
products sold
services
Both
Either
Durable goods
4231
Motor vehicles and parts
8
13
3
18
4232
Furniture and home furnishings
25
26
10
41
4233
Lumber and other construction materials
14
20
4
30
4234
Professional and commercial equip. and supplies
19
18
7
30
4235
Metal and mineral
15
26
5
36
4236
Electrical and electronic goods
21
20
7
34
4237
Hardware, plumbing, heating equip. and supplies
15
17
4
28
4238
Machinery, equip. and supplies
19
22
7
34
4239
Miscellaneous durable goods
25
21
10
36
Nondurable goods
4241
Paper and paper products
22
25
10
37
4242
Drugs and druggist sundries
22
26
11
37
4243
Apparel, piece goods, and notions
42
35
21
56
4244
Grocery and related
13
14
4
23
4245
Farm product raw material
6
6
1
11
4246
Chemical and allied products
24
24
8
40
4247
Petroleum and petroleum products
3
8
1
10
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4248
4249

Beer, wine, distilled alcoholic beverages
Miscellaneous nondurable goods
Total, durable and nondurable
Memo:
Establishments of FGP semiconductor companies
Firms of FGP semiconductor companies

5
21
18

14
17
20

1
7
6

18
31
32

51
67

22
56

18
48

55
75

NOTE: Response rate was approximately 50 percent. Special question was on all Census of Wholesale Trade forms in 2002. Establishments reclassiﬁed to wholesale trade during census processing did not receive a survey form with this question.
SOURCE: 2002 Census of Wholesale Trade.
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Table 4.5 Performance of Product Design/Engineering and Use of Contract Manufacturing Services Share of
Merchant Wholesale Establishments, 2007 (%)
Purchase
Design/
contract
NAICS
engineer
manufacturing
Code
Industry description
products sold
services
Both
Either
Durable goods
4231
Motor vehicles and parts
6
8
3
11
4233
Lumber and other construction materials
12
16
4
24
4234
Professional and commercial equip. and supplies a
23
20
12
31
4235
Metal and mineral
13
23
5
31
4236
Electrical and electronic goods
15
16
7
24
a
4238
Machinery, equipment, and supplies
15
15
7
23
4239
Miscellaneous durable goods
18
17
8
27
Nondurable goods
4241
Paper and paper products
17
16
7
26
4242
Drugs and druggist sundries
22
27
14
35
4243
Apparel, piece goods, and notions
35
29
16
48
4244
Grocery and related
13
12
4
21
4245
Farm product raw material
5
6
1
10
4248
Beer, wine, distilled alcoholic beverages
4
5
2
7
a
4249
Miscellaneous nondurable goods
17
12
6
23
Total, durable and nondurable
15
15
7
23
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Memo:
Establishments of FGP semiconductor companies
Firms of FGP semiconductor companies

52
68

40
42

35
47

57
63

NOTE: 2007 response rate was approximately 53 percent for establishments receiving forms. Survey forms for some wholesale trade
industries did not include these questions. Statistics are shown for covered six-digit industries within each four-digit industry group.
Industry groups marked with an asterisk have omitted industries. Industry groups with no coverage are 4232, 4237, 4246, and 4247.
Establishments reclassiﬁed to wholesale trade during census processing did not receive a survey form with this question. The “Purchase
contract manufacturing services” column combines results for separate questions on domestic and foreign CMS.
SOURCE: 2007 Census of Wholesale Trade.
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Prevalence among pharmaceutical and apparel wholesalers is particularly high, as we expected in light of our company report analysis.
Interestingly, “Electrical and electronics wholesaling” is not among
the industries with the highest prevalence of FGPs. However, when we
matched known semiconductor FM companies to census ﬁrm records
(as discussed in the next section), we found that 75 percent have at
least one wholesale establishment reporting design or use of contract
manufacturing.15
Results for prevalence of contract manufacturing use and product
design by industry were similar in 2007 to what they were in 2002;
unfortunately, the questions asked were somewhat different in the two
years, making it hard to discern trends. Furthermore, in 2007 the questions were not asked of establishments in all industries, as they had
been in 2002 (Bernard and Fort 2013).
Estimates in Related Work
Other studies have estimated the scope and scale of factoryless
manufacturing using the Economic Census and other data. No survey
contains an ideal set of questions for identifying FM, and consequently
approaches in studies of FM have varied signiﬁcantly.
Doherty (Chapter 2 of this volume) focuses on wholesalers who
reported their type as “own-brand importer-marketer” (OBM), a term
that is similar to FGP, but one that only applies to the use of offshore
contract manufacturing. In the 2007 Economic Census, 3 percent of
wholesale establishments self-identiﬁed as OBMs, which is a reasonable lower bound on FGP prevalence. However, because domestic outsourcing is much more common than offshore outsourcing (Fort 2011),
FGPs are likely to be substantially more common than OBMs. Kask,
Kiernan, and Friedman (2002) note that the OBM share of wholesalers
was 3 percent for the 1997 Economic Census as well. In light of other
evidence on the rising prevalence of offshore MSPs between 1997 and
2007, the stable share for OBMs is somewhat puzzling.
Jarmin, Krizan, and Tang (2011) look at outsourcing and offshoring
using the same Economic Census special questions used in this study,
but they employ a different FGP classiﬁcation rule, which requires that
establishments report “resales” as their primary activity in addition to
reporting use of contract manufacturing and performance of product
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design. Conditioning on resale—the sale of products bought and sold
without further processing—is problematic in that we expect that FGPs
may contract for the service provided by the MSP, rather than purchasing the good itself. Also, as noted above, creating the product design
is sufﬁcient to establish ownership of the intellectual property, but not
necessary—designs can be purchased or licensed by FGPs. Jarmin,
Krizan, and Tang estimate that FGPs account for 1 percent of establishments within the manufacturing and wholesale trade sectors combined.
Bernard and Fort (2013) use a deﬁnition of FGP that differs from the
ECPC standard in that a wholesale establishment that fabricates products on-site and does not use contract manufacturing can be counted
as an FGP. We view reports of fabrication at wholesale trade establishments as evidence of one of two possibilities: 1) misclassiﬁcation of an
IM to wholesale trade, or 2) an FGP establishment with secondary IM
activity. Despite the conceptual differences, Bernard and Fort ﬁnd that
the inclusion of FGPs in manufacturing leads to an increase in gross
output ranging from 5.2 to 19.4 percent—estimates that are similar to
ours. The range in Bernard and Fort depends on the assumptions made
about respondents who did not answer the key questions.
Kamal, Moulton, and Ribarsky (Chapter 3 of this volume) examine company-level data from surveys conducted by the Census Bureau
and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and report results broadly
consistent with ours, in that they ﬁnd that the use of contract manufacturing is common in a wide array of industries and that companies
with a mixed FGP/IM approach are far more common than pure FM
companies.16

THE STRUCTURE OF FACTORYLESS MANUFACTURING
FIRMS IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
Semiconductor manufacturing is a prominent example of an industry with extensive factoryless manufacturing—in 2012, 25 percent of
global semiconductor sales came from FM companies (Figure 4.2).17
By matching directories of FM ﬁrms in the semiconductor industry to
Economic Census microdata, we are able to study the establishment
structure of FM ﬁrms for this industry.18 In this section, we discuss the
results of that matching exercise.
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We ﬁnd that the footprint of semiconductor FM ﬁrms in the Economic Census is complex. Single-unit ﬁrms account for about 90 percent of the company observations in our data, and of these, only about
30 percent are located in the wholesale trade sector (Table 4.6).19 This is
a surprising result in light of the Census Bureau directive to treat FGPs
as wholesalers. However, the classiﬁcation process depends on a broad
review of an establishment’s activities. The sole establishment of a single-unit ﬁrm would likely be engaged in multiple business processes in
addition to production management, such as product, process, and technology development; marketing and sales; strategic management; and
any general management “back ofﬁce” operations that have not been
outsourced. If one of these other activities is the primary activity of the
establishment, as “determined by its relative share of current production cost and capital investment,” the establishment may be classiﬁed
to an industry outside of “Wholesale trade” (OMB 1998, p. 17). Still,
establishments in the wholesale trade sector account for two-thirds of
the value of sales for these ﬁrms for 2007 (Table 4.7). About one-half
of the 2007 employment for FM semiconductor ﬁrms is found in the
wholesale trade sector. Among the smaller number of multiunit ﬁrms,
the majority have units in multiple sectors (Table 4.6).
The establishments of these FM ﬁrms are highly concentrated in a
few key information technology industries, corroborating our matching process (Table 4.8). Many units are found outside of the wholeTable 4.6 Firms by Establishment Structure
Category
2002
Total
525
Single-unit
450
Manufacturing
105
Wholesale
130
Services
220
Multi-unit
70
3 Sectors
15
2 Sectors
25
1 Sector
30

2007
525
470
100
120
245
55
10
20
20

NOTE: Excludes management establishments. Rounded to nearest 5. Numbers may
not sum to totals because of rounding.
SOURCE. Economic Census, 2002 and 2007.
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Table 4.7 Sector Distribution of Semiconductor FM Firm Activity
Sales
Employment
Sector
($ billions)
(000s)
2002
Total
22
55
Wholesale
15
27
Services
2
10
Manufacturing
5
18
2007
Total
26
55
Wholesale
19
29
Services
2
12
Manufacturing
5
14
NOTE: Sales and employment rounded to whole numbers. Numbers may not sum to
totals because of rounding.
SOURCE: Matched Economic Census and company data, 2002 and 2007. See data
appendix.

sale trade sector, but note that while Census Bureau practice is to classify FGPs (establishments) in wholesale trade, establishments of FM
companies may have primary activity in other sectors and be properly
classiﬁed there. Wholesale trade establishments for the FM ﬁrms are
almost exclusively in “Other electronic parts and equipment wholesalers” (which includes semiconductor wholesalers) and in “Computers,
peripherals, and software wholesalers.” The service establishments for
these ﬁrms are predominantly in “Custom computer programming and
systems design services,” in “Physical, engineering, and life sciences
R&D services,” and in “Engineering services.” Manufacturing establishments for the FM ﬁrms are heavily concentrated in “Semiconductor and related device manufacturing,” with a small but notable share
in other electronics manufacturing industries. These manufacturing
establishments are an indication that the associated company employs a
hybrid FGP/IM approach to production.
Focusing on establishments in the two key wholesale industries,
we ﬁnd that semiconductor FGPs are signiﬁcantly larger with respect
to the value of revenue and the number of employees than non-FGPs
within these industries (Table 4.8).20, 21 The difference in log revenue
between FGPs and non-FGPs is 1.5, and the difference in average log
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Table 4.8 Mean Establishment Characteristics by Firm Type and
Sector, 2002
Sector
Wholesale trade a
FM ﬁrm
Other
Log revenue ($ 000s)
8.7
7.2
Log employment
2.4
1.8
Log avg. earnings ($ 000s)
4.4
3.7
Services b
FM ﬁrm
Other
Log revenue ($ 000s)
7.8
5.8
Log employment
2.9
1.5
Log avg. earnings ($ 000s)
4.4
3.7
Manufacturing c
FM ﬁrm
Other
Log revenue ($ 000s)
9.6
7.9
Log employment
4.2
2.8
Log avg. earnings ($ 000s)
4.1
3.8
Dominant industries (and their NAICS codes) for the wholesale trade sector include
“Other electronic parts and equipment” (423690) and “Computers, peripherals, and
software” (423430).
b
Dominant industries (and NAICS codes) for the services sector include “Custom computer programming services” (541511) and “Computer systems design” (541512).
c
Dominant industries (and NAICS codes) for the manufacturing sector include “Semiconductor and related device manufacturing” (334413) and other industries within
“Computer & electronic product manufacturing” (334).
SOURCE: 2002 Matched Economic Census and company data. See data appendix.
a

employment is 0.6. The average earnings for employees of FM ﬁrms is
substantially higher as well—the mean of the log earnings distribution
is 4.4 for FGPs and 3.7 for non-FGPs. We speculate that FGPs are more
likely than conventional wholesalers to employ engineers and other
technical professionals with relatively high earnings and are less likely
to employ lower-skilled laborers, such as those devoted to managing
warehouse inventories.
Establishments of the semiconductor FM ﬁrms in the two wholesale industries identiﬁed in the previous paragraph and in superscript
note a of Table 4.8 display a striking tendency to cluster geographically. Approximately two-thirds of wholesale revenue for semiconduc-
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tor FGPs comes from plants located in just three metropolitan statistical
areas (MSAs), and the top 10 MSAs for FGP activity account for 87
percent of FGP revenue (Table 4.9). In contrast, the other establishments within the two key wholesale trade industries are more geographically diverse. The top three MSAs account for only 26 percent of revenue, and the top 10 MSAs account for only 56 percent. We conjecture
that in contrast to wholesalers as conventionally deﬁned—a warehouse
or sales ofﬁce—which are drawn to centers of business activity and
transportation hubs, FMs locate FGPs close to other establishments in
their industry to beneﬁt from active local markets for specialized labor
and other inputs. Silicon Valley for electronics and New York City for
apparel are well-known examples (Porter 1998).
The composition of employment in the semiconductor manufacturing industry would be much different with FGPs included in its scope.
The mean of the log earnings distribution is 4.4 for FGPs in “Wholesale
trade,” noticeably greater than the 3.8 average for log earnings in the
“Electronics manufacturing” sector (NAICS 334), excluding semiconductor FGPs.
Table 4.9 Geographic Concentration of Wholesale Sales, 2002
FM semiconductor ﬁrms
Other ﬁrms
MSA
Sales share
MSA
Sales share
1
43
1
10
2
11
2
8
3
11
3
8
4
6
4
7
5
3
5
6
6
3
6
5
7
3
7
3
8
3
8
3
9
2
9
3
10
2
10
3
Total
87
Total
56
NOTE: MSA rankings generated separately for FM and non-FM companies. “FM”
stands for “factoryless manufacturing.” See text for deﬁnition.
SOURCE: 2002 Matched Economic Census and company data. See data appendix.
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U.S. MANUFACTURING WITH FACTORYLESS GOODS
PRODUCERS INCLUDED
Total Manufacturing Using Economic Census Special Questions
As noted in the section beginning on p. 82, the OMB has encouraged economic statistical agencies to assess the feasibility of classifying
FGPs in the manufacturing sector. What remains unknown, however, is
the effect of this reclassiﬁcation on the size of the sector. The 2002
and 2007 Economic Censuses of Wholesale Trade both include two
questions on contract manufacturing and design that offer an opportunity to assess the difference that classifying FGPs to manufacturing
would make. For 2007, we estimate that if one reclassiﬁed to manufacturing those establishments answering “yes” to both questions, the
value-added for the sector would be greater by $96 billion, or 4 percent
(Table 4.10).22 Using a more lenient assumption—that an afﬁrmative
answer to either question sufﬁces to identify an establishment as an
FGP, manufacturing value-added would be greater by $303 billion, or
13 percent. For 2002, manufacturing would be 3 percent greater using
the strict deﬁnition, and 14 percent greater using the lenient deﬁnition.
Unfortunately, response rates for these questions are quite low, and
these results implicitly assume nonresponse is a negative answer. We
imputed answers for nonrespondents and found manufacturing valueadded would have been 5 to 20 percent higher in both years, which we
take to be our most plausible estimate.23
Semiconductor Manufacturing Using Matched FM Company Data
Next, we narrow our focus to the semiconductor industry, and we
use the matched company-establishment data. We count sales of the
wholesale establishments of FM ﬁrms as manufacturing revenue and
estimate that the value of shipments for the semiconductor industry in
2007 would have been $92 billion—26 percent higher than the $75 billion reported in the 2007 Economic Census. The share of the (broader)
semiconductor industry accounted for by plants of FM ﬁrms (including
those already in manufacturing) would have been 28 percent.24
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Table 4.10 Total Value-Added for Establishments Reporting Product
Design, Use of Contract Manufacturing, or Both ($ billions)
Levels
2002
2007
Baseline
Either CMS or design
260
303
Both
60
96
Baseline + imputed response
Either CMS or design
Both

364
94

413
152

1,888

2,383

Increase to manufacturing (%)
Baseline
Either CMS or design
Both

14
3

13
4

Baseline + imputed response
Either CMS or design
Both

19
5

17
6

Total manufacturing value added

NOTE: Selected wholesale trade industries (423690, 423430). Manufacturing valueadded from the Census of Manufacturers.
SOURCE: Economic Census, 2002 and 2007.

Interestingly, the FGP share of industry shipments for 2002 is little
different from its share for 2007. Consequently, semiconductor industry
shipments, including shipments from FGPs, rose 3.7 percent (annual
rate) between 2002 and 2007, an increase only slightly greater than
the 3.4 percent reported under the current classiﬁcation system. Meanwhile, the FM portion of the global semiconductor industry ballooned
from $15 billion in 2002 to $54 billion in 2007 (Figure 4.2). Because
U.S. companies account for a very large share of global FM revenue,
this could suggest that U.S. FM companies were expanding rapidly during this period, but that the expansion was primarily at offshore establishments. However, such a scenario could be the result of companies
keeping earnings overseas for tax avoidance purposes.
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SELECTED EFFECTS OF RECLASSIFICATION AND
RELEVANCE FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Because the impact of the NAICS guidance for FGP classiﬁcation
will reﬂect not only the effect of conceptual differences but also the
signiﬁcant measurement challenges faced by statistical programs in
adopting the change, no deﬁnitive analysis can be made of its effect
on measures of economic activity. Nevertheless, for the sake of discussion we provide a speculative assessment of the effect on some key
economic measures.
Manufacturing Value-Added
To begin with, estimates in this chapter and in other work suggest
that classiﬁcation of FGPs to the manufacturing sector will materially
increase that sector’s value-added. However, it is important to note
that the total nominal value-added of the economy should not change,
because the increase in manufacturing will be offset by decreases in
other sectors. The expansion of the scope of the manufacturing sector
beyond establishments engaged in fabrication on-site will introduce an
appreciable discontinuity in statistics for the manufacturing sector. That
said, the change has the appeal of introducing continuity in the treatment of production management activities and product development.
When those tasks are colocated with fabrication, their value-added is
counted as manufacturing, and the outsourcing of fabrication arguably
should not move their value-added out of that sector. To quote from the
OMB decision on the issue, “Goods producers arrange for and bring
together all of the factors of production necessary to produce a good. . . .
When individual steps in the complete process are outsourced, an establishment should remain classiﬁed in the manufacturing sector.” That
goal will be served by classifying FGPs in the manufacturing sector,
but it would be desirable to also report economic statistics that allow for
analysis of manufacturing with FGPs excluded.25
In addition, classifying FGPs to manufacturing will change the
industry composition of the sector because FGPs are not evenly prevalent across wholesale trade industries (Tables 4.4 and 4.5). For example,
we expect the change will temper the long decline in U.S. production of
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electronics. We consider a provocative example for illustration: Valueadded in the “Electronic computer manufacturing” industry (NAICS
Industry 334111), as reported by the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of
Manufacturers (ASM), dropped from $26 billion to $9 billion between
2008 and 2010, and it fell further, to $3 billion, in 2011. In addition to
the economy-wide effects of the recent recession, such as businesses
postponing computer investment, the decline can be partially attributed
to a shift in the composition of household computer spending toward
tablet computers, especially the iPad, produced by Apple Inc., a company that relies primarily on offshore MSPs for fabrication.
To the extent that offshore iPad fabrication is managed by domestic FGPs, a portion of value-added for this type of product will be
counted in the U.S. computer industry under the new classiﬁcation
rules. According to Apple annual reports, Apple’s global iPad revenue
surged from $5 billion to $20 billion between 2010 and 2011. Assuming Apple’s gross margin share of overall revenue, approximately 40
percent, applies to sales of iPads, and assuming for the sake of argument that half of that margin is value-added at domestic Apple FGPs,
under the new NAICS guidance $6 billion in value-added at these FGPs
would be counted in the manufacturing sector and would roughly offset the $6 billion decline in domestic computer manufacturing reported
in the ASM. This somewhat fanciful example illustrates how the new
classiﬁcation approach may have ﬁrst-order effects and change the narrative for some industries where FM is prevalent.
Trade
It is also worth noting that the new treatment of FGPs has the potential to cause signiﬁcant changes in the composition of U.S. trade ﬂows,
though net trade is in principle unaffected. An FGP that purchases contract manufacturing will record as its own production the product fabricated by the MSP. If the MSP is located abroad and the product is
delivered to a foreign market, the sale will be treated as a U.S. export,
even though the ﬁnished good did not cross the U.S. border. In contrast,
if the product is shipped to the U.S. market from the foreign MSP, it
will not be treated as a U.S. import, even though the good did cross
the U.S. border. In both cases, an import of manufacturing services
will be recorded. Thus, the relative importance of services and goods
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in total trade may differ under the new system. The new treatment of
FGPs has the potential to cause signiﬁcant changes in the composition
of U.S. trade as recorded in the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPAs), though net trade is in principle unaffected.
Measurement Effects
In addition to the conceptual changes mentioned above, we note
two ways in which aggregates conceptually unaffected by the change
in treatment of FGPs may nevertheless be affected as measured. First,
the accuracy of economic statistics whose construction relies on the
combination of data generated by different statistical programs, such as
industrial production and labor productivity, will be aided by the better
alignment of FGP classiﬁcation practices. Such statistics are at risk of
inadvertent mismeasurement if differences with respect to current FGP
classiﬁcation are not taken into account. The added clarity with regard
to the treatment of FGPs will serve to reduce the risk of such errors.
Second, measurement of the prices needed to deﬂate nominal valueadded and trade ﬂows for FGPs and MSPs will require signiﬁcant
attention. Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) study prices for manufacturing services in the semiconductor industry and ﬁnd that the wellknown challenges faced in quality-adjusting product prices also exist
for semiconductor manufacturing services. If the composition of trade
shifts from goods to services, the relative quality of price measures for
services will affect the resulting real balance of trade.26
Economic Issues
Deeper understanding of the use of the FM business model may
lead to insights into important economic questions. Among these are
the following four:
1) What is the effect of offshoring on domestic activity—do
management and design follow fabrication offshore, or does
offshoring enhance that domestic activity through gains from
trade?27
2) What is the impact of this shift in manufacturing approach
on manufacturing employment—does the loss of production
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worker jobs to offshoring coincide with a gain in domestic
knowledge-worker jobs?28
3) How much of the substantial contribution of information technology (IT) production to productivity growth can be attributed to FGP activity, and how much to fabrication?29
4) What is the role of FGPs in global “trade in tasks”? Can FGP
data lead to more appropriate input-output tables for use in the
burgeoning work on decomposing product value into contributions from different economies through value-added trade?30

CONCLUSION
Using company data, we document our premise that factoryless
manufacturing is becoming more prevalent and is employed in the production of an increasingly wide variety of goods. With Census Bureau
establishment microdata, we ﬁnd evidence that factoryless goods producers are present in a broad mix of industries in the wholesale trade
sector. We present a case study of the semiconductor industry using a
data set constructed by matching company data and census establishment data. Here, we ﬁnd that FGPs are larger in terms of revenue and
employment, have higher average earnings, and cluster markedly more
than conventional wholesale trade establishments. Finally, we estimate
that shifting FGP activity from wholesale trade to manufacturing may
increase manufacturing value-added by 5 to 20 percent. In the case of
semiconductors, we ﬁnd that value-added in 2007 would be 26 percent
higher if census data were used. We provide examples of anticipated
effects on economic statistics from the clariﬁcation of the treatment of
FGPs and note several areas of economic study that may beneﬁt from
the change.
Implementing the OMB guidance on the treatment of FGPs presents substantial challenges for U.S. statistical agencies going forward
(Doherty, Chapter 2 of this volume). As was noted earlier, factoryless
manufacturing is far from new, and looking backward, there is the
daunting task of building a history consistent with the clariﬁed scope
of manufacturing, which will be needed to fully exploit the data. How-
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ever, bearing in mind the evident size of the FGP phenomenon and the
role that better measures of FGPs may play in discussion of pressing
economic issues, we consider the clariﬁcation of the treatment of factoryless goods producers to be a welcome effort to update the U.S. statistical system.

Notes
This chapter stems from a paper that was prepared for presentation in 2013 at the “Measuring the Effects of Globalization” conference, organized by the Progressive Policy
Institute and the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research and funded by the
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. We are grateful for the feedback we received from participants at the conference. We also beneﬁted from additional feedback from Maureen
Donoghue, Teresa Fort, Susan Houseman, Javier Miranda, John Murphy, Bill Powers,
Jennifer Ribarsky, Falan Yinug, and participants in a workshop at the U.S. Census
Bureau. The Global Semiconductor Alliance and IHS iSuppli provided data, and we
also appreciate their guidance on the semiconductor industry. Remaining errors are our
own.
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purchased data, public ﬁnancial reports, and news accounts, not on conﬁdential census
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Department of Economics. Direct correspondence can be addressed to the following:
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2.

3.

An establishment is a company unit, such as a plant, warehouse, or ofﬁce. The
Ofﬁce of Management and Budget deﬁnes it this way: “The establishment . . .
is the smallest operating entity for which records provide information on cost of
resources . . . employed to produce the units of output. . . . The establishment . . .
is generally a single physical location” (OMB 1998).
A summary of a recent study of the FGP classiﬁcation issued by the Economic
Classiﬁcation Policy Committee noted, “To the extent that FGPs can be identiﬁed,
the Census Bureau statistical programs classify them to wholesale trade” (Murphy
2009). However, this guidance does not apply to apparel. (John Murphy, chair of
the ECPC, in discussion with author Byrne, September 2013.)
Presentation by the FGP Implementation Planning Group at the Semiconductor
Industry Association’s annual meeting, September 11, 2012. The group’s presentation was titled “Redeﬁning Manufacturing in NAICS 2012: The Factoryless
Goods Producer (FGP).”
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13.
14.

For a discussion of the deliberations leading to this decision and the alternatives
considered, see Doherty (2013).
The Federal Register notice from August 17, 2011 (found in Federal Register
76[159]: 51240–51243), describes the announced NAICS classiﬁcation standard
for FGP establishments as a clariﬁcation, but it also acknowledges that “the inclusion of revenues from FGP activities in manufacturing will effectively change the
traditional deﬁnition of manufacturing.”
Although the Business Processes and Business Functions classiﬁcation system
was not referenced in the FGP classiﬁcation deliberations, it provides a useful
framework for thinking about the nature of factoryless manufacturing. BPBF is
based on the concepts developed for the Global Value Chains Initiative and was
employed in the BLS’s Mass Layoff Statistics Program, which was discontinued
in June 2013 (Sturgeon 2002; Sturgeon and Gerefﬁ 2008).
The NAICS manual notes that “almost all manufacturing has some captive
research and development or administrative operations, such as accounting, payroll, or management” (OMB 1998).
Steiner (1995, 1997) was an early advocate for modifying classiﬁcation practices
to account for FM activity, though the term “factoryless goods producer” had
not been coined at the time. Steiner notes that in the 1970s, for a “host of consumer goods,” manufacturing moved offshore but the companies “did the research
and development, the production engineering, and were responsible for quality
control.”
In the electronics sector, the complicated web of component production, design,
and management cannot always be simpliﬁed to an FGP-MSP relationship. (See
Dedrick and Kraemer [2002]; Grunwald and Flamm [1985]; and Sturgeon and
Lee [2001].)
Under Regulation S-K of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, annual reports to the
SEC on Form 10-K are required to include discussion of risks “likely to result in
registrant’s liquidity increasing or decreasing in a material way.”
Because the S&P 500 is constructed to be representative of the “large cap” segment of the U.S. equities market, these results do not apply to smaller ﬁrms. Small
and medium-sized ﬁrms are an important topic for further study. One potential
beneﬁt of decoupling production management from fabrication and the associated
ﬁxed costs may be that smaller-scale enterprises are more viable, thus promoting
ﬁrm creation. That being said, Kamal, Moulton, and Ribarsky (Chapter 3 of this
volume) ﬁnd that two-thirds of ﬁrms reporting the use of MSPs or the provision of
contract manufacturing are large—they have 250 or more employees.
References to contract manufacturing of components of the ﬁnal product, purchase of “private label” merchandise, licensing of company designs, and provision
by the company of contract manufacturing services to others were not treated as
evidence of factoryless manufacturing.
The survey forms for the Census of Wholesale Trade are included in Appendix 4B.
Speciﬁcally, the 2002 question asked whether fabrication was “performed for this
establishment by another company,” but offshore fabrication by another establish-
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15.

16.

17.

18.
19.

20.
21.

22.

23.

ment of the same company would be sufﬁcient to meet the deﬁnition of FGP. The
2007 contract manufacturing question is also not a perfect match. With regard to
design, to be an FGP, the establishment must own the rights to the design, but it
may be independently developed or otherwise acquired.
A negative response to both of these questions by an establishment of an FM ﬁrm
need not be erroneous. For example, a pure sales ofﬁce for an FM ﬁrm would
properly be classiﬁed in “Wholesale trade.”
Kamal, Moulton, and Ribarsky use the Company Organization Survey, conducted
by the Census Bureau, and the BEA’s Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad as well as its Benchmark Survey of Transactions in Selected Services and Intellectual Property Products with Foreign Persons.
For a detailed discussion of FGPs and MSPs in the semiconductor industry, see
Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013). To avoid confusion, we do not use the industryspeciﬁc term “fabless” for FM ﬁrms or the term “foundries” for manufacturing
service providers.
See Appendix 4A for a description of the sources and matching process.
A handful of these single-unit ﬁrms have a second establishment in the management sector. These establishments are omitted from the ﬁrm structure calculations. Results for the management sector did not meet Census Bureau standards
for disclosure.
Most ﬁrms have no more than one establishment in these wholesale industries, and
the results are little changed by treating each establishment separately.
Note that our “other” group may contain establishments of FM companies producing products other than semiconductors. We believe this would lead us to
understate the differences between our semiconductor FGPs and true wholesale
establishments.
We focus on value-added for now because of issues involved in double-counting
gross output if an FGP purchases contract manufacturing services from a domestic
establishment already in the scope of manufacturing. The value-added approach
has limitations as well. We calculate value-added in the wholesale sector as sales
minus the cost of merchandise and change in inventory. These results will be
biased downwards if the reported cost of merchandise reﬂects the value of product
design or of the management of the fabrication process performed at the FGP—for
example, if its valuation on import includes the FGP’s value-added.
For each question, we predict the probability that each nonresponding establishment would answer “yes” based on observable characteristics. We then add the
value-added of the establishment, weighted by the predicted probability, to the
manufacturing sector, in addition to the full value-added for the respondents in
our baseline estimates. In unreported results, we also use the weighting scheme
developed by Fort (2011) to develop predicted probabilities of answering a question conditional on observables. We then multiply value-added for an establishment that answered both questions by the inverse of the predicted probability. This
methodology yields estimates that differ by only a few percentage points from the
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24.

25.
26.
27.

28.

29.

30.

results reported. Our estimates of the magnitude of the proportional increment to
manufacturing gross output are similar as well.
Because very little MSP activity for the semiconductor industry was located
domestically in 2007, the magnitude of double-counting when using gross output
is unlikely to be signiﬁcant.
At the time of this writing, it has not been determined whether such detail will be
made available in U.S. economic statistics.
On the importance of prices for imported intermediates for productivity measurement, see Houseman et al. (2011).
Levinson (2013) notes the relevance for policymakers of the question of whether
manufacturing is becoming “hollowed out”—that is, whether a greater share of
value-added is taking place offshore.
Helper, Krueger, and Wial (2012) note the dwindling role of the manufacturing
sector as a source of “high-wage jobs, especially for workers who would otherwise earn the lowest wages.”
Byrne, Oliner, and Sichel (2013) note that the contribution from factoryless
goods production is an important area for extension of the contribution of IT in
productivity.
On “trade in tasks,” see Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). On developments
in the measurement of value-added trade, see Ahmad (Chapter 6 of this volume),
Timmer et al. (2013), and Yao, Ma, and Pei (Chapter 7 of this volume).
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Appendix 4A
Data Construction
For the case study of the semiconductor industry, we linked company
directory entries to the Census Business Register.1 The Business Register is
a database of U.S. business establishments and companies that serves as a
sampling frame for Census Bureau ﬁrm and establishment surveys.2 For each
establishment in the Business Register there are identiﬁers that allow the establishment to be linked to corresponding records in Census Bureau economic
surveys. In addition, the Business Register contains a ﬁrm identiﬁer for each
establishment, which enables us to locate other establishments within the same
ﬁrm.
To generate our list of census ﬁrm identiﬁers corresponding to FGP companies, we began with a list of 1,579 FGP semiconductor companies created
from a directory published by Gartner, a high-tech consultancy, and a directory
published by the Global Semiconductor Alliance (GSA), a trade association
representing a wide variety of companies involved in semiconductor design
and fabrication. Gartner provided a worldwide directory of semiconductor
FGP companies active in 2001. The GSA provided a worldwide directory of
all semiconductor FGP companies active as of 2012 and a supplemental list
of mergers and acquisitions between 2005 and 2012.3 The supplemental list
proved critical because of the high frequency of ﬁrm birth and ﬁrm death in
the industry. We reviewed public records for these companies to amend incomplete records. Eliminating companies that we believed were not operational
in either 2002 or 2007 based on a review of public records left us with a list
of 1,475 companies (Table 4A.1). The list contains the name, headquarters
address, and year of occurrence for major events (establishment, dissolution,
merger, acquisition) for each company.
Table 4A.1 Match Statistics
Company list
Matched to business register
Total Firm IDs
Matched to 2002 EC establishments
Matched to 2007 EC establishments
Matched to either 2002 or 2007

1,475
1,050
1,125
525
525
750

NOTE: Rounded to nearest 25.
SOURCE: Company data matched to Economic Census (EC) data for 2002 and 2007.
See Appendix 4A.
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First, for 2002 and 2007, we matched all companies in operation in either
census year to a three-year window of the Business Register ending in the
census year. For this ﬁrst stage, we only exploit the company name, by ﬁnding
the name or names in the Business Register that match the greatest number of
leading characters for the FGP company name. We then reviewed a randomly
selected set of 1,000 of the approximately 40,000 potential matches generated, and we judged whether the entries were a match when considering both
full-name information and address variables. This set of matches was used to
estimate the importance of all available match-quality variables using a probit.
Variables included an indicator of state match, number of leading digits of
the zip code in common, company name-spelling distance, address-spelling
distance, and whether the establishment operated in a high-tech industry. The
estimated index function was then used to rank possible matches for each company on our list from most to least probable. Then we reviewed by hand the
matches for each company in descending order until we judged that we had
either found a match or there was no match for the company.
Using this name-matching procedure, we located 71 percent of these FGP
companies in the Census Business Register ﬁles (Table 4.6).4 Sometimes,
however, we could not ﬁnd in the Economic Census ﬁrm identiﬁers that had
appeared in the Business Register. In the end, we were able to locate establishments for about 50 percent of the companies on our list of FGP ﬁrms in the
Economic Census microdata for 2002 and 2007. Once we link ﬁrms from the
GSA and Gartner directories to the census data, we identify all establishments
connected to those ﬁrms and include them in our ﬁnal data set.

Appendix Notes
1. For more detail on the matching process, see Smith (2013).
2. See Jarmin and Miranda (2002).
3. Both the GSA and Gartner directories contained companies from around the
world. We attempted to ﬁnd matches for both foreign and domestically headquartered companies because we assumed many of the foreign companies would have
a U.S. presence. For the foreign companies we were forced to rely on only namematching characteristics.
4. It is important to note that our list contains many ﬁrms headquartered abroad that
may have no U.S. presence.
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Appendix 4B
Census of Wholesale Trade Forms
Form WH-42103
28 ESTABLISHMENT ACTIVITIES
A. Indicate activities that were performed by this establishment or were performed for this establishment by another
company during 2002.
(Mark "X" ALL that apply.)
This activity was
This activity was
This activity was
performed by this performed for this not provided by
establishment by this establishment
establishment
another company

1. Product Development
a. Product design/engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

0921

0941

0961

b. Materials fabrication/processing/assembly/blending . . . . .

0922

0942

0962

a. Bundling or kitting (combining multiple items into a
prepackaged product) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

0923

0943

0963

b. Pick and pack (taking goods from inventory and packaging
them to fill orders) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

0924

0944

0964

c. Warehousing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

0925

0945

0965

d. Breaking bulk (reducing large shipments into smaller
portions for customers) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

0926

0946

0966

e. Local delivery (within a city, town, or other local area,
including adjoining towns and suburban areas) . . . . . . .

0927

0947

0967

f. Long distance delivery (beyond local areas and commercial
zones) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

0928

0948

0968

g. Less than truckload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

0929

0949

0969

a. Customs brokerage (providing the services of a licensed
customs broker) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

0930

0950

0970

b. Logistics consulting (providing advice and expertise) . . . .

0931

0951

0971

c. Processing of returned merchandise . . . . . . . . . . . .

0932

0952

0972

2. Order Fulfillment

3. Other Services

B. During 2002 did this establishment:
1. Manage inventory owned by this establishment AND held at this location? . . .

0936

Yes

0937

No

2. Manage inventory owned by this establishment BUT held at a customer’s
location? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

0956

Yes

0957

No

3. Manage inventory owned by another company BUT held at this location? . . . .

0976

Yes

0977

No

4. Manage inventory owned by another company AND held somewhere other than
at this location? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

0994

Yes

0995

No

113
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$$CENSUS_REMARKS$$

-

-

Thank you for completing your 2007 ECONOMIC CENSUS form.
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Form WH-42311

(02-02-2012)

26 SPECIAL INQUIRIES - Continued
C. PURCHASE OF CONTRACT MANUFACTURING
1. Did this establishment purchase contract manufacturing services from other companies or foreign plants of
your company in 2012?
Include:
• Products for which the manufacturing (i.e., transforming or otherwise processing materials or
components based on specifications provided by your company) was outsourced to other companies.
• Products for which the manufacturing was performed by your company's foreign plants.
Exclude:
• Services for packaging and assembling.
• Purchases of merchandise for resale (sale of products bought and sold without further processing or
transformation).
1011

Yes - Go to line 2

1012

No - Go to

Y
N COP T
O
I
T
A
M
OR
INFOR
O REP
T
E
S
TU
DO NO
30

$ Bil.

2. Report the costs incurred by this establishment for contract
manufacturing purchased in 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1013

3. Report the value of sales, shipments, receipts, or revenue generated
in 2012 from products whose purchases were reported as contract
manufacturing costs in line 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1015

2012
Mil.

Thou.

27 – 29 Not Applicable.
REMARKS (Please use this space for any explanations that may be essential in understanding your reported data.)

$$CENSUS_REMARKS$$

30 CERTIFICATION - This report is substantially accurate and was prepared in accordance with the instructions.
Is the time period covered by this report a
calendar year?
Yes

Month

No - Enter time period covered

Name of person to contact regarding this report

Area code

Telephone

-

Month

Year

TO
Title

Number

-

Year

FROM

Extension

-

Area code

Fax

E-mail address

Number

Month

Day

Year

Date
completed

Thank you for completing your 2012 ECONOMIC CENSUS form.
PLEASE PHOTOCOPY THIS FORM FOR YOUR RECORDS AND RETURN THE ORIGINAL.
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New Measures of Competitiveness Based
on the World Input-Output Database
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Gaaitzen J. de Vries
University of Groningen

OVERVIEW
It is frequently argued that globalization has entered a second phase.
In the early twentieth century, rapidly falling transport costs ended the
need for colocation of production and consumption. Competitiveness
of countries in the ﬁrst phase was determined by domestic clusters of
ﬁrms, mainly competing sector to sector. More recently, fostered by
rapidly falling communication and coordination costs, the production
process itself was unbundled, as the various stages of production need
not be performed near each other anymore. In this new phase, international competition increasingly plays itself out at the level of tasks
within ﬁrms, rather than at the level of products. And trade in goods
is increasingly replaced by trade in tasks (Baldwin 2006). This creates
new challenges for the way in which the competitiveness of nations is
analyzed.
Traditional measures indicate that China and other emerging countries have rapidly improved in competitiveness since the late 1990s,
both in quantity and in quality, as attested to by booming exports of
technologically sophisticated products. But recent product case studies
suggest that European, Japanese, and U.S. ﬁrms still capture major parts
of these value chains, as they specialize in high-value-added activities
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such as software, design, branding, and system integration. China and
other emerging countries are mainly involved in the assembling, testing, and packaging activities, which are poorly compensated. A typical
ﬁnding is that China keeps less than 4 percent of a product’s export
value as income for its labor and capital employed in the production
process of electronic goods (Ali-Yrkkö et al. 2011; Dedrick, Kraemer,
and Linden 2010). To reﬂect this new reality, a new measure of competitiveness is needed that is based on the value added in production by
a country, rather than the gross output value of its exports. Or, as put
by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006, pp. 66–67), “Such measures
are inadequate to the task of measuring the extent of a country’s international integration in a world with global supply chains. . . . We would
like to know the sources of the value-added embodied in goods and the
uses to which the goods are eventually put.”
Recently, Timmer et al. (2013) introduced a new concept that allows
one to analyze the value that is added in various stages of regionally
dispersed production processes. It is deﬁned as the income generated in
a country by participating in global manufacturing production, abbreviated by the term “GVC income” (for global value chain income). Compared to traditional competitiveness indicators such as a country’s share
in world exports, this new metric has three advantages. First, it indicates to what extent a country can compete with other nations in terms
of activities related to global manufacturing, rather than by competing in manufacturing products as measured by exports. These activities
take place in manufacturing industries but also in services industries.
Second, it is a reﬂection of an economy’s strength to compete in both
domestic and global markets. Third, income and employment effects of
trade in tasks for separate groups of workers (such as low- and highskilled) can also be determined in the same uniﬁed framework, referring to the concept of “GVC jobs.”1
The main aim of this chapter is to establish a series of stylized facts
on GVC incomes and jobs that can serve as a starting point for deeper
analysis of the causes of global manufacturing production. Whereas
Timmer et al. (2013) focused their analysis on trends in European competitiveness, this chapter takes a more global view and provides analyses for 20 major countries in the world, including the United States,
Japan, major economies in Europe, Brazil, China, India, and Russia.
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In the remainder of this chapter, we ﬁrst outline our methodology
for slicing up global value chains (in the next section, Section Two—
“GVC Incomes and Jobs: Methodology”) and introduce the concepts
of GVC income and GVC jobs. We identify GVCs by tracing the ﬂow
of goods and services across industries and countries as described in a
world input-output table. Using a decomposition technique that is built
upon the original insights by Leontief (1949), we slice up the value of
manufacturing expenditure into incomes for labor and capital in various countries. These are the incomes of factors that are directly and
indirectly needed for the production of the ﬁnal manufacturing goods.
The empirical analysis is based on a new database, called the World
Input-Output Database (WIOD), which combines national input-output
tables, bilateral international trade statistics, and data on production factor requirements. A crucial characteristic of this database is the explicit
measurement of national and international trade in intermediates. In
Section Three, “The World Input-Output Database (WIOD),” we discuss the major features of this database.
Section Four, “Trends in Manufactures’ GVC Incomes,” provides
trends in GVC income shares across regions and major countries in
the world. The analysis is based on demand for ﬁnal manufacturing
products, and we show the dependency of countries on domestic and
foreign sources of demand. We also show that only about half of the
GVC income originates in the manufacturing sector itself, which indicates the importance of interindustry linkages in the production of
manufacturing goods. In Section Five, “Manufactures’ GVC Income
by Production Factor,” we focus more in-depth on the role of different factors of production. We show how in advanced countries GVC
income generated by capital and high-skilled labor is increasing, while
incomes for medium- and low-skilled workers in manufactures production are declining. In Section Six, “Manufactures’ GVC Jobs,” we study
the number of jobs involved in GVC production of manufactures and
ﬁnd a strong difference between Europe and the United States. Lowand medium-skilled jobs are on the decline in all advanced countries,
but whereas in Europe and Japan high-skilled job opportunities have
increased, they have declined in the United States since 1995.
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GVC INCOMES AND JOBS: METHODOLOGY
In this section we outline the method to slice up GVCs, as introduced by Timmer et al. (2013). The basic aim of this empirical analysis
is to decompose expenditure on a ﬁnal product into a stream of factor incomes around the world. By modeling the world economy as an
input-output model in the tradition of Leontief, we can use his famous
insight, which links up changes in consumption to changes in the distribution of factor income both within and across countries. Basically,
we will provide the macroeconomic equivalent of famous product case
studies that suggest a new division of labor and value in electronics,
such as Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden (2010) for iPods and electronic
notebooks and Ali-Yrkkö et al. (2011) for a study of mobile phones.
These studies suggest a division of activities between mature and
emerging economies where the former concentrate on activities that
require skilled labor and capital (in particular, intangibles), while the
latter mainly contribute through unskilled labor.
The GVC income metric provides a macroeconomic complement
to the product case studies described above. It covers a wide set of
products and analyzes not only the ﬁrst-tier suppliers but also secondtier and higher-order suppliers. The method provides a full decomposition of the value of consumption in a country and traces the associated
income ﬂows for labor and capital in various regions in the world. We
model the global production system through input-output tables and
international trade statistics. The approach follows the seminal insight
from Leontief (1949) and traces the amount of factor inputs needed to
produce a certain amount of ﬁnal demand. Value is added at various
stages of production through the utilization of production factors such
as labor and capital. These links between expenditure and income are
illustrated in Figure 5.1.
The arrows in Figure 5.1 indicate ﬂows of products and factor services, which are mirrored by payments that ﬂow in the opposite direction. The central link between income and consumption is the production
process, in which value is added through the deployment of labor and
capital in the various stages of production. This production process can
be highly fragmented, as the case study of the iPod illustrates. Through
international trade, consumption in Country B will lead to income for
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Figure 5.1 Links between Expenditure, Production, and Income
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SOURCE: Authors’ construction.
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production factors in other countries, either through importing ﬁnal
goods, or through the use of imported intermediates in the production
process of Country B. Through these indirect linkages, consumption in
Country A will generate income in Country C even though Country C
does not trade directly with Country A. These indirect effects are sizable, as international trade in intermediate goods is high.
To model the international production linkages, we use a world
input-output model that obeys the identity that at the global level consumption is equal to all value-added generated.2 Below we will outline
how this identity can be used to consistently decompose the value of
consumption by a country into income in any country in the world.
To do this we rely on the fundamental input-output identity introduced
by Leontief (1949), which states that Q = BQ + C, where Q denotes
outputs, C is consumption, and B is an input-output matrix with intermediate input coefﬁcients. B describes how a given product in a country is produced with different combinations of intermediate inputs. The
identity states that a good produced is either used as an intermediate
input in another production process or is consumed. It can be rewritten
as Q = (I − B)−1C, with I being an identity matrix.3 (I − B)−1 is famously
known as the Leontief inverse. It represents the total production value
in all stages of production that is generated in the production process of
one unit of consumption.
To see this, let Z be a vector column, with the ﬁrst element representing the global consumption of iPods produced in China, which
is equal to the output of the Chinese iPod industry, and the rest zeros.
Then BZ is the vector of intermediate inputs, both Chinese and foreign,
needed to assemble the iPods in China, such as the hard-disc drive,
battery, and processors. But these intermediates need to be produced as
well. B2Z indicates the intermediate inputs directly needed to produce
BZ, and so on. Thus


B Z
n

n1

represents all intermediate inputs needed for the iPod production. Then
the total gross output value related to the production of Z is given by


Z   B n Z  (I  B) 1 Z .
n1
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Using this insight, we can derive production factor requirements
for any vector Z. Let F be the direct factor inputs per unit of gross output. An element in this matrix indicates the share in the value of gross
output of a production factor used directly by the country to produce a
given product. These are country- and industry-speciﬁc—one example
would be the value of low-skilled labor used in the Chinese electronics
industry to produce one dollar of output and to add up to value-added
by construction in our data. The elements in F are direct factor inputs in
the industry, because they do not account for value embodied in intermediate inputs used by this industry. To include the latter as well, we
multiply F by the total gross output value in all stages of production that
is generated in the production process deﬁned above, so that
(5.1)

K  F (I  B ) 1 C ,

in which C indicates the levels of consumption4 and K is the matrix of
amounts of factor inputs attributed to each consumption level. A typical
element in K indicates the amount of a production factor f from country
i, embodied in consumption of product g in country j. By the logic of
Leontief’s insight, the sum of all elements in a column of K will be
equal to the consumption of this product. Thus we have completed our
decomposition of the value of consumption into the value-added by
various production factors around the world.5
For the purpose of this chapter, we are also interested in the effects
of foreign versus domestic ﬁnal demand for growth in GVC income and
jobs. For a particular country i, we deﬁne foreign ﬁnal demand (CFOR)
and domestic ﬁnal demand (CDOM) so that CFOR + CDOM = C. Substituting this in the linear system given above, one can now derive the gross
output generated because of ﬁnal demand from home country i, and that
generated because of ﬁnal demand from other countries, so that
(5.2)

K  F (I  B) 1 C DOM  F (I  B) 1 C FOR  K DOM  K FOR .

In this equation, we have decomposed the amount of factors used in
each sector of the home economy as given by K into the amount used
to satisfy domestic ﬁnal demand (KDOM) and the amount used to satisfy foreign demand (KFOR). The latter measures value-added exports,
deﬁned by Johnson and Noguera (2012) as the amount of value-added
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produced in a given source country that is ultimately embodied in ﬁnal
products absorbed abroad.
In Table 5.1 we provide an example of a GVC decomposition for
ﬁnal expenditures in the United States on electrical machinery in 1995
and 2008. The expenditure value is given at the basic price concept. A
key distinction in the System of National Accounts is between a value at
basic prices and at purchasers’ prices. The latter is the price paid by the
ﬁnal consumer and consists of the basic price plus trade and transport
margins in the handling of the product and any (net) product taxes. The
basic price can thus be considered as the price received by the producer
of the good. In 1995, the share of the value added in the United States
was over 50 percent, but this swiftly dropped in the period following
that year. Instead, value was increasingly added in other parts in the
world, both within NAFTA and outside. China in particular beneﬁted
from U.S. demand for electrical machinery and captured more than 20
percent of the value in 2008. Partly this was by exporting ﬁnal goods to
the United States that had been produced in China (direct contribution),
but also it was accomplished indirectly through the production of intermediates (such as parts and components) that are used in the United
States and elsewhere to produce ﬁnal goods destined for the U.S. marTable 5.1 Value-Added in Final Expenditure on Electrical Products in
United States (billions of 1995 US$)
Total expenditure in US$, of which
Domestic value-added
Foreign value-added, of which
Canada and Mexico
China
East Asia
EU 27
Other

1995
217
119
98
10
7
37
19
25

2008
253
106
147
15
53
24
28
27

Change
36
−13
49
5
46
−13
9
2

NOTE: Table shows breakdown of ﬁnal expenditure by households, ﬁrms, and government in the United States on electrical machinery products (ISIC Rev. 3 industries 30
to 33) into value-added in regions at basic prices, excluding domestic trade and transport margins, and in billions of U.S. dollars, deﬂated to 1995 prices with the overall
U.S. CPI. “East Asia” includes Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. “EU 27” includes all
countries of the European Union.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.
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ket. The decline in value-added in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is
illustrative of the major shifts that occurred in production stages across
Asia as China was increasingly used as a production location by East
Asian multinationals (Fukao, Ishido, and Ito 2003), an issue we will
return to later.

THE WORLD INPUT-OUTPUT DATABASE (WIOD)
To implement the new GVC metrics, one needs to have a database with linked consumption, production, and income ﬂows within
and between countries. For individual countries, this type of information can be found in input-output tables. However, national tables do
not provide any information on bilateral ﬂows of goods and services
between countries. For this type of information, researchers have to rely
on data sets constructed on the basis of national input-output tables in
combination with international trade data. Various alternative data sets
have been built in the past, of which the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database is the most widely known and used (Narayanan
and Walmsley 2008). Other data sets are constructed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD; see Ahmad,
Chapter 6 of this volume; IDE-JETRO (2006); and Yamano and Ahmad
[2006]). However, all these databases provide only one or a limited
number of benchmark year input-output tables, which preclude an analysis of developments over time. And although they provide separate
import matrices, there is no detailed breakdown of imports by trade
partner.
For this chapter, we use a new database, called the World InputOutput Database (WIOD), that aims to ﬁll this gap. The WIOD provides a time series of world input-output tables from 1995 onwards,
distinguishing between 35 industries and 59 product groups. The construction of the world input-output tables will be discussed in the following subsection. Another crucial element for this type of analysis
comes from detailed value-added accounts that provide information on
the use of various types of labor (distinguished by educational attainment level) and capital in production. This is discussed in the subsection titled “Factor Input Requirements.”
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World Input-Output Tables: Concepts and Construction
In this subsection we outline the basic concepts and construction
of our world input-output tables. Basically, a world input-output table
(WIOT) is a combination of national input-output tables in which the
use of products is broken down according to their origin. In contrast
to the national input-output tables, this information is made explicit in
the WIOT. For each country, ﬂows of products both for intermediate
and ﬁnal use are split into domestically produced or imported. In addition, for imports, the WIOT shows which foreign industry produced
the product. This is illustrated by the schematic outline for a WIOT in
Table 5.2. It illustrates the simple case of three regions: 1) Country A,
2) Country B, and 3) the rest of the world. In the World Input-Output
Database we will distinguish between 40 individual countries and the
rest of the world, but the basic outline remains the same.
The rows in the WIOT indicate the use of output from a particular
industry in a country. This can be intermediate use either in the country
itself (use of domestic output) or by other countries (in which case it is
exported). Output can also be for ﬁnal use,6 either by the country itself
(ﬁnal use of domestic output) or by other countries (in which case it is
exported). Final use is indicated on the right side of the table, and this
information can be used to measure the C matrix deﬁned in Section
Two, “GVC Incomes and Jobs: Methodology.” The sum of all of the
uses is equal to the output of an industry, denoted by Q in Section Two.
A fundamental accounting identity is that total use of output in a row
equals total output of the same industry, as indicated in the respective
column in the left-hand part of the table. The columns convey information on the technology of production, as they indicate the amounts of
intermediate and factor inputs needed for production. The intermediates can be sourced from domestic industries or imported. This is the B
matrix from Section Two. The residual between total output and total
intermediate inputs is value-added. This is made up by compensation
for production factors. It is the direct contribution of domestic factors
to output. We prepare the F matrix from Section Two on this information after breaking out the compensation of various factor inputs as
described in the next subsection, “Factor Input Requirements.”
As building blocks for the WIOT, national supply-and-use tables
(SUTs) were used; these are the core statistical sources from which
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Table 5.2 Schematic Outline of World Input-Output Table (WIOT), Three Regions
Intermediate industry
Country A

Country B

Rest of world

Final domestic
Country A

Country B

Country A
industry

Intermediate
Intermediate
Intermediate
use of domestic use by B of
use by RoW of
output
exports from A exports from A

Final use of
Final use by
domestic output B of exports
from A

Country B
industry

Intermediate
Intermediate
Intermediate
use by A of
use of domestic use by RoW of
exports from B
exports from B output

Final use by
A of exports
from B

Rest of world Intermediate
(RoW)
use by A of
industry exports from
RoW

Intermediate
use by B of
exports from
RoW

Intermediate
use of domestic
output

Value-added

Value-added

Value-added

Output in A

Output in B

Output in RoW

Rest of world

Total

Final use by
RoW of exports
from A

Output in A

Final use by
Final use of
domestic output RoW of exports
from B

Output in B

Final use by A Final use by B Final use of
of exports from of exports from domestic output
RoW
RoW

Output in RoW

SOURCE: Authors’ compilation.
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national statistical institutes (NSIs) derive national input-output tables.
In short, we derive time series from national SUTs. Benchmark national
SUTs are linked over time through the use of the most recent National
Accounts statistics on ﬁnal demand categories, as well as through the
use of gross output and value-added by detailed industry. This ensures
both intercountry and intertemporal consistency of the tables. As
such, the WIOT is built according to the conventions of the System of
National Accounts and obeys various important accounting identities.
National SUTs are linked across countries through detailed international
trade statistics to create so-called international SUTs. This is based on
a classiﬁcation of bilateral import ﬂows by end-use category (intermediate, consumer, or investment), in which intermediate inputs are split
by country of origin. These international SUTs are used to construct
the symmetric world input-output of the industry-by-industry type.
See Timmer (2012) for a more elaborate discussion of construction
methods, practical implementation, and detailed sources of the WIOT.
Dietzenbacher et al. (2013) provide an in-depth technical discussion.
The construction of the WIOT has a number of distinct characteristics. First, we rely on national supply-and-use tables rather than
input-output tables as our basic building blocks. SUTs are a natural
starting point for this type of analysis, as they provide information on
both products and industries. A supply table provides information on
products produced by each domestic industry, and a use table indicates
the use of each product by an industry or ﬁnal user. The linking with
international trade data, which is product-based, and with factor use,
which is industry-based, can be naturally made in an SUT framework.7
Ideally, we would like to use ofﬁcial data on the destination of
imported goods and services. However, in most countries these ﬂows
are not tracked by statistical agencies. Nevertheless, for imports, most
do publish an input-output table constructed with the import proportionality assumption, applying a product’s economy-wide import share
for all use categories. For the United States, researchers have found that
this assumption can be rather misleading, in particular at the industry
level (Feenstra and Jensen 2012; Strassner, Yuskavage, and Lee 2009).
Therefore, we are not using the ofﬁcial import matrices but instead use
detailed trade data to make a split. Our basic data are the bilateral import
ﬂows of all countries covered in WIOD from all partners in the world
at the HS6-digit product level, taken from the UN Comtrade database.
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Based on the detailed description, products are allocated to three use
categories: 1) intermediates, 2) ﬁnal consumption, and 3) investment,
effectively extending the UN Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classiﬁcation. We ﬁnd that import proportions differ widely across use categories and, importantly, also across country of origin. For example,
imports by the Czech car industry from Germany contain a much higher
share of intermediates than imports from Japan. This type of information is reﬂected in our WIOT by using detailed bilateral trade data. The
domestic use matrix is derived as total use minus imports.
Another novel element in the WIOT is the use of data on trade in
services. As yet, no standardized database on bilateral service ﬂows
exists. These ﬂows have been collected from various sources—including the OECD, Eurostat, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
the World Trade Organization (WTO)—checked for consistency, and
integrated into a bilateral service trade database.
Clearly, the validity of the ﬁndings in this chapter relies heavily
on the quality of the databases used. The WIOD has been constructed
with the aim of making maximum use of the publicly available data
on national input-output tables, international trade statistics, and production factor incomes. In the process of consolidating these separate
databases, inconsistencies have been found and compromises made to
arrive at an internally consistent world input-output table. For example,
the well-known inconsistency between mirror trade ﬂows in the UN
Comtrade data was resolved by focusing on import ﬂows only. Other
issues relate to reexports of goods and trade in services that are not
very well reﬂected in today’s trade statistics. It is clear that presentday statistical systems are lagging behind the developments in today’s
world. In particular, trade in services and intangibles such as royalties
and licences are still poorly reﬂected (see, e.g., Feenstra et al. [2010];
Houseman and Ryder [2010]). This should have priority in the future
development of international trade statistics.
Factor Input Requirements
For factor input requirements, we collected country-speciﬁc data
on detailed labor and capital inputs. This includes data on hours worked
and on compensation for three labor types, as well as data on capital
stocks and compensation. Labor types are distinguished on the basis
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of educational attainment levels, as deﬁned in the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (ISCED) (low-skilled: ISCED 1 + 2;
medium-skilled: ISCED 3 + 4; and high-skilled: ISCED 5 + 6). These
series are not part of the core set of national accounts statistics reported
by NSIs, and additional material has been collected from employment
and labor force statistics. For each country covered, we chose what we
considered the best statistical source for consistent wage and employment data at the industry level. In most countries, this was the labor
force survey (LFS). In most cases this needed to be combined with
an earnings survey, as information on wages is often not included in
the LFS. In other instances, an establishment survey or social security database was used. Care has been taken to arrive at series that are
time-consistent, as most employment surveys are not designed to track
developments over time, and breaks in methodology or coverage frequently occur.
Labor compensation of self-employed persons is not registered in
the National Accounts, which, as emphasised by Krueger (1999), leads
to an understatement of labor’s share. This is particularly important
for less advanced economies, which typically feature a large share of
self-employed workers in industries like agriculture, trade, business,
and personal services. We make an imputation by assuming that the
compensation per hour of self-employment is equal to the compensation per hour of employees. For most advanced countries, labor data
is constructed by extending and updating the EU KLEMS database
(www.euklems.net) using the methodologies, data sources, and concepts described in O’Mahony and Timmer (2009). For other countries
additional data has been collected according to the same principles.
Capital compensation is derived as gross value-added minus labor
compensation, as deﬁned above. It is the gross compensation for capital, including proﬁts and depreciation allowances. Being a residual
measure, it is the remuneration for capital in the broadest sense, including tangible capital (such as machinery and buildings), intangible (such
as research and development [R&D], software, database development,
branding, and organizational capital), mineral resources, land, and
ﬁnancial capital.
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TRENDS IN GVC INCOMES OF MANUFACTURES
In this section, we explore trends in the distributions of value in
global production chains using the decompositions introduced in Section Two. We decompose global expenditure on manufacturing products into compensation for factor services that are directly or indirectly
needed in the production of these products. Throughout the chapter we
use the phrase “global manufacturing” to indicate the set of all production activities directly or indirectly needed in producing ﬁnal manufacturing goods. Note that this includes not only activities in the manufacturing sector but also production activities in all other sectors, such as
agriculture, utilities, business services, and so on, that provide inputs in
any stage of the production process. Next, we deﬁne “GVC income” as
the income of all production factors that have been directly and indirectly used in the production of ﬁnal manufacturing goods. World GVC
income is the GVC income summed over all countries; it will be equal
to world expenditure on manufacturing goods as we model all regions
in the world in our empirical analysis. By deﬁnition, any dollar spent
on ﬁnal goods must end up as income for production factors somewhere
in the world.
The share of a country in world GVC income is a novel indicator of
the competitive strength of a nation. Compared to traditional competitiveness indicators like a country’s share in world exports, it has three
advantages. First, it indicates to what extent a country can compete
with other nations in terms of activities related to global manufacturing, rather than competing in manufacturing products as measured by
exports. Second, it is a reﬂection of an economy’s strength to compete
in both domestic and global markets. Countries might gain income by
serving foreign demand, but might at the same time lose income in
production for the domestic market. The income share of a country in
global manufacturing measures the combined net effect. Third, income
and employment effects of trade in tasks for separate groups of workers
(such as low- and high-skilled) can also be determined in the same uniﬁed framework, as shown later on.
Throughout the chapter we will focus on GVC income in the production of ﬁnal manufacturing goods. We denote these goods by the
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term “manufactures.” Production systems of manufactures are highly
prone to international fragmentation, as activities have a high degree
of international contestability: They can be undertaken in any country with little variation in quality. It is important to note that GVCs of
manufactures do not coincide with all activities in the manufacturing
sector; neither do they coincide with all activities that are internationally contestable. Some activities in the manufacturing sector are geared
toward production of intermediates for ﬁnal nonmanufacturing products and are not part of GVCs of manufactures. On the other hand,
GVCs of manufactures also include value-added outside the manufacturing sector (such as business services, transport, and communication
and ﬁnance) and value-added in raw materials production. These indirect contributions will be explicitly accounted for through the modeling
of input-output linkages across sectors.
Ideally, to measure competitiveness one would like to cover valueadded in all activities that are internationally contestable, and not only
those in the production of manufactures.8 GVCs of services cannot be
analyzed, however, as the level of observation for services in our data
is not ﬁne enough to zoom in on those services that are heavily traded,
such as consultancy services. The lowest level of detail in the WIOD
is “business services,” which for the most part contains activities that
are not internationally traded, and hence are much less interesting to
analyze from a GVC perspective. This is all the more true for other
services, such as personal or retail services. They require a physical
interaction between the buyer and the provider of the service, and a
major part of the value-added in these chains is effectively not internationally contestable. More detailed data on trade in, and production of,
services is needed before meaningful GVC analyses of ﬁnal services
can be made.
GVC Incomes of Manufactures
Figure 5.2, Panel A, provides a comparison of the GVC incomes in
advanced and emerging regions in the production of ﬁnal manufacturing goods. The GVC income share of advanced countries (East Asia
plus the United States, Canada, Australia, and the EU15) has declined
from almost three-quarters in 1995 to just above half of world GVC
income today. Emerging regions have rapidly increased their shares,
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and almost all of this increase was realized after 2003. Since 2004 the
increase in the GVC income of emerging countries has always been
higher than that of advanced countries, reaching a peak in 2008 at a
time when advanced countries’ GVC income stalled. The drop in the
crisis year of 2009 was large for all countries, but recovery occurred
much faster in the emerging economies (Figure 5.2, Panel B).
One might hypothesize that shifts in the composition of global manufacturing demand in terms of the type of products being demanded
might also be a determinant of the decline of the advanced nations in
global manufacturing production. However, the product structure of
global demand remained stable over the period 1995 to 2009. Following Engel’s law, the expenditure shares of food and other nondurable
goods, such as apparel, shoes, furniture, and toys, were on a long-term
declining trend. Expenditure on machinery and transport equipment was
relatively stable, around 16 percent of the total, as increasing consumer
and investment demand from emerging markets was counteracted by
declining demand from mature economies. Also, demand for electrical
machinery was stagnant in the long run. The only clear upward trend
is found for chemical products—including gasoline, cosmetics, and
medicines—demand for which has steadily increased around the world,
going from 12 percent of global manufacturing expenditures in 1995
to 15 percent in 2008. But these global demand shifts are too small
to account for the decline in advanced nations’ GVC income. Instead,
this decline is due to losses in the amount of value-added in each product’s GVC. This will be analyzed in more detail in the remainder of this
section.
In Figure 5.3 we show the shares of regions in world GVC income
in the production of manufactures for the period from 1995 to 2011.
The ﬁgure plots measures for ﬁve groups of countries: 1) members of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Canada, Mexico,
and the United States); 2) the European Union (EU), consisting of the
27 EU member states; 3) East Asia, consisting of Japan, South Korea,
and Taiwan; 4) China; and 5) BRIIAT, which includes Brazil, Russia,
India, Indonesia, Australia, and Turkey. In Table 5.3, additional data
for 20 major individual economies can be found for 1995 and 2008. It
should be kept in mind that international competition is not a zero-sum
game, and declining shares in global GVC do not necessarily mean an
absolute decline in GVC income in a region. On the contrary, in real
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Figure 5.2 GVC Incomes in Advanced and Emerging Countries, All
Manufactures, 1995–2011
Panel A: Shares in world GVC income
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terms, world GVC income on manufactures (deﬂated by the U.S. Consumer Price Index) rose by about one-third over the period 1995–2008.
Figure 5.3 illustrates that the share of the NAFTA countries in world
GVC income increased during the ICT bubble years, climbing as high
as 30 percent, at which point their share was even higher than that of
the EU. But it rapidly declined after 2001, reaching a low of 20 percent in 2008. The decline of the advanced nations taken as a whole
is particularly due to the demise of East Asia, whose share has been
dropping rapidly since the mid-1990s. While the shares of South Korea
and Taiwan are still increasing, the GVC income share of Japan has
been declining precipitously. In contrast, the EU’s GVC income share
has been relatively stable, only declining slowly over the period from
1995 to 2008. France, Italy, and the United Kingdom slowly lost some
shares. The German share dropped rapidly in the latter 1990s but stabilized afterwards. These drops were compensated for by increasing
shares for other EU countries, in particular the new member states. As is
well known, the aftermath of the global ﬁnancial crisis hit Europe par-
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Figure 5.2 (continued)
Panel B: Annual change (in billions of 1995 US$)
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NOTE: “Advanced” nations include the EU15, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Canada, and the United States. “Emerging” nations include all other countries in the
world. National currencies have been converted to U.S. dollars with ofﬁcial exchange
rates, deﬂated to 1995 prices with the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI). World GVC
income is equal to world expenditures on manufacturing products at basic prices.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database. Series updated
to 2011 in April 2012.

ticularly hard, and its share dropped sharply, from 32 percent in 2003
to 24 percent in 2011. On the ﬂip side, the share of other regions in the
world rapidly increased. China is mainly responsible for the increase
of the emerging countries’ share, because its share accelerated after its
ascension to the WTO in 2000. In 2007 it overtook East Asia in terms
of share. In 2009 the Chinese GVC income share overtook that of the
combined countries of BRIIAT. And in 2011 its share was almost equal
to that of the NAFTA region.9
One might argue that these shifts in regional GVC income shares
are unsurprising, given the faster growth of China and other emerg-
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Figure 5.3 Regional Shares in World GVC Income, All Manufactures,
1995–2011 (%)
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NOTE: Figure shows value-added by regions in the production of ﬁnal manufacturing goods. “East Asia” includes Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. “BRIIAT” includes
Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, Australia, and Turkey. “EU27” includes all countries
that have joined the European Union. “NAFTA” includes Canada, Mexico, and the
United States. Shares do not add up to 100 percent, as the remainder is the share of all
other countries in the world.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012,
updated to 2011.

ing economies vis-à-vis advanced regions. Higher consumption in the
home economy would naturally lead to higher GVC incomes. But this is
only true to the extent that demand for manufactures has a strong home
production bias—that is, a bias mainly geared toward goods with a high
level of domestic value-added. Given the high tradability of manufacturing goods, this home bias is not obvious, however. Increased Chinese
demand for, say, chemicals or electronic equipment can be as easily
served by imports as by Chinese domestic production. And in the latter case, a sizable share could still be captured by advanced countries
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Table 5.3 Real GVC Income, All Manufactures (in billions of 1995 US$)
Country
1995
2008
Change
Advanced nations
United States
1,312
1,373
62
Japan
1,154
676
−478
Germany
618
664
46
France
292
330
37
United Kingdom
254
260
6
Italy
289
353
64
Spain
126
171
44
Canada
124
190
66
Australia
68
112
45
South Korea
142
157
15
Netherlands
94
119
25
Other 10 advanced
390
459
69
Total 2l advanced
4,863
4,864
1
Emerging nations
China
277
1,114
837
Russian Federation
80
246
166
Brazil
164
265
101
India
114
229
115
Mexico
99
208
109
Turkey
73
122
49
Indonesia
83
113
30
Poland
33
86
52
Czech Republic
14
41
27
Rest of world
786
1,396
610
Total emerging countries
1,723
3,820
2,097
World
6,586
8,684
2,098
NOTE: Real GVC indicates the value-added in countries to global output of ﬁnal manufactures. It includes all manufactures and is in constant 1995 prices using the U.S.
Consumer Price Index (CPI) as the deﬂator. Some numbers in “Change” column may
be off by 1 because of rounding.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.

through the delivery of key intermediate inputs and services. The occurrence of falling shares in global GVC income for advanced regions in
Figure 5.2 indicates that these regions failed to capture a large part of
the value of the increased market for manufacturing goods in emerging
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economies. At the same time, the domestic value-added content of their
own production declined. Both trends can be interpreted as a loss of
competitiveness.
A number of caveats are in order. Shares in world GVC income
are expressed in U.S. dollars using current exchange rates. For income
changes over time, we deﬂate incomes in U.S. dollars to the 1995 U.S.
dollar value using the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI). Exchange
rates have ﬂuctuated over the period considered: The dollar-to-euro
rate10 declined sharply over 1995–2001, followed by a steep rise, which
by 2007 had returned it to near its 1995 value. The yen-to-dollar rate
ﬂuctuated around a long-term constant for this period. The yuan-todollar rate was effectively constant over this period, slightly appreciating at the end of the 2000s. The choice of the U.S. dollar as numéraire
has no impact on the GVC income measure of a country relative to
other countries. For example, expressing GVC income shares in yen or
euros would give identical results. But it will affect the absolute levels
of GVC incomes and hence comparisons over time within a country.
Second, one has to keep in mind that the location where the value is
being added is not necessarily identical to where the generated income
will eventually end up. The building of global production chains is not
only through arms-length trade in intermediate inputs; it also involves
sizable ﬂows of investment, and part of the value-added in emerging
regions will accrue as income to multinational ﬁrms headquartered in
advanced regions through the ownership of capital. What is needed is to
analyze capital income on a national rather than a domestic basis, as this
chapter does in its data on foreign ownership. This type of information
is notoriously hard to acquire, not least because of the notional relocation of proﬁts for tax accounting purposes. Hence, further research
is needed in this area (Baldwin and Kimura 1998; Lipsey 2010). The
decline in East Asian GVC income is likely overestimated, as it is
also related to the offshoring of activities to China, which effectively
became the assembly place of East Asia. Income earned by East Asian
capital is allocated to the place of production (in this case China) and
not by ownership, as discussed in Section Two. This difference is probably larger for East Asian countries than for NAFTA or the EU, which
have larger FDI ﬂows within the region, so that they net out in regional
aggregate numbers.
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The Role of Domestic and Foreign Demand
By splitting the ﬁnal demand vector in the decomposition given in
Equation (5.2), we can analyze the importance of domestic versus foreign ﬁnal demand in the generation of GVC income in a country. The
GVC income due to foreign demand is identical to what Johnson and
Noguera (2012) refer to as “exports of value-added.”11 Table 5.4 provides the share of GVC income of manufactures due to foreign demand
for 20 major economies in the world. The overriding conclusion is that
all countries have become increasingly dependent on foreign demand
Table 5.4 Percentage of Real GVC Income Due to Foreign Demand, All
Manufactures
Country
1995
2008
Change
Advanced nations
United States
25.9
33.0
7.1
Japan
24.6
41.8
17.2
Germany
46.3
69.9
23.6
France
53.1
60.0
7.0
United Kingdom
52.6
68.5
15.8
Italy
45.2
52.8
7.6
Spain
39.1
53.3
14.2
Canada
65.8
65.8
0.0
Australia
43.9
55.3
11.3
South Korea
45.2
67.8
22.6
Netherlands
79.3
87.8
8.5
Emerging nations
China
35.3
48.7
13.5
Russian Federation
42.6
47.3
4.7
Brazil
15.7
26.0
10.3
India
17.7
29.3
11.6
Mexico
32.9
36.5
3.5
Turkey
22.5
35.3
12.8
Indonesia
28.5
38.7
10.2
Poland
42.7
63.0
20.3
NOTE: Numbers represent real GVC income for all manufactures and in constant 1995
prices using the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI) as a deﬂator. Some numbers in the
“Change” column may be off by 0.1 because of rounding.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.
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to generate GVC income of manufactures, with the exception of Canada. For all major mature economies, increases in foreign demand have
been a necessary spur for slow or even negative growth in their valueadded shares in domestic demand. Domestic demand was not a source
of growth in the United States, and it contributed strongly to negative
growth in Japan, as import substitution took place against a backdrop of
stagnating domestic demand. The direction of this trend for advanced
countries was to be expected, as the income elasticity of demand for
manufactures is low, and in most countries domestic demand is increasingly served through imports with high foreign value-added. But this
domestic decline was more than counteracted by a rapid increase in
exports of value-added. The most extreme example of this shift toward
foreign demand dependence is to be found in Germany, given the large
size of its domestic market. In 1995, 46 percent of its GVC income
was due to foreign ﬁnal demand, and by 2008 this had increased to 70
percent. Also, dependence upon foreign demand in Japan, South Korea,
Spain, and the United Kingdom rapidly increased over this period.
For emerging economies, changes in foreign demand have been
important, but they also have strongly beneﬁted from growth in domestic expenditure on manufacturing. In China, the share of GVC income
due to foreign demand increased from 35 percent to 49 percent—which
is high, but not outstanding when compared to that of countries of comparable size such as Japan or Germany. The share of foreign demand in
Mexico and Russia did barely increase over this period; also, the share
for India, while growing, is still at a relatively low level, indicating that
the integration of these major emerging economies into world markets
is still limited.
Sectoral Origin of GVC Income of Manufactures
The production of manufacturing goods involves a wide variety of
activities, which do not take place only in the manufacturing sector.
Using the decomposition technique outlined above, one can trace not
only the country but also the sector in which value is added during the
production process. Typically, the value that is added through activities
in the manufacturing sector itself is around half the basic price value
of a good, and declines over time. In Table 5.5 we provide for each
country the share of a sector in the total value added by the country in

Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb 144

2/16/2015 8:39:35 AM

Incomes and Jobs in Global Production of Manufactures 145
Table 5.5 Sectoral Shares in Total GVC Income, All Manufactures (% of
total)
Natural resources Manufacturing
Services
Country
1995
2008
1995
2008
1995
2008
Advanced
United States
0.06
0.09
0.56
0.52
0.38
0.39
Japan
0.04
0.03
0.65
0.62
0.31
0.35
Germany
0.03
0.02
0.61
0.56
0.36
0.42
France
0.07
0.04
0.48
0.45
0.46
0.51
United Kingdom
0.07
0.07
0.60
0.48
0.34
0.45
Italy
0.05
0.03
0.57
0.52
0.38
0.44
Spain
0.09
0.05
0.54
0.51
0.37
0.43
Canada
0.12
0.19
0.54
0.44
0.34
0.37
Australia
0.20
0.26
0.42
0.34
0.37
0.39
South Korea
0.10
0.04
0.62
0.67
0.28
0.29
Netherlands
0.11
0.12
0.49
0.42
0.40
0.45
Emerging
China
0.21
0.17
0.58
0.57
0.22
0.26
Russian Federation 0.20
0.21
0.42
0.39
0.38
0.40
Brazil
0.13
0.17
0.55
0.46
0.32
0.37
India
0.22
0.18
0.42
0.41
0.35
0.40
Mexico
0.21
0.22
0.49
0.49
0.30
0.29
Turkey
0.09
0.13
0.64
0.52
0.27
0.36
Indonesia
0.22
0.30
0.61
0.54
0.18
0.16
Poland
0.15
0.10
0.53
0.49
0.32
0.42
NOTE: The numbers represent the share of that sector in total value-added by a country’s production of ﬁnal manufacturing products. “Natural resource” includes the
agriculture and mining industries (ISIC Rev. 3 industries A to C), “manufacturing”
includes all manufacturing industries (D), and “services” all other industries (E to Q).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.

global manufacturing expenditure. This is done for 20 major economies in 1995 and 2008, distinguishing between three broad sectors: 1)
natural resources, including the agriculture and mining industries (ISIC
Rev. 3 industries A to C), 2) manufacturing, including all manufacturing
industries (D), and 3) services including all other industries (E to Q).
The table shows that the share of manufacturing has declined between
1995 and 2008 in all countries except South Korea and Mexico. The
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unweighted average share across all 20 countries declined from 54 percent to 50 percent. This partly reﬂects a shift away from traditional
manufacturing activities, such as those carried out by blue-collar
production workers, but also the outsourcing of white-collar activities by manufacturing ﬁrms to domestic services ﬁrms. Contributions
from the natural resources sector are high and have increased over the
1995–2008 period in countries such as Australia, Canada, Indonesia,
Mexico, Russia,12 and Turkey. This pattern of value-added suggests that
for resource-abundant countries, activities within manufacturing production networks are reinforcing their comparative advantage. Given
India’s low level of development, services contribute relatively much
in that country, reﬂecting its well-developed business services sector,
which delivers intermediate services to both domestic and foreign manufacturing ﬁrms. In China, the share of natural resources is declining,
and activities in the services sector are starting to contribute more, but
the level is still well below the contributions of services in Europe and
the United States.

GVC INCOME OF MANUFACTURES BY
PRODUCTION FACTOR
Our income data on labor and capital allow us to study which production factors have beneﬁted from the changes in the regional distribution of global value-added. Increasing trade and integration of world
markets have been related to increasing unemployment and stagnating relative wages of low- and medium-skilled workers in developed
regions. On the other hand, those factors have offered new opportunities
in developing regions for countries to employ their large supply of lowskilled workers. To study these trends, we decomposed value-added
into four parts: 1) income for capital and income for labor, further split
into 2) low-, 3) medium- and 4) high-skilled labor. High-skilled labor
is deﬁned as workers with a college degree or above. Medium-skilled
workers have secondary schooling or above, including professional
qualiﬁcations but below a college degree, and low-skilled have below
secondary schooling. An estimate for the income of self-employed
workers is included in labor compensation. The income for capital is
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the amount of value-added that remains after subtracting labor compensation. It is the gross compensation for capital, including proﬁts and
depreciation allowances. As a residual measure, it is the remuneration
for capital in the broadest sense, including tangible, intangible, mineral
resources, land, and ﬁnancial capital.
In Figure 5.4 and Table 5.6 we provide a breakdown of GVC income
by labor and capital for major regions. This is a breakdown of the GVC
income discussed in the previous section, “Trends in Manufactures’
GVC Incomes.” At the global level, the share of GVC income that goes
to labor is coming down, while the share of capital is increasing. In
all regions, the compensation for capital is increasing relative to labor.
Particularly in emerging regions, this increase is important and occurs
faster than the labor income increase. This might be related to the low
wage/rental ratios in these regions, which are still characterized by an
abundant surplus of low-skilled workers from agricultural and informal
urban sectors. In advanced regions, the increasing importance of capital
might be a reﬂection of the increased investment in so-called intangible assets, which are becoming increasingly important for growth in
advanced nations (Corrado and Hulten 2010).
It is important to note that the share captured by capital in emerging markets is known to be overestimated. Our approach is based on
domestic production accounting for the location of the production factor and is silent on the ownership, as discussed before. In the case of
labor income, this is unproblematic, since for most countries crossborder labor migration is relatively minor. Hence, labor income paid
out in a particular country mostly beneﬁts the workers of the country in
which production takes place.
Worldwide, medium- and low-skilled workers are losing out to
high-skilled workers, as the latter’s share of GVC income is increasing. As expected, GVC income for low-skilled workers has increased
strongly in China and in other emerging economies while declining in
the advanced regions. In the United States and East Asia, the decline was
particularly pronounced for medium-skilled workers. Within Europe,
medium-skilled workers in Germany lost the biggest share, and in other
European countries the income share going to low-skilled workers also
declined. Income for high-skilled workers related to global manufacturing went up in most EU countries. This is not simply the result of a
strong supply of higher-skilled labor replacing medium-skilled workers
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Figure 5.4 GVC Income by Production Factor (in millions of 1995 US$),
Change between 1995 and 2008
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NOTE: Figure shows factor income earned by high-skilled labor and capital (HS + K) and
by medium- and low-skilled labor (MS + LS). “EU27” includes all countries in the European Union. “BRIIMT” includes Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012,
updated to 2011.
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Table 5.6 GVC Income by Production Factor and Region (shares in
world GVC income)
Value-added
Value-added
by labor
by capital
Value-added total
1995
2008
1995
2008
1995
2008
EU27
21.5
18.9
9.7
9.8
31.2
28.7
United States
12.8
9.5
7.4
6.7
20.2
16.2
East Asia
12.9
6.1
8.1
4.6
21.0
10.7
China
2.0
5.2
2.1
7.8
4.2
13.0
BRIIMT
4.1
6.1
5.1
7.4
9.3
13.5
Other
6.4
7.3
7.9
10.6
14.3
17.9
World
Advanced
Emerging

EU27
United States
East Asia
China
BRIIMT
Other
World
Advanced
Emerging

59.7
47.1
12.6

53.1
34.4
18.8

Value-added by
high-skilled
1995
2008
4.8
6.0
4.3
4.1
3.2
2.1
0.1
0.4
0.8
1.4
0.8
1.5
14.0
12.4
1.6

15.5
12.2
3.3

40.3
25.5
14.9

46.9
21.2
25.7

Value-added by
medium-skilled
1995
2008
10.0
8.9
7.4
4.9
7.2
3.3
0.7
1.8
1.7
3.0
2.3
2.9
29.1
24.8
4.3

24.8
17.2
7.6

100.0
72.6
27.4

100.0
55.5
44.5

Value-added by
low-skilled
1995
2008
6.6
4.0
1.1
0.5
2.5
0.6
1.3
3.0
1.7
1.7
3.4
3.0
16.6
10.0
6.6

12.8
5.0
7.8

NOTE: “East Asia” includes Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. “EU27” designates the
countries that had joined the EU as of January 1, 2013. “BRIIMT” includes Brazil,
Russia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey. “Other” is the rest of the world. Skill
categories classify workers by their educational attainment levels. World income is
equal to world expenditures on manufacturing products at basic prices. Some numbers
may not sum to total because of rounding.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.
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but essentially carrying out the same activities; if this were the case, the
wages for high-skilled workers should have dropped and the increase
in GVC income for high-skilled workers would be limited. However,
relative wages for high-skilled workers did not show this pattern (see
Timmer et al. 2013).

GVC JOBS IN MANUFACTURES
Many policy concerns surrounding globalization issues are ultimately about jobs—good jobs in particular. The disappearance of
manufacturing jobs in advanced nations is occasionally linked to production fragmentation and the associated offshoring of activities; see
Bardhan, Jaffee, and Kroll (2013) for an overview. It is thus useful to
look at the structure of employment in global value chains and analyze the changes in the characteristics of workers directly and indirectly
involved in the production of manufacturing goods—in short, GVC
jobs in manufactures.13 For each country, we will measure the number of workers involved in the domestic territory. As the mobility of
labor is much lower than that of capital, GVC jobs will be closer to a
national concept than GVC income. We will characterize GVC workers by sector of employment and level of skills. In the next subsection,
“The Shift toward Service Jobs in GVCs of Manufactures,” we show
that only about half of the workers in manufacturing GVCs are actually
employed in the manufacturing sector. The other half are employed in
nonmanufacturing industries delivering intermediates, and this share is
growing. In most countries, GVC job increase in services is even higher
than job loss in manufacturing. In the subsection titled “Specialization
in High-Skilled Activities in Advanced Countries,” on p. 154, we analyze the skill structure of GVC workers and ﬁnd that there has been a
shift away from low-skilled toward high-skilled workers for advanced
nations. This increase is faster than the trend in the overall economy,
suggesting increased specialization of advanced countries in GVC
activities performed by high-skilled workers. This is in line with broad
Heckscher-Ohlin predictions of which countries will see a comparative
advantage when possibilities for international production fragmentation
increase.
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The Shift Toward Service Jobs in GVCs of Manufactures
By using the number of workers rather than value-added per unit
of output in each industry-country as the requirement vector in Equation (5.1), we can trace the number of workers directly and indirectly
involved in the production of manufacturing goods, and their sector of
employment. Developments in the 20 main countries over the period
from 1995 to 2008 are shown in Table 5.7. The ﬁrst two columns indicate the share of manufacturing GVC workers as a percentage of the
overall workforce in the economy. In the next columns the sectoral
structure of employment of these workers is shown. Three sectors are
considered—1) agriculture, 2) manufacturing and 3) services (which
also include mining, construction, and utilities)—followed by a fourth
column for “All sectors.” The ﬁrst set of four columns refers to the
absolute number of GVC workers by sector in 2008, while the latter set
of four columns refers to the change over the period 1995–2008. Two
main facts clearly stand out:
1) The declining importance of global production of manufactures for overall employment in most advanced nations
2) The strong shift in the sector of employment of these workers
away from the manufacturing sector toward the services sector
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 5.7 show the decline in importance
of GVCs of manufactures in providing jobs in the economies of all
countries except China and Turkey. The job losses in Japan and the
United States are major, around 2.9 and 4.6 million, respectively. Also,
job loss in the United Kingdom stands out, as more than 1.6 million
GVC jobs disappeared in that country alone. The only exception to this
trend in advanced countries is Germany: In 2008, 26 percent of German
employment was involved in the global production of manufactures,
which is the highest share across all advanced countries.
Another important ﬁnding on the basis of Table 5.7 is the strong
shift toward service jobs in the global production of manufactures since
1995. Faster growth (or slower declines) in service jobs than in manufacturing can be seen in all major advanced countries. As a result, in
2008, the manufacturing sector accounted for about half of the total
number of GVC jobs in manufactures in advanced countries. The other
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GVC workers in
manufactures, as
share of all workers
in the economy (%)
1995
2008
Advanced
United States
Japan
Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Spain
Canada
Australia
South Korea
Netherlands
Emerging
China
Russian
Federation
Brazil
India
Mexico

GVC workers in manufactures in 2008
(in thousands), employed in
Agriculture

Manufacturing
Services All sectors

Change in GVC workers in
manufactures between 1995 and 2008
(in thousands), employed in
Agriculture

Manufacturing
Services All sectors

16.0
22.6
26.8
22.0
20.1
29.1
23.2
20.8
18.2
29.7
22.8

11.1
19.4
26.4
18.7
12.6
25.5
17.5
16.0
14.5
22.8
19.0

1,143
1,298
400
303
115
333
271
157
165
655
89

8,837
6,491
5,481
2,195
1,946
3,553
1,827
1,138
641
2,646
643

6,892
4,417
4,766
2,355
1,931
2,559
1,494
1,482
855
2,077
929

16,872
12,207
10,647
4,853
3,992
6,444
3,592
2,777
1,661
5,378
1,661

−331
−794
−161
−96
−128
−192
−97
−102
−48
−468
−42

−3,144
−2,225
−666
−423
−1,148
−234
185
−136
3
−735
−87

−1,138
148
1,388
368
−347
517
353
193
196
524
158

−4,612
−2,871
561
−151
−1,624
91
440
−45
150
−679
29

31.7
24.7

33.3
21.9

121,342
4,259

87,568
6,749

49,468
6,228

258,378
17,237

9,963
−1,403

20,508
−2,120

11,965
2,198

42,436
−1,325

29.6
27.9
30.3

28.7
27.3
24.4

8,347
57,926
2,817

9,490
41,933
6,128

9,823
26,483
3,205

27,660
126,343
12,150

−705
2,118
−400

2,450
10,896
1,403

4,118
7,025
1,121

5,863
20,039
2,124
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Turkey
Indonesia
Poland
Czech Republic

27.1
32.1
31.0
30.8

30.4
25.6
28.8
30.9

1,778
13,921
917
93

3,115
7,427
2,278
990

1,554
5,725
1,347
553

6,446
27,073
4,542
1,636

−341
−1,899
−468
−59

620
−425
81
74

584
1,380
368
35

863
−944
−19
50

NOTE: GVC workers are workers directly or indirectly involved in the production of manufacturing goods. Columns 3 through 6 indicate
the total number of GVC workers by sector in 2008; columns 7 through 10 indicate the change in the number of GVC workers by sector
between 1995 and 2008. The last column shows the change in the total number of workers in the economy for that period. Some numbers
in the “All sectors” columns may be off by 1 because of rounding.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.
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half of those jobs are found in agriculture and even more so in services—
workers who are involved in the production of intermediate goods and
services used in the manufacturing process. These ﬁndings testify to the
increasing intertwining of manufacturing and service activities.
Following Baumol’s cost disease hypothesis, one might argue that
this shift in the sectoral distribution of the GVC jobs might be interpreted as the result of differential productivity growth in manufacturing
and services. But while there is clear evidence that productivity growth
in manufacturing is higher than in services overall, this does not necessarily hold for the service activities in GVCs of manufactures. These
only form a subset of the services sector, and they involve in particular
intermediate services such as wholesaling, transportation, ﬁnance, and
several business services.14 These activities are generally open for international competition and likely to have much higher rates of innovation
and productivity growth than service activities for domestic demand,
which are dominated by personal services, education, health, and public administration. Hence, it seems more likely that our ﬁndings are
indicative of a fundamental shift in the type of activities carried out by
advanced countries in the global production of manufactures—a shift
away from blue-collar manufacturing to white-collar service activities.
This hypothesis is conﬁrmed when one analyzes the skill content of
GVC jobs, as is done in the next subsection.
In the major emerging economies, most of the jobs are still added
in the manufacturing sector, as is to be expected. For China, India,
Mexico, and Turkey, job increases in manufacturing outnumber those
in the services sector. In Brazil, however, services job growth appears
to be more important. Even more strongly, in Indonesia and Russia the
number of jobs in the production of manufactures has declined. These
countries actually lost jobs overall for the period 1995–2008 and seem
to have entered a premature deindustrialization phase.
Specialization in High-Skilled Activities in Advanced Countries
In a world with international production fragmentation, the broad
Heckscher-Ohlin predictions will still hold: Countries will carry out
activities for which local value-added content is relatively intensive
amongst their abundant factors. In fact, increased opportunities for international production fragmentation may have the tendency to magnify
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the comparative advantage of countries, as suggested by Baldwin and
Evenett (2012). A simple example will illustrate. Assume two goods, A
and B, which are both produced with two activities: a low-skilled (LS)
and a high-skilled (HS) activity. Before unbundling, Goods A and B are
bundles of production activities with different skill intensities. Assume
that Good A is on average more skill-intensive than Good B, as the HS
activity is more important in the production of A than of B. A relatively
skill-abundant country would specialize in the production of A, and
a skill-scarce country in the production of B. After unbundling, each
nation specializes in speciﬁc production activities. The skill-abundant
country will specialize in the HS activities in the production of both
goods, and the skill-scarce country in the LS activities for those goods.
As a result, the potential range of comparative advantages across countries in activities will be greater than in the ﬁnal products (see, e.g.,
Deardorff [2001]).15
To test this prediction, we analyze the number of workers by skill
type needed in GVCs of manufactures using Equation (5.1) in combination with a skill requirement vector. This vector is based on a characterization of workers in each industry and country by their observable educational attainment levels, as described in Section Three, “The World
Input-Output Database (WIOD).” This delivers the number of low- (LS),
medium- (MS) and high-skilled (HS) GVC workers for a particular
year. Results are given in Table 5.8. We ﬁnd that during 1995–2008, in
all advanced countries combined, the increase in high-skilled jobs was
4.6 million. Medium-skilled jobs declined by nearly 3.8 million, and
the drop in low-skilled jobs was even bigger—9.7 million. This pattern
of high-skilled jobs growing faster (or declining slower) than mediumand low-skilled jobs can be found for most countries. But there are
some regional differences. In the United States, employment in global
production of manufactures dropped for all workers, in particular the
medium-skilled. This is a well-known phenomenon that characterizes a
broader segment of the U.S. economy and has been extensively studied
(see, e.g., Autor [2010]). More surprising is the ﬁnding that the number
of high-skilled jobs has also declined. This is in stark contrast to Japan
and the major EU countries: There, less-skilled jobs also dwindled, but
this was at least in part compensated for by increasing opportunities for
high-skilled jobs.
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Table 5.8 Change in Number of Workers in Global Production of Final
Manufactures by Skill Type, 1995 and 2008 (in thousands)
Country
Low
Medium
High
Total
United States
−1,125
−3,286
−201
−4,612
Japan
−1,834
−1,399
361
−2,871
Germany
−168
115
614
561
France
−768
52
566
−151
United Kingdom
−1,236
−560
172
−1,624
Italy
−1,201
853
439
91
Spain
−507
391
556
440
Canada
−118
−105
177
−45
Australia
−84
141
94
150
South Korea
−1,110
−335
766
−679
Netherlands
−119
−54
202
29
Other 10 advanced
−1,441
425
840
−176
Total 21 advanced
−9,711
−3,762
4,587
−8,886
All other countries
56,214
64,370
19,393
139,977
World
46,503
60,607
23,981
131,091
NOTE: Figures represent changes in the number of workers (including both employees and self-employed) involved in global production of ﬁnal manufactures between
1995 and 2008, split into the number of low-skilled, medium-skilled, and high-skilled
workers based on educational attainment. Some numbers may be off by 1 because of
rounding.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.

CONCLUSION
A global-value-chain perspective has profound implications for how
one thinks of competitiveness and growth. It highlights the importance
of global production networks and the increasing interrelation of consumption, production, and income across national boundaries through
the trade of goods and services. Enhancing competitiveness and growth
is increasingly about capturing a larger share of global value chains—
in particular, of products for which global demand is growing (Porter 1990). This rise of global value chains (GVCs) is also posing new
challenges to analyses of international trade and measures of countries’
competitiveness.
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In this chapter, we take a macro perspective and analyze the valueadded of production for a wide set of manufacturing product groups.
This is done through a newly developed accounting method in which
we build upon an input-output modeling of the world economy in the
tradition of Leontief (1949). The novelty of our approach is that we
trace the value added by all labor and capital that is directly and indirectly used for the production of ﬁnal manufactures. We call this “GVC
income.” We also introduce the related concept of “GVC jobs,” which
connotes the number of jobs directly and indirectly needed in the production of ﬁnal goods. To measure GVC incomes and jobs for a wide
set of countries in the world, we use the global input-output tables and
supplementary labor accounts from the World Input-Output Database,
available at www.wiod.org and described in Timmer (2012).
The chapter presents new evidence on the main changes in GVC
income and jobs across both mature and developing countries. Taken
together, the results show that international fragmentation in the production of manufactures has been accompanied by a rapid shift toward
higher-skilled activities in advanced nations. These activities are
increasingly carried out in the services sector and no longer in the manufacturing sector itself. As such, the shift contributes to the so-called
job polarization in advanced economies, as the displaced manufacturing workers are likely to be absorbed into personal and distributional
services, where low-skilled employment opportunities are still growing
(Goos, Manning, and Salomons 2011). Emerging economies are taking
up increasing shares in global GVC income; much of this increase has
been driven by rapid growth in China after its accession to the WTO in
2001. We also ﬁnd increasing intertwining of manufacturing and services activities, which argues against a myopic view of manufacturing
jobs in discussions on GVC issues. Rather than focusing on the particular sector in which jobs are lost or created, the discussion should be led
by a view toward the activities that are carried out in GVCs, irrespective
of the sector in which they are ultimately classiﬁed. Thinking in terms
of sectors is basically a relic of a world where fragmentation of production, both domestically and internationally, had not progressed far.
Although the model to measure GVC income and jobs is relatively
straightforward, it is clear that the validity of the ﬁndings relies heavily
on the quality of the database used. The WIOD is a prototype database
developed mainly to provide a proof-of-concept, and it is up to the sta-
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tistical community to bring international input-output tables into the
realm of ofﬁcial statistics. The development work done by the OECD
(Ahmad, Chapter 6 of this volume) is certainly a step in the right direction. Various weak areas in data remain, particularly in the measurement
of trade in services and intangibles. In addition, because of the lack of
ﬁrm-level data matching national input-output tables, one currently has
to rely on the assumption that all ﬁrms in an industry have a similar
production structure. If various types of ﬁrms, in particular exporters,
have a different production technology and input sourcing structure
(i.e., they import larger shares), more detailed data might reveal a bias
in the results presented here. More information on the ownership of
capital income, which is currently measured on a domestic basis rather
than on a national basis, is also desirable. This is far from easy, though,
and in pursuing this line of investigation one needs to trace not only the
nationality of the ﬁrms involved but also the nationality of the ultimate
claimants of residual proﬁts.
Arguably the most important area where more study is needed is in
tracing where in the value chain the proﬁts from lead ﬁrms are realized,
as well as how these are recorded in the current statistical system. For
example, the product case studies by Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden
(2010), among others, suggest that the proﬁts made by the lead ﬁrms
in the chains can only be inferred by comparing the ﬁnal purchase and
exfactory prices of the product, which include the trade margins (see
also Gerefﬁ 1999). The use of brand names, software, knowledge systems, and other intangibles of the lead ﬁrm by other ﬁrms in the chain
is typically not compensated for by a direct money ﬂow from the users.
Rather, the compensation is realized indirectly through the ability of the
lead ﬁrm to have the exclusive right to sell the particular product with
a premium through its own (or through other tightly controlled) sales
channels. This indirect compensation takes place in value chains that
are completely within a multinational enterprise, but it also arises in
chains that are to a large extent organized through arm’s-length transactions. When the residual proﬁts are realized—in other words, when
manufacturing ﬁrms sell to ﬁnal consumers—this is picked up in our
GVC income measure. But alternative value-chain arrangements are
feasible.
One particular example is the existence of so-called factoryless
goods producers (FGPs), which are proliferating in the United States.
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These are ﬁrms that are manufacturer-like in that they perform many of
the tasks and activities found in manufacturing establishments themselves, except for the actual manufacturing production process. In the
current U.S. statistical system they are classiﬁed in wholesaling, and
their output is recorded as a wholesale margin rather than as manufacturing sales. The value-added of these ﬁrms should clearly be part of
GVC incomes of manufactures but are currently not picked up, since
GVC income is measured at basic prices, which means that trade and
transport margins associated with ﬁnal consumption are not included in
GVC incomes. This might bias downwards the total GVC income for
the United States compared to other countries to the extent that FGP
production is more prominent in this country than in other countries.
The scope for this bias is not particularly large, however. Bernard and
Fort (2013) suggest that reclassifying the FGPs to the manufacturing
sector would increase reported U.S. manufacturing output in 2007 by
about 5 percent in a conservative estimate and by a maximum of 17
percent using a more liberal set of assumptions. A deeper understanding of the workings of global value chains is clearly needed before our
measurement systems will adequately reﬂect all of their intricacies.

Notes
A draft version of this chapter was prepared for the conference “Measuring the Effects
of Globalization,” held February 28–March 1, 2013, in Washington, D.C., and organized by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. It is a spin-off from the
work done under the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) project, which was funded
by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Research and Innovation as
part of the Seventh Framework Programme, Theme 8: Socio-Economic Sciences and
Humanities, Grant Agreement No. 225 281. We gratefully acknowledge the helpful
comments we received from the conference participants and in particular from Susan
Houseman, Michael Mandel, Carol Corrado, Brad Jensen, and Robert Koopman.
1. Additional applications of the GVC income concept and analysis of fragmentation
can be found in Timmer et al. (2014) and Los, Timmer, and de Vries (2014).
2. This identity does not hold true at the country level, as countries can have current account imbalances driving a wedge between value-added produced and ﬁnal
consumption value.
3. See Miller and Blair (2009) for an introduction to input-output analysis.
4. Throughout the paper, we analyze ﬁnal expenditure, including private and government consumption, and investment.
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5. Variations of this approach are also used in the burgeoning literature on trade in
value-added, and our approach is related to the work by Koopman, Wang, and
Wei (2014) and in particular the work by Johnson and Noguera (2012). But rather
than using Leontief’s insight to analyze factor content of trade ﬂows, we focus on
analyses of global value distributions.
6. Final use includes consumption by households, government and nonproﬁt organizations, and gross capital formation.
7. Because industries also have secondary production, a simple mapping of industries and products is not feasible.
8. When considering all goods and services produced, the GVC income of a country
is equal to gross domestic product when ﬁnal demand for all goods and services
in the world economy are taken into account. Hence, for a meaningful analysis,
one has to limit the group of products, and we focus on those products for which
production processes are most fragmented and which can be analyzed with the
data at hand.
9. We do not show the value-added by the “Rest of the World,” consisting of all countries not covered individually in the world input-output database but for which an
estimate has been made as a group (see Section Three, “The World Input-Output
Database [WIOD]”). Its share in global GVC income rose from 14 percent in 1995
to 17 percent in 2008.
10. The euro was introduced in 2001. For the period before 2001, we are referring to
the Deutsche Mark.
11. Johnson and Noguera (2012) focused on foreign ﬁnal demand for all goods and
services, not only on ﬁnal manufactures as we do here.
12. The share of the natural resource sector in Russia is severely underestimated, since
part of the oil and gas production is classiﬁed under wholesale services rather than
under mining in the Russian national accounts. Adding the wholesale sector would
almost double the natural resource share in 2008.
13. We will use the term “jobs” instead of “number of workers” as shorthand. But the
underlying data pertains to number of workers rather than jobs. Ideally, one would
like to measure hours worked.
14. It should be noted that these numbers exclude any jobs involved in the retailing
of manufacturing goods, as we analyze ﬁnal demand at the basic price concept.
15. Following this traditional international trade theory, having a greater range of
comparative advantages across countries would generate higher welfare improvements from trade. These models are essentially comparative, static of nature, and
they disregard any dynamic effects. In the innovation and business literature, it
has been recently argued that the separation of high-skilled, innovative activities
in advanced countries from production in emerging economies will in the long run
lead to a decline of innovation activity. In this literature, the spillovers from manufacturing and innovation activities are central (see, e.g., Pisano and Shih [2012]).
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Measuring Trade in
Value-Added and Beyond
Nadim Ahmad
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Global value chains (GVCs) have become a dominant feature of
today’s global economy. This growing process of international fragmentation of production, driven by technological progress, cost, trade
policy reforms, and access to resources and markets, has challenged
the conventional wisdom on how we look at and interpret trade and,
in particular, the policies that we develop around it. Indeed, taken by
themselves, traditional measures of trade, which record gross ﬂows of
goods and services each and every time they cross borders, may lead
policymakers to make misguided decisions.
In practice, two main approaches (micro and macro) have been
used to shed light on this issue. The former is perhaps best characterized by the well-known Apple iPod example (Dedrick, Kraemer, and
Linden 2010), which showed that of the $144 factory-gate price of an
iPod dispatched from China, less than 10 percent represented Chinese
value-added, with the bulk of the components (costing about $100) being imported from Japan and much of the rest coming from the United
States and Korea.
But this stylized approach can generally only be conducted for speciﬁc products and, even then, only reveals part of the story related to
who beneﬁts from trade and how GVCs work, as it is typically unable to
reveal how the intermediate parts are created. For example, the message
would be signiﬁcantly different if, for sake of argument, the imported
parts from Japan used to make the iPod required signiﬁcant Chinese
content. To deal with the bigger picture and also to capture all of the
upstream effects, a number of studies have adopted a macro approach
based on the construction of intercountry or world input-output tables
(Daudin, Rifﬂart, and Schweisguth 2009; Hummels, Ishii, and Yi 2001;
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Johnson and Noguera 2012; Koopman et al. 2011). And a number of pioneering initiatives, such as those of the Global Trade Analysis Project
(GTAP), collaborative efforts between the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and the Institute of Developing Economies–Japan External
Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO), and the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), have helped accelerate improvements in the underlying
statistics used to construct the results.
But these studies and initiatives have generally been one-off in nature and often require the use of nonofﬁcial statistical data. What has
been lacking thus far has been a systematic attempt to mainstream the
development of statistics in this area. In response to this need, on March
15, 2012, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and WTO joined forces to develop a database of Trade
in Value-Added (TiVA) indicators and to mainstream their production
within the international statistics system. The ﬁrst preliminary results
from this intiative were released on January 16, 2013, and some highlights from this ﬁrst release are presented in the following sections of
this chapter. But, as described below, further work is needed (and can be
done) in order to improve the quality of the estimates produced under
the “trade in value-added” umbrella.
Ultimately this chapter acts, in some ways, as a clarion call to statistical agencies to alert them that the world is increasingly interconnected
and that conventional approaches used to understand how economies
work can no longer rely solely on national statistics. Increasingly, it is
necessary to see the whole in order to understand how economies work
and, for example, how to target and create industrial policies focusing
on competitiveness (notwithstanding trade policies and the implications
and importance of trade). National statistics build pictures based on interrelationships between producers and consumers and the rest of the
world. But these relationships, particularly those with the rest of the
world, have become increasingly more complex, and, as such, there is
an increasing need to consider global production within a global accounting framework. This implies a departure from the traditional role
of international organizations as compilers of internationally comparable national statistics, such as national input-output or supply-use
tables. Instead, it requires that they bring together these national tables
to create a global table.
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The remainder of this chapter describes the policy drivers and
needs for such a framework, as well as the underlying methodology
and assumptions used to estimate trade in value-added, before assessing the implications for statistics ofﬁces, data collection, and national
input-output tables in particular. It ends by describing longer-term future avenues of research.

WHAT IS TRADE IN VALUE-ADDED?
The “trade in value-added” initiative addresses the double counting
implicit in current gross ﬂows of trade. Instead of using that method, it
measures ﬂows related to the value that is added (labor compensation,
other taxes on production, and operating surplus, or proﬁts) by a country in the production of any good or service that is exported.
The simple example shown in Figure 6.1, below, illustrates this.
Country A exports $100 of goods, produced entirely within A, to Country B, which further processes them before exporting them to Country
C, where they are consumed. Country B adds value of $10 to the goods
and so exports $110 to C. Conventional measures of trade show total
global exports and imports of $210, but only $110 of value-added has
been generated in their production. Conventional measures also show
that C has a trade deﬁcit of $110 with B, and no trade at all with A, despite the fact that A is the chief beneﬁciary of C’s consumption.
Figure 6.1 Exports: Gross and Value-Added Flows, in US$
Country

Country

Gross exports (110)
Gross exports
(intermediates) (100)

A

B

Value-added (10)

Country

C

Value-added (100)

SOURCE: Author’s composition.
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If instead we track ﬂows in value-added, one can recalculate C’s
trade deﬁcit with B on the basis of the value-added it “purchases” from
B as ﬁnal demand, which reduces its deﬁcit on this basis to $10, and apply the same approach to A’s value-added to show C running a deﬁcit of
$100 with A. Note that C’s overall trade deﬁcit with the world remains at
$110. All that has changed is its bilateral positions. This simple illustration reveals how output in one country can be affected by consumers in
another, and by how much. (An example of this is C’s consumers driving
A’s output.) However, it can also reveal many other important insights
into global value chains. For example, it shows that B’s exports depend
signiﬁcantly on intermediate imports from A, and so reveals that protectionist measures on imports from A could harm its own exporters and
hence competitiveness. Indeed, by providing information at the level of
speciﬁc industries, it is possible to provide insights in other areas, too,
such as the contribution of the service sector to international trade.

HOW CAN MEASURES OF TRADE IN VALUE-ADDED
INFORM POLICYMAKING?
Even though the literature on trade in value-added is quite technical, it has attracted a lot of attention from policymakers. What initially
seemed a concern for trade statisticians is now understood as a key issue
for the policy debate. For example, Pascal Lamy, the director-general
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), noted that “the statistical bias
created by attributing commercial value to the last country of origin
perverts the true economic dimension of the bilateral trade imbalances.
This affects the political debate, and leads to misguided perceptions”
(Lamy 2011). Recently, the French Senate devoted a special seminar to
the related statistical and policy issues (WTO and Sénat 2011). There
are a number of areas where measuring trade in value-added terms
brings a new perspective and is likely to have an impact on policies.
Seven key areas are described below:
1) Trade, growth, and competitiveness. A better understanding of how much domestic value-added is generated by the
export of a good or service in a country is crucial for devel-
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opment strategies and industrial policies. Some countries have
capitalized on GVCs by developing comparative advantages
in speciﬁc parts of the value chain. For example, in China,
many of its exports involve assembly work, where the foreign
content is high. Access to efﬁcient imports therefore matters
as much in a world of international fragmentation as access to
markets. Conventional gross trade statistics, however, are not
able to reveal the foreign content of exports, and so there is
a risk that policies to protect industries where gross statistics
reveal a comparative advantage may decrease the competitiveness of those very same domestic industries. Because of this,
mercantilist-style “beggar thy neighbor” strategies can turn out
to be “beggar thyself” miscalculations.
2) Domestic value-added in imports. Domestic value-added
is found not only in exports but also in imports: Goods and
services produced in one domestic industry are intermediates shipped abroad whose value comes back to the domestic
economy embodied in the imports of other, and often the same,
industries. As a consequence, tariffs, nontariff barriers, and
trade measures—such as antidumping rights—can also affect
the competitiveness of domestic upstream producers (as well
as the competitiveness of downstream producers, as mentioned
above), in addition to foreign producers. For example, a study
on the European shoe industry undertaken by the Swedish
National Board of Trade highlights that shoes “manufactured
in Asia” incorporate between 50 and 80 percent of European
Union (EU) value-added. In 2006, antidumping rights were introduced by the European Commission on shoes imported from
China and Vietnam. An analysis in value-added terms would
have revealed that EU value-added was in fact subject to the
antidumping rights (Isakson and Verrips 2012).
3) Improving competitiveness in upstream domestic industries
can boost exports. Looking at trade from a value-added perspective is also a way to better reveal how upstream domestic
industries contribute to exports, even if those same industries
have little direct international exposure. Gross trade statistics,
for example, reveal that less than one-quarter of total global

Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb 169

2/16/2015 8:39:43 AM

170 Ahmad

trade is in services. But in value-added terms the share is significantly higher. Goods industries require signiﬁcant intermediate
inputs of services, both from foreign and also from domestic
suppliers. Looking at trade in value-added terms therefore can
reveal that policies to encourage services trade liberalization
and more foreign direct investment (and so policies designed
to improve access to more efﬁcient services) can improve the
export competitiveness of goods industries.
4) Global imbalances. Accounting for trade in value-added
(speciﬁcally accounting for trade in intermediate parts and
components), and taking into account “trade in tasks,” does not
change the overall trade balance of a country with the rest of the
world—rather, it redistributes the surpluses and deﬁcits across
partner countries. When bilateral trade balances are measured
in gross terms, the deﬁcit with ﬁnal goods producers (or the
surplus of exporters of ﬁnal products) is exaggerated because it
incorporates the value of foreign inputs. The underlying imbalance is in fact with the countries who supplied inputs to the ﬁnal
producer. As pressure for rebalancing increases in the context of
persistent deﬁcits, there is a risk of protectionist responses that
target countries at the end of global value chains on the basis of
an inaccurate perception of the origin of trade imbalances. As
shown in the section starting on p. 172, the preliminary results
from the OECD-WTO database point to signiﬁcant changes.
5) The impact of macroeconomic shocks. The 2008–2009 ﬁnancial crisis was characterized by a synchronized trade collapse
in all economies. Authors have discussed the role of global supply chains in the transmission of what was initially a shock on
demand in markets affected by a credit shortage. In particular,
the literature has emphasized the “bullwhip effect” of GVCs
(Escaith, Lindenberg, and Miroudot 2010; Lee, Padmanabhan,
and Whang 1997). When there is a sudden drop in demand,
ﬁrms delay orders and run down inventories, with the consequence that the fall in demand is ampliﬁed along the supply
chain and can translate into a standstill for companies located
upstream. A better understanding of value-added trade ﬂows
would provide tools for policymakers to anticipate the impact
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of macroeconomic shocks and adopt the right policy responses.
Any analysis of the impact of trade on short-term demand is
likely to be biased when looking only at gross trade ﬂows. This
was recently demonstrated in the aftermath of the natural disaster that hit Japan in March 2011.1
6) Trade and employment. Several studies on the impact of
trade liberalization on labor markets try to estimate the “job
content” of trade. Such analysis is only relevant if one looks at
the value-added of trade. What the value-added ﬁgures can tell
us is where exactly jobs are created. Decomposing the value of
imports into the contribution of each economy (including the
domestic one) can give an idea of who beneﬁts from trade. The
EU shoe industry example given above can be interpreted in
terms of jobs. Traditional thinking in gross terms would regard
imports of shoes manufactured in China and Vietnam by EU
shoe retailers as EU jobs lost and transferred to these countries. But in value-added terms, one would have to account for
the EU value-added, and while workers may have indeed lost
their jobs in the EU at the assembly stage, value-added-based
measures would have highlighted the important contribution
made by those working in the research, development, design,
and marketing activities that exist because of trade (and the fact
that this fragmented production process keeps costs low and
EU companies competitive). When comparative advantages
apply to “tasks” rather than to “ﬁnal products,” the skill composition of labor embedded in the domestic content of exports
reﬂects the relative development level of participating countries. Industrialized countries tend to specialize in high-skilled
tasks, which are better paid and capture a larger share of the total value added. A WTO and IDE-JETRO study on global value
chains in East Asia shows that China specializes in low-skilled
types of jobs. Japan, on the other hand, has been focusing on
export activities intensive in medium- and high-skilled labor
while importing goods produced by low-skilled workers. The
study also shows that in 2006 the Republic of Korea was adopt-
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ing a middle-ground position but was also moving closer to the
pattern found in Japan (WTO and IDE-JETRO 2011).
7) Trade and the environment. Another area where the measurement of trade ﬂows in value-added terms would support
policymaking is in the assessment of the environmental impact of trade. For example, concerns over greenhouse gas
emissions and their potential role in climate change have triggered research on how trade openness affects CO2 emissions.
The unbundling of production and consumption and the international fragmentation of production require a value-added
view of trade to understand where imported goods are produced (and hence where CO2 is produced as a consequence of
trade). Various OECD studies note that the relocation of industrial activities can have a signiﬁcant impact on differences
in consumption-based and production-based measures of CO2
emissions (Ahmad and Wyckoff 2003; Nakano et al. 2009).

EARLY EVIDENCE FROM THE OECD-WTO DATABASE
Currently, the database is based on a global input-output table that
brings together national input-output tables for 57 economies, combined with bilateral trade data on goods and services broken down into
37 industries aggregated from a 48-industry list (see Table 6.1). The following provides an overview of the key messages provided by the data.2
Exports Require Imports
The data reveal that the import content of exports—the share of
value added by the export of a given product that originates abroad—is
signiﬁcant in all countries for which data are presented (40 at the time
of this writing: all 34 OECD countries, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia,
the Russian Federation, and South Africa—see Figure 6.2).
Typically, the larger a country, the lower the overall foreign content;
this reﬂects, in part, scale and cost. But a number of smaller economies
also have relatively low foreign content in their exports, such as Aus-
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Table 6.1 OECD Input-Output Industry Classiﬁcation and Concordance
with ISIC
ISIC Rev. 3 code
Description
1+2+5
1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and ﬁshing
10 + 11 + 12
2 Mining and quarrying (energy)
13 + 14
3 Mining and quarrying (nonenergy)
15 + 16
4 Food products, beverages, and tobacco
17 + 18 + 19
5 Textiles, textile products, leather, and footwear
20
6 Wood and products of wood and cork
21 + 22
7 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing, and publishing
23
8 Coke, reﬁned petroleum products, and nuclear fuel
24ex2423
9 Chemicals, excluding pharmaceuticals
2423
10 Pharmaceuticals
25
11 Rubber and plastics products
26
12 Other nonmetallic mineral products
271 + 2731
13 Iron and steel
272 + 2732
14 Nonferrous metals
28
15 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equip.
29
16 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.
30
17 Ofﬁce, accounting and computing machinery
31
18 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c.
32
19 Radio, television, and communication equipment
33
20 Medical, precision, and optical instruments
34
21 Motor vehicles, trailers, and semitrailers
351
22 Building and repairing of ships and boats
353
23 Aircraft and spacecraft
352 + 359
24 Railroad equipment and transport equipment, n.e.c.
36 + 37
25 Manufacturing, n.e.c.; recycling (including furniture)
401
26 Production, collection, and distribution of electricity
402
27 Manufacture of gas; distribution of gaseous fuels
through mains
403
28 Steam and hot water supply
41
29 Collection, puriﬁcation, and distribution of water
45
30 Construction
50 + 51 + 52
31 Wholesale and retail trade; repairs
55
32 Hotels and restaurants
60
33 Land transport; transport via pipelines
61
34 Water transport
(continued)
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Table 6.1 (continued)
ISIC Rev. 3 code
Description
62
35 Air transport
63
36 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities
of travel agencies
64
37 Post and telecommunications
65 + 66 + 67
38 Finance and insurance
70
39 Real estate activities
71
40 Renting of machinery and equipment
72
41 Computer and related activities
73
42 Research and development
74
43 Other business activities
75
44 Public administration and defense; compulsory social
security
80
45 Education
85
46 Health and social work
90–93
47 Other community, social, and personal services
95 + 99
48 Private households and extraterritorial organizations
NOTE: “n.e.c.” stands for “not elsewhere classiﬁed.”
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.

tralia, Chile, and Norway. This can be explained by their high share of
exports of natural resource goods, such as ores, oil, and copper, which
have, not surprisingly, a low foreign content. Geography also plays a
role; this helps to explain New Zealand’s relatively low ratio, as well as
its relatively high dependency on agricultural exports, which also have
a low foreign content. For midsize economies, however, particularly
those in Eastern Europe, the norm is that around one-third of the value
of exports reﬂects foreign content.
Notwithstanding some of the interpretative caveats above, the ratio is perhaps the single most digestible indicator of the propensity of
a country to engage in global value chains. It reveals the existence of
European, Asian, and North American production hubs and also the
signiﬁcant dependency many countries have on imports to generate
exports. In Mexico, with its maquiladoras, and in China, with its processors/assemblers, about one-third of overall exports reﬂect foreign
content (and, as described below, these are considered to be conservative estimates).
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Figure 6.2 Domestic Content of Exports: Percentage of Total Gross
Exports Represented by Domestic Value-Added Exports, 2009
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SOURCE: OECD-WTO Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) indicators, preliminary results
from OECD, January 2013, http://stats.oecd.org.

Some care is needed in interpreting the results, however: 2009
was an exceptional year, the year that signiﬁed perhaps the nadir of
the recent ﬁnancial crisis. As such, it was partly characterized by an
unprecedented slowdown in global trade. Although the database only
provides data as far back as 2005, illustrative data going back to 1995
suggest that international fragmentation of production (in other words,
the import content of exports) had been steadily rising in most countries
over recent decades, which continued over the period 2005–2008 (Figure 6.3), despite the slowdown that began in many countries in 2008.
But 2009 saw drops in the import content of exports, an indication that
the greater the fragmentation of a good or service, the more likely it was
to be affected by the synchronized slowdown in trade. In most countries, therefore, the import content of overall exports in 2009 returned
to around the ratios seen in 2005, but in China the data point to a steady
rise over the period, suggesting developments that saw China begin to
move up the value-added chain.
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Figure 6.3 Domestic Content of Exports: Percentage of Total Gross
Exports Represented by Domestic Value-Added Exports,
2005, 2008, and 2009
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SOURCE: OECD-WTO Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) indicators, preliminary results,
OECD, January 2013.

Tangible evidence of the scale of global value chains emerges more
clearly when considering speciﬁc sectors. For example, between onethird and one-half of the total value of exports of transport parts and
equipment by most major producers originated abroad in 2009 (Figure
6.4), driven by regional production hubs. In the United States and Japan, the shares were only about one-ﬁfth, reﬂecting the larger scope
in those countries of source inputs from domestic providers. However,
this was also the case for Italy, and there it may have reﬂected efﬁcient
upstream domestic networks of small and medium enterprises. Interestingly, in 2009, Germany exported 25 percent more transport parts and
equipment output than the United States in gross terms but only 5 percent more in value-added terms.
Similar patterns emerge in other sectors with a high degree of international fragmentation. For example, in China and Korea, in 2009, the
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Figure 6.4 Transport Equipment, Gross Exports Decomposed by Source,
2009 (billions of US$)
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SOURCE: OECD-WTO TiVA indicators, preliminary results, OECD, January 2013.

Figure 6.5 Electronic Equipment, Gross Exports Decomposed by Source,
2009 (billions of US$)
500
Foreign content

Billions
of US$
$US billions

400

Domestic content

300

200

100

0

SOURCE: OECD-WTO TiVA indicators, preliminary results, OECD, January 2013.
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foreign content of exports of electronic products was about 40 percent,
and in Mexico, the share was over 60 percent (Figure 6.5).
High Shares of Intermediate Imports Are Used to Serve
Export Markets
The ﬁgures above reveal that exporting ﬁrms require access to efﬁcient imports in order to be competitive, and so highlight the potential
counterproductive effects of protectionist measures. But an alternative
way of indicating the adverse effects of such policies can be seen when
looking at the overall share of intermediate imports that are used to
serve export markets.
In most economies, around one-third of intermediate imports are
destined for the export market. Not surprisingly, typically, the smaller
the economy the higher the share, but even in the United States and
Japan these shares are 15 and 20 percent, respectively, at the total economy level, with a higher incidence of intermediate imports in some
Figure 6.6 Intermediate Imports Embodied in Exports: Percentage of
Total Intermediate Imports, 2009
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highly integrated industries (Figure 6.6). In Japan, for example, nearly
40 percent of all intermediate imports of transport equipment end up in
exports.
In many other countries, the share of intermediate imports embodied in exports is signiﬁcantly higher. In Hungary, two-thirds of all
intermediate imports are destined for the export market after further
processing, and the share reaches 90 percent for electronic intermediate
imports. In China, Korea, and Mexico, around three-quarters of all intermediate imports of electronics are embodied in exports. The database
also shows that close to 85 percent of China’s intermediate imports of
textile products end up in exports.
Open and Efﬁcient Service Markets Matter
Services make up about two-thirds of gross domestic product
(GDP) in most developed economies, but in gross terms, trade in services typically accounts for less than one-quarter of their exports This
partly reﬂects the fact that signiﬁcant shares of services output are generally not tradable—e.g., government services, many personal services,
and imputations such as those made in GDP calculations to reﬂect the
rent homeowners are assumed to pay themselves (between 6 and 10
percent of GDP in most developed economies). But it also reﬂects the
fact that the service sector provides signiﬁcant intermediate inputs to
domestic goods manufacturers.
Accounting for the value-added produced by the service sector in
the production of goods shows that the service content of total gross
exports is over 50 percent in many OECD economies, and it approaches
two-thirds of the total in the United Kingdom (Figure 6.7). Canada,
because of its signiﬁcant exports of natural resources, which typically
have low service content, has the lowest service content of its exports in
the G7—but even here the share is close to 40 percent.
Typically, emerging economies and other large exporters of natural
assets, such as Norway, Chile, and Australia, have the lowest shares
of services. But in India, over half of the value of its gross exports
originates in the service sector. Indonesia has the lowest share of the 40
countries in the database at around 20 percent.
Part of the explanation for the difference between OECD countries
and emerging economies can be found in the relatively higher degree of
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Figure 6.7 Services Value-Added: Percentage of Total Exports, 2009
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(largely domestic) outsourcing of services by manufacturers in OECD
countries in recent decades, suggesting that a similar process could lead
to improvements in the competitiveness of emerging economy manufacturers. Figure 6.7 also reveals a not insigniﬁcant contribution to
exports coming from foreign service providers.
Another, perhaps clearer way of illustrating the importance of services to exports is to consider the services content of speciﬁc exports in
goods-producing sectors. Figure 6.8 takes an average of all 40 countries
in the database and shows that services make a signiﬁcant contribution
(typically one-third) across all manufacturing sectors, with signiﬁcant
shares provided by both foreign and domestic service providers. For
individual sectors in speciﬁc countries the importance of the service
sector is often starker. In France, for example, the data reveal that over
half of the domestic value-added generated in producing transport
equipment originates in the French service sector.
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Figure 6.8 Services Value-Added: Percentage of Total Exports of Goods,
2009
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Intermediate Imports Often Embody a Country’s Own (Returned)
Domestic Value-Added
Imports can also contain “returned” value-added, which is valueadded that originated in the importing country. The preliminary—and,
one should stress, conservative—estimates in the OECD-WTO database
show that in the United States, for example, nearly 5 percent of the total
value of imported intermediate goods reﬂects U.S. value-added, and in
China the equivalent shares are close to 7 percent. For electronic goods,
Chinese intermediate imports contain over 12 percent of returned Chinese domestic value-added, and Korean intermediate imports contain
close to 5 percent of returned Korean domestic value-added.
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Figure 6.9 Difference between China’s Value-Added and Gross Trade
Balances, 2009 (billions of US$)
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What You See Is Not What You Get: Trade Patterns Change
Bilateral trade balance positions can change signiﬁcantly when
measured in value-added terms, even though the total trade balance is
unaffected. Figure 6.9 shows that China’s bilateral trade surplus with
the United States was over US$40 billion (25 percent) smaller in valueadded terms in 2009. (It was 30 percent smaller in 2005.) This partly
reﬂects the higher share of U.S. value-added imports in Chinese ﬁnal
demand but also the fact that a signiﬁcant share (one-third) of China’s
exports reﬂects foreign content—the “Factory Asia” phenomenon. The
data illustrate that signiﬁcant exports of value-added from Korea and
Japan pass through China on their way to ﬁnal consumers, resulting
in signiﬁcantly smaller Chinese trade deﬁcits with these countries but
also typically higher Japanese and Korean trade surpluses with other
countries. Similarly, the database shows that Korea’s signiﬁcant trade
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deﬁcit with Japan in gross terms almost disappears when measured in
value-added terms.

ESTIMATING TRADE IN VALUE-ADDED
Creating a Multiregional Input-Output Table
As mentioned above, several initiatives have tried to address the
issue of the measurement of trade ﬂows in the context of the fragmentation of world production.3 The most commonly used approach to
develop a macro picture is based on global input-output tables, using
simple standard Leontief inverses. More detail can be found in a joint
report by the OECD and WTO (2012) and in an online appendix to this
chapter, “Appendix 6A: Indicator Descriptions and Deﬁnitions,” which
can be found at http://www.upjohn.org/MEG/ahmad-appendix.pdf.
Constructing a global table is a data-intensive process and presents numerous challenges. The key challenge is to identify and create
links between exports in one country and the purchasing industries (as
intermediate consumers) or ﬁnal-demand consumers in the importing
country. In this respect, it is important to note that the data issues faced
by the OECD are similar to those confronted by other initiatives, such
as IDE-JETRO (which has produced intercountry input-output tables
for Asia) or the World Input-Output Database project, with whom
(along with the U.S. International Trade Commission) the OECD and
WTO have been actively coordinating in order to share experiences and
derive a set of best practices.
The data sources at OECD are harmonized input-output tables and
bilateral trade coefﬁcients in goods and services, derived from ofﬁcial
sources.4 The model speciﬁcation and estimation procedures can be
summarized as follows:
•

Preparation of input-output (I-O) tables for reference years,
using the latest published data sources—e.g., supply-and-use
tables, national accounts, and trade statistics.

•

Preparation of bilateral merchandise data by end-use categories
for reference years. The published trade statistics are adjusted
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for analytical purposes (such as conﬁdential ﬂows, reexports,
waste and scrap products, and valuables). Trade coefﬁcients
of utility services are estimated based on cross-border energy
transfers. Other trade coefﬁcients of service sectors are based
on the OECD Statistics on International Trade in Services and
the United Nations (UN) Service Trade statistics. However,
many missing ﬂows are currently estimated using econometric
model estimates.
•

Conversion of “cost, insurance, and freight” (CIF) price-based
import ﬁgures to “free on board” (FOB) price-based imports
to reduce the inconsistency issues of mirror trade. (Because of
asymmetry in reporting exports and imports in national trade
statistics, imports of Country A from Country B often differ
signiﬁcantly from the exports reported from Country B to
Country A). In an international I-O system, trade ﬂows need to
be perfectly symmetrical (i.e., the bilateral trade ﬂows should
be consistent at the highest relevant level of disaggregation)
and consistent with the supply-utilization tables’ trade data.

•

Creation of import matrices.

•

Total adjustment (missing sectors, trade with rest of the world,
and other factors) and minimization of discrepancy columns
using biproportional methods.

The OECD has been updating and maintaining harmonized I-O
tables—that is, splitting intermediate ﬂows into tables of domestic origin and imports—since the mid-1990s. Usually this process follows the
rhythm of national releases of benchmark I-O tables. The ﬁrst edition
of the OECD Input-Output Database came out in 1995. It covered 10
OECD countries, and its I-O tables spanned the period from the early
1970s to the early 1990s. The ﬁrst updated edition of this database, released in 2002, increased the country coverage to 18 OECD countries,
China, and Brazil, and introduced harmonized tables for the mid-1990s.
The database now includes national I-O tables for 34 OECD member
countries and 18 non-OECD countries.5
The I-O tables show transactions between domestic industries but,
as a complement, also include supplementary tables, which break down
total imports by user (industry and category of ﬁnal demand). Some
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countries provide these import tables in conjunction with their I-O tables, but in other cases they are derived from calculations by the OECD.
The OECD’s input-output tables are based on an industry-byindustry basis, reﬂecting the fact that the underlying source data measure both the activities and production of industries. This means that the
relationships between value-added and industrial output are unaffected
by the statistical manipulations that will be required to build productby-product-based input-output tables. The industry classiﬁcation used
in the current version of OECD’s I-O database is based on the International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation of All Economic Activities,
Revision 3 (ISIC Rev. 3) (Table 6.1), meaning that it is compatible
with other industry-based analytical data sets, and in particular with
the OECD bilateral trade in goods by industry data set (derived from
merchandise trade statistics through the standard Harmonized System
to ISIC conversion keys). The system, by necessity (in other words, to
maximize cross-country comparability), is relatively aggregated.
Differentiating between types of companies within a given sector is essential, however, to improve the quality of trade in value-added results
(particularly in the context of exporting and nonexporting companies),
and so part of future work will be to explore ways to do this, using microdata that could improve the quality of results (which is discussed in
more detail in the following section).
In essence, a global I-O table is little different from a national
I-O table except that while the matrix of ﬂows of intermediate goods
and services in a national table can be industry × industry, in a global
I-O table, the rows and columns are country-industry combinations.
In addition, in a global I-O table there are separate columns for each
country’s ﬁnal demand. For illustration, Table 6.2 shows a two-country,
two-sector representation.
Most of the components intuitively follow from the row and column
headings, but by way of explanation, Z12AB = intermediate purchase by
Sector 2 of Country B from Sector 1 of Country A; F1AB = ﬁnal demand
of consumers in Country B of output of Sector 1 in Country A.
Typically in the above matrix, statistics ofﬁces are able to provide
most of the blocks required (recalling that supply-use tables can be
readily converted to the above format and, moreover, that the above
format can be initially constructed as a global supply-use table, which
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Country A
Sector 1
Sector 2
Country A
Sector 1: Goods
Sector 2: Services
Country B
Sector 1: Goods
Sector 2: Services
Tax less subsidy on products
International trade margin and insurance
Value-added
Labor compensation
Operating surplus
Tax less subsidy on production
Output
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.

Country B
Sector 1
Sector 2

Final demand
Country A Country B

Z11AA
Z21AA

Z12AA
Z22AA

Z11AB
Z21AB

Z12AB
Z22AB

F1AA
F2AA

F1AB
F2AB

Z11BA
Z21BA
NTZ1A
TIZ1A

Z12BA
Z22BA
NTZ2A
TIZ2A

Z11BB
Z21BB
NTZ1B
TIZ1B

Z12BB
Z22BB
NTZ2B
TIZ2B

F1BA
F2BA
NTFA
TIFA

F1BB
F2BB
NTFB
TIFB

VL1A
VO1A
VT1A
X1A

VL2A
VO2A
VT2A
X 2A

VL1B
VO1B
VT1B
X1B

VL2B
VO2B
VT2B
X 2B
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will form the long-term approach to be used by the OECD). But even
though some countries are able to estimate the overall import of a given
product used by a particular industry, many are not, and none are able to
show, systematically, the source of that import (by originating country
and industry) by the using industry (or “ﬁnal demand” category).
Central to the construction of a global input-output table, therefore, is the estimation of trade ﬂows between industries and consumers
across countries. Indeed, these trade ﬂows in intermediate goods and
services are the glue that binds together the national individual inputoutput tables. A positive spin-off of the work is worth mentioning in this
context. National estimates of trade (exports and imports) are not coherent across countries, even after adjusting for price differences, CIF, and
FOB. The process of constructing a global I-O table confronts this issue
head-on. The spin-off to the work is therefore a mechanism to reveal
where global imbalances lie. The results and policy implications of the
work highlight the importance that should be attached to reconciling
these ﬂows at the national level. Over the coming years, this will form
an important part of the OECD’s work program, through its Working
Party on Trade in Goods and Services.
Bilateral trade in goods and services and I-O balancing
Given the fact that many imports enter countries through intermediaries (wholesalers), it is highly unlikely that countries will ever be
able to collect statistics that systematically show the country source
of all imports consumed by all industries, nor does it seem likely that
countries will be able to show which foreign industries consume their
products. But, as shown below, it is possible, at least in the medium
term, for countries to do more in this ﬁeld by capitalizing on microdata
and links between trade and business registers.
In the short term, however, more can be—and is being—done to
improve how imports are allocated to using industries. Most countries
are able to produce estimates of bilateral trade in goods and services
showing the export of a given good or service to a given partner country. And indeed, most countries are able to further reveal whether any
particular import or export of a good (at least, for most imports and
exports) was intermediate, an investment, or a consumer good.

Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb 187

2/16/2015 8:39:55 AM

188 Ahmad

In constructing the import (and export) ﬂows of its global I-O table,
the OECD necessarily uses a number of assumptions. The main assumption used in creating these import matrices is the “proportionality”
assumption, which assumes that the country-of-origin share of a given
import consumed by a given industry in a given country is the same for
all industries in that country. For countries that are not able to provide
any “import-ﬂow” matrices at all—i.e., the intermediate consumption
of imports by origin and destination industries—the OECD necessarily assumes that the share of intermediate imports in total intermediate
consumption for a given imported product is the same for all using
industries. Furthermore, the OECD assumes that this share is equivalent to the overall share of intermediate imports to total intermediates
supplied for that product. In all cases, the OECD has been able to signiﬁcantly improve the quality of the assumptions it necessarily uses by
creating a new database of bilateral trade (for goods) that breaks down
imports (and exports) on the basis of the nature of the traded product
(intermediate, household, investment, other). This database is called the
Bilateral Trade Database by Industry and End-Use category (BTDIxE),
and is derived from the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) UN
Comtrade database, where values and quantities of imports and exports
are compiled according to product classiﬁcations and by partner.6
UN Comtrade data are classiﬁed by declaring country (the country
supplying the information), by partner country (the origin of imports
or destination of exports), and by product (according to Harmonized
System, or HS). Trade ﬂows are stored according to the product classiﬁcation used by the declaring country at the time of data collection. In
general, source data are held according to Standard International Trade
Classiﬁcation (SITC) Revision 2 ( Rev. 2) for the time period 1978–
1987, the Harmonized System (1988) for 1988–1995, HS Rev. 1 (1996)
for 1996–2001, HS Rev. 2 (2002) for 2002–2006, and HS Rev. 3 (2007)
from 2007 onwards.
To generate estimates of trade in goods by industry and by end-use
category, six-digit product codes from each version of HS from UN
Comtrade are assigned to a unique ISIC Rev. 3 industry and a unique
end-use category—and hence, assigned to a basic class of goods as
speciﬁed in the System of National Accounts (SNA) (European Commission et al. 2009; see Table 6.3).
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Notwithstanding the known problems relating to the asymmetries
that exist within bilateral trade statistics (i.e., global exports do not equal
global imports), these bilateral statistics form the basis for populating
the international ﬂows in goods used in the OECD’s global input-output
tables, before balancing.
The approach used for bilateral trade in services statistics is in essence similar: Estimates based on ofﬁcial bilateral statistics form the
basis for the original estimates of exports and imports by country. However, the quality of bilateral trade in services statistics is notoriously
poor, and so the original partner-share coefﬁcients used to populate
I-O cells of international trade in services are based on gravity model
techniques (see Miroudot, Lanz, and Ragoussis 2009), which are subsequently balanced within the overall system.
Only very few countries have a consistency between bilateral trade
ﬂows (imports and exports) by partner country and the corresponding
ﬂows shown in their supply-use tables (the basis for the creation of
national I-O tables), reﬂecting the fact that, for goods at least, bilateral trade ﬂows follow merchandise trade accounting standards. As
such, there are a number of recommendations that follow for ofﬁcial
statisticians:
Coherent bilateral trade and national accounts data. Producing bilateral trade ﬂows that are consistent with underlying supply-use
tables should form a high priority of national statistics ofﬁces.
Conﬁdential trade. In some countries, disclosure rules suppress
six-digit HS components in UN Comtrade and also higher two-digit
HS chapter levels. This should be avoided where possible by adopting
other forms of preserving conﬁdentiality, such as suppressing another
six-digit category.
Reexports. Adjustments are required for reexports—and, for major
continental trading hubs, these adjustments can be signiﬁcant. Sufﬁcient data are available to adjust for reported trade between China and
the rest of the world via Hong Kong, but not currently for other major
hubs such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Singapore.
Identifying used capital goods. HS codes, and thus reported trade
in UN Comtrade, cannot differentiate between new and old capital
goods (such as secondhand aircraft and ships). Estimating international
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End-use
Final-demand goods
Product characteristics
Intermediate
Household consumption
Industrial capital goods
Food and beverages (111) Food and beverages (112)
Primary products
Industrial supplies (21)
Fuels and lubricants (31)
Processed unﬁnished Fuels and lubricants (32)
Industrial supplies (22)

Fuels and lubricants (32)
Food and beverages (122)

Parts and components of
transport equipment (53)
Parts and components of
capital goods (42)
Processed ﬁnished

Packed medicaments
(part of 63)

Packed medicaments (part of 63)

Capital goods (41)

Nonindustrial transport equipment
(522)

Industrial transport equipment (521)

Nondurable consumer goods (63)
Semidurable consumer goods (62)
Durable consumer goods for
households (61)
Durable personal consumer goods, Durable personal consumer goods,
e.g., personal computers (part of 61) e.g., personal computers (part of 61)
2/16/2015 8:39:56 AM

Mobile phones (part of 41)

Mobile phones (part of 41)
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Other
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Other

Passenger motor cars (51)

Passenger motor cars (51)

Fixed-line phones (part of 62)

Fixed-line phones (part of 62)
Goods
n.e.c. (7)

NOTE: Numbers are in Broad Economic Categories (BEC) codes. “SNA” stands for “System of National Accounts.” “n.e.c.” stands for
“not elsewhere classiﬁed.”
SOURCE: United Nations Statistics Division (2013).
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trade in these ﬂows in a value-added context requires an elaboration
on the input-output framework that allows these ﬂows to be recorded
in a way that aligns with total global value-added produced in a given
period.
Unidentiﬁed scrap and waste. Certain types of waste and scrap
do not have separate six-digit HS codes—e.g., PCs and other electrical
equipment exported (often to developing countries) for recycling.
Better services data. Moreover, for services, countries are encouraged to provide more detail on partner countries and also on the type of
products (following EBOPS 2010).7
Coherent international trade data. Greater efforts are needed to
reconcile asymmetries in international trade ﬂows.
Without the issues outlined above being resolved, the OECD’s
global input-output table must necessarily balance global discrepancies in trade using a quasi automatic (RAS) balancing procedure. This
process constrains each country’s exports and imports to published
national accounts totals, while also constraining estimates of national
GDP. Resolving these asymmetries in bilateral trade statistics is a work
in progress, and efforts to improve the nature of the balancing process
are ongoing (Ahmad, Wang, and Yamano 2013).
Given the assumptions and balancing adjustments necessarily used,
it is important to stress that the indicators shown in the database are
estimates. Ofﬁcial gross statistics on international trade produced by
national statistics institutions result in inconsistent ﬁgures for total
global exports and total global imports, inconsistencies that are magniﬁed when bilateral partner country positions are considered. The global
input-output tables from which trade in value-added indicators are derived necessarily eliminate these inconsistencies, such as those that
reﬂect different national treatments of reexports and transit trade (e.g.,
going through hubs such as the Netherlands), to achieve a coherent picture of global trade. For the countries for which data are presented,
total exports and imports are consistent with ofﬁcial national accounts
estimates.
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Level of detail in national supply-use and input-output (I-O)
tables—future improvements
Indicators created by input-output techniques are limited by the degree of industry disaggregation that the tables provide. The national
input-output tables used by the OECD are based on a harmonized set
of 37 industries. In simple terms, therefore, any given indicator for a
particular industry assumes that all consumers of that industry’s output
purchase exactly the same shares of products produced by all of the
ﬁrms allocated to that industry.
In practice, this boils down to (but is not the same thing as) assuming that there exists only one single production technique for all of the
ﬁrms (and all of the products) in the industry grouping. We know that
this is not true and that different ﬁrms, even those producing the same
products, will have different production techniques (and so technical
I-O coefﬁcients), and we also know that different ﬁrms produce different products and that these products will be destined for different types
of consumers and markets.
Of chief concern in this respect is the evidence that points to exports
having very different coefﬁcients from the coefﬁcients of goods and
services produced for domestic markets, particularly when the exports
(typically intermediate) are produced by foreign-owned afﬁliates in a
global value chain. Because exporting ﬁrms are generally more integrated into value-added chains, they will typically have higher foreign
content ratios, particularly when they are foreign-owned. Generally,
therefore, an ability to account for this heterogeneity in producing trade
in value-added estimates will result in lower shares of foreign content than might be recorded if more detailed input-output tables were
available.
It is important to note, however, that more detail does not necessarily translate into more disaggregated industries. What matters
for developing indicators on GVCs is more detail on ﬁrms trading internationally. In this sense, given a choice between doubling
the number of industries available within current national I-O or
supply-and-use tables or providing a split of existing industries into one
group of exporting ﬁrms and another of nonexporting ﬁrms, the latter
may, arguably, be preferable.
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Ideally, therefore, countries should attempt to construct supply-use
or input-output tables that better respond to the challenges presented by
GVCs. In a project coordinated by the OECD and the Chinese Ministry
of Commerce (the latter in collaboration with the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics), an input-output table for China was created that split
all of its industrial sectors into three categories: 1) processing ﬁrms, 2)
other exporting ﬁrms, and 3) all other ﬁrms (Cuihong et al 2013).
Ideally, countries could adopt similar approaches in constructing their I-O or supply-and-use tables, using splits based on national
circumstances. Processing ﬁrms form a signiﬁcant part of China’s exporters, so such a classiﬁcation made sense in the case of China, but
this may not be optimal for all countries. For most countries, achieving
changes to national I-O or supply-and-use tables may take some time.
Other, potentially simpler, approaches, however, could be used to
signiﬁcantly improve the quality of the information I-O tables are able
to produce for analyzing GVCs.
In October 2012, the OECD and Eurostat launched one such approach by building on the OECD-Eurostat Trade by Enterprise
Characteristics (TEC) data collection. The TEC exercise collects information on the turnover generated through exports broken down by size
class, industry, and partner country. For imports, similar information is
provided but with a more limited breakdown on the importing industry.
But these indicators only begin to scratch the surface of the potential,
if researchers can make links to structural business statistics (Ahmad
et al. 2011). With these further links, they can create information on
the direct value-added of exporting ﬁrms, as well as information on
employment. In addition, they can create indicators broken down by
whether the ﬁrms are foreign or domestically owned, an important additional breakdown required for analyses of “trade in income.” (This
topic of trade in income is further addressed under the subsection heading of that name, below.) Moreover, information that links the data on
importing ﬁrms with those on exporting ﬁrms can provide vital insights
into the nature of global production chains. Importantly, for those countries that already produce TEC statistics, researchers could develop this
information without necessarily using links to structural business statistics, although they would have to do so on the basis of turnover ﬂows.
This information could form the basis for disaggregating I-O or supplyand-use industries into characteristics required to better measure GVCs.
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The questionnaire that was circulated to test the feasible and practical level of detail that could be collected, bearing in mind disclosure
rules, focused only on export intensities (rather than on import intensities, where it was recognized that other steps would need to precede
development of a questionnaire on that aspect). The primary purpose of
the questionnaire was to categorize ﬁrms on the basis of their share of
output generated by exports (i.e., export intensities). The form provided
for three different levels of breakdown; it asked countries to use the
level of breakdown that best suited their disclosure rules and resources:
1) Firms that export (i.e., more than 0 percent of output is made up
by exports) and ﬁrms that don’t (0 percent of output is exported).
2) A breakdown of ﬁrms by export-intensity quartiles, with a separate category for nonexporting ﬁrms: 0 percent, between >0 and
25 percent, between >25 and 50 percent, between >50 and 75
percent, and greater than 75 percent.
3) A more aggregated breakdown of export intensity into three categories: a) nonexporting ﬁrms, b) ﬁrms with exports between >0
and 50 percent, and c) ﬁrms with exports greater than 50 percent.
Seven variables, described below, were requested in the exercise,
and each was broken down by industry, size class, and ownership.
However, recognizing that disclosure rules would restrict what could
realistically be produced for public consumption, the distributors of the
survey asked countries to prioritize their information along the following lines:
•

Priority 1: Industries (preferably, ISIC Rev. 4) for two-digit
groupings

•

Priority 2: Export intensities (exports as a percentage of output)

•

Priority 3: Ownership (a breakdown into foreign/domestic
ownership)

•

Priority 4: Size class (a breakdown preferably done by number
of employees)

The seven variables requested were as follows:
1) The number of statistical units, participating or otherwise, in
exports, ideally using a concept consistent with that used in
preparing supply-use and input-output tables.
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2) The value-added generated by ﬁrms in national currency units,
ideally at basic prices.
3) The value of exports generated by ﬁrms in national currency
units, ideally at FOB (free on board) prices.
4) The output generated by ﬁrms in national currency units, ideally at basic prices.
5) The total employment of ﬁrms, ideally on a full-time equivalent basis.
6) The total compensation of employees of ﬁrms.
7) Direct imports of ﬁrms in national currency units, ideally at
CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) prices.
Going beyond Trade in Value-Added
Looking at trade in value-added terms provides a valuable insight
into broader notions of competitiveness (in addition to providing insights into trade policies) by illustrating interlinkages between countries
and also by illustrating those activities (or tasks) that generate the most
value. But additional indicators and insights can be gained by considering extensions to the accounting framework.
Trade in jobs
One immediate area relates to jobs. This requires consistent estimates of employment measures (employment, employees, actual hours
worked) using the underlying value-added estimates produced by national statistics ofﬁces in their supply-use tables.
Countries have already begun to make improvements in this area,
driven by a need to produce coherent productivity estimates by industry, and it is hoped that highlighting the important insights that can be
gained by looking at trade in jobs will reinforce and support these national initiatives aimed at improving coherence. Going a step further,
we can state that, particularly because international fragmentation has
meant industries across countries are less comparable than they used
to be (as countries specialize in those stages of the underlying activity
where they have a comparative advantage), it is increasingly becoming
necessary to link jobs statistics to skills statistics.
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The OECD’s ANSKILL database (in the process of being updated)
provides information on employment and skill composition at the industry level. The database matches industry data at the two-digit level
(classiﬁed according to the ISIC Rev. 3) to occupations at the two-digit
level (classiﬁed according to International Standard Classiﬁcation of
Occupations [ISCO]-88). It also includes an additional proxy for skills,
in the form of data on the educational attainment of employees (classiﬁed on the basis of International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education
[ISCED]-97). The database covers 26 countries, mostly for 1997–2005,
although coverage of seven of the countries is much more limited.
For ANSKILL, the ISCO-88 occupation classiﬁcation corresponds
to high-, medium-, and low-skilled levels, as follows:
•

Categories 1 (legislators, senior ofﬁcials, managers), 2 (professionals), and 3 (technicians and associate professionals) are
regarded as high-skilled.

•

Categories 4 (clerks), 5 (service workers and shop and
market sale workers), 6 (skilled agricultural and ﬁshery workers), and 7 (craft and related trade workers) are regarded as
medium-skilled.

•

Categories 8 (plant and machine operators and assemblers) and
9 (elementary occupations) are regarded as low-skilled.

The ISCED-97 educational classiﬁcation maps to high, medium,
and low skill levels in ANSKILL as follows:
•

Categories 1 (primary education) and 2 (lower secondary/second stage of basic education) are regarded as low-skilled.

•

Categories 3 (upper secondary education) and 4 (postsecondary
nontertiary education) are regarded as medium-skilled.

•

Categories 5 (ﬁrst stage of tertiary education) and 6 (second
stage of tertiary education) are regarded as high-skilled.

Trade in income
Conventional trade statistics do not always record transactions
between afﬁliates as sales or purchases of goods and services. This is
especially true of intellectual property products (IPPs).
Consider, for example, an afﬁliate enterprise, recognized in the national accounts of its resident economy as the economic owner of an
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IPP that it uses to produce goods, which it sells. The afﬁliate’s valueadded would reﬂect in part the return on this underlying asset, realized
as proﬁts (operating surplus). These proﬁts would subsequently be recorded as reinvested earnings, whether or not any actual ﬂows occur
between the parent and its afﬁliate. Ultimately, therefore, it is the parent
(often the entity that ﬁnances the underlying IPP) that beneﬁts from
the use of the IPP. (Indeed, this in itself raises questions about how
economic ownership of IPPs should be considered with respect to multinationals—an issue that is currently being tackled by the international
statistics community.)
However, the difﬁculties raised by the current recording of IPPs
in the balance of payments and national accounts of countries extend
beyond this simple example (which correctly records ﬂows in line with
current standards and guidelines). Often, for example, the national accounts in the economy of the parent company will record the asset, but
there will not be any ﬂows related to the use the owner makes of its
afﬁliates, which use is frequently driven by tax minimization purposes.
Often, as well, the owner may transfer the asset to an afﬁliate (such as
a special purpose enterprise, or SPE), with the parent and other afﬁliates making explicit payments to the SPE, again driven to do so by tax
minimization purposes.
What is clear from the above, therefore, is that ﬂows related to IPPs
require an extension of accounting systems beyond looking merely at
value-added ﬂows in order to fully understand who beneﬁts from trade
and indeed trade liberalization (and investment). Sometimes these ﬂows
will increase value-added, sometimes they will not. But in both cases
the beneﬁciary is arguably the same (the parent company).
But the ﬂows merely illustrate a wider issue, notwithstanding the
obvious implications they raise for multifactor productivity calculations. First, they illustrate the potential distortions that may arise when
one factors in the scope for transfer pricing manipulations. Second,
such interpretations extend beyond looking only at the conventional set
of assets recognized as such in the 2008 SNA. Other knowledge-based
assets, such as brands and organizational capital, can also increase an
afﬁliate’s value-added, and even though these assets are not recognized
in the SNA, the proﬁts recorded by the afﬁliate compensate for their use,
and these still ﬂow back to the parent, eventually, as reinvested earnings ﬂows in the accounts. But these ﬂows are typically not available
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on a bilateral partner country basis, let alone a partner country–industry
basis, which is what is needed to analyze trade in income analogously
with trade in value-added.
Recording these ﬂows, therefore, is crucial. Part of the solution
lies in producing supply-use tables (or indicators) that capture foreign
ownership. Clearly, it is unlikely that it will be feasible to produce
supply-use tables that capture foreign ownership by country for all of
the owners of the afﬁliates. But a separate breakdown of activities in
a supply-use table that differentiates between foreign- and domesticowned ﬁrms should be feasible, as it relates to conﬁdentiality rules and
burdens.
By supplementing this with bilateral trade in primary income statistics (a from-whom-to-whom framework) broken down by type of
income (in particular, reinvested earnings and interest), it should be
possible to create extensions to the trade-in-value-added accounting
framework by treating the primary income ﬂows (and components) as
if they were services produced by artiﬁcial industries in the host country
of the parent company.
Some of the tools to do this already exist. Foreign afﬁliate trade
statistics (FATS) can be combined, for example, with information in
supply-use tables that shows breakdowns based on ownership. And
there is also scope to link this further to balance-of-payment (BoP) data
ﬂows. The OECD is looking at developing a more detailed accounting
framework and set of recommendations in this area, which could form
the basis for estimating ﬂows of trade in income.
Figure 6.10 provides an illustration of the potential impact this may
have on our understanding of trade relationships. For illustrative purposes only, the operating surplus generated by U.S.-owned afﬁliates
in the “Chemicals and electronics” sector in Ireland (available from
FATS) is considered to be equivalent to value-added generated by U.S.
ﬁrms. These ﬂows can then be treated as exports from the United States
to those countries consuming the U.S. afﬁliate exports from Ireland,
revealing not insigniﬁcant changes in bilateral trade positions. For example, for France the trade deﬁcit in value-added terms becomes a trade
surplus again, which is what gross ﬂows show.
To further illustrate the potential impact of accounting for these
ﬂows between multinationals, about 70 percent of China’s gross hightech exports were made by foreign afﬁliates in 2009, according to data
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Figure 6.10 U.S. Trade Balance, Adjusted for U.S. Afﬁliates’ Exports
from Ireland, $US Billions, 2009
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NOTE: “VA” stands for “value-added.”
SOURCE: OECD calculations, based on the OECD-WTO Trade in Value-Added
(TiVA) database and the OECD Activity of Multinational Enterprises (AMNE) database.

supplied by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. Furthermore, between
1995 and 2007, Japanese foreign afﬁliates increased their employment
in China eightfold, from just over one hundred thousand employees to
more than one million, and in Thailand fourfold, from over one hundred thousand to over four hundred thousand; the pattern was similar in
other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, such
as the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. And from 1995 to 2009,
Japan’s primary income trade surplus increased by around $100 billion,
more than offsetting the $50 billion reduction in its gross trade surplus
over the same period.
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Trade in CO2 (and other emissions)
One additional extension that follows from the accounting framework for trade in value-added (and trade in jobs) is carbon footprints.
Carbon footprint calculations are typically estimated using I-O tables
(Ahmad and Wyckoff 2003).
Incorporating capital ﬂows
Other areas where extensions to the accounting framework would
be desirable include the contribution made by capital more generally.
Because of the way capital (gross ﬁxed capital formation) is recorded in
the accounting system, analyses that look at trade in value-added do not
fully capture how production across countries is linked and how capital
goods (and services) produced in one country contribute to the valueadded in another. For example, all the value-added exported by Japan
in producing machinery for manufacturers in China will be recorded as
Chinese imports from Japan. But, arguably, the capital service values
embodied in the goods produced and exported by China should show
Japan as the beneﬁciary. This requires high-quality capital ﬂow (and
capital stock) matrices.
Distribution sectors and trade
One ﬁnal area of work that merits attention concerns the value added
by distributors through sales of ﬁnal imported goods. The estimates of
trade in value-added do not reveal how cheap imports are also important to retailers, who are able to generate domestic value-added through
sales to consumers. Tariff measures will necessarily impose additional
costs on these goods which, all other things being equal, could suppress
demand and so in turn lead to lower value-added in the distribution
sectors. The OECD is also considering how these estimates could be
incorporated within its accounting framework, using margin rates for
all products in national supply-use tables, and through this usage motivating the further development of such data.
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Notes
1. See an application of international I-O in Escaith et al. (2011).
2. For more information on the database, see OECD (2013).
3. An OECD–World Bank workshop on “New Metrics for Global Value Chains” was
held on September 21, 2010. WTO hosted a “Global Forum on Trade Statistics” on
February 2–4, 2011, in collaboration with Eurostat, the United Nations Statistics
Division (UNSD), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD).
4. Some research-oriented initiatives have been using the GTAP database for international input-output data. This database is not, however, based on ofﬁcial sources
of statistics.
5. For more details, see OECD (2012b). The list of countries includes Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, the United States, Argentina, Brazil, China, Chinese Taipei, Cyprus,
India, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Romania, the Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, and Vietnam.
6. For more details, see OECD (2012a).
7. EBOPS stands for Extended Balance of Payments Services Classiﬁcation; see
the service list of EBOPS items at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/servicetrade/mr/
rfCommoditiesList.aspx.
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Estimating the economy-wide and sectoral domestic value-added in
exports requires an input-output (I-O) table with good information on
import uses. Normally, statistical agencies do not compile this information at the sectoral level. The I-O experts either break down the data
on total import uses or make an inference from available but limited
microdata. In so doing, they often explicitly rely on the proportionality assumption to assign imported inputs to different sectors, or else
they implicitly resort to the proportionality assumption when making
generalizations about the import use patterns by a sample of ﬁrms.
However, this assumption is hardly valid in reality, because individual
sectors normally do not have the same patterns of import use as the
overall economy, and also because ﬁrms are heterogeneous and they
often behave differently in international trade (Bernard et al. 2007). As
a result, these approaches tend to lead to biased estimates, as shown by
the microdata work at the U.S. Census Bureau (Feenstra and Jensen
2012) and the microdata work for Germany (Winkler and Milberg
2009). Meanwhile, I-O-based trade-related estimates are sensitive to
the structure of the import matrix, such as for emission estimation, as
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shown in Dietzenbacher, Pei, and Yang (2012), and for vertical specialization (VS) estimation, as in Yang et al. (2013).1
Therefore, when the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
launched the “Made in the World Initiative” in 2011 to promote worldwide research on domestic value-added share (DVS) estimation and to
enhance understanding of the global value chain, they pointed out that
“the key challenges in the immediate future concern the quality of trade
statistics and the assumptions made to allocate imports to users” and
that linking traders to the manufacturers would form an important part
of the work (Ahmad et al. 2011). In addition to the Trade by Enterprise
Characteristics (TEC) joint project with Eurostat, the OECD’s exercise
with Turkish microdata is another attempt to reveal the patterns of ﬁrm
heterogeneity in trade and production and, based on that, to improve
trade in value-added measures (Ahmad and Araujo 2011).
There are two threads of methodologies with which to estimate China’s DVS in exports under an I-O framework: one relies on assumptions
or optimization programming to derive key coefﬁcients, and the other
employs real data to obtain these coefﬁcients. The former approach
includes the work of Dean, Fung, and Wang (2011) and of Koopman,
Wang, and Wei (2012). Koopman, Wang, and Wei split the ofﬁcially
published Chinese 2007 I-O tables into two parts—1) processing and
2) normal trade—in their modiﬁed Chinese I-O tables. Ma, Wang, and
Zhu (2013) take the modiﬁed I-O table that Koopman, Wang, and Wei
developed and further split it by producers’ ownership. In doing so,
Ma, Wang, and Zhu also incorporate micro ﬁrm-level data and other
real data. Even though their approach contains real data, it falls into the
former category, given the complexity of the I-O tables’ structure after
two rounds of splitting and the lack of import-use information in the
microdata, as will be shown in this chapter.
On the other hand, the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)
follows the latter approach. When compiling China’s 2007 input-output
table, NBS researchers for the ﬁrst time used a survey of ﬁrms to prepare the import-use coefﬁcients. Recently, in updating the I-O tables
and also as China’s response to the WTO/OECD Made in the World
Initiative, the NBS decided to employ import-use matrices from two
sources. While the NBS will keep the previous 2007 matrix, the Chinese General Administration of Customs has started its own indepen-
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dent ﬁrm survey on import uses. The approaches by the two agencies
are quite different. The NBS has jurisdiction over enterprise production data collection, and its survey is an added module to its existing
annual survey on above-scale industrial production enterprises, called
the Annual Survey of Industrial Production (ASIP). On the other hand,
Customs is responsible for managing the customs clearance documents
provided by ﬁrms doing international trade. These ﬁrm-level trade data
form the basis on which Customs conducts the survey.
The two agencies are trying to reach the same goal from different
starting points and by taking different routes. The two microdata sets
have rich information on ﬁrms’ production, ﬁnancial positions, and trade.
Combined, they would be able to provide much-needed information on
ﬁrms’ import uses. However, the two threads of similar work are independent of each other. Therefore, among various sampling problems, the
biggest problem with the two approaches is that neither of them is based
on prior knowledge of both production and trade distribution patterns in
the population.2 Although this chapter does not include them, surveys on
import uses by the two agencies serve as background for our analysis of
the combined production and trade microdata sets on import uses.
Surveys are costly. Unless existing microdata are exhausted, surveys would not be efﬁcient and, even worse, could lead to aggregation
bias if they were not based on samples representative of Chinese ﬁrms’
trade and production patterns, as the proportionality assumption would
be implicitly applied.
Needless to say, the ideal approach is to make the best use of existing microdata on trade and production. Upward, Wang, and Zheng
(2013) made the ﬁrst attempt to do so in estimating China’s DVS in
exports. However, their work suffers from several ﬂaws. These include
•

proportionality assumption on import uses between domestic
and export production,

•

no differentiation regarding the proprietary rights between
the two submodes of processing trade—1) processing with
imported materials (PWIM) and 2) processing and assembly
with provided imported materials (P&A),

•

ignoring trading agency issues,

•

treating the import and export data in the ﬁrm-level trade data
set as having been used or produced by the same ﬁrms, and
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•

giving no consideration of the imported inputs embodied in
domestic inputs.

Despite the above problems, Upward, Wang, and Zheng (2013)
represent the right direction in which to move to pursue the microdata
work in order to estimate the Chinese DVS in exports. This chapter
follows this direction. Speciﬁcally, like Upward, Wang, and Zheng, we
combine the two microdata sets used respectively and independently
by the NBS and Customs. We identify the production enterprises that
also do international trade by linking the two data sets. This enables us
to reveal the patterns of Chinese ﬁrm heterogeneity in trade and production, which justify further exploration of the microdata in import
uses and DVS estimation. After appropriately treating the problems in
Upward, Wang, and Zheng, identiﬁed above, this chapter provides various estimates of DVS boundaries.
The chapter has ﬁve sections, counting this one. The next section,
“Chinese I-O Table Development: Backgrounding the Microdata Work,”
introduces the recent development of Chinese I-O tables as background
for our microdata work. Section Three, “Chinese Microdata and Firm
Heterogeneity,” explores the merged microdata and reports various measures of ﬁrm exposure to international trade to illustrate not only the
within-sample but also the between-sample ﬁrm heterogeneity. Section
Four, “Estimating DVS: Boundaries and Conﬁdence,” estimates Chinese DVS in exports based not only on various samples pulled from the
microdata population but also on the aggregate commodity-level trade
data. It provides lower and upper boundaries for DVS and the associated
conﬁdence levels. Section Five concludes with our speculation on how a
ﬁrm survey project might improve the VS/DVS estimation.

CHINESE I-O TABLE DEVELOPMENT: BACKGROUNDING
THE MICRODATA WORK
Recent Chinese I-O Table Development
As a tool of central planning, Chinese I-O tables traditionally had a
domestic focus when the country was closed to the outside world, before
1978. The treatment of international trade in the I-O tables was mini-
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mal, assuming as it did that domestic and imported goods were identical. But with China increasingly opening up to foreign trade and investment, this assumption was later relaxed so that domestic and imported
goods were treated as differentiated products. Pioneered by Chen et al.
(2001) and continued in Chen et al. (2012), the structure of Chinese
I-O tables has undergone dramatic change in the past decade to reﬂect
the unique feature of Chinese foreign trade: About half of the country’s
foreign trade is administered under the processing trade regime. The
separation of processing trade, normal trade, and domestic production
in the Chinese I-O tables is justiﬁed by the theory of ﬁrm heterogeneity
(Melitz 2003). The new I-O table has a rich trade structure and requires
more information to ﬁll in the coefﬁcients, including the import-use
matrices, which are crucial to estimating DVS in exports.
DVS Estimation without Import-Use Information
What can we know about the Chinese DVS in exports if we do not
know the information on import uses? Table 7.1 shows several estimates based on public data. When talking about DVS in exports, one
may be quick to think of it as a country’s net exports in goods and services, or its current account balances. This is true only if imports used
for ﬁnal domestic consumption replace the same amount of domestic
resources, which would otherwise be used for the same domestic production but instead are allocated to export production. This is a strong
assumption. More often than not, imports for ﬁnal domestic use are not
perfect substitutes for goods or services in the export sector. This proxy
overestimates the foreign content in exports or underestimates the DVS
in exports. The proxy could be treated as the lower bound of the real
DVS in exports. As shown in Table 7.1, this measure of lower-bound
DVS (Total DVS1_lower) ranges between 8.2 and 25.3 percent over the
period 2001–2010, reaching its high of 25.3 percent in 2007.
Furthermore, by breaking down Chinese foreign trade into normal
and processing trade, the numbers for which are readily available from
major Chinese government Web sites, we could treat processing imports
as the only imported intermediates used for exports. This allows us to
obtain an estimate of lower-bound vertical specialization, or VS, ranging from 26.4 to 37.5 percent over 2001–2010 and measuring 30.3 percent for 2007, which translates into an upper bound of DVS in exports
of 69.7 percent for that year (Total DVS2_upper in Table 7.1).
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Table 7.1 Estimates of Domestic Value-Added Shares in Exports without Import-Use Information (%)
CA balances/
L&M ﬁrms
Total
total exports
Processing
Processing
Processing
Processing
imports/
imports/
imports/
imports/
total
Total
Total
total
processing
Total
processing
DVS3_upper
exports
DVS2_upper
exports
exports
exports
Year DVS1_lower
49.2
50.8
35.3
64.7
64.9
10.6
63.7
2001
2002
11.5
67.9
37.5
62.5
67.9
51.0
49.0
2003
8.2
67.4
37.2
62.8
67.3
51.1
48.9
2004
8.3
67.6
37.4
62.6
69.9
50.6
49.4
2005
16.4
65.8
36.0
64.0
67.9
49.6
50.4
2006
21.6
63.0
33.2
66.8
62.4
44.8
55.2
2007
25.3
59.6
30.3
69.7
57.6
40.5
59.5
2008
24.4
56.0
26.4
73.6
—
—
—
2009
18.3
54.9
26.8
73.2
—
—
—
2010
14.7
56.4
26.5
73.5
—
—
—
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In short, with the data on current account balances and the Chinese
trade statistics alone, we can at best estimate only a range of Chinese
DVS in exports, which for 2007 is 25.3 to 69.7 percent. To narrow down
the lower and upper boundaries, we need to explore other data sources,
which is the focus of the remaining part of the chapter.
Microdata Approach: What Can We Do, and What Can’t We Do?
At the ﬁrm level, the Customs statistics have the same variables as
those in the commodity-level trade statistics. Together with the ﬁrm
production data, they raise the hope of estimating ﬁrm-level I-O tables.
However, the following three problems hamper our efforts to do so:
1) The production enterprise data contain only total input use,
but not its breakdown into domestic or foreign sources, or into
different sectors.
2) The production enterprise data, normally without an importuse module, do not have import information and only have
total exports. There is detailed import and export information
in the ﬁrm trade data set, but the trading companies may resell
the imports to other production ﬁrms and may also help export
products made by other ﬁrms.
3) Neither of the two data sets has interﬁrm transaction information in either inputs or ﬁnal products.
As a result, with the current Chinese ﬁrm-level data, it is difﬁcult to
give a precise DVS estimate. However, with rich information, it could
be used to reveal the stylized patterns of ﬁrms’ trade and production
and serve as the basis for sensible assumptions and for efﬁcient and
unbiased survey design.

CHINESE MICRODATA AND FIRM HETEROGENEITY
Chinese Microdata Sets and Their Matching
We use two sets of 2007 Chinese ﬁrm-level data. First, the Customs
data has product-level transaction information for 236,505 trading com-
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panies, which is the entire population of ﬁrm-level trade statistics. Second, ASIP data has 336,768 enterprises—all state-owned enterprises
and other enterprises with annual sales of more than 5 million yuan—
and covers 95 percent of industrial output and 98 percent of industrial
exports, approximately the whole population of the Chinese industrial
enterprises.
To merge the two data sets by ﬁrm name and other identifying information produces the linked data set, which is a subset of each of the
two data sets. This is a standard exercise for researchers working on
Chinese microdata. They may differ in speciﬁc matching criteria, but
they use a similar strategy and therefore produce similar overall results.
In this chapter, the matching exercise includes only trade data with nonzero exports and excludes those with zero exports but nonzero imports.
This is a shortcoming for research on import uses. In terms of ﬁrm size,
ﬁrms in the matched data set do both production and direct trade and
tend to be large and medium (L&M), while ﬁrms in the nonmatched
data set are generally small. Key summary statistics of the matching
exercise for this chapter are presented in Table 7.2.
Among the 336,768 ﬁrms in the ASIP data set and the 236,505
ﬁrms in the trade data set, only 65,545 ﬁrms are successfully matched,
accounting for 19.5 and 27.7 percent of the two data sets, respectively.
The shares are small, but they account for 82.9 percent of the total of
79,103 exporting ASIP ﬁrms. In terms of trade volume, the matched
ﬁrms handle 35.1 and 27.8 percent of the total exports for the two data
sets, respectively. The ASIP data set does not have the import variable,
and this data set accounts for only 16.9 percent of the total imports for
the trade data set, lower than the same export share. The output and
sales variables only appear in the ASIP data set, and they are almost the
same in value, roughly 40–41 trillion yuan in total and 21–22 trillion
yuan for exporting ASIP. Therefore, the L&M ﬁrms produce and sell
about 18.5 percent of all ASIP ﬁrms’ sales/output and 34.5 percent of
exporting ASIP ﬁrms’ sales/output.
There are several reasons that a large number of ﬁrms in the two
data sets are not matched, in addition to the lack of accurate identiﬁcation information. For the 80.5 percent of the total ASIP ﬁrms and the
17.1 percent of the exporting ASIP ﬁrms that are not matched, they
either do not export at all or do not export directly, and therefore their
names do not show up in the Customs registry. As for the 72.3 percent
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Table 7.2 Summary Statistics of the 2007 Enterprise and Trade Data
Data Set
Firm numbers Exports Imports Output
Sales
ASIP
336,768
7.34
40.50
40.00
Exporting ASIP

79,103

7.34

236,505

9.27

7.27

L&M (matched)

65,545

2.58

L&M ASIP exp > 0

50,277

L&M imp > 0

37,536

Trade data

21.90

21.30

1.23

7.54

7.34

2.31

1.05

5.95

5.81

2.17

1.23

5.48

5.38

NOTE: Values for “Exports,” “Imports,” “Output,” and “Sales” columns are in trillions
of yuan. “ASIP” stands for “Annual Survey of Industrial Production.” “L&M” stands
for “large and medium-sized ﬁrms.” Blank cell = data not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from National Bureau of Statistics of
China Web site and China Customs Statistics (CCS).

of the ﬁrms in the trade data set that are not matched, they could be pure
trading companies with no production at all, or they could be production ﬁrms that are not included in the ASIP data set.
In the L&M data set, there are two subsets that are used in this
chapter. The subset “L&M ASIP exp > 0” represents the ﬁrms whose
exports in the production data are also positive. The last row in Table
7.2 shows a subset of the matched data with positive imports (L&M
imp > 0). This is the data set that Upward, Wang, and Zheng (2013) use
in estimating China’s DVS in exports. Because it is the smallest sample
in terms of number of ﬁrms, its representativeness of the whole population is in doubt, and both ﬁrm heterogeneity within the data set and ﬁrm
heterogeneity across samples deserve careful scrutiny if the aggregate
DVS is to be derived from it.
Firm Heterogeneity in Trade and Production Patterns
The intermediates include two parts: 1) processing imports are
treated as intermediates, and 2) intermediates under normal imports are
identiﬁed with the “broad economic categories” (BEC) classiﬁcation
developed by the United Nations Statistics Division. Because of the
existence of two submodes of processing imports, two different deﬁnitions are adopted for imported intermediates under processing imports
in estimating DVS. One deﬁnes all processing imports as intermedi-
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ates, and the other includes only processing with imported materials, or
PWIM. To be consistent, the second deﬁnition is adopted when ﬁrms’
input and output are used in estimating DVS together with import data,
as the P&A (processing and assembly with provided imported materials) imports are not counted as input and not part of the output, either.
Trade intensity by ownership is shown in Table 7.3. The shares of
intermediate imports in processing exports are listed in the ﬁrst two
columns. In comparing the shares in the L&M samples with those in
the total population of trade statistics, we see that collective enterprises,
wholly foreign-funded enterprises, and joint ventures behave similarly,
whereas state-owned enterprises and private ﬁrms show signiﬁcant differences. These differences possibly stem from the high concentration
of pure trading companies among state-owned trading enterprises and
the prevalence of small private ﬁrms in China’s processing trade sector,
since neither of these concentrations is included in the L&M samples.
In both the total population and the L&M samples, only wholly foreignfunded enterprises have higher-than-average shares.
In the third and fourth columns in Table 7.3, normal imports of
intermediates (deﬁned in the BEC classiﬁcation as a share of normal
exports) are listed, showing large differences between the L&M samples and the population for all types of ﬁrms. Therefore, L&M samples
are not representative of the population for this indicator either. Foreign
ﬁrms (wholly foreign-funded ﬁrms and joint ventures) and state-owned
enterprises have higher-than-average shares in both the total population
and the L&M samples.3
In terms of the share of processing exports in total exports, shown in
the ﬁfth and sixth columns in Table 7.3, foreign ﬁrms (wholly foreignfunded ﬁrms and joint ventures) have the highest shares, and they are
even higher in the L&M samples (85.9 and 65.5 percent, respectively),
far ahead of the closest state-owned enterprises (34.2 percent). But the
opposite is true for normal export share in total exports, as foreign ﬁrms
have the lowest shares, shown in the seventh and eighth columns.
Across and within sample variations
Firm heterogeneity can be revealed in many ways. As we report in
an earlier version of this chapter, which is available on the Web (Yao,
Ma, and Pei 2013), when constructing export intensity (export/output)
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Table 7.3 Use of Imported Intermediates and Exports Breakdown by Firm Type, 2007 (%)

Formula
Firm type

Imported intermediates as share of export value
Processing imports/
Normal BEC input
processing exports
imports/normal exports
Total
L&M ﬁrms
Total
L&M ﬁrms

Share of exports by customs category
Processing exports/
Normal exports/
total exports
total exports
Total
L&M ﬁrms
Total
L&M ﬁrms

Collective enterprises

41.6

41.0

37.8

14.9

24.1

15.4

75.9

84.6

Wholly foreign-funded
enterprises
Joint ventures

63.1

61.9

78.7

52.4

81.8

85.9

18.2

14.1

48.3

46.7

73.7

59.2

59.7

65.5

40.3

34.5

Private ﬁrms

58.7

47.2

25.6

6.4

9.8

14.9

90.2

85.1

State-owned enterprises

63.4

38.0

104.4

64.3

26.6

34.2

73.4

65.8

All

59.7

57.6

62.7

40.7

50.6

70.4

49.4

29.6

NOTE: “L&M” stands for “large and medium-sized ﬁrms.” “BEC” stands for the “broad economic categories” classiﬁcation.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from National Bureau of Statistics of China Web site and China Customs Statistics (CCS).
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and intermediates import intensity (imports input/output and imports
input/input) indicators, we see considerable ﬁrm heterogeneity across
and within sectors or samples, as well as evidence of importing agency
problems, shown as larger-than-one intermediate import ratios over
total output or input. To put things in perspective, Table 7.4 assembles
some aggregate measures together with shares of value-added in output, with breakdown by ﬁrm ownership (domestic or foreign) and size.
For import intensity, large discrepancies exist between domestic and
foreign ﬁrms, as foreign ﬁrms’ import shares are much higher. There are
some differences across ﬁrm size but more differences within the same
size group for the share of imported input in total input, as shown by the
difference between the weighted and simple averages, where total input
value is used as the weight.
For export intensity, too, domestic and foreign ﬁrms behave differently: Again, foreign ﬁrms’ export shares are higher. Compared to the
“L&M ASIP exp > 0” sample, ﬁrm size matters more for the “Other
exporting ASIP” sample, in which larger ﬁrms tend to export a smaller
share of total output.
Value-added share in total output (Value-added/output) is a new
indicator. While the aggregate measures in the two samples are quite
similar, they can differ by as much as 6.3 and 58.6 percent, respectively,
for the sectors “Artcrafts and other manufacturing” (China Industrial
Classiﬁcation [CIC] 42) and “Tobacco” (CIC 16), as shown in the tables
of an earlier version of this chapter (Yao, Ma, and Pei 2013).
In summary, the existence of ﬁrm heterogeneity is extensive, and
the issues of proprietary rights in processing imports and trading agency
are real. These will complicate the efforts to estimate the DVS in Chinese exports.

ESTIMATING DVS: BOUNDARIES AND CONFIDENCE
Proportionality Assumption on Domestic and Export Production
Proportionality assumption regarding import uses means two things:
1) imports are proportionally allocated among different sectors, and
2) within each sector, they are further proportionally allocated between
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Table 7.4 Summary Indicators by Type of Ownership and Firm Size, 2007 (%)
Type of ownership
Firm size (no. of employees)
Indicator
Data set
Average
All
Domestic Foreign
<50
50–200 200–1,000 >1,000
Import input/
L&M
Weighted
22.8
6.3
29.4
28.7
24.6
21.3
23.9
input
across ﬁrms
59.0
22.0
71.0
38.0
57.4
69.5
29.7
Import input/
L&M
Weighted
17.3
4.8
22.2
21.6
18.6
16.2
18.2
output
across ﬁrms
16.1
5.3
19.6
18.9
15.8
15.4
18.5
Export/output
L&M
Weighted
45.6
37.0
59.5
55.0
50.1
50.8
52.5
across
ﬁ
ASIP exp > 0
62.1
51.1
68.9
58.9
60.9
63.8
62.6
rms
Other exporting Weighted
41.5
37.5
55.3
62.3
55.6
43.1
32.9
across ﬁrms
ASIP ﬁrms
66.7
64.3
71.4
70.5
69.4
62.8
46.2
Value-added/
L&M
Weighted
25.9
25.8
26.0
25.7
25.4
26.1
26.0
output
across ﬁrms
26.7
25.6
27.4
24.4
26.1
27.6
28.4
Other exporting Weighted
27.1
26.9
27.6
24.1
26.6
27.1
27.8
across ﬁrms
ASIP ﬁrms
28.3
27.5
30.0
23.8
27.5
31.1
31.8
NOTE: For the ﬁrst indicator, total input value is used as the weight, and for the remaining three indicators, output value is used as the
weight. “L&M” stands for “large and medium-sized ﬁrms.” “ASIP” stands for “Annual Survey of Industrial Production.”
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from National Bureau of Statistics of China Web site and China Customs Statistics (CCS).
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domestic and export production. If the importing agency problem could
be solved so that the import data truly reﬂected the amount of intermediate imports used in a ﬁrm’s production, then the L&M data set would
be able to remedy the ﬁrst problem. Thus, the importing agency issue is
a focus of this chapter. As for the second problem, unfortunately, ﬁrmlevel data alone are of little help, as they do not contain information
on how ﬁrms split intermediate imports between domestic and export
production.
When Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) ﬁrst employ I-O tables to estimate VS, they assume an equal percentage of foreign input in domestic output and exports. Upward, Wang, and Zheng (2013) retain this
assumption in estimating China’s vertical specialization (VS). Working
from a data set similar to L&M, Upward, Wang, and Zheng distinguish
between processing and normal trade and apply this assumption to normal trade only. That is, within normal trade, imports are allocated to
domestic and export production proportionally to domestic output and
normal exports. This assumption is oversimpliﬁed but still acceptable.
However, when Upward, Wang, and Zheng actually do the calculation,
they use the following formula to determine the ratio of intermediate
import in domestic output and normal exports:
(7.1)

 ݎ௨௪௭ ൌ

ܯ
.
ܻ െ ܺ

This is problematic, because imports for processing and assembly (M p&a)
in the trade data set are included only in X p but not in Y. Therefore, the
denominator in the above formula gives a lower value for domestic output and normal exports, or a higher share of foreign content in domestic
output and normal exports. M p&a accounts for 17.0 and 24.2 percent
of L&M processing imports and total processing imports, respectively,
and these are not trivial amounts. As such, the problem associated with
M p&a in the above formula cannot be ignored.
Imports for Processing and Assembly and a Lower VS Boundary
This chapter corrects this problem and modiﬁes the above formula
by deducting M p&a from processing exports when calculating the ratio
of normal intermediate imports deﬁned by BEC (M bec):
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(7.2)

ݎൌ

ܯ
ܯ
,
ൌ
ܻ െ ሺܺ  െ ܯƬ ሻ
ܰܦ

where DN represents domestic output and normal exports.
Export production often uses more foreign inputs than domestic
production. This can be seen from trade intensity measures by ownership breakdown in Tables 7.3 and 7.4, where foreign-funded enterprises
(FFEs) have higher shares of intermediate imports in normal exports,
total input, and total output. Because FFEs dominate Chinese foreign
trade in both imports and exports, a link can be established showing
that export production has higher shares of foreign intermediates than
domestic production. Also, considering that a domestic content requirement is normally imposed on FFEs for domestic production, a lower
bound of VS exists as a result of this policy. In fact, the proportionality assumption regarding the import uses among domestic and export
production, as reﬂected in Equation (7.2), can be regarded as the lower
bound:
(7.3)

ܸܵ ௪ ൌ ܯ 

ܯ
ܺ  ൌ ܯ   ݎൈ ܺ  .
ܻ െ ሺܺ  െ ܯƬ ሻ

Trading Agency Problem
Imports and exports in the above equations mean the actual imports
used as inputs by the ﬁrms and the actual exports produced by the ﬁrms.
Because of the trading agency problem, trade volume from the trade
data set does not meet this requirement at the ﬁrm level. However, since
the L&M data already screened out the pure trading companies, production ﬁrms doing trading agency business are more likely to deal with
ﬁrms in the same sector. Based on this assumption, we ﬁrst sum up
the variables across ﬁrms within a sector and then proceed to estimate
sectoral VS using that formula. By so doing, we neutralize the trading
agency problem among ﬁrms within a sector, but we also risk introducing aggregation bias. This can be illustrated by the following equations:

ܯ

ܯ

ൈ ܺ ,
ܰܦ

(7.4)

ܸܵ௪

(7.5)

ܸܵ ௪ ൌ  ܯ 
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(7.6)

σ ܺ
ܺ
ܸܵ ௪ െ  ܸܵ௪ ൌ  ቆ
െ
ቇ ൈ ܯ .
ܰܦ σ ܰܦ

Because both within and between sectors variations could be large,
as suggested in the section titled “Chinese Microdata and Firm Heterogeneity,” the two approaches may generate different sectoral VS, as
the right-hand side of Equation (7.6) is not always zero. This potential bias can also occur when estimation is done at the whole manufacturing level. The lower bound of VS thus should be treated with less
conﬁdence.4
Upper VS Boundary
After determining that the estimation of the lower bound of VS
should be treated with less conﬁdence, we now turn to the upper-bound
VS estimation. As exports use more intermediate imports than domestic
production, the upper limit of VS can be achieved by assuming all intermediate imports are used for export production:
(7.7)

ܸܵ ௨ ൌ ܯ  ܯ .

In contrast to the lower-bound VS, the upper-bound VS estimate is
invariant of the level of analysis, commodity, or sectoral level. It is not
subject to the constraint of the domestic content requirement, either. As
a result, the conﬁdence level is high for it, as long as we are conﬁdent
in the BEC deﬁnition of intermediates.5
Results and Discussions
Sectoral and whole manufacturing shares of VS (VSS) over two
samples, “L&M imp > 0” and “L&M,” are reported in Table 7.5.6 The
lower bound of VSS is converted into the upper bound of DVS through
the following formula:
(7.8)

 ܸܵܦൌ ͳ െ

ܸܵ
ൌ ͳ െ ܸܵܵ .
ܺ

Across all sectors, DVS upper bounds are 61.0 and 67.2 percent for
the respective two samples. Among all sectors, DVS’s in the CIC sectors “Food manufacturing” and “Beverages” (CIC 14 and 15), “Furni-
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Table 7.5 VS Share (VSS) and DVS by Sector, Estimated with
Microdata (%)
L&M imp > 0
L&M
Total
Total
VSS_
DVS4_
VSS_
DVS5_
lower
upper
lower
upper
CICa Sector description
13
Agriculture and food processing
32.2
67.8
20.5
79.5
14
Food manufacturing
11.5
88.5
8.3
91.7
15
Beverages
8.2
91.8
5.5
94.5
16
Tobacco
56.7
43.3
56.7
43.3
17
Textile
23.1
76.9
16.2
83.8
18
Clothing, footwear, and caps
27.9
72.1
22.7
77.3
19
Leather, fur, feather, and products
35.7
64.3
28.1
71.9
20
Timber and wood products
24.6
75.4
16.2
83.8
21
Furniture
12.5
87.5
10.2
89.8
22
Paper and products
56.9
43.1
50.3
49.7
23
Printing and recording
26.9
73.1
24.0
76.0
24
Culture, educ., and sports products
23.7
76.3
20.2
79.8
25
Energy resource processing
16.6
83.4
6.1
93.9
26
Raw chem. materials and products
49.0
51.0
39.2
60.8
27
Medicines
19.7
80.3
14.3
85.7
28
Chemical ﬁbers
51.8
48.2
48.8
51.2
29
Rubber
39.2
60.8
35.2
64.8
30
Plastics
55.1
44.9
47.2
52.8
31
Nonmetallic mineral products
17.8
82.2
11.7
88.3
32
Ferrous metals processing
72.8
27.2
37.9
62.1
33
Nonferrous metals processing
50.9
49.1
36.8
63.2
34
Metal products
23.6
76.4
18.9
81.1
35
General purpose machinery
22.7
77.3
18.3
81.7
36
Special purpose machinery
29.0
71.0
25.7
74.3
37
Transport equipment
30.0
70.0
26.2
73.8
39
Electrical machinery & equipment
35.6
64.4
30.8
69.2
40
Electronics
66.6
33.4
64.9
35.1
41
Measuring, cultural, ofﬁce machine
42.0
58.0
39.2
60.8
42
Artcrafts and other manufacturing
30.9
69.1
21.8
78.2
43
Waste recycling and processing
88.8
11.2
80.7
19.3
All
39.0
61.0
32.8
67.2
NOTE: Gross output (rather than total sales) is adopted in the denominator. “VSS”
stands for “vertical specialization share.” “DVS” stands for “domestic value-added
share.” CIC category 38 has been omitted from the table.
a
“CIC” stands for China Industrial Classiﬁcation.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from National Bureau of Statistics of
China Web site and China Customs Statistics (CCS).
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ture” (CIC 21), “Petroleum and coking processing” (shown as “Energy
resource processing,” CIC 25), and “Nonmetallic mineral products”
(CIC 31) are among the highest, because these domestic sectors are
not as much globalized as the sectors with the lowest DVS’s, such as
“Communication, computer, and other electronic equipment” (shown as
“Electronics,” CIC 40) and “Waste recycling and disposal” (shown as
“Waste recycling and processing,” CIC 43). The DVS patterns are consistent with import intensity patterns reported in an earlier version of
this chapter (Yao, Ma, and Pei 2013), where sectors with higher DVS’s
tend to have lower intensity of intermediate imports, and vice versa.
Comparing the two data samples, DVS’s in the “L&M” sample are
consistently higher than those in the “L&M imp > 0” sample, simply
because the former data set has records with zero imports. Firms that
do not import intermediates may buy from other production ﬁrms that
are also in the importing agency business. This is another example of
the fact that sampling matters in DVS estimation and the view that the
trading agency problem deserves careful treatment.
Table 7.6 reports the aggregate DVS’s, both lower and upper
bounds, for overall and normal trade estimated with different data sets
and intermediate deﬁnitions. Some of the numbers are drawn from previous tables. The numbers with superscript “a” are the estimates with
Table 7.6 Estimated DVS Boundaries (%)
Total DVS
Data scope and imports input Lower Upper
CA balances (DVS1)
25.3
Total PI (DVS2)
69.7
L&M PI (DVS3)
59.5
L&M imp > 0 PI BEC (DVS4) 50.7
61.0a
L&M PI BEC (DVS5)
58.5
67.2a
Total PI BEC
38.9
68.0a

Normal DVS Shares of
Lower Upper P&A in PI

66.9
77.8
37.3

94.5a
96.4a
96.3a

17.0
17.0
24.2

NOTE: “DVS” stands for “domestic value-added share.” “P&A” stands for “processing
and assembly.” “PI” stands for “processing imports.” “L&M” stands for “large and
medium-sized ﬁrms.” “BEC” stands for the “broad economic categories” classiﬁcation. Blank cell = data not applicable.
a
Signiﬁes a number that is an estimate with less conﬁdence.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from National Bureau of Statistics of
China Web site and China Customs Statistics (CCS).
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less conﬁdence, in part because of the ﬁrm heterogeneity issue, as discussed earlier in regard to Equation (7.6).7 As a reminder, Table 7.6 also
lists the shares of processing and assembly imports in total processing
imports for the three data sets affected by the proprietary rights issue.
Taking this issue into consideration helps improve the conﬁdence level
in the GVC upper bounds for the three data sets.
Clearly, the range of DVS estimates varies, depending on the scope
of the data and the associated deﬁnitions of intermediates. For overall
DVS, both lower and upper bounds are estimated with conﬁdence, and
the true value could be anywhere in the range of 38.9 to 69.7 percent.
For normal trade, the DVS could be anywhere in a much wider range,
from 37.3 to 96.3 percent.
What have we learned from our DVS estimation results? First of all,
DVS estimates are sensitive to data samples. Cross-sample variations
for lower and upper DVS bounds as well as the ranges of possible DVS
are signiﬁcant, especially when compared to the overall DVS estimates.
This suggests that none of the samples appear to be representative of
the population.
Second, as reﬂected by the wide range of possible GVC values,
DVS estimates are sensitive to assumptions on import uses. This is intuitive, as the import uses across sectors and across domestic and export
production directly allocate the ﬂow of foreign intermediates within a
country, and they ultimately determine the sectoral and overall DVS’s.
It is also in line with previous ﬁndings in I-O table literature—e.g.,
Dietzenbacher, Pei, and Yang (2012) and Yang et al. (2013).
Given the uncertainties surrounding the true DVS numbers, it is natural and logical to speculate about a ﬁrm survey project on import uses
that aims to obtain additional information for better DVS estimation.

CONCLUSION
This chapter does not estimate the exact true DVS value because
we do not make arbitrary assumptions. Instead, we take stock of the
possible estimates, and in so doing we clarify several conceptual issues,
which helps to improve the methodology in the literature. We leave a
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wide range for possible DVS estimates and only expect them to be narrowed down by future ﬁrm survey work.
Firm-level data have rich information that could be used to correct
the bias in the import-use matrix caused by proportionality assumption
in I-O table development. To realize the potential of such data, surveys
need to overcome the nonrepresentative sampling and trading agency
problems. They can do so, among other ways, by taking the following
steps:
•

First, identify the small production ﬁrms from ﬁrm-level trade
data. This could be done by ﬁrst screening the nonmatched
small trading ﬁrms and then tracking them through ﬁrms’ contact information to verify their production status. By incorporating these small trade and production ﬁrms, the L&M data set
could be expanded to include large, medium, and small ﬁrms
(LMS).

•

Second, select a sample of ﬁrms from LMS to be covered by
the survey. The questionnaire should include questions on the
amount of imports that are for a ﬁrm’s own use, the exports produced by customs regime, and the amount split between domestic production and export production, among others.

Of course, various other aspects of the ﬁrm distribution should also
be considered, such as ownership, sector, location, and trading partners.
Firms are able to answer questions regarding direct import uses, but
it is difﬁcult for ﬁrms to know the uses of imports embodied in domestic
inputs. Probably this is the only area that would require an assumption.
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1. The term “vertical specialization” is borrowed from Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001)
and is deﬁned as the value of imported intermediates in exports.
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2. Details on the NBS and Customs import use surveys are documented in an earlier
version of this chapter (Yao, Ma, and Pei 2013), which is available on the Web.
3. The higher shares for the state-owned companies are either because some of the
traditional state trading companies have diversiﬁed their operations into production business and therefore are kept in the L&M data set, or because import of
primary resources is often conducted by state-owned production enterprises with
overseas investment.
4. Less conﬁdence in the lower bound of VS is also due to lack of an exact minimum
for domestic content requirement.
5. According to Timmer (2012), 14 percent of BEC codes can be both ﬁnal goods
and intermediates.
6. We do not attempt to compare the numerical results with those from other studies
because our methodology is based on a different set of concepts, which makes it
uncomparable.
7. VS is ﬁrst estimated at sector level and then summed up across sectors. For VS
estimation with the entirety of commodity trade data, in the last row of Table 7.6,
there is no link between production output and trade data, and estimation can only
be done with data summed over the whole database.
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The Balance of Payments and International Investment Position
Manual, Sixth Edition (BPM), and the System of National Accounts
2008 (SNA) both recommend attributing production to countries based
on the residence of productive entities. The residence of an entity is
generally determined to be the country in which a signiﬁcant amount of
production takes place. In cases where an entity has little or no physical
presence, residence is determined as the country in which the entity is
legally incorporated or registered. In the case of a multinational enterprise (MNE), the residency-based framework of the BPM and the SNA
requires that the activities of afﬁliated entities resident in different
countries be measured separately in order to accurately attribute the
economic activity of each entity to the country in which it is resident.1
Likewise, the residency-based framework requires that cross-border
transactions between afﬁliated entities resident in different countries be
included in balance of payments statistics.
For practical reasons, statisticians generally measure production
and other attributes of MNEs based on accounting data. While the
BPM (International Monetary Fund 2009) and the SNA (European
Commission et al. 2009) recommend the residency-based framework
for attributing measured production, attribution under the framework
is not limited to a speciﬁc accounting treatment. In this chapter, we
focus on formulary apportionment as an alternative treatment to sepa-
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rate accounting, which is the basis for current measures of production.
Under separate accounting, accounting records are maintained separately for each entity within an MNE. As a result, accounting measures
such as costs and proﬁts are attributed to afﬁliated entities based on
each entity’s purpose within the structure of the MNE and not necessarily on the economic activity of the entity. In other words, accounting measures recorded under separate accounting may not accurately
reﬂect the economic activity of the entity. Formulary apportionment
is commonly required by U.S. state corporate income tax regulations
to determine the income attributable to the state for a corporation that
operates in multiple states. Rather than keeping separate accounting
records for operations in each state, the corporation keeps consolidated
records and attributes income to a state based on prescribed apportionment factors—such as employment, property, and sales—that reﬂect
where income is actually earned.
Residency-based separate accounting may be particularly problematic for statisticians in cases where production is accomplished with
inputs that are shared by multiple entities within the same MNE. Shared
inputs may include intangible property such as patents, trademarks, formulas, processes, and so forth, or they may include headquarter services such as accounting, ﬁnance, and marketing, which do not need to
be physically located at an entity in order to provide service (Helpman
1984; Markusen 1984, 1997). If a statistician is able to directly observe
the economic activity of the entity in order to determine actual production, residency-based separate accounting may pose no particular problem. However, if the statistician only has accounting data for the entity,
then identifying the location of production, which is the essence of the
residency-based framework, is particularly difﬁcult when the entity
employs relatively few or no local inputs such as labor or property,
plant, and equipment (PPE) but reports relatively signiﬁcant accounting
measures related to shared inputs. As shared inputs become more common and as MNE activities increase, challenges encountered under the
residency-based framework become more important in the U.S. international transactions accounts (ITAs) and the U.S. National Income and
Product Accounts (NIPAs) (Lipsey 2009, 2010; United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 2011).
As is consistent with the residency-based framework, the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) attributes production to a foreign

Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb 230

2/16/2015 8:40:09 AM

Foreign Afﬁliates of U.S. Parents 231

afﬁliate of a U.S. parent according to the country in which the afﬁliate
is resident. If the afﬁliate has little or no physical presence in the country, the BEA follows the BPM and SNA recommendations to attribute
production to the afﬁliate as long as the afﬁliate is legally incorporated
or registered in the country. In addition, the BEA measures production based on accounting measures reported for the afﬁliate, and the
accounting measures are determined under separate accounting according to generally accepted U.S. accounting principles. Thus, if an MNE
is structured in a way that attributes accounting measures to an afﬁliate
based on economic activity resulting from shared inputs that are not
actually employed by the afﬁliate, production may be attributed to an
afﬁliate with no economic activity.
In this chapter, we use formulary apportionment, which is also
consistent with the residency-based framework, as an alternative for
separate accounting to measure value-added at foreign afﬁliates of U.S.
parents. We ﬁnd that overall reattributions from foreign afﬁliates to
U.S. parents are relatively small—less than 5 percent of total valueadded attributed to all majority-owned foreign afﬁliates and U.S. parents under separate accounting. In contrast, reattributions across global
regions including Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle
East are greater than 10 percent of value-added under separate accounting. Moreover, reattributions for foreign afﬁliates are greater than 10
percent of value-added under separate accounting for all industry sectors except administration, information, and transportation.
In addition to applying formulary apportionment to reattribute
value-added, we report preliminary results to reattribute service imports
and exports between U.S. parents and their foreign afﬁliates. We ﬁnd
a relatively large decrease in imports but no meaningful change in
exports. The overall effect on gross domestic product (GDP) is only a
small increase—approximately 0.1 percent. Based on our preliminary
results, we expect to be able to provide a complete picture of the U.S.
current account under formulary apportionment in a future paper.
Using factor shares to evaluate the results, we conclude that valueadded attributed to foreign afﬁliates and U.S. parents under formulary
apportionment yields a picture of measured production by industry
sector and country that is more congruent with economic activity than
related measures generated under separate accounting. Thus, formulary
apportionment appears to be a viable alternative to separate accounting
under the residency-based framework of the BPM and the SNA.
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Following this introductory section, the chapter is organized into
the ﬁve sections that follow. The next section provides an overview of
related literature. The third section outlines the BEA’s current framework for measuring production based on residency-based separate
accounting and outlines the proposed framework for attributing production based on residency-based formulary apportionment. The fourth
section describes the BEA’s survey data on the operations of MNEs.
The ﬁfth section presents the results of the formulary apportionment.
The last section offers a conclusion.

RELATED LITERATURE
To provide context for our work, we draw upon four distinct but
related lines of literature. First, we borrow features from the industrialorganization (IO) literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) and
trade to outline a simple production model for foreign afﬁliates that
underlies our choice of formulary apportionment. Second, we describe
the international guidelines that provide a framework for organizing
ofﬁcial statistics on FDI and trade. Third, we review the literature that
identiﬁes challenges encountered under the residency-based framework
and proposes alternative frameworks for organizing ofﬁcial statistics on
FDI and trade. Fourth and ﬁnally, we discuss the literature on formulary apportionment as it is applied in international taxation and identify
features of formulary apportionment as a tool for attributing measured
production to entities within an MNE.
Industrial-Organization Literature
The IO literature on FDI and trade focuses on adapting general equilibrium trade models to include endogenous MNEs. Early work explains
the origination of MNEs based on the organization of production into
one of two types (Caves 1971): 1) vertical integration (Brainard 1993;
Helpman 1984) and 2) horizontal integration (Brainard 1997; Markusen
1984). However, Markusen (1997) argues that the outcomes identiﬁed
by vertical and horizontal models face limitations based on underlying
assumptions; he constructs an alternative knowledge-capital model.

Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb 232

2/16/2015 8:40:09 AM

Foreign Afﬁliates of U.S. Parents 233

Regardless of how production is organized, a useful feature of each
of the IO models of FDI and trade is the inclusion of a local input and a
ﬁrm-speciﬁc shared input, which can be used jointly by multiple afﬁliates. Firm-speciﬁc inputs do not need to be physically present for production to take place, but ﬁrm-speciﬁc inputs cannot generate production without the local input. General equilibrium in each model results
under assumptions that include foreign afﬁliates that produce with constant returns to scale and operate in perfectly competitive markets. The
models also assume that production is separable across afﬁliates and
that markets are segmented.
International Guidelines
The international guidelines explain how ofﬁcial FDI and trade statistics should be constructed. In paragraph 4.11 of the BPM, an economy
is deﬁned as comprising “all the institutional units that are resident in a
particular economic territory.”2 One of the attributes of an institutional
unit is the existence of a complete set of accounting records (BPM para.
4.13[d]; SNA para. 4.2[d]), which implies that the possibility of separate
accounting is required under the residency-based framework. In addition, the international guidelines consider the possibility that production may be located somewhere other than the economic territory where
an entity is legally incorporated or registered. In particular, paragraph
4.134 of the BPM states, “A legal entity is resident in the economic territory under whose laws the entity is incorporated or registered. . . . It
must not be combined with entities resident in other economies. If [the
entity] has substantial operations in another economy, a branch may be
identiﬁed there.” In this case, the branch is treated as an institutional
unit subject to the criterion for accounting records (BPM para. 4.27[a]),
and the operations of the branch are to be attributed to the corresponding economic territory (BPM para. 4.26). Thus, as is consistent with
the IO literature on FDI and trade, the international guidelines consider
the possibility that factors of production may be located somewhere
within an MNE other than with an afﬁliate to which production would
be attributed based merely on legal incorporation or registration of the
afﬁliate. Furthermore, the criterion for accounting records does not rule
out formulary apportionment as an alternative to separate accounting
for either the measurement or the attribution of production at the afﬁli-
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ate. The intent of the guidelines is that production is attributed where it
is actually taking place.
Alternative Measurement Frameworks
Challenges in implementing the residency-based framework are
widely addressed in international discourse and academic literature. The
United Nations recently published a collection of papers that address the
impact of globalization on national accounts (United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe 2011). An entire chapter is dedicated to identifying and explaining challenges associated with allocating production
to national economies under a residency-based framework. Among the
challenges are the transfers of intangible property and the attribution of
associated income. However, the chapter does not offer any analysis to
identify the extent to which allocation of production may be incongruent with actual economic activity. Lipsey (2009, 2010) offers evidence
of possible distortions in U.S. outbound FDI and trade ﬂows present in
aggregate data published by the BEA for service industries. Lipsey suggests the distortions are a result of global structuring of MNEs and the
mobility of productive resources in the service industries. As a result, he
suggests but does not develop an alternative location-based framework
to accompany the residency-based framework for measuring trade in
services.
Early work also suggests supplemental frameworks for organizing FDI and trade statistics based on ownership. Baldwin and Kimura
(1998) ﬁnd that net sales activities of U.S. afﬁliates of foreign-based
MNEs to Americans and of foreign afﬁliates of U.S.-based MNEs to
foreigners are almost as high as measured U.S. imports and exports,
respectively. Kimura and Baldwin (1998) ﬁnd that FDI has an even
larger role in the Japanese economy. In each case, the authors use their
results to highlight the usefulness of an ownership-based framework.
Landefeld, Whichard, and Lowe (1993) explain and evaluate
ownership-based trade measures and propose an alternative residencybased trade measure that includes an adjustment for the net effect on
the U.S. economy of the operations of U.S.-owned companies abroad
and of foreign-owned companies in the United States. As a result of
the early work on alternative organizing frameworks, the BEA publishes annual ownership-based measures of the current account of the
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ITAs as a supplement to the residency-based framework (Whichard and
Lowe 1995). The ownership-based framework is fully consistent with
the international standards of the BPM and the SNA and combines with
the residency-based measures of U.S. imports and exports the transactions of afﬁliates that are not captured in the residency-based framework. While the ownership-based framework may address some of
the challenges encountered under the residency-based framework, the
ownership-based framework is not intended to identify the location of
production, which is the centerpiece for national economic accounting
purposes.
Formulary Apportionment Literature
While formulary apportionment is historically used in U.S. multistate taxation practice, the treatment of global income under formulary apportionment is also explored in research. In particular, some
researchers suggest formulary apportionment as an alternative to the
complexities of determining transfer prices and applying the arm’s
length standard in the determination of international tax obligations
of MNEs. Martens-Weiner (2006) discusses the problems related to
replacing separate accounting for companies operating in Europe with a
system of formulary apportionment for the European Union. The issues
span a spectrum including business attitudes toward formulary apportionment, designing an apportionment formula, and tax administration
and compliance.
In related work, Fuest, Hemmelgarn, and Ramb (2007) ﬁnd that
smaller European countries that currently attract a relatively large tax
base under separate accounting would have a much smaller tax base
under formulary apportionment. Avi-Yonah and Clausing (2007) propose a system of formulary apportionment that would include sales
as a single apportionment factor. Avi-Yonah and Clausing argue that
their proposed method would protect the U.S. tax base by preventing
the practice of income-shifting to low-tax countries. Avi-Yonah (2010)
proposes a hybrid system in which separate accounting is used to the
extent that income can be attributed based on observed determinants
and the residual proﬁt is attributed under formulary apportionment.
Altshuler and Grubert (2010) simulate ﬁrm behavior and U.S. revenue
collection and ﬁnd that different responses to tax incentives yield simi-
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lar revenue under separate accounting and formulary apportionment.
In contrast, Hines (2010) presents evidence that the determination of
international tax obligations under formulary apportionment may distort actual income attributable to a given country because of income
that is unexplained by apportionment factors; this may lead to inefﬁcient allocation of productive resources because of differences in tax
rates across countries.
We are not aware of any previous study that applies formulary
apportionment to attribute measured production to entities within an
MNE, but the attribution of measured production under formulary
apportionment does not invoke the policy concerns described above for
international taxation, because MNEs presumably do not make operating decisions based on surveys intended solely for statistical purposes.
However, formulary apportionment could affect the picture of global
production, which could have policy implications. Given the deﬁnitions
and concepts underlying the international guidelines for measuring ofﬁcial FDI and trade statistics and the challenges encountered under the
resulting residency-based framework when applied to MNEs, we next
draw upon the related IO literature to outline a simple production model
for foreign afﬁliates and construct a formulary framework for attributing measured production to foreign afﬁliates of U.S. parents.

MEASURING PRODUCTION
Before we outline the formulary framework to attribute production to foreign afﬁliates of U.S. parents, we discuss a production model
based in part on Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003), Helpman (1984), and
Markusen (1984, 1997). Consider an MNE with one U.S. parent and
one or more foreign afﬁliates. An afﬁliate engages in actual production,
denoted as Q*, with locally purchased inputs such as labor and PPE,
denoted as L, and shared inputs such as intangible property and headquarter services, denoted as H, as follows:3
(8.1)

Q* = f (L,H) .

While we do not assume a particular functional form, we do assume
that shared inputs cannot be utilized without local inputs (i.e., L > 0). In
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contrast, we assume that local inputs do not necessarily require shared
inputs (i.e., H ≥ 0).
In practice, a statistician does not observe actual production for the
afﬁliate. However, value-added, denoted as Q ε, can be measured for
the afﬁliate with one of two approaches. As one approach, value-added
can be measured as the difference between gross sales and intermediate inputs. In this case, a discrepancy exists between actual production
and measured production to the extent that gross sales and intermediate inputs include related party transactions that do not reﬂect market
prices. Alternatively, value-added can be measured as the sum of costs
incurred (other than costs of intermediate inputs) and proﬁts earned in
production. In this case, costs and proﬁts reﬂect returns to local inputs
and shared inputs, and a discrepancy exists between actual production
and measured production to the extent that returns accruing to local and
shared inputs are over- or underattributed to the afﬁliate. While we can
assume returns accruing to local inputs are properly attributed because
they are generally determined from market transactions, we cannot
be sure that returns to shared inputs are properly attributed, given the
mobility of shared inputs and their related returns as well as the possible
lack of associated market transactions. In either case, the discrepancy,
denoted as ε, between actual production, Q*, and measured production,
Q ε, can be written as follows:
(8.2)

ε = Q* − Q ε.

The objective is to choose a measurement approach to minimize ε.
Determining the magnitude of ε is difﬁcult, but Lipsey (2009, 2010)
provides some evidence of possible distortions in statistics measured
for foreign afﬁliates of U.S. parents.
Residency-Based Separate Accounting
As is consistent with the residency-based framework of the BPM
and the SNA, the BEA attributes value-added to a foreign afﬁliate
according to the country in which the afﬁliate is resident. If the afﬁliate
has little or no physical presence in the country, the BEA follows the
BPM and SNA recommendations to attribute value-added to the afﬁliate, as long as the afﬁliate is legally incorporated or registered in the
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country. The BEA measures value-added as the sum of costs incurred
and proﬁts earned in production. Both costs and proﬁts are determined under separate accounting, according to generally accepted U.S.
accounting principles. Under separate accounting, accounting records
are maintained separately for each entity within an MNE. As a result,
if the MNE is structured in a way that attributes costs and proﬁts to an
afﬁliate based partially or solely on economic activity related to shared
inputs, measured value-added may be attributed to an afﬁliate with relatively few or no local inputs and relatively little or no economic activity.
In other words, value-added attributed to the afﬁliate may be distorted
to the extent that costs and proﬁts reﬂect economic activity related to
shared inputs that are not actually employed by the afﬁliate.4
Figure 8.1 depicts each of the components and subcomponents of
value-added that are published as part of the BEA’s multinational statistics. Costs incurred include four components: 1) compensation, 2)
capital consumption allowance (CCA), 3) indirect business taxes (IBT),
and 4) net interest paid (IP). Compensation includes payroll taxes. CCA
is an accounting rather than an economic measure of depreciation.5 IBT
includes taxes related to business registry and operations other than
income taxes and payroll taxes.6 IBT is adjusted for government subsidies received and production royalty payments to foreign governments
for natural resources. Net IP includes interest expensed or capitalized
less interest income. The proﬁts component is referred to as proﬁt-type
return (PTR) in the BEA’s multinational statistics and includes net
income adjusted for foreign income taxes paid, depletion, income from
equity investments in foreign afﬁliates, and realized and unrealized
gains and losses.
Using the context of our production model, we identify the components of value-added that reﬂect returns to local inputs and to shared
inputs. In particular, we consider compensation and CCA to only reﬂect
returns to local inputs. Compensation and CCA are returns for services provided by labor and PPE, respectively, which need to be physically located at an afﬁliate in order to provide service. In contrast, IBT
reﬂects payments to the host government for the privilege of existing
in a location, such as fees for licenses and registration, in addition to
payments for conducting operations in the location, such as sales taxes
and property taxes. Licenses and registration do not require a physical
location, but we do consider sales taxes for unafﬁliated sales and prop-
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Figure 8.1 Measurement Framework for Value-Added Attributable to
Foreign Afﬁliates and U.S. Parents
Compensation
+
CCA
+

Costs
incurred

=

IBT

=

Taxes (except payroll and income)
+
Royalties paid
–
Subsidies received

=

Interest paid
–
Interest received

=

Net income
+
Foreign income taxes paid
+
Depletion
–
Income from equity investments
–
Realized and unrealized G/L

+
Value-added

=

Net IP
+

Profits
earned

=

PTR

NOTE: “CCA” stands for capital consumption allowance; “IBT” stands for indirect
business taxes; “IP” stands for interest paid; “PTR” stands for proﬁt-type return; and
“G/L” stands for gain/loss.
SOURCE: Authors’ summary based on Table 10 of Mataloni and Goldberg (1994).

erty taxes to require a physical location. Likewise, net IP and PTR can
reﬂect returns to local inputs, shared inputs, or both. However, absent
any compensation and CCA (and IBT related to operations), measured
value-added that includes only net IP and PTR (and IBT related to registration) under separate accounting cannot be correct, according to our
model. According to our assumption for L in Equation (8.1), production
is impossible without local inputs. In other words, separate accounting
may not minimize ε in Equation (8.2). We refer to IBT, net IP, and PTR
collectively as the shared input components of value-added. We turn
now to formulary apportionment as an alternative to separate accounting for attributing value-added to foreign afﬁliates.
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Residency-Based Formulary Apportionment
While the BPM and the SNA recommend the residency-based framework for attributing measured production to entities within an MNE,
attribution under the framework is not limited to separate accounting
and may presumably include formulary apportionment. In contrast to
separate accounting, formulary apportionment is based on consolidated
accounting measures. Formulary apportionment is commonly required
by U.S. state corporate income tax regulations to determine the income
attributable to the state for a corporation that operates in multiple states.
Rather than keeping separate accounting records for operations in each
state, the corporation keeps consolidated records and attributes income
to states based on prescribed apportionment factors that ideally reﬂect
where income is actually earned based on economic activity. Apportionment factors generally include factors related to employment, property, and sales, which reﬂect the presence of local inputs and economic
activity speciﬁc to the entity.
As is consistent with our production model, consider an MNE m
with one U.S. parent and one or more foreign afﬁliates. Let qn denote
measured production under separate accounting for each entity n (i.e.,
the U.S. parent and its foreign afﬁliates) belonging to the MNE m. For
ﬂexibility, q may include total value-added or simply include the sharedinput components of value-added. Likewise, let xj,n denote apportionment factor j for each entity n, and let αj denote the weight associated
with apportionment factor j, where   j  1 . Apportionment factor j
j

should reﬂect economic activity. Under formulary apportionment, measured production (denoted as q−n) attributable to entity n within MNE m
is calculated as follows:
(8.3)



x j,n 

q n    j

x j,. n 

 j
n
Apportionment
Weight



  qn   n  m .

n

MNE
Output
Production

As noted under the horizontal brackets in Equation (8.3), measured
production attributable to an entity under formulary apportionment, q−n ,
is a weighted average of the consolidated measured production deter-
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mined for the MNE (i.e., the U.S. parent and its foreign afﬁliates) under
separate accounting. Each apportionment weight is a combination of
each apportionment factor and its associated weight.
We apply data to q in Equation (8.3) for the shared-input components of value-added (i.e., IBT, net IP, and PTR) for foreign afﬁliates
and their U.S. parents. We then add the shared input components attributed to each entity under formulary apportionment to the local input
components of value-added (i.e., compensation and CCA) attributed to
each entity under separate accounting in order to obtain a new measure
of value-added for each entity under formulary apportionment.7

DATA
We use survey data for 2009 that are collected by the BEA from
MNEs on direct investment operations and that are used to compile the
BEA’s published statistics on the activities of MNEs. The data include
apportionment factors related to employment, property, and sales. We
focus attention on results obtained for foreign afﬁliates classiﬁed in
select service-industry sectors because services are a growing component of MNE activities and because of the role shared inputs potentially
play in the production attributed to foreign afﬁliates classiﬁed in the
select service industry sectors (Lipsey 2010). The select service industry sectors include administration; ﬁnance; information; insurance;
management of companies; miscellaneous; professional, scientiﬁc, and
technical (PST); and real estate and leasing.
Data on Operations
We use operations data collected for U.S. parents and their majorityowned foreign afﬁliates (MOFAs) in the 2009 Benchmark Survey of
U.S. Direct Investment Abroad. A foreign afﬁliate is an enterprise that
has more than 10 percent of its voting stock owned by a U.S. parent.
A MOFA is a foreign afﬁliate in which the combined direct and indirect ownership interest of all U.S. interests is more than 50 percent.
A U.S. parent is deﬁned as a U.S. person with an investment interest,
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either directly or indirectly, of 10 percent or more in a foreign business
enterprise.
Benchmark-operations survey forms are required to be completed
for all U.S. parents (Form BE-10A). In addition, benchmark-operations
survey forms are required for each MOFA with more than $80 million
in assets, sales, or net income (net loss) (Form BE-10B).8 Data used in
this study for a given U.S. parent pertain only to the activities of the parent. Data for a given foreign afﬁliate pertain only to the activities of the
afﬁliate. Data collected on the operations survey forms include income
statement information and balance sheet information. Income statement
information includes sales by type (i.e., goods, services, and investment
income), location, and afﬁliation. In addition, income statement information includes detailed expenses such as compensation, depreciation,
interest, and taxes. The BEA uses information from the income statement to measure value-added for each afﬁliate. Balance sheet information includes details regarding assets, liabilities, and owner’s equity.
Asset details include PPE.
Apportionment Factors
The choice of apportionment factors and their associated weights
inﬂuences the results obtained from formulary apportionment. We consider three apportionment factors that are available in the operations
data: 1) compensation, 2) net PPE, and 3) unafﬁliated sales. Compensation and net PPE reﬂect local inputs employed in production. Unafﬁliated sales may also reﬂect local inputs that may not be reﬂected
in compensation and net PPE. If an afﬁliate has no compensation or
net PPE, production is still attributed to the afﬁliate under formulary
apportionment if unafﬁliated sales are greater than zero. Likewise, if
an afﬁliate has no unafﬁliated sales, production is still attributed to the
afﬁliate under formulary apportionment if compensation or net PPE is
greater than zero. In other words, production attributed to the afﬁliate
by Equation (8.3) is assumed to be proportional to the economic activity reported for the afﬁliate.9
We report the results from weighting compensation by 60 percent, net PPE by 25 percent, and unafﬁliated sales by 15 percent.10 We
determine the factor weights based on each factor’s share of the mean
value-added, as calculated by using coefﬁcients from a regression of
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value-added on the apportionment factors. We initially determine factor weights separately for two subsamples of the data: 1) MOFAs and
U.S. parents classiﬁed in select service industry sectors and 2) MOFAs
and U.S. parents classiﬁed in all other industry sectors. However, even
though the coefﬁcient estimates are statistically different for the two
subsamples, the resulting factor weights from each subsample are
nearly identical because of differences in the subsample means.11 Thus,
we apply the factor weights obtained from the combined sample of
MOFAs and U.S. parents classiﬁed in any industry sector. In addition
to obtaining reasonable factor weights, the explanatory power of the
apportionment factors is high (i.e., adjusted r-squared = 0.84).

RESULTS
Our goal is to use formulary apportionment as a substitute for separate accounting to reattribute measured value-added to foreign afﬁliates of U.S. parents. Our primary approach is to consolidate the sharedinput components of value-added (i.e., IBT, net IP, and PTR) measured
under separate accounting for a given MNE (i.e., the U.S. parent and
its MOFAs) and reattribute to all entities within the MNE (i.e., the U.S.
parent and its MOFAs) based on each entity’s apportionment weight. In
this case, value-added for an entity within the MNE includes compensation and CCA under separate accounting plus the shared-input components reattributed under formulary apportionment.
We divide the discussion of the results into four subsections: 1)
reporting value-added and the related reattributions under formulary
apportionment, 2) evaluating value-added under formulary apportionment relative to value-added under separate accounting, 3) interpreting
the results in the context of our production model, and 4) discussing
implications for the U.S. current account.
Value-Added and Reattributions under Formulary Apportionment
Table 8.1 summarizes value-added by industry sector and by global
region for MOFAs and U.S. parents. For reference, the ﬁrst three columns report published value-added determined under separate account-
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10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Other industry sectors
Accommodation and food services
Construction
Farming, ﬁshing, forestry
Health care and social assistance
Manufacturing
Mining
Retail trade
Transportation and warehousing
Utilities

14.3
4.9
0.9
1.5
478.2
153.7
57.1
18.1
9.5

52.7
22.1
2.2
31.8
1,034.1
76.1
238.6
106.1
62.0

67.0
27.0
3.1
33.3
1,512.3
229.8
295.7
124.3
71.5

18.2
(D)
(D)
(D)
411.1
104.4
50.8
17.0
(D)

49.1
(D)
(D)
(D)
1,147.7
81.4
241.0
106.9
(D)

67.3
(D)
(D)
(D)
1,558.8
185.7
291.7
123.9
(D)

244

Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb 244

Table 8.1 Value-Added by Industry Sector and by Global Region (billions of US$)
Separate accounting
Formulary apportionment
MOFAs U.S. parents
Total
MOFAs U.S. parents
Total
Select service industry sectors
1
Administration
25.1
59.1
84.2
27.2
60.6
87.8
2
Finance
66.9
192.7
259.6
48.7
206.7
255.4
3
Information
51.0
287.6
338.7
50.7
294.6
345.2
4
Insurance
13.8
67.4
81.2
9.9
74.7
84.6
5
Management of companies
−14.5
−1.3
−15.7
3.2
– 0.6
2.7
6
Miscellaneous services
10.3
28.1
38.4
8.4
28.9
37.3
7
Professional, scientiﬁc, technical
78.5
177.5
256.1
88.3
176.2
264.5
8
Real estate and rental and leasing
22.7
34.5
57.2
14.1
35.7
49.9
9
Subtotals
254.0
845.6
1,099.6
250.6
876.8
1,127.4
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19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Wholesale trade
Subtotals
Totals for industry sectors
Global regions
Africa
Asia
Canada
Europe
Latin America
Middle East
United States
Totals for global regions

152.7
891.0
1,145.0

124.4
1,750.1
2,595.8

277.1
2,641.1
3,740.7

122.4
741.1
991.7
29.7
210.7
111.3
523.7
102.3
14.0

2,595.8
2,595.8

44.9
241.1
113.7
599.2
128.4
17.7
2,595.8
3,740.7

44.9
241.1
113.7
599.2
128.4
17.7
1,145.0

991.7

128.6
1,872.2
2,749.0

251.1
2,613.3
3,740.7

2,749.0
2,749.0

29.7
210.7
111.3
523.7
102.3
14.0
2,749.0
3,740.7

NOTE: A “(D)” denotes data suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies. Blank cell = data not applicable. Some totals
or subtotals may be slightly off because of rounding.
SOURCE: The ﬁrst three columns, under the heading "Separate accounting," include statistics published online in the BEA’s ﬁnancial and
operating data on direct investment and multinational companies (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_MNC.cfm). The second three columns, under the heading "Formulary apportionment," include the authors’ calculations after value-added is attributed under Equation (8.3).
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ing. The second three columns of Table 8.1 present results determined
under formulary apportionment in Equation (8.3). Table 8.2 reports
the dollar differences and the percentage differences between valueadded under formulary apportionment and value-added under separate
accounting from Table 8.1. Table 8.2 shows overall reattributions, reattributions by global region, and reattributions by industry sector.
Overall Reattributions
Line 21 of Table 8.2 shows that the overall reattribution of valueadded from MOFAs to U.S. parents is $153.3 billion under formulary
apportionment. The percentage decrease in value-added attributable
to MOFAs is 13.4 percent (column 4), and the percentage increase
in value-added attributable to U.S. parents is 5.9 percent (column 5).
Overall, reattributions are small relative to total value-added attributed
to all MOFAs and U.S. parents under separate accounting—less than 5
percent.
Reattributions by Global Region
In contrast to overall reattributions from MOFAs to U.S. parents,
reattributions across some global regions are relatively large. In particular, the percentage decreases in value-added are greater than 10 percent
for Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East but less
than 10 percent for Canada (Table 8.2, column 4). Under both formulary
apportionment and separate accounting, more value-added is attributed
to MOFAs in Europe than in any other global region (Table 8.1, line
25). However, Canada and Latin America change places under formulary apportionment in the distribution of value-added by global region
(Table 8.1, lines 24 and 26). Under formulary apportionment, more
production is attributable to MOFAs in Canada than in Latin America.
Thus, in addition to less measured production attributable to MOFAs in
each of the six global regions, there are interregional changes in the distribution of measured production attributable to MOFAs of U.S. parents
as a result of formulary apportionment.
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Reattributions by Industry Sector
Reattributions across some industry sectors are also relatively large.
The percentage changes in value-added are greater than 10 percent for
MOFAs classiﬁed in all industry sectors except administration, information, and transportation (Table 8.2, column 4). Reattributions greater
than 10 percent also result for U.S. parents classiﬁed in insurance, management, and manufacturing (Table 8.2, column 5).
Under both formulary apportionment and separate accounting,
more value-added is attributed to MOFAs classiﬁed in PST than for
any other select service sector (Table 8.1, line 7), and more value-added
is attributed to MOFAs classiﬁed in manufacturing than for any of the
other industry sectors (Table 8.1, line 14). The distribution of valueadded under formulary apportionment is also the same for MOFAs classiﬁed in all other select service sectors except ﬁnance and information
(Table 8.1, lines 2 and 3, respectively). However, the distribution of
value-added under formulary apportionment changes for MOFAs classiﬁed in accommodation, mining, transportation, and wholesale (Table
8.1, lines 10, 15, 17, and 19, respectively). The industry distribution of
value-added under formulary apportionment does not change for U.S.
parents. Thus, we observe an interindustry change in the distribution
of measured production attributable to MOFAs but not to U.S. parents.
As is consistent both with overall reattributions and with reattributions by global region, value-added reported in Table 8.1 for each
industry sector is generally higher under formulary apportionment for
U.S. parents and lower for MOFAs. While this is not directly observable in Table 8.2, we look at the underlying data to trace reattributions
to U.S. parents from MOFAs. Reattributions to U.S. parents classiﬁed
in manufacturing are due in large part to reattributions from MOFAs
classiﬁed in manufacturing and mining. Likewise, increases for U.S.
parents classiﬁed in information and manufacturing are explained in
large part by decreases for MOFAs classiﬁed in leasing. There are also
reattributions from MOFAs classiﬁed in ﬁnance to U.S. parents classiﬁed in insurance. The remaining reattributions are among MOFAs
classiﬁed in management and MOFAs and U.S. parents classiﬁed in
ﬁnance, insurance, miscellaneous, PST, retail, and wholesale.

Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb 247

2/16/2015 8:40:14 AM

248

Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb 248

Table 8.2 Value-Added Reattributable under Formulary Apportionment
Billions of US$

Percentage

MOFAs

U.S. parents

Total

MOFAs

U.S. parents

Total

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Select service industry sectors
Administration
Finance
Information
Insurance
Management of companies
Miscellaneous services
Professional, scientiﬁc, technical
Real estate and rental and leasing
Subtotals

2.0
−18.2
−0.4
−3.9
17.7
−1.9
9.8
−8.6
−3.4

1.5
14.0
6.9
7.3
0.7
0.8
−1.3
1.2
31.2

3.6
−4.2
6.6
3.4
18.4
−1.0
8.4
−7.3
27.8

8.1
−27.2
−0.7
−28.0
122.5
−18.1
12.4
−37.8
−1.3

2.6
7.3
2.4
10.8
53.5
2.9
−0.7
3.6
3.7

4.3
−1.6
1.9
4.2
116.9
−2.7
3.3
−12.8
2.5

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Other industry sectors
Accommodation and food services
Construction
Farming, ﬁshing, forestry
Health care and social assistance
Manufacturing
Mining
Retail trade

3.8
(D)
(D)
(D)
−67.0
−49.3
–6.3

−3.5
(D)
(D)
(D)
113.5
5.2
2.4

0.3
(D)
(D)
(D)
46.5
−44.1
–4.0

26.6
(D)
(D)
(D)
−14.0
−32.1
−11.1

−6.7
(D)
(D)
(D)
11.0
6.9
1.0

0.4
(D)
(D)
(D)
3.1
−19.2
−1.3
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17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Transportation and warehousing
Utilities
Wholesale trade
Subtotals
Totals for industry sectors
Global regions
Africa
Asia
Canada
Europe
Latin America
Middle East
United States
Totals for global regions

−1.1
(D)
−30.3
−149.9
−153.3

0.8
(D)
4.2
122.1
153.3

−0.3
(D)
−26.1
−27.8
0.0

−6.1
(D)
−19.8
−16.8
−13.4
−33.8
−12.6
−2.1
−12.6
−20.4
−20.5

153.3
153.3

−15.2
−30.4
−2.4
−75.5
−26.2
−3.6
153.3
0.0

−15.2
−30.4
−2.4
−75.5
−26.2
−3.6
−153.3

−13.4

0.7
(D)
3.4
7.0
5.9

−0.3
(D)
−9.4
−1.1
0.0

5.9
5.9

−33.8
−12.6
−2.1
−12.6
−20.4
−20.5
5.9
0.0

NOTE: A “(D)” denotes data suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies. The values for “Billions of US$” (ﬁrst three
columns) are calculated by subtracting value-added under separate accounting from value-added under formulary apportionment. Percentages (second three columns) are calculated by dividing the values for ‟Billions of US$” by the absolute value of value-added under
separate accounting. Some totals or subtotals may be slightly off because of rounding. Blank cell = data not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ tabulations.
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Evaluation of Value-Added under Separate Accounting and
Formulary Apportionment
We calculate approximate factor shares of value-added using the
local input components and shared input components of value-added.
Factor shares are informative because they reveal the relative contributions of local inputs and shared inputs to total measured production.
We interpret factor shares using global factor shares as a reference.
Published returns to local inputs as a share of published value-added
are 52.8 percent for all MOFAs and 75.3 percent for all U.S. parents.
Published returns to local inputs for all MOFAs and all U.S. parents
combined are 68.4 percent of published value-added for all MOFAs and
all U.S. parents combined. Thus, we use 68.4 percent as a reference for
factor shares based on local inputs for both separate accounting and formulary apportionment. Likewise, we use 31.6 percent as a reference for
factor shares based on shared inputs. In other words, we expect the relative contributions of local inputs and of shared inputs to total measured
production to be about 68.4 percent and 31.6 percent, respectively.
Given differences in production functions, we expect some variation
in factor shares across MOFAs and U.S. parents, across industry sectors and global regions, and across industries and countries. In addition,
the factor shares are affected to the extent that returns to local inputs
are included in the shared input components of value-added. However,
given our model, in which afﬁliate production is a function of both
local inputs and shared inputs, we consider differences in factor shares
between formulary apportionment and separate accounting based on
local inputs to be indicative of possible over- or underattributed returns
to entities, based on shared inputs under separate accounting.12
Table 8.3 reports factor shares based on local input components
under separate accounting and under formulary apportionment. Table
8.4 reports factor shares based on shared input components. Overall, the
factor shares reﬂect the net reattribution of value-added from MOFAs to
U.S. parents presented in Table 8.2. In particular, the local input shares
of value-added increase for MOFAs and decrease for U.S. parents under
formulary apportionment (Table 8.3, line 21). In contrast, the shared
input shares of value-added decrease for MOFAs and increase for U.S.
parents (Table 8.4, line 21). Local input shares are lower for MOFAs
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than for U.S. parents, and shared input shares are higher for MOFAs
than for U.S. parents; however, local input shares and shared input
shares for MOFAs and U.S. parents combined are generally closer to
the global reference points under formulary apportionment.
Across all industry sectors, local input shares and shared input
shares display considerable variation under separate accounting and
under formulary apportionment. Local input shares are generally higher
for the select service industry sectors than for the other industry sectors. Local input shares for MOFAs classiﬁed in ﬁnance, information,
leasing, management, manufacturing, mining, miscellaneous, transportation, and wholesale increase under formulary apportionment. Conversely, local input shares for MOFAs classiﬁed in accommodation,
administration, insurance, and PST decrease under formulary apportionment. These results imply that separate accounting may result in
over- or underattributed returns to local inputs in some industries.
Across global regions, local input shares increase by more than 10
percentage points for Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East and by
less than 10 percentage points for Asia, Canada, and Europe. Increases
in Latin America are driven in large part by considerable increases in
Barbados, Bermuda, and the UK Caribbean islands. Increases in Asia
are explained primarily by increases in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Increases in Europe are a result in part of increases
in Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Norway.
We do not report numerical results for individual countries, in order to
avoid disclosure of individual companies.
Economic Interpretation
According to our production model and the related empirical framework, value-added may be overattributed to a MOFA under separate
accounting based on the availability of shared inputs within an MNE.
The shared input components of value-added (i.e., IBT, net IP, and
PTR) reﬂect, in part, returns to shared inputs that may not actually be
employed by the MOFA to the extent reﬂected under separate accounting. In contrast, formulary apportionment attributes returns to shared
inputs based on the MOFA’s proportion of economic activity reﬂected
in the chosen apportionment factors. As is consistent with our produc-
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Separate accounting (%)
MOFAs U.S. parents
Total

Formulary apportionment (%)
MOFAs U.S. parents
Total

2/16/2015 8:40:15 AM

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Select service industry sectors
Administration
Finance
Information
Insurance
Management of companies
Miscellaneous services
Professional, scientiﬁc, technical
Real estate and rental and leasing
Subtotals

89.5
72.9
63.8
92.1
12.5
61.2
74.5
51.8
77.0

86.4
91.4
66.0
81.2
20.4
82.3
73.5
81.2
85.6

87.3
99.3
65.7
83.9
13.2
76.6
73.8
69.5
83.6

82.8
99.9
64.3
82.0
73.8
74.7
66.2
83.2
78.0

84.2
97.2
64.5
87.0
29.8
78.8
74.0
78.4
82.5

83.8
97.7
64.4
86.4
94.1
77.8
71.4
79.8
81.5

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Other industry sectors
Accommodation and food services
Construction
Farming, ﬁshing, forestry
Health care and social assistance
Manufacturing
Mining
Retail trade
Transportation and warehousing
Utilities

77.1
76.3
79.8
73.3
51.3
28.2
46.5
69.9
39.9

71.4
89.7
99.1
79.1
72.8
57.5
60.5
76.7
49.7

72.6
87.3
93.4
78.8
66.0
37.9
57.8
75.7
48.4

60.9
(D)
(D)
(D)
59.7
41.5
52.3
74.4
(D)

76.5
(D)
(D)
(D)
65.6
53.8
59.9
76.1
(D)

72.2
(D)
(D)
(D)
64.1
46.9
58.6
75.9
(D)
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Table 8.3 Factor Shares Based on Local Input Components
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19
20
21

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Wholesale trade
Subtotals
Totals for industry sectors
Global regions
Africa
Asia
Canada
Europe
Latin America
Middle East
United States
Totals for global regions

39.5
45.9
52.8

74.7
70.3
75.3

55.3
62.1
68.4

49.3
55.2
60.9

44.0
59.3
64.3
62.5
58.2
56.9

75.3
75.3

29.1
51.8
63.0
54.6
46.3
45.2
75.3
68.4

29.1
51.8
63.0
54.6
46.3
45.2
52.8

60.9

72.3
65.8
71.1

61.1
62.7
68.4

71.1
71.1

44.0
59.3
64.3
62.5
58.2
56.9
71.1
68.4

NOTE: A “(D)” denotes data suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies. We calculate factor shares based on local
inputs by dividing the sum of compensation and CCA by the sum of compensation, CCA, and the absolute value of shared inputs [i.e.,
local input share = (compensation + CCA) ÷ (compensation + CCA +│IBT + net IP + PTR│)]. Blank cell = data not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ tabulations.
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10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Other industry sectors
Accommodation and food services
Construction
Farming, ﬁshing, forestry
Health care and social assistance
Manufacturing
Mining
Retail trade
Transportation and warehousing
Utilities

22.9
23.7
20.2
26.7
48.7
71.8
53.5
30.1
60.1

28.6
10.3
0.9
20.9
27.2
42.5
39.5
23.3
50.3

27.4
12.7
6.6
21.2
34.0
62.1
42.2
24.3
51.6

Formulary apportionment (%)
MOFAs U.S. parents
Total
17.2
0.1
35.7
18.0
26.2
25.3
33.8
16.8
22.0

15.8
2.8
35.5
13.0
70.2
21.2
26.0
21.6
17.5

16.2
2.3
35.6
13.6
5.9
22.2
28.6
20.2
18.5

39.1
(D)
(D)
(D)
40.3
58.5
47.7
25.6
(D)

23.5
(D)
(D)
(D)
34.4
46.2
40.1
23.9
(D)

27.8
(D)
(D)
(D)
35.9
53.1
41.4
24.1
(D)
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Table 8.4 Factor Shares Based on Shared Input Components
Separate accounting (%)
MOFAs U.S. parents
Total
Select service industry sectors
1 Administration
10.5
13.6
12.7
2
Finance
27.1
8.6
0.7
3
Information
36.2
34.0
34.3
4
Insurance
7.9
18.8
16.1
5
Management of companies
87.5
79.6
86.8
6
Miscellaneous services
38.8
17.7
23.4
7
Professional, scientiﬁc, technical
25.5
26.5
26.2
8
Real estate and rental and leasing
48.2
18.8
30.5
9
Subtotals
23.0
14.4
16.4

Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb 255

19
20
21

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Wholesale trade
Subtotals
Totals for industry sectors
Global regions
Africa
Asia
Canada
Europe
Latin America
Middle East
United States
Totals for global regions

60.5
54.1
47.2

25.3
29.7
24.7

44.7
37.9
31.6

50.7
44.8
39.1

56.0
40.7
35.7
37.5
41.8
43.1

24.7
24.7

70.9
48.2
37.0
45.4
53.7
54.8
24.7
31.6

70.9
48.2
37.0
45.4
53.7
54.8
47.2

39.1

27.7
34.2
28.9

38.9
37.3
31.6

28.9
28.9

56.0
40.7
35.7
37.5
41.8
43.1
28.9
31.6

NOTE: A “(D)” denotes data suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies. We calculate factor shares based on shared
inputs by dividing the absolute value of shared inputs by the sum of compensation, CCA, and the absolute value of shared inputs [i.e.,
shared input share = (│IBT + net IP + PTR│) ÷ (compensation + CCA +│IBT + net IP + PTR│)]. Blank cell = data not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ tabulations.
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tion model, our results for value-added imply that too much production
is attributed to MOFAs and too little production is attributed to U.S.
parents under separate accounting.
Given the economic activity embodied in each of the apportionment factors (i.e., compensation, net PPE, and unafﬁliated sales), the
modest overall reattributions from MOFAs to U.S. parents in Table
8.2 and the relatively large reattributions across some global regions
in Table 8.2 imply an overstatement of economic activity for MOFAs
under separate accounting. Likewise, the relatively large reattributions
across some industry sectors in Table 8.2 and across MOFAs and U.S.
parents by industry sector in Table 8.2 reveal considerable differences
in economic activity as reﬂected under formulary apportionment and in
economic activity as reﬂected under separate accounting. Value-added
measures constructed under a method of separate accounting generally
imply more economic activity than under a method of formulary apportionment for MOFAs classiﬁed in ﬁnance, information, insurance, leasing, manufacturing, mining, miscellaneous, retail, transportation, and
wholesale and for U.S. parents classiﬁed in accommodation and PST.
In contrast, less economic activity is generally implied under separate
accounting than under formulary apportionment for MOFAs classiﬁed
in accommodation, administration, management, and PST and for U.S.
parents classiﬁed in industry sectors other than accommodation and
PST.
The reattributions reported in Table 8.2 and the factor shares
reported in Tables 8.3 and 8.4 generally support formulary apportionment as an alternative to separate accounting. Given the results obtained
for value-added, formulary apportionment appears to yield measures of
production that are more congruent with economic activity for MOFAs
and U.S. parents and more consistent with expectations based on global
factor shares. Thus, formulary apportionment appears to be a viable
alternative to separate accounting under the residency-based framework of the BPM and the SNA.
Implications for the U.S. Current Account
In addition to applying formulary apportionment to reattribute
value-added, we apply formulary apportionment to reattribute service
imports and exports between U.S. parents and their foreign afﬁliates.
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Since imports and exports are components of GDP, our results enable
us to assess the effect on GDP of formulary apportionment as we apply
it here. However, given data limitations and other practical considerations, our work with the current account is very preliminary and does
not yet incorporate income payments and receipts. Based on our preliminary results, we expect to be able to provide a complete picture of the
U.S. current account under formulary apportionment in a future paper.
We use cross-border transactions data collected from U.S. parents
on service imports and exports with their foreign afﬁliates for 2008
because the cross-border transactions data for 2008 have already been
linked with the operations data, which contain the apportionment factors (Barefoot and Koncz-Bruner 2012).13 Based on our model, in
which production is a function of local inputs and shared inputs, we
do not expect exports by U.S. parents to their foreign afﬁliates to be
as affected under formulary apportionment as imports by U.S. parents
from their foreign afﬁliates, because the data indicate U.S. parents generally have a meaningful amount of local inputs. As is consistent with
our expectations, exports are nearly unchanged under formulary apportionment. However, the overall reattribution of imports from foreign
afﬁliates to U.S. parents is $10.9 billion, which is almost 13 percent
of published private-service imports from afﬁliated parties (an amount
totaling $85.2 billion) but only about 3 percent of published total private service imports ($371.2 billion).
Given the role imports and exports play as components of GDP, we
also assess the overall effect of reattributing service imports and exports
under formulary apportionment. U.S. goods and services imports
decrease by approximately 0.4 percent, but exports remain unchanged.
Net exports increase by approximately 1.5 percent. The overall effect
on GDP is only an approximate 0.1 percent increase. Thus, while reattributions of U.S. service imports and exports under formulary apportionment have a relatively moderate effect on the foreign transactions
component of GDP and a bit larger effect on the closely related statistics of the ITAs, the impact on GDP is relatively small.14
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The BEA currently measures value-added of foreign afﬁliates and
U.S. parents based on separate accounting. Based on a simple production model and a related empirical framework, value-added may be overattributed to foreign afﬁliates under separate accounting; this is due to
the availability of shared inputs within an MNE. In particular, the sharedinput components of value-added (i.e., IBT, net IP, and PTR) reﬂect, in
part, returns to shared inputs that may not actually be employed by foreign afﬁliates to the extent reﬂected under separate accounting. In this
chapter, we use formulary apportionment as an alternative for separate
accounting to reattribute measured value-added to foreign afﬁliates of
U.S. parents.
We ﬁnd that overall reattributions from foreign afﬁliates to U.S.
parents are relatively small—less than 5 percent of total value-added
attributed to all majority-owned foreign afﬁliates and U.S. parents under
separate accounting. In contrast to overall reattributions, reattributions
across global regions including Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America,
and the Middle East are greater than 10 percent of value-added under
separate accounting. In addition, reattributions for foreign afﬁliates are
greater than 10 percent of value-added under separate accounting for all
industry sectors except administration, information, and transportation.
In addition to applying formulary apportionment to reattribute
value-added, we report preliminary results to reattribute service imports
and exports between U.S. parents and their foreign afﬁliates. We ﬁnd
a relatively large decrease in imports but no meaningful change in
exports. The overall effect on GDP is only a small increase—approximately 0.1 percent. Based on our preliminary results, we expect to be
able to provide a complete picture of the U.S. current account under
formulary apportionment in a future paper.
Given the economic activity embodied in each of the apportionment
factors (i.e., compensation, net PPE, and unafﬁliated sales), the reattributions summarized here imply an overstatement of economic activity
for MOFAs under separate accounting. Using factor shares to evaluate
the results, we conclude that value-added attributed to foreign afﬁliates and U.S. parents under formulary apportionment yields a picture
of measured production by industry sector and country that is more
congruent with economic activity than related measures generated
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under separate accounting. Thus, formulary apportionment appears to
be a viable alternative to separate accounting under the residency-based
framework of the BPM and the SNA.

Notes
The statistical analysis of ﬁrm-level data on U.S. multinational enterprises and companies engaged in international transactions was conducted at the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, under arrangements that maintain legal conﬁdentiality requirements. The views expressed in this chapter are solely those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the U.S. Department of Commerce or the Bureau
of Economic Analysis.
1. Throughout the chapter, we use “MNE” or “enterprise” to refer to a group of afﬁliated entities that includes both U.S. parents and foreign afﬁliates. We use “entity”
to refer to individual establishments within the MNE; such individual establishments may be either a U.S. parent or a foreign afﬁliate. We also use “parent” or
“afﬁliate” to refer to a U.S. parent or a foreign afﬁliate, respectively.
2. Economic territory is discussed in paragraphs 4.3–4.11 of the BPM, institutional
units are discussed in paragraphs 4.12–4.56, and residence is discussed in paragraphs 4.113–4.168.
3. We do not distinguish between nominal output and real output. In the absence of
data to adjust for price differences, we treat real output as proportional to nominal
output.
4. The BEA publishes estimates of value-added for MNEs as part of the annual statistics on direct investment and multinational companies.
5. In the NIPAs, consumption of ﬁxed capital is the measure of economic depreciation. Given that depreciation is a cost in afﬁliates’ accounting records, any difference between CCA and consumption of ﬁxed capital is reﬂected in proﬁts. Thus,
measured value-added is unaffected (Mataloni and Goldberg 1994).
6. IBT includes sales tax, value-added tax, consumption tax, excise tax, taxes on
property and other assets, duties, license fees, ﬁnes, penalties, and any other taxes
other than payroll taxes and income taxes.
7. Equation (8.3) inevitably changes the industry and country composition of valueadded from that measured under separate accounting, because there are no restrictions by industry or country. In other words, value-added attributed under separate accounting to an afﬁliate classiﬁed in one industry may be reattributed under
formulary apportionment to an afﬁliate classiﬁed in another industry. Likewise,
value-added attributed to an afﬁliate located in one country may be reattributed
to an afﬁliate located in another country. If returns accruing to shared inputs are
under- or overattributed to an entity under separate accounting, then statistics
by industry and country do not accurately reﬂect actual output, and reattributing
across industries and countries is presumably justiﬁed. However, we also restrict
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8.
9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

reattributions by industry while assuming the same production function across
countries within a given industry, because entities in different countries belong to
the same MNE. While restricting reattributions by industry does affect the results
under formulary apportionment, the restriction does not affect our conclusions.
Less information is collected for each MOFA with assets, sales, or net income (net
loss) of less than $80 million (Form BE-10C or Form BE-10D).
In addition to compensation, net PPE, and unafﬁliated sales, we consider other
possible apportionment factors. In particular, we consider research and development expenditures, which are reported for MOFAs. However, R&D expenditures are likely in some cases to be made pursuant to intercompany cost-sharing
arrangements. In addition, we are unable to discern the extent to which R&D
expenditures reﬂect intercompany transactions. Thus, we limit the apportionment
factors to compensation, net PPE, and unafﬁliated sales.
We also weight compensation by 100 percent in Equation (8.3), which does not
affect our conclusions. In addition to reﬂecting the number of employees employed
by an afﬁliate, compensation reﬂects wages. Thus, if workers are paid according to their value marginal product, compensation reﬂects variation in economic
activity across industries and countries. In other words, using compensation as
an apportionment factor yields relatively more output attributable to high-margin
industries and high-wage countries and relatively less output attributable to lowmargin industries and low-wage countries. In addition, compensation is based on
market transactions rather than accounting conventions, which may affect both net
PPE and unafﬁliated sales. Furthermore, unafﬁliated sales may reﬂect local inputs
or shared inputs. Thus, compensation may provide the most objective measure of
economic activity.
The subsample of select service-industry sectors yields factor weights of 0.63,
0.28, and 0.09 for compensation, net PPE, and unafﬁliated sales, respectively. The
subsample of other industry sectors yields factor weights of 0.64, 0.21, and 0.15
for compensation, net PPE, and unafﬁliated sales. The combined sample yields
factor weights of 0.61, 0.24, and 0.15 for compensation, net PPE, and unafﬁliated
sales.
Since compensation and CCA are always nonnegative, the local input components
are always nonnegative. However, since net IP or PTR may be negative, the shared
input components and total value-added may be negative. In order to obtain factor
shares between 0 and 100 percent, we calculate local input shares by dividing the
sum of compensation and CCA by the sum of compensation, CCA, and the absolute value of shared inputs. Likewise, we calculate shared input shares by dividing
the absolute value of shared inputs by the sum of compensation, CCA, and the
absolute value of shared inputs.
The cross-border transactions include annual amounts reported on the Quarterly
Survey of Insurance Transactions by U.S. Insurance Companies with Foreign Persons (Form BE-45), the Quarterly Survey of Transactions in Selected Services and
Intangible Assets with Foreign Persons (Form BE-125), and the Quarterly Survey
of Financial Services Transactions between U.S. Financial Services Providers and
Foreign Persons (Form BE-185).

Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb 260

2/16/2015 8:40:18 AM

Foreign Afﬁliates of U.S. Parents 261
14. Small differences exist between foreign transactions published in the NIPAs and
foreign transactions published in the ITAs because of adjustments for gold, U.S.
territories, and other small statistical differences.
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Data, Trade, and Growth
Michael Mandel
Progressive Policy Institute

The architecture of the Internet is designed as a “network of networks.” As such, one of its key attributes is making the passage of data
from one network to another easy. So when a user sends an e-mail,
views a video, or downloads a ﬁle from a Web site, the data may pass
through a large number of different networks on the way from its origin
to its destination, with the routing virtually invisible to the user. This
architecture has proven to be extremely ﬂexible and powerful, both
nationally and globally. People and businesses with Internet access can
easily get data of all sorts from around the world. Similarly, companies
can efﬁciently and cheaply provide services such as e-mail and Web
search on a global basis, in many cases without charge.
One sign of the Internet’s global success is this: the rapid growth of
cross-border data ﬂows. Cross-border data ﬂows are growing far faster
than conventionally measured trade in goods and services. According
to TeleGeography, a consulting ﬁrm that keeps track of international
data ﬂows, demand for international bandwidth increased at an annual
rate of 49 percent between 2008 and 2012 (TeleGeography 2012). By
comparison, the overall volume of global trade in goods and services,
adjusted for inﬂation, rose at an annual rate of 2.4 percent over the same
period.
Looking at the data links between the United States and Europe in
particular, the data-carrying capacity of transatlantic submarine cables
rose at an average annual rate of 19 percent between 2008 and 2012.
Meanwhile, the overall volume of trade in goods and services between
the United States and Europe, adjusted for inﬂation, is barely above
prerecession peaks.
Indeed, the global economic and ﬁnancial system, as it stands
today, would not function without cross-border data ﬂows. Data ﬂows
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that cross national borders are essential to almost everything: manufacturing supply chains, global ﬁnance, international medical and physics
research, entertainment, tourism, education, social media, and community. Indeed, cross-border data is becoming increasingly important as an
input to production, and as a crucial element for economic growth. “The
cross-border free ﬂow of information enables international trade which
can lead to increased innovation, productivity, and economic growth,”
writes Meltzer (2013, p. 11) in a paper from the Brookings Institution.
Moreover, trade in data creates positive externalities and gives
an extra boost to global growth. Unlike exports of goods, data can be
shipped from one country to another without depriving the ﬁrst country
of the beneﬁts. All other things being equal, growth in cross-border data
ﬂows can be a far more powerful impetus to consumer welfare and economic growth than growth in trade in goods and services.
However, despite the importance of cross-border data ﬂows, current international economic statistics are mostly uninformative and
even misleading about their magnitude. First, note that cross-border
data ﬂows are not tracked as a separate category in the trade statistics.
Instead, cross-border trade that involves data is lumped in with trade in
services. For example, international telecommunications are treated as
the export/import of a service. The World Trade Organization (WTO)
estimates that global exports of telecommunications services totaled
$111.5 billion in 2012 (WTO 2013).
But treating cross-border data as a service creates the real problem:
By international agreement among statistical agencies, the export or
import of services is deﬁned to occur when there is a monetary payment
from a resident of one country to a resident of another in exchange for
the service. For example, if a U.S. business hires accountants in London, that becomes an export of accounting services from the United
Kingdom to the United States.
Virtually all of the existing statistics about cross-border trade in data
are based on this monetary deﬁnition of service exports and imports. The
July 2013 report from the United States International Trade Commission, Digital Trade in the U.S. and Global Economies, Part 1, identiﬁes
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the U.S. Census Bureau, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
and Eurostat as the main sources for statistics on “digital trade.” Each of
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these relies on the same basic deﬁnition of service exports and imports
as being tied to a monetary exchange between residents of two different countries (U.S. Internationl Trade Commission 2013, Table 4.2, p.
4.24). Currently, international agencies such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) only collect fragmentary statistics on
cross-border data ﬂows, though they are putting more effort into estimating such ﬁgures (see, for example, ITU [2012]).
I will show in this chapter that the efﬁcient global architecture of
the Internet allows and even encourages data to cross national borders
without leaving a signiﬁcant monetary footprint. As a result, economically important cross-border data ﬂows are simply not being counted
by current international economic statistics. I will offer evidence in this
chapter that both the level and rate of growth of data trade are being
signiﬁcantly understated.
This understatement has serious policy implications. First, the data
sector is a bigger contributor to U.S. and global growth than current
economic statistics show. Second, to the degree that trade negotiators
prioritize their goals according to the relative magnitude of different
trading sectors, trade policy should place more emphasis on maintaining the free ﬂow of data. Similarly, international tax policy should place
more emphasis on maintaining the free ﬂow of data.
Third, attempts by various countries to implement barriers to the
free ﬂow of data may do considerably more economic damage than the
current trade statistics show. This is especially important in the wake
of recent revelations about the extent to which the National Security
Agency (NSA) has monitored data ﬂows around the world. This news
has caused a rising demand within countries such as Brazil for certain
data to be kept within national borders—so-called data localization or
data protectionism. The European Union is also considering new data
privacy regulations that could potentially act as an impediment to ﬂows
of data in and out of the EU.
Finally, it’s becoming clear that better statistics about cross-border
data ﬂows are needed to convince policymakers of how important data
is to economic health. That might help avoid trade and tax policies that
are detrimental to growth. It is self-evident that good policy rests on
a foundation of accurate and comprehensive knowledge about current
and emerging trade ﬂows.
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HOW CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS ARE
MEASURED TODAY
The WTO and national statistical agencies such as the BEA regularly produce ﬁgures on cross-border trade in data-related services such
as telecommunications services, computer and information services,
and ﬁnancial services. Table 9.1, below, shows the reported dollar value
of global exports of selected data-related services (WTO 2013).
According to international standards, trade in services is typically
measured by monetary transactions between residents of one country
and residents of another country. That’s the main principle laid out in
the Manual on Statistics of International Trade in Services, approved in
2010 by the United Nations Statistical Commission:
The market price is used as the basis for valuation of transactions
in international trade in services. Market prices for transactions are
deﬁned as amounts of money that willing buyers pay to acquire
something from willing sellers. The exchanges are made between
independent parties and based on commercial considerations only
and are sometimes called ‘at arm’s length’ transactions. (United
Nations 2011, p. 34)

Similarly, the BEA—the statistical agency in charge of tracking
service trade—measures data-related exports and imports by tracking

Table 9.1 Reported Global Exports of Selected Data-Related Services,
2012, and Annual Growth Rate, 2008–2012
Global exports Annual growth rate,
Service
($US billions)
2008–2012 (%)
Communications services (both voice
111.5
3.4
and data)
Financial services
303.1
0.3
Computer and information services
262.7
7.2
(including Web search)
Royalties and license fees
289.6
5.9
Sum of selected data-related services
966.9
4.0
Merchandise exports
18,401.0
3.3
SOURCE: WTO (2013).

Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb 266

2/16/2015 8:40:19 AM

Data, Trade, and Growth 267

the money received from “foreign persons” and the money paid to “foreign persons.”
The BEA collects much of its data on service sector exports and
imports through surveys: speciﬁcally the BEA Benchmark (BE-120)
and Quarterly (BE-125) Surveys of Transactions in Selected Services
and Intellectual Property with Foreign Persons (BEA 2011). Table 9.2
shows the fairly long list of service and intellectual property export
transactions that are covered in the benchmark survey. The list of
service and intellectual property import transactions is similar, while
the quarterly survey covers a similar but slightly shorter list of traded
services. Many of these include cross-border data ﬂows such as telecommunication services, royalties and license fees, database and other
information services, and ﬁnancial services.
These surveys feed into the widely cited monthly report “U.S.
International Trade In Goods and Services,” including the goods and
services trade deﬁcit, which is a key number for economists in government and the private sector. In addition, the BEA produces an annual
report on trade in services. Table 9.3 shows statistics on exports for
selected data-related services in 2012.

THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE INTERNET AND
DATA TRADE
The ﬁgures in the previous section raise two disturbing questions.
First, when measured as a service, the rate of growth of the cross-border
data-related services is barely higher than the growth rate of merchandise trade, both for the globe and for the United States. Second, the
aggregate numbers make cross-border data trade look relatively unimportant. For example, reported U.S. telecom exports of $14 billion in
2012 are roughly the same size as U.S. exports of newsprint. (Box 9.1
explains how international phone calls are treated in the trade statistics.)
The global and national statistics on trade in services are based on
tracking monetary exchanges between residents of different countries.
In theory, this principle can be applied to trade in data as well. If a person in the United States downloads a ﬁle from a Web site in a different
country, it’s theoretically possible that he or she could be charged both
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Table 9.2 Selected Service and Intellectual Property Export
Transactions Tracked by BEA Survey BE-120
Types of export transactions
Receipts for intellectual property
Rights related to industrial processes and products
Rights related to books, music, etc.
Rights related to trademarks
Rights related to performance and events prerecorded on motion picture ﬁlm and TV
tape (include digital recordings)
Rights related to broadcast and recording of live events and performances
Rights related to general use software
Business format franchising fees
Other intellectual property
Receipts for selected services
Accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping services
Advertising services
Auxiliary insurance services
Computer and data processing services
Data base and other information services
Educational and training services
Industrial engineering services
Industrial-type maintenance, installation, alteration, and training services
Legal services
Management, consulting, and public relations services (including expenses allocated
by a U.S. parent to its foreign afﬁliates)
Merchandising services
Operational leasing services
Trade-related services, other than merchandising services
Performing arts, sports, and other live performances, presentations, and events
Research and development services
Telecommunications services
Agricultural services
Disbursements to fund production costs of motion pictures
Disbsursements to fund news-gathering costs and production costs of program
material other than news
Waste treatment and depollution services
Other selected services
SOURCE: BEA Form BE-120: “Benchmark Survey of Transactions in Selected Services and Intellectual Property with Foreign Persons,” p. 6, http://www.bea.gov/
surveys/pdf/be120.pdf (accessed December 2013).
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Table 9.3 Reported U.S. Exports of Selected Data-Related Services,
2012, and Annual Growth Rate, 2008–2012
Global exports Annual growth rate,
Service
($US billions)
2008–2012 (%)
Communications services (both voice
14.0
8.8
and data)
Financial services
76.4
4.9
Computer and information services
17.3
7.2
(including Web search)
Royalties and license fees
124.2
5.0
Sum of selected data-related services
231.9
5.3
Goods exports
1,536.0
4.3
SOURCE: BEA international services statistics, Table 1: “Trade in Services, 1999–
2012.” http://www.bea.gov/international/xls/tab1a.xls (accessed December 2013).

for the cross-border telecommunications link and for the content in the
ﬁle.
However, in practice the architecture of the Internet has developed
in such a way that many or perhaps most cross-border data ﬂows do not
result in an exchange of money between residents of different countries.
Let us illustrate this important point with a simple example: an American economist who visits the Web site for the Bank of Russia (www
.cbr.ru) and wants to obtain statistics about the latest movement of the
Russian monetary supply.
First, imagine that these statistics were in bound volumes that had
to be shipped from Moscow. There’s little doubt that the cost of the
volumes and the shipping would be quite high and would register as
imports in the trade statistics.
But when the data is downloaded, there is no charge for content. The
Russian central bank is not charging U.S. economists for downloading
data. So if this cross-border data transfer is going to create a monetary
footprint and show up in the BEA statistics, it will happen because
the telecommunications transport across national borders involves an
exchange of money between a U.S. resident and a non–U.S. resident.
Obviously, the economist or his or her institution pays a domestic
Internet service provider such as Comcast or Verizon for an Internet
connection. But unlike an international phone call, no extra money is
paid for the foreign Web site. The data request is passed from network
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Box 9.1 The International Phone Call and Foreign Trade
Historically the major cross-border data ﬂow was the conventional
international phone call. In the United States, the originator of an international phone call picked up a telephone, dialed 011, then the country code
and phone number, and paid an international charge to his or her phone
company. The provider then paid the carrier in the receiving country according to a government-mandated settlement schedule. Conversely, the
recipient of an overseas call did not pay an international charge—instead,
the overseas caller paid the local provider in his or her own country, who
settled up with the U.S. phone company.
Under this scheme, calls from the United States to overseas points were
classiﬁed as imports, because the foreign carrier received the payments.
Calls from other countries were classiﬁed as exports, since the payments
came to the U.S. carriers. So if U.S. customers made more overseas calls
than they received, the telecom trade balance would be negative. Indeed,
that was true for many years. According to an FCC report from 1998, “U.S.
carriers owe settlement payments for the services that they bill, and are
owed payments for the services that the foreign carriers bill. In addition,
U.S. carriers are owed payments for switched trafﬁc that transits U.S.
points. Because U.S. customers place far more calls than they receive and
because U.S. carriers terminate more collect calls that generate surcharges
for the originating carrier, U.S. carriers make net settlement payments to
most foreign carriers. The total net payment for all U.S. carriers grew from
$0.4 billion in 1980 to $5.6 billion in 1996” (Blake and Lande 1998).
Reading this explanation, however, should make it clear that this
deﬁnition of telecom imports and exports is an artifact of a regulatory convention that “calling party pays” for wireline calls. Suppose instead that
we had a rule that “receiving party pays,” as in a collect call or an 800
number. Under that alternative regulatory regime, the toll on an outgoing
international call would be collected from the recipient of the call by his
or her (foreign) carrier. The foreign carrier would then remit a portion of
the charge to the originating domestic carrier. As a result, with “receiving
party pays,” an outgoing international call would be treated as an export.
Similarly, an incoming call would be treated as an import. Thus, a shift in
regulatory conventions from “caller pays” to “recipient pays” would immediately turn a telecom trade deﬁcit into a trade surplus, without altering
the ﬁnal allocation of revenues to the respective telecom carriers after the
settlement process. In addition, outgoing and incoming international calls
are physically indistinguishable, in terms of the equipment used.
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to network until it reaches the Russian central bank, which then sends
the money supply ﬁgures back again. At some point, that data request
passes from a U.S.-owned network to a foreign-owned network. For
the sake of clarity of the example, let’s assume that the U.S.-owned network also owns the submarine cable between New York and the United
Kingdom, so that the interchange between the U.S.-owned network and
the foreign network physically occurs in the UK.1
Is there an exchange of money between the U.S-owned and the
foreign-owned network? Now we have to delve into the architecture
of the Internet. Networks are connected in two ways, by peering or
by the payment of transit fees. Peering is an agreement between two
networks to exchange trafﬁc without exchanging money. Peering agreements, especially between large networks, are so ubiquitous that they
are basically conducted on a handshake, as one authoritative OECD
study shows: “A survey of 142,000 peering agreements conducted for
this report shows that the terms and conditions of the Internet interconnection model are so generally agreed upon that 99.5 percent of
interconnection agreements are concluded without a written contract”
(Weller and Woodcock 2013, p. 3).
In fact, the largest global networks—the so-called ‘Tier 1’ networks—almost by deﬁnition peer with every other Tier 1 network. That
means if a data packet goes from AT&T’s network to British Telecom’s
on the way from Russia, it is unlikely that money changed hands at the
interconnect between the two.
It might seem as if peering is a barter-type agreement that should
generate revenue recognition on the ﬁnancial books, even if no money
changes hands. However, peering takes place mostly in situations of
balanced trafﬁc, so the revenues and costs would net out. The accounting ﬁrm KPMG notes that, “in our experience, peering arrangements
between Tier 1 telecoms do not result in the recognition of revenue even
though a service is provided and value is transferred between telecoms
in much the same way as under traditional interconnect arrangements”
(KPMG 2010, p. 30).
It’s worth noting that peering is a key reason that you can access
Web sites from all over the world without having additional charges
added to your Internet bill.
Alternatively, smaller networks can connect to larger ones by paying transit fees—also known as buying Internet transit. In theory, these

Houseman and Mandel Vol2.indb 271

2/16/2015 8:40:20 AM

272 Mandel

Internet transit payments could show up as trade in telecommunications
services if the smaller network was paying a provider from a different
country for transit. However, the price of Internet transit has been dropping sharply. According to the market research ﬁrm TeleGeography, the
price of IP transit at major hubs has dropped by roughly 30 percent a
year over the past ﬁve years (TeleGeography 2013). To my knowledge,
no statistical agency currently uses the price of Internet transit to adjust
service trade.

ESTIMATING ONE COMPONENT OF DATA TRADE
For the reasons described in the previous section, we would expect
that the ofﬁcial statistics on cross-border data trade (trade in data-related
services) far understate both the actual economic value and the growth
of cross-border data ﬂows. But how big is the understatement?
In this section I will try to answer one small piece of this question. In particular, we will delve deeper into the measurement of U.S.
telecom exports and construct an alternative estimate based on directly
measuring cross-border data ﬂows. For 2012, the BEA reports that
exports of communications services from the United States amounted
to $14 billion (payments from nonresidents to residents). Imports of
communications services into the United States amounted to $8 billion (payments from residents to nonresidents). These numbers have
been rising, but they are still minuscule compared to the importance
and amount of international data trafﬁc in and out of the United States.
However, a closer look helps explain why these have to be understatements. Let’s start with a simple example. Suppose a major U.S.
telecom provider builds its own submarine cable to Great Britain, say,
or Singapore. That expenditure will show up in the company’s capital spending budget, rather than as a payment for cross-border telecom
services. Then, if the U.S. provider peers with foreign providers at the
non-U.S. cable landing, no money will change hands at the connection
point. The result: The telecom provider has made a major investment in
providing cross-border data ﬂows, none of which show up in the trade
account. The export beneﬁts of capital investment by the telecom industry are not being counted.
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More generally, most submarine cables are being built these days
by a consortium of companies, each of whom gets access to a share of
the bandwidth. The same principle shows up as in the previous example—the spending on the cable appears as a capital investment, rather
than as a payment for cross-border telecom services. From here, we
can construct increasingly complicated examples that arrive at the same
place—cross-border transport of data without a corresponding monetary transfer between residents and nonresidents.
How can we construct a better estimate of cross-border telecom
services? In an earlier paper, I discussed the idea that the production
and use of data should be treated as a fundamental component of economic activity, parallel to the production and use of goods and services
(Mandel 2012). This approach leads naturally to an increased focus on
directly measuring data generation, data ﬂows, and data storage as a
way of understanding economic activity.
One pioneer in such efforts has been Martin Hilbert, who has been
developing a systematic methodology for comparing the communications capacity of various media, ranging from mobile to television
(Hilbert and López 2011). Based on this work, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has been gradually moving toward direct
measures of data ﬂows, as opposed to indirect measures such as number
of cellular subscriptions or broadband connections. A recent publication from the ITU notes,“Using the unifying metric of bits per second,
employed for measuring global technological capacity to communicate, it is possible to compare different communication technologies.
It is also possible to analyse bits per second per capita, per technology,
per country, or per any other relevant socio-economic or demographic
parameter” (ITU 2012, p. 167).
This section follows in the same spirit of direct measurement of
data ﬂows. For the purposes of this section, data ﬂow is measured in
terabits per second (Tbps). The telecommunications market research
and consulting ﬁrm TeleGeography estimates that the United States had
23 Tbps of international Internet capacity in 2012, with an average utilization of 29 percent and a peak utilization of 49 percent.2 This suggests
that, on average, the U.S. cross-border data ﬂow is roughly 6.7 Tbps.3
Is this volume of cross-border data a large number or a small number? I compare the cross-border data ﬂow with a recent Cisco Systems–
sponsored projection of data trafﬁc, by country and type (Cisco Sys-
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tems 2013).4 For 2012, the Cisco study estimates Internet and IP trafﬁc
in the United States at 8 exabytes per month and 13 exabytes per month,
respectively.5 That translates into roughly 26.5 Tbps and 42.2 Tbps.6
Table 9.4, below, compares the U.S. cross-border data ﬂows with
the overall U.S. Internet and IP trafﬁc. I ﬁnd that cross-border data
ﬂows are roughly 25 percent and 16 percent of U.S. Internet and IP trafﬁc, respectively. To put this in perspective, U.S. exports of goods and
services are 14 percent of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012,
while U.S. imports of goods and services are 18 percent of U.S. GDP in
2012. (Box 9.2 brieﬂy reports similar calculations for Europe.)
This calculation offers us a reasonable way of estimating the size
of the international component of the U.S. telecom sector. According to
the BEA (2014), the gross output for the telecommunications industry
in 2011 was $556 billion. After adjusting for growth, that puts the gross
output at roughly $575–$600 billion in 2012.
If we assume that the international component of the telecom
industry is proportional to the size of the data ﬂow, the international
component of U.S. telecom would be roughly $92–$150 billion. That’s
compared to the $14 billion in exports and $8 billion in imports that the
ofﬁcial statistics report.
Table 9.4 Cross-Border Data Flows, 2012: United States

International Internet capacity connected to the U.S.
Average utilization (%)
Average cross-border data ﬂow
(average international trafﬁc)
All U.S. Internet trafﬁc
All U.S. IP trafﬁc
Average U.S. cross-border data ﬂow as a percentage of:
All U.S. Internet trafﬁc (%)
All U.S. IP trafﬁc (%)

Terabits per
second (except
as noted)
23.0
29.0
6.7
26.5
42.2
25.0
16.0

SOURCE: International capacity and utilization estimates from TeleGeography (2014).
Trafﬁc estimates from Cisco. IP includes both Internet trafﬁc and managed IP such as
consumer video. Figures omit mobile.
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Box 9.2 Europe’s Data Connections
Using a similar methodology as for the United States, we can calculate interregional cross-border data ﬂows as a share of Internet trafﬁc for
Europe. TeleGeography estimates that international bandwidth in Europe was 56.5 Tbps in 2012, but that 78 percent of that bandwidth was
between cities in the same region. As a result, “interregional Internet
capacity connected to Europe” equaled 12.6 Tbps in 2012. Based on this
ﬁgure, we calculate that cross-border data ﬂows between Europe and the
rest of the world equaled 16 percent of the region’s Internet trafﬁc and
13 percent of the region’s IP trafﬁc.
These results, which should be viewed as highly imprecise and tentative, suggest that the United States is more interconnected with the rest
of the world than Europe. The sources of error enumerated in the caveats
above are potentially very signiﬁcant.

Obviously, this should be viewed as an exploratory effort, with
plenty of caveats. However, the revised estimates intuitively make more
sense than the ofﬁcial statistics, in terms of measuring the importance of
cross-border telecom services. Of course, these numbers are accompanied by substantial and worrisome caveats, as well as the possibility of
large errors in both directions. In particular, these include the following:
•

Coverage and methodology may differ. Cisco’s projections
include all IP usage. TeleGeography’s estimates of international capacity by country do not include private networks such
as intracorporate networks, Google and other content providers’ networks, and research networks. This factor would tend to
underestimate the share of cross-border trafﬁc.

•

Double-counting is inevitable. International Internet trafﬁc
is often routed through third-party countries before getting to
its destination. Trafﬁc between Moscow and New York might
be routed through London and therefore show up as part of
European cross-border data ﬂows. Trafﬁc between the Canadian cities of Vancouver and Toronto might be routed through
the United States and therefore show up as part of U.S. crossborder data ﬂows. And since less-developed countries may have
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better Internet connections with the United States and Europe
than with each other, it’s possible for intra-African trafﬁc, say,
to be routed through New York or London. This factor would
tend to overestimate the share of cross-border trafﬁc.
•

When comparing estimates/forecasts from different
sources, timing matters. International Internet capacity, as
estimated by TeleGeography, has been growing at almost 50
percent per year. Domestic U.S. Internet trafﬁc, as projected by
Cisco, has been growing roughly as fast. As a result, calculating cross-border data ﬂows as a share of Internet trafﬁc can be
heavily inﬂuenced if one source is using yearly averages while
the other source (TeleGeography) is using a particular point in
time (April of each year). The direction of bias is uncertain.

•

Compression may distort the statistics. Widespread and
growing use of compression means that “we communicate
around three times more information through the same installed
infrastructure as we did in 1986” (Hilbert 2011, p. 7). It’s possible that cross-border data ﬂows may be compressed more
intensively than purely domestic data ﬂows.

MEASURING THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF
CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS
Why are we concerned with correctly measuring cross-border data
ﬂows? The classic justiﬁcation for the beneﬁts of trade is that two or
more countries working together can produce more than the same countries operating separately. Moreover, the size of the gain from trade is
related to the magnitude of trade, all other things being equal. The more
trade, the better.
Under the current trade statistics, the magnitude of trade in data is
being systematically underestimated. Thus, the beneﬁts from trade in
data are being systematically underestimated as well, which, as we will
see in the next section, distorts policy decisions.
Moreover, trade in data has somewhat of the characteristic of a public good, since data can be duplicated relatively costlessly. As a result,
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the fact that the data is created in one country and used in another
country does not deprive the ﬁrst country of the use. To give a speciﬁc example, one type of intangible capital stock is “entertainment,
literary, and artistic originals,” including ﬁlms. Licensing the right to
show a ﬁlm in a foreign country currently shows up as an export in the
national income accounts. However, such a license generally does not
reduce the ability of American consumers to view the ﬁlm, and it does
not reduce the intangible capital stock of “entertainment, literary, and
artistic originals.”
As a result, trade in data creates positive externalities and an extra
boost to global growth. Unlike exports of goods, data can be shipped
from one country to another without depriving the ﬁrst country of the
beneﬁts. All other things being equal, growth in cross-border data ﬂows
can be a far more powerful impetus to consumer welfare and economic
growth than growth in trade in goods and services. This means that data
trade generates a positive externality for the global economy. If a U.S.
university produces educational videos about computer science and
makes them available on the Internet, then students around the world
can beneﬁt from those videos.
Now we turn to the question of how data trade ﬁgures into calculations of GDP and economic growth. As noted in an earlier paper, data
can be “consumed” by individuals; can be used as an intermediate input
into production; and can be an investment in intangible capital (Mandel
2012).
For trade in conventional goods and services, there is a wellestablished methodology for assessing such trade’s contribution to economic growth. In the calculation of GDP, the dollar value of exports is
a plus, while the dollar value of imports is a minus. For the calculation
of gross domestic purchases—which are one measure of living standards—the dollar value of exports of goods and services is a minus,
while the dollar value of imports of goods and services is a plus.
The arithmetic does not work quite the same for cross-border data
ﬂows, for two reasons. First, because data that are exported are still
available domestically, exports don’t need to be subtracted from gross
domestic purchases. Second, imports of data potentially come in at low
or zero prices, as discussed above, despite the fact that there is a positive price to originally producing the data and then transporting it across
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national borders. As a result, imports of data, valued in dollars, appear
not to contribute to growth.
Consider, however, that the alternative to importing the data at a
low or zero price is to produce it domestically at its full cost, which
would be higher than the import price. Viewed from that perspective,
there is a growing body of literature about how to value the contribution to growth of imports that are priced much lower than comparable
domestic products. I will show how this approach can be used to value
cross-border data ﬂows.7
To demonstrate how this would work, I will consider the amusing category of YouTube videos of cats involved in different activities
(Illustration 9.1). Quite a few of these videos are produced in Japan and
get millions of free views (Lewis-Kraus 2012). They provide pleasure
for viewers in America and around the world—in that sense they are
analogous to going skiing or reading a book. Thus, they raise consumer
welfare in the United States for people who enjoy videos of cats. But
how should the gain to the U.S economy from these “free” data ﬂows
be measured? The key is to realize that there are two relevant prices
here. One is the price to Americans of consuming the Japanese-made
cat video, which is zero. The second is the maximum price, Pcat, that an
American would pay for viewing a Japanese-made cat video, measured
either in dollars or in value of time. We assume that there is no way
of proﬁtably producing a comparable video with Japanese cats in the
United States—in other words, in order for someone in this country to
produce comparable videos domestically, the videos would have to be
sold at an average price per viewing in excess of Pcat.
So before YouTube, it was as if the price of a Japanese cat video to
Americans was equal to Pcat, and the volume of videos viewed was zero.
After the Internet and YouTube, the price P of Japanese cat videos goes
to zero, and the volume of videos viewed goes to V.
How much does this change contribute to U.S. gross domestic purchases? For the sake of simplicity, assume that X is the size of gross
domestic purchases in dollars, excepting cat videos. Let’s also assume
that there is no inﬂation and that X is otherwise not changing. Then the
straightforward way of calculating growth would be as (X + P × V)/X,
where P is the price of a cat video after the introduction of YouTube.
But P is zero, so it looks like there is no gain.
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Illustration 9.1 Maru the Cat, as Seen on a YouTube Video from Japan

In fact, a better approach is roughly analogous to the procedure
used to calculate chain-weighted GDP growth. I take the geometric
average of two growth rates—the ﬁrst assuming that the price of the
video is always zero, and the second assuming that the price of the
video is always Pcat :
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In other words, the gain to gross domestic purchases from crossborder data ﬂows of cat videos is roughly equal to the revenue that
would be generated by pricing the videos at the average of the actual
price (zero) and the price that Americans would be willing to pay, Pcat.
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Since this requires no additional domestic resources, it is also the gain
to consumer welfare.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Trade in data is fundamentally a new phenomenon. While many
people would like to ﬁt it into the framework of previous trade deals—
in particular, the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS)—such efforts will not work. We need new analytical tools to
deal with both measuring cross-border data ﬂows and assessing the
beneﬁts.
This chapter has made the case that, without those tools, the economic impact of cross-border data ﬂows is being understated. What
effect does this understatement have on trade and tax policy?
Trade and Tax Policy
Both trade and tax policy require a series of compromises and
trade-offs. In the case of trade negotiations, a wide variety of different
industries and interests—agriculture, low-tech manufacturing, hightech manufacturing, ﬁnance, insurance—are competing for the attention of policymakers. Trade negotiators have to decide which issues are
“must-haves” and which ones they can retreat on.
Similarly, tax policy requires balancing out the need to raise revenue against the negative effect of taxes on different industries. That’s
especially true in today’s climate, where tax cuts beneﬁting one industry will have to be balanced by closing tax loopholes or raising taxes on
other industries.
Policymakers and negotiators make these decisions partly by
assessing political reality and partly by assessing economic strength.
All other things being equal, industries that have a bigger positive effect
on jobs and growth will fare better in trade and tax policy.
The problem is that the positive beneﬁts of cross-border data
ﬂows—because they are such a new phenomenon—are signiﬁcantly
underestimated in the available ofﬁcial statistics. Reported exports of
data-related services show up as relatively minor in the larger picture.
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Under the circumstances, the impact of cross-border data ﬂows on economic growth will be understated as well, and it will be more difﬁcult
for policymakers to set the right priorities for trade and tax policy.
There have been several recent proposals for increasing the tax rate
paid by international Internet companies, or for imposing additional
regulations on them. In one instance of this, a recent paper from the
French government suggested a sort of tax on data (Collin and Colin
2013). Such proposals—which would be likely to discourage crossborder data ﬂows—are more likely to be seriously considered in the
absence of evidence showing the large positive economic impacts from
such cross-border data ﬂows.
Impact of Data Localization
Another example comes from the aftermath of the revelations about
NSA monitoring, which created a backlash against U.S. Internet companies and intensiﬁed discussions about building “walls” that would keep
certain types of personal data from leaving countries such as Brazil.
Several reports have identiﬁed the possible negative economic
consequences of such actions (Castro 2013a,b; Staten 2013). However,
what’s missing is the ability to actually track the negative consequences
from data protectionism, since we do not currently track cross-border
data ﬂows. By comparison, if a country erects trade barriers against a
particular tangible product, the impact of such a policy would immediately show up in the trade statistics. It’s difﬁcult to measure the harm
from barriers to data trade if we cannot measure the data ﬂows to begin
with. Weller and Woodcock (2013) note that adverse effects may be
incidental:
It is also the case that regulations that are not explicitly intended
to apply to Internet trafﬁc exchange may have that effect. For example, restrictions on the ability to export certain data, such as
customer proﬁles, intended to protect security and privacy, may
also limit the development of Internet topology and the growth
of Internet assets in some regions. Similarly, tax policies in each
country toward broadband and Internet businesses are likely to affect the choice of the locations for investment in Internet assets.
(p. 24)
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CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR BETTER DATA ON
CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS
Businesses in any industry are usually ambivalent about the collection of government statistics on that industry. On the one hand, objective
industry-wide statistics can be extremely useful for business decisionmaking and planning. On the other hand, the collection process can be
intrusive, and accurate statistics can potentially attract new competitors
or unwanted attention from regulators.
The calculation gets even tougher for rapidly innovating tech
industries. Tech companies are unlikely to call for additional investment in statistics that may be quickly rendered obsolete by technological change.
However, the balance changes in a situation where businesses need
government support in order to avoid bigger problems. In particular,
better information about cross-border data ﬂows will help make the
case that data protectionism and taxes on data can be economically
destructive.
The bottom line is that the statistical agencies should supplement
the current trade statistics with additional metrics on cross-border data
ﬂows. This should be part of a large push to better measure data consumption and investment domestically.

Notes
My thanks to the Sloan Foundation for funding this research. I thank Diana Carew of
the Progressive Policy Institute, Alan Mauldin of TeleGeography, Steve Bauer and Bill
Lehr of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Michael Kende of Analysis Mason for very useful assistance. All mistakes and errors are my own.
1. Many large providers own their own undersea cables, have a share of a cable, or
have long-term rights to use part of the bandwidth. Submarine cable is used to
carry cross-border data ﬂows across oceans but also often between countries on
the same continent, because it’s often easier and safer to maintain cables that run
along the coast underwater than across difﬁcult terrain. Cables are typically laid
with multiple strands of optic ﬁber, some of which are “lit”—i.e., they have the
necessary equipment to be used—and some of which are “dark,” or not yet ready
for use. Capacity can be increased by laying new cables, by lighting dark ﬁber, or
by improving the capacity of already-lit ﬁber.
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2. I thank Alan Mauldin of TeleGeography for providing these estimates.
3. These ﬁgures are based on the bidirectional averages of the average for the month
of April and the peak during April of each year.
4. See also http://ciscovni.com/forecast-widget/index.html.
5. Non-Internet IP trafﬁc in the United States is mainly consumer video.
6. 1 exabyte = 1,024 petabytes; 1 petabyte = 1,024 terabytes; 1 terabyte = 8 terabits.
7. This growing body of literature on how to assess growth when import prices are
less than domestic prices includes Diewert and Nakamura (2010) and Feenstra et
al. (2009).
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